The Most Critical Question!

[modest]

You should realize that, if it makes you feel better, you can choose to call those systems "human world views" or "human like world views" or whatever. Maybe call them "predictive world views" if you want. I'm just afraid that would get laughed at because world view commonly is taken to refer to a "prediction system",

 

I would certainly not laugh at that.

 

I think it is good to be specific and I think there is a very good reason to do as you suggest in terms of the topic of this thread.

 

Please realize, I am not objecting just to object. I will try to explain why I think this matters so much.

 

...you can choose to call those systems "human world views" or "human like world views" or whatever...

 

...Okay, so let's do this. I'll call these constructs of interest "those world views that generate predictions". Is that going to make you guys happy?...

 

I think it is best to be as specific as possible. There are a number of concepts which have to be defined in order to establish just what a mechanism that tracks predictions is. It must be established what time is and how it works with respect to the information. This is fine—as I keep saying—I have no problem with making assumptions so long as we recognize that's what we are doing specifically.

 

To be specific I would prefer replacing the terms "any explanation" and "any worldview" with "any Doctordick-like explanation" and "any Doctordick-like worldview". I have a very specific reason for wanting to do this. Where DD says:

 

"central to my approach is to make no assumptions not absolutely necessary to the definition of an explanation"

 

I believe it is important to stress that he makes no assumptions not absolutely necessary to his specific definition of an explanation. This matters because the ultimate claim (that is relevant to the issue of this thread) is as follows:

 

"What I have discovered is that I can guarantee you that, for any explanation of anything, there exists a totally consistent interpretation of the symbols used to communicate that explanation which will require the fundamental elements of that explanation to obey my equation so long as that explanation is internally consistent"

 

This would seem to solve the problem outlined by Doctordick and yourself, but if we stress that assumptions are being made regarding what an explanation is then we get a rater different claim:

 

What I have discovered is that I can guarantee you that, for a Doctordick-like explanation of some thing, there exists a totally consistent interpretation of the symbols used to communicate that explanation which will require the fundamental elements of that explanation to obey Doctordick's equation so long as that explanation is Doctordick-like and internally consistent

 

I believe this is an incredibly important distinction.

 

Notice you could not answer the very simple question in my last post because you are not willing to make assumptions about the nature of reality. So, what Doctordick's analysis does is to shift those assumptions regarding reality that are normally made in quantum formalism into Doctordick's 'definition' of an explanation. But, the same assumptions are still there. Logically, whether the assumptions are placed inside the definition of "reality" or inside the definition of "explanation of reality" should make no difference in terms of the map/territory problem.

 

You wanting everyone to agree a priori with your concept of a worldview (saying, how else could it be?) is very much like those you despise who want everyone to agree with their a priori concept of reality (saying, how else could it be?).

 

I do not believe DD's analysis solves the problem outlined by this thread.

 

~modest

[AnssiH]

Sweet lord maybe this is exactly why you keep failing to understand what I say!

 

I suspect you are understanding the word understand in a manner which is not necessarily understood.

 

Of course there are many ways to understand any single word I am using.

 

However, I do not for a second believe that you actually wouldn't understand what I mean by all this communication, if you wanted to understand it. Why would I be pointing out that any supposed argument we can ever make about the validity of our world views, always boils down to correct predictions? I was very surprised that you even bothered to comment on the meaning of individual words, because I'm certain you could see the forest from the trees if you wanted to. We are both rational persons and we both realize it is always just far too easy to start nit-picking on words.

 

The whole thing about focusing on predictions is just another way to say that there does not exist a rational argument to the effect of "there must be God because it explains so much" or "there must be a multi-verse because it explains so much". I.e. the existence of any single defined entity is always matter of belief; just because it is part of a representation that is capable of generating correct predictions, does not prove its existence.

 

Also note that there are many different ways to view this particular aspect of our world views. One is to point out that whatever works for survival constitutes a valid world view. Just to dissect that a bit, every survival choice is always a function of being able to anticipate/predict something.

 

The reason I am stressing on this issue is that, if I try to explain what I'm about to explain to a person who assumes that prediction-wise validity of a world view is an indication of the existence of its defined elements, as oppose to only an indication that it is "a valid method of generating expectations", my explanation is going to be misinterpreted. There are many junctions where the reader would raise objection based on the idea that some defined entities of their world view must obviously exist, "because they explain so much".

 

Just as a side note, it is surprising to me that this aspect does cause so much trouble. I have often assumed it is trivially understood by most people, as soon as they have acknowledged that prediction-wise validity is indeed the only measure we have. I.e. at that point it should be understood that "understanding correctly" cannot be required to be an aspect of a valid world view at all. That is, "world view explains what some information means" cannot be assumed as true for any of those constructs that we call world views. The real meaning of the information becomes completely irrelevant, and the only defining aspect we have left then, is prediction-wise validity.

 

And since that is the only defining aspect left, the sensibility of viewing world views explicitly as "prediction methods" should be clear as a day. To argue that there may be world views that do not predict, it just means that the last defining characteristic was just removed. It says "maybe there are prediction methods that don't predict".

 

I know this consequence has not been understood, because in this thread the argument goes "maybe there exists understanding that does not predict". To argue that would mean you insist that "understanding correctly" is re-inserted into the definition of a valid world view. So it has already been forgotten, that we just established that we can't defend such an aspect...

 

We are talking about 3 or 4 logical steps that the reader needs to be able to keep together to understand why this is a sensible definition of a world view, and the fact that I need to spell this out so much just proves exactly the point made in the OP... :I

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

I think it is best to be as specific as possible. There are a number of concepts which have to be defined in order to establish just what a mechanism that tracks predictions is. It must be established what time is and how it works with respect to the information. This is fine—as I keep saying—I have no problem with making assumptions so long as we recognize that's what we are doing specifically.

 

To be specific I would prefer replacing the terms "any explanation" and "any worldview" with "any Doctordick-like explanation" and "any Doctordick-like worldview". I have a very specific reason for wanting to do this. Where DD says:

 

"central to my approach is to make no assumptions not absolutely necessary to the definition of an explanation"

 

I believe it is important to stress that he makes no assumptions not absolutely necessary to his specific definition of an explanation. This matters because the ultimate claim (that is relevant to the issue of this thread) is as follows:

 

"What I have discovered is that I can guarantee you that, for any explanation of anything, there exists a totally consistent interpretation of the symbols used to communicate that explanation which will require the fundamental elements of that explanation to obey my equation so long as that explanation is internally consistent"

 

This would seem to solve the problem outlined by Doctordick and yourself, but if we stress that assumptions are being made regarding what an explanation is then we get a rater different claim:

 

What I have discovered is that I can guarantee you that, for a Doctordick-like explanation of some thing, there exists a totally consistent interpretation of the symbols used to communicate that explanation which will require the fundamental elements of that explanation to obey Doctordick's equation so long as that explanation is Doctordick-like and internally consistent

 

I believe this is an incredibly important distinction.

 

Notice you could not answer the very simple question in my last post because you are not willing to make assumptions about the nature of reality. So, what Doctordick's analysis does is to shift those assumptions regarding reality that are normally made in quantum formalism into Doctordick's 'definition' of an explanation. But, the same assumptions are still there. Logically, whether the assumptions are placed inside the definition of "reality" or inside the definition of "explanation of reality" should make no difference in terms of the map/territory problem.

 

You wanting everyone to agree a priori with your concept of a worldview (saying, how else could it be?) is very much like those you despise who want everyone to agree with their a priori concept of reality (saying, how else could it be?).

 

I do not believe DD's analysis solves the problem outlined by this thread.

 

The answer to the question in your earlier post is simply "No I don't agree. I can only understand how you defined reality, and if the definition is universally valid then it ensures you are not really saying anything about what reality is" (which is exactly true for DD's analysis too and no one has ever said otherwise)

 

I believe you asked that question in the attempt to argue that my definition of an explanation is not defendable in ontological sense, and it simply leads to the results I want. It is true it is not defendable in ontological sense, but it is defendable in epistemological sense, i.e. I can defend that this is indeed how we measure our so-called "understanding". Thus it leads to results that are true for all constructs that fall into my definition.

 

Now I think you should think really carefully about whether there exists world views that are other kind than, what you call, "Doctordick like explanation". And I won't take "maybe somekind" as an answer. Let's hear an example, because you really need to spend some time thinking about this.

 

Just as another side note, if you agree that at least your world view is like that, would you then also agree that the results of his analysis apply directly to your world view?

 

And as yet another side note, you seem to be arguing a lot from the angle of "just because you define explanation like this, does not mean it leads to any knowledge about what reality is like". To that I can only say EXACTLY, and I think both me and DD have been stressing this point as much as humanly possible. The only thing is, the same argument applies to ANY world view.

 

If you accept that, then there are aspects that should be understood about the prediction mechanisms. I think it should be clear by now that we can't sensibly talk about generating knowledge about the meaning of some information whose meaning is unknown. And indeed, our world views are not quite about that!

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

However, I do not for a second believe that you actually wouldn't understand what I mean by all this communication, if you wanted to understand it.

But the point was that you made no effort to understand me. :shrug:

 

We are both rational persons and we both realize it is always just far too easy to start nit-picking on words.

I was addressing your point about a vertebrate with no spinal chord. :shrug:

 

The whole thing about focusing on predictions is just another way to say that there does not exist a rational argument to the effect of "there must be God because it explains so much" or "there must be a multi-verse because it explains so much". I.e. the existence of any single defined entity is always matter of belief; just because it is part of a representation that is capable of generating correct predictions, does not prove its existence.

Why do you keep coming back to this when it wasn't the point of what I said? :doh:

 

Let's see if you can understand it this way: The requisite for a model being "valid" is that anything inferred from (any part of) the data can't be in contradiction with any part of the data. If you infer something based on some subset, drawing correct conclusions about a remaining part which was not in any manner considered in the process, this is clearly not prediction but logically it is no different from having drawn an expectation about "future" data from "already known" data. The before and after element simply highlights the aspect of the actual data not having influenced the reckoning, somehow guiding toward or hinting at the correct conclusion.

 

Do you see how the role of past and future isn't so logically essential?

[AnssiH]

But the point was that you made no effort to understand me. :shrug:

 

I sometimes just don't comment on what you are referring to, but it doesn't mean I don't make effort to understand what you are saying. Very often I even agree with everything you say, it's just that you are not on the same topic I was getting at, and my response is just flat attempt to get back to the topic.

 

I was addressing your point about a vertebrate with no spinal chord. :shrug:

 

I was referring to your comment about what "world view" means.

 

Why do you keep coming back to this when it wasn't the point of what I said? :doh:

 

I didn't assign any of that as a response to something specific you said. I'm just trying to stay on topic.

 

Let's see if you can understand it this way: The requisite for a model being "valid" is that anything inferred from (any part of) the data can't be in contradiction with any part of the data. If you infer something based on some subset, drawing correct conclusions about a remaining part which was not in any manner considered in the process, this is clearly not prediction but logically it is no different from having drawn an expectation about "future" data from "already known" data. The before and after element simply highlights the aspect of the actual data not having influenced the reckoning, somehow guiding toward or hinting at the correct conclusion.

 

I understand and agree with that entirely. Especially the "logically it is no different from having drawn an expectation about "future" data from "already known" data".

 

If you look at my first responses about this to modest, you can see I am desperately trying to point out that I do not mean any of this as a specific definition. I do not mean there needs to be "future" or "time" defined in every world view for it to be valid.

 

There just is no general umbrella word in the english language to refer to that aspect of having a "known set of data" and using that to infer something about "unknown set of data". The best I could think of was "changes", which I use just to imply that there is a way to judge those so-called "expectations" about the unknown set. I.e. something becomes "known" -> something "changes".

 

If you look at DD's presentation about this, you can see he is very meticulously defining things in exactly the manner, as treating things in terms of "known set" and "unknown set", just in the attempt to stay as neutral as possible.

 

The definition he makes to call the unknown data "future", is completely arbitrary and ad-hoc; it does not mean he suggests "future" is a necessary definition or that thus we know there exists time or anything like that.

 

In other words;

 

Do you see how the role of past and future isn't so logically essential?

 

I do not say they are essential, I say they can always be used. Furthermore, I am saying that using them does not tell us anything about reality. Ultimately, I am saying that their existence in our world view tells us nothing about reality. (Or, it does not tell us that such things exist the way we think about them).

 

You know this is one of the things that I am absolutely certain you already agree with if I just managed to explain what I mean. Am I any closer to that?

 

-Anssi

[LaurieAG]

Hi Anssi,

 

I.e, because those constructs that we normally call "world views", are constructs whose validity can only be judged by the predictions they make about some information, we focus our attention to the requirements of generating valid predictions. I.e. we explicitly drop the idea that these constructs generate correct understanding about the explicit meaning of the information.

 

Are you interested to consider what implications this issue has on our world views?

 

I read an interesting passage in Platos Phaedrus which has direct implications for manipulating worldviews.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phaedrus_(dialogue)#Discussion_of_rhetoric_and_writing

 

Socrates tells a brief legend, critically commenting on the gift of writing from the Egyptian god Theuth to King Thamus, who was to disperse Theuth's gifts to the people of Egypt. After Theuth remarks on his discovery of writing as a remedy for the memory, Thamus responds that its true effects are likely to be the opposite; it is a remedy for reminding, not remembering, he says, with the appearance but not the reality of wisdom. Future generations will hear much without being properly taught, and will appear wise but not be so, making them difficult to get along with.

 

The art of modern political rhetoric is little different to measuring the force on a point a fixed distance away from the source of an electrical field. The main political expectation is that the point behaves as the amount and type of force emanating from the source is expected to induce in the point (individual).

 

So, if your (political) world view valued increased wealth over all else, would you expect that all the points (individuals) within the field of influence also valued increased wealth over all else?

 

Would this particular world view mean that a non expansionary monetary policy (internal or external) would become anathema to its existence, something to be banished from the worldview because of its obvious threat to that worldviews existence?

 

What type of behaviour would you expect as a result of this type of worldview on an internal/external financial market?

 

Plato goes on further.

 

Madness and divine inspiration

McDaniel (1989: p.7) in her work on the bhakti saints of Bengal holds that Plato defined four types of divine madness: the mantic divination of Apollo; the telestic possession-trance of Dionysus which reaches its apogee in the maenads; the poetic from the Muses; and the erotic frenzied love of Eros and Aphrodite:

 

"Plato distinguished two types of mania in the Phaedrus: one arising from human disease, and the other from a divine state, "which releases us from our customary habits." He notes four sorts of divine madness sent by the gods: the mantic, from Apollo, which brings divination; the telestic, from Dionysus, which brings possession trance (as a result of ritual); the poetic, from the Muses, which brings enthusiasm and poetic furor; and the erotic, from Eros and Aphrodite, which brings frenzied love. He states, "In reality, our greatest blessings come to us by way of madness, which indeed is a divine gift."[1]

 

In the Phaedrus, Socrates makes the rather bold claim that some of life's greatest blessings flow from madness; and he clarifies this later by noting that he is referring specifically to madness inspired by the gods. It should be noted that Phaedrus is Plato's only dialogue that shows Socrates outside the city of Athens, out in the country. It was believed that spirits and nymphs inhabited the country, and Socrates specifically points this out after the long palinode with his comment about listening to the cicadas. After originally remarking that "landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me, only people do",[Note 62] Socrates goes on to make constant remarks concerning the presence and action of the gods in general, nature gods such as pan and the nymphs, and the Muses, in addition to the unusually explicit characterization of his own daemon. The importance of divine inspiration is demonstrated in its connection with and the importance of religion, poetry and art, and above all else, love. Eros, much like in the Symposium, is contrasted from mere desire of the pleasurable and given a higher, heavenly function. Unlike in the Ion, a dialogue dealing with madness and divine inspiration in poetry and literary criticism, madness here must go firmly hand in hand with reason, learning, and self-control in both love and art. This rather bold claim has puzzled readers and scholars of Plato's work for centuries because it clearly shows that Socrates saw genuine value in the irrational elements of human life, despite many other dialogues that show him arguing that one should pursue beauty and that wisdom is the most beautiful thing of all.

 

I wrote the following in the middle of 2000 after my bad data accident, it fell out of my head in 5 mins.

 

The Green knights claim

 

Noble sirs, exercise thy renowned might,

honour thine agreement with the Green knight, tis his by right.

 

Do not be unnerved, justice shall be served,

while accolades are undeserved and truthful valour is reserved.

 

Qualms about the justice of fate, carry no weight on this judgement date,

pious fervour too late.

 

Come now and cement the agreed pact,

that ye have enacted through use of his multifaceted axe.

 

Once ye have availed of its plentiful resource,

there is nay recourse, ye have chosen thine course.

 

I wrote this one before 2000, it took a day all up.

 

The plea of Beibionn

 

You can have your magic beans jack,

your children are hungry and we need the cow back.

 

The lack of just terms and equitable or fair pacts,

expose all crooked beanstalks to concerted attacks.

 

Unless obsessive cycles are stopped in their tracks,

our towns will again be as flat as tacks.

 

You have been too trusting Jack,

your childrens futures remain black,

while current problems compound through lack.

 

Struggle earnestly against the pack,

repudiate rights to depreciatingly retract,

as giants fortress lie ripe for sack.

 

for only fair shares of the golden goose Jack,

will save giants and beanstalks from the axe.

 

Did the same worldview create both pieces?

 

Do these constructs generate correct understanding about the explicit meaning of the information, are these valid predictions?

 

They are both based on medieval stories. Does that mean this worldview is irrelevant today?

 

Going back to the early medieval period we get the vulgate Book of Kells and the illuminated front page that describes the 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God'. If you apply a relatively simple process to interpreting the spaceless text and move on after getting the closest match from a latin lexicon you can get 'During original worship poetry springs twisting both sayings'.

 

These are two different worldviews based on different translation methods of the same text.

[Qfwfq]

Anssi it just takes too much patience. If you were only trying to keep on topic, then why does it come across as arguing against us? You could at least try to be clearer instead of trying to clarify later.

 

I was referring to your comment about what "world view" means.

Which was clearly associated with the one about vertebrates. It was you that upheld the analogy, I pointed out the distinction.

 

If you look at my first responses about this to modest, you can see I am desperately trying to point out that I do not mean any of this as a specific definition. I do not mean there needs to be "future" or "time" defined in every world view for it to be valid.

Well, nobody noticed that.

 

You agree with what I said but don't seem to have got it that there needn't even be the distinction between known and unknown. Logically, I said, it is sufficient for things to match up with each other and it is of especially good value when the conclusions are drawn about some part of the data in a manner which does not in any manner depend on that part of the data. That part of the data being "not yet known" is a convincing guarantee of the lack of influence on the reckoning, but logically this isn't necessary for the concept of conclusions being independent of it. There's no need for an umbrella word.

 

Funny thing is, this makes it all the harder to see how the presentation could have such strong, universal implications including those on the fundamental laws of physics.

[modest]

The answer to the question in your earlier post is simply "No I don't agree. I can only understand how you defined reality, and if the definition is universally valid then it ensures you are not really saying anything about what reality is"

 

Clearly you understand the difference between "any reality" and "my definition of reality", but you cannot make a distinction between "any explanation" and "my definition of an explanation".

 

I can repeat back to you the same thing you just said but in terms of "an explanation" ---> "I can only understand how you defined "an explanation". You are not really saying anything about what an explanation is."

 

In order for you to solve the problem at hand you must prove:

 

"any explanation of anything must be generalizable into this form..."

But, that is clearly not what you have proved. You have proved:

 

"this is my idea of an explanation and it can be generalized into this form..."

I can't tell if you don't understand the difference between those two things, or you perhaps don't understand why the first is necessary to solve the map/territory problem and the second is insufficient.

 

Maybe it would help if I restate those two things in terms of "any reality". In order to solve the map/territory problem I must prove:

 

"any reality must be generalizable into this form..."

if I could do that then I could solve the map/territory problem. This, on the other hand, does not solve the problem:

 

"this is my idea of reality and it can be generalized into the following form..."

 

In other words, I think you understand how saying "my definition of reality (and assumptions about that reality) are sufficient for me to derive modern physics" doesn't solve the map/territory problem. On the other hand, you seem completely incapable of either admitting or understanding that "my definition of an explanation (and assumptions about that explanation) are sufficient for me to derive modern physics" does *not* solve the map/territory problem.

 

I believe you asked that question in the attempt to argue that my definition of an explanation is not defendable in ontological sense, and it simply leads to the results I want. It is true it is not defendable in ontological sense, but it is defendable in epistemological sense, i.e. I can defend that this is indeed how we measure our so-called "understanding". Thus it leads to results that are true for all constructs that fall into my definition.

 

Exactly. In order to solve the problem at hand you need to prove that any understanding of anything is consistent with your analysis. It is not enough to say that 'your understanding' is consistent with your analysis.

 

Now I think you should think really carefully about whether there exists world views that are other kind than, what you call, "Doctordick like explanation". And I won't take "maybe somekind" as an answer.

 

You should think really carefully about whether there exist worldviews that are other kind than, what I call a "Modest-like understanding of reality". And I won't take "maybe somekind" as an answer.

 

I can assume that my idea of reality is a good foundation for any possible reality and therefore solves the map/territory problem just as well as you can assume that your idea of an explanation is a good foundation for any explanation of any reality. We would both err in that assumption.

 

You clearly understand how:

 

"I understand no reality inconsistent with my view of reality"

does *not* solve the problem you outline. Yet, you think:

 

"I understand no explanation of reality inconsistent with my explanation of reality"

solves it.

 

:shrug:

 

Let's hear an example, because you really need to spend some time thinking about this.

 

Examples have been given. Classical mechanics is a good and internally consistent worldview that does *not* obey DD's equation because he assumes something about time—that it is not deterministic. He assumes a certain kind of symmetry of time that is consistent with his idea of 'an explanation' but is certainly not consistent with 'any explanation'.

 

General relativity is another example where time is non-linear.

 

DD's analysis is certainly very clever and perhaps a very good formalism of QM, but it does *not* do what you claim. It does not solve the problem that this thread concerns itself with.

 

Just as another side note, if you agree that at least your world view is like that, would you then also agree that the results of his analysis apply directly to your world view?

 

If you and I agree on the nature of reality, it does not demonstrate what the real nature of any possible reality must be. If you and I agree on the nature of our worldviews, it does not demonstrate what the real nature of any possible worldview of any possible reality must be. If you and I agree on the nature of "an explanation", it does not demonstrate what "any explanation of anything" must be.

 

And as yet another side note, you seem to be arguing a lot from the angle of "just because you define explanation like this, does not mean it leads to any knowledge about what reality is like".

 

The failure of the analysis is that you make assumptions about what an explanation (or a worldview) is then conclude that any explanation (or worldview) must be consistent with those assumptions.

 

~modest

[AnssiH]

I read an interesting passage in Platos Phaedrus which has direct implications for manipulating worldviews.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phaedrus_(dialogue)#Discussion_of_rhetoric_and_writing

 

That's kind of interesting in terms of difficulties of communication.

 

You know I'm sort of reminded by that old "Verizon Wireless billing problem" that floats around the internet. I mean, in my mind I'm pointing out something incredibly trivial, but the difference in the terminology just makes communication of my point very difficult. Even though it is something that the other party already "sort of agrees" (I mean, agrees with the direct consequences of what I'm saying)

 

Well, I have patience. The thing I'm worried about most is whether people can remember what my definitions were for more than couple of posts.

 

I didn't understand myself what you were getting at with the rest of the post so I hope you excuse me if I don't comment either.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

Well, nobody noticed that.

 

Well I can honestly say that I am trying to be as clear as I can possibly be. Admittedly, I did not expect the communication to be this difficult.

 

You agree with what I said but don't seem to have got it that there needn't even be the distinction between known and unknown. Logically, I said, it is sufficient for things to match up with each other and it is of especially good value when the conclusions are drawn about some part of the data in a manner which does not in any manner depend on that part of the data. That part of the data being "not yet known" is a convincing guarantee of the lack of influence on the reckoning, but logically this isn't necessary for the concept of conclusions being independent of it. There's no need for an umbrella word.

 

Yes, so now, is there something in the post #83 ( http://scienceforums.com/topic/22957-the-most-critical-question/page__st__75__p__304131#entry304131 ) that you'd object?

 

Focus especially on the part where I point out that we only validate our understanding via, what I call "expectations" (I suspect you now understand exactly what I mean by that, and the word "future" is arbitrary label to anything that is "not yet known"), and thus would you find it sensible to center our focus around constructs that generate so-called "expectations", being that, all the constructs we normally call "world views" are exactly like that?

 

Or in other words, would you find it sensible that we exclude constructs that do not generate "validatable expectations" from our considerations?

 

ps, if you are interested of difficulties of communication, you might find it interesting to view my first responses to Modest, and notice that this is exactly what I'm trying to point out; I just want to exclude these things from the definition, on the grounds that they are very different kinds of constructs. EDIT: In your words "taxonomists would think up some other name!"

 

Funny thing is, this makes it all the harder to see how the presentation could have such strong, universal implications including those on the fundamental laws of physics.

 

I'm not planning to discuss those matters in this thread anyway so don't worry.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

I am incapable of communicating with you Modest. I do not know how to point your focus onto the fact that I have thus far only made an attempt to point out that I will be talking about "all constructs that generate expectations about not yet known information" in some sense. Your insistence that "not all world views are like that" is just saying that you don't agree with my definition of a world view, without offering a different definition.

 

Well in my mind this is very simple; what I'm about to say is true only for "constructs that generate expectations", and thus it is true for all constructs that are normally called "world views". If that sounds like an argument about reality to you, I do not know how to explain this better.

 

The only comment I have about your post is;

 

Examples have been given.

 

I was asking for examples of "world views that do not generate expectations". Or rather "world views whose validity is not a function of their prediction ability". In thinking that I was referring to DD's fundamental equation, you are jumping ridiculously far ahead without a care in the world about whether you understand anything about DD's definitions. Please don't do that.

 

-Anssi

[modest]

I am incapable of communicating with you Modest.

 

I have, unfortunately, noticed you have that problem with a fair number of people.

 

I do not know how to point your focus onto the fact that I have thus far only made an attempt to point out that I will be talking about "all constructs that generate expectations about not yet known information" in some sense.

 

Qfwfq and I have both pointed out that "generating expectations", "not yet known", and "making predictions" are temporal concepts.

 

If you make assumptions regarding time—if you do this:

 

My position is that a proper representation of reality has to do with more than that; it has to provide for the exact nature of that boundary: the change from fixed static information (the past) into the unknown (the future}

then your analysis will be valid only so far as the assumptions are valid.

 

The nature of the map/territory problem is to ask how we can assure that our map is good when we cannot truly know the nature of the territory. The first step of your analysis is to claim that every map performs the same primary function as your particular map—they all predict information in a manner consistent with your understanding of time.

 

This means that your solution of the map/territory problem rests on your assumption of what a good map is. You answer the question of how we can assure our map is good by making assumptions about what a good map is.

 

As Craig and others put it, you are trying to sidestep the critical issue of "what is a map?" or "what is a worldview?" or "what is I?".

 

In all honesty, assuming what form a map must take does not prove what form a map must take.

 

Your insistence that "not all world views are like that" is just saying that you don't agree with my definition of a world view, without offering a different definition.

 

You may not be reading my posts in their entirety because a few days ago you asked me about the definition of worldview and I said:

 

I would define worldview as "_____________".

If you go back and read my posts you should find my definition and it could, perhaps, help with the problem you are having communicating with me. That is to say, if you read my posts you should have an easier time responding to them.

 

Well in my mind this is very simple; what I'm about to say is true only for "constructs that generate expectations", and thus it is true for all constructs that are normally called "world views". If that sounds like an argument about reality to you, I do not know how to explain this better.

 

Also, if you read my posts you will find that *nowhere* have I claimed you are making assumptions (or an argument) about reality. I know that you hate making assumptions about reality and it is, in fact, my whole point that you are shifting assumptions usually made about reality to assumptions made about 'an explanation' or 'a worldview'.

 

It is discouraging that you characterize my position so poorly.

 

The only comment I have about your post is;

 

I was asking for examples of "world views that do not generate expectations". Or rather "world views whose validity is not a function of their prediction ability". In thinking that I was referring to DD's fundamental equation, you are jumping ridiculously far ahead without a care in the world about whether you understand anything about DD's definitions. Please don't do that.

 

:hihi: Funny, half the time you say something like "you need to go read DD's analysis and catch up before we can consider your objection" and now you say "you are jumping ridiculously far ahead. Please don't do that." That's too good :)

 

It shouldn't be hard to catch you up.

 

It isn't just that a proper worldview is assumed to generate expectations. Doctordick's analysis has to do with more than that. It describes the exact nature of the boundary between past and future. I already quoted DD saying this earlier in the thread and earlier in this post. Here it is again:

 

My position is that a proper representation of reality has to do with more than that; it has to provide for the exact nature of that boundary: the change from fixed static information (the past) into the unknown (the future}

As far as time being non-deterministic which was the basis for the counterexample:

 

Until that information is available to us, the outcome is in the future and is only determinable as a probability. Thus it is that the mechanism to be used is quantum mechanics which overtly recognizes probabilistic outcomes.

 

Cheers

 

~modest

[dduckwessel]

A 'worldview' must begin from the premise of 'all humans are basically the same' rather than, 'I'm black, you're white, I'm Chinese, you're Italian'.

 

As was the case in 'Independence Day' one country wasn't arguing against another who has the right to the first retaliation. The entire world was united against a common 'enemy'.

 

It will be centering on the 'similarities' among humans that creates a worldview - but we're still in the 'I'm black, you're white' stage and until we get over that there will never be a 'world'view.

[Rade]

Let me re-cap the whole argument:

 

- What some information means to you, must be a function of your world view.

- Your world view must be a function of what some information means to you.

 

We all agreed this far.

No, I do not agree at all. Why must my world view be limited to what information (data) "means to me" ? Why is it not possible for "information without meaning" also to help form my world view ?

 

It is like saying that the reason your running car slowly comes to a stop MUST BE because it has run out of gas. Well, in fact, IT MUST NOT BE true, it may be true, but it MUST not be true.

 

Logical arguments cannot be COMMANDMENTS (your MUST BE function). To use a commandment to defend the presentation of Doctordick does more harm than good.

[Rade]

So are you guys now both disagreeing with the assertion;

 

"The ONLY measure of validity of a world view, is its ability to produce valid predictions"

 

?

 

If so, let me hear you explain clearly in your words, why that is.

Yes, I disagree with your assertion. The validity of any world view is not limited to producing "valid predictions". Sure, it is great when your world view does so, but it is not necessary for a world view to be valid. Using your criterion it would be absolutely impossible to have a "valid world view" of the electron. The reason being that no world view can predict both the position and momentum at the same time for the electron. However, I think you would agree that it is silly to argue that physicists do not have a valid world view of the electron by definition because they cannot produce valid predictions for it caused by Heisenberg uncertainty.

 

The ONLY measure of validity of a world view, is whether or not it conforms to reality. Would you disagree with this statement ?

[Qfwfq]

Rade, I think I understand what you are getting at (despite the lack of clarity in your MUST BE argument). However, I don't see predicting every detail with arbitrarily perfect accuracy as a requisite for the concept of prediction. Regarding the consideration of the Heisenberg principle, it applies equally to what can be known about a system's past and present state.

 

The ONLY measure of validity of a world view, is whether or not it conforms to reality. Would you disagree with this statement ?

:ebomb:

That's a dangerous way of putting it, when talking to Anssi!!!! You should know by now that you can't call it reality; you need to call it the known data, else he'll think you mean the poltergeist. :doh: This of course will include future data when it becomes available.

Edited February 4, 2011 by Qfwfq
slight addition

[LaurieAG]

Hi Anssi,

 

That's kind of interesting in terms of difficulties of communication.

 

Tell me about it, I am the only IT qualified person out of 50 in HR, in a 3K+ employee organisation. I effectively administer the HRIS in consultation with the stakeholders as the HR manager is the business owner of the data. I'm also the PM who set up and configured an ESS that I am currently rolling out across the entire organisation.

 

The main problem is that people don't bother to read and think about what they are doing (and considering that civilisations never learn the lessons of history either it is probably a condition of the human collective (or deceitful politicians more likely)). I don't know how many times I've had people email me and say they have a problem without communicating anything whatsoever apart from the fact that they have a problem. After getting further information, reading the documentation, and testing their problem I often find that the software isn't the problem (so their message was true). Due to this I am also the poor bastard who has to talk to all the non technical people (the HRIS data is used in many other systems) in the organisation, work out what exactly they are talking about, and then give the real problem to our technical staff (only 200 people), if there is one.

 

I didn't understand myself what you were getting at with the rest of the post so I hope you excuse me if I don't comment either.

 

No worries, in uni Communication studies I wrote a self titled essay called 'When does a message become noise? when does noise become a message?' based on a modification to the standard communication model. Noise can become the real message when there is no overlap in the zones of experience of the parties communicating. It all depends on the communication context. A massive spreadsheet is a good example of when a message becomes noise while a chart or graph of the same data turns that noise back into a message that can be understood.

 

Have a read of the two poems again in the context of the actual medieval situations they represent.

 

(a) Hans Christian Anderson was brought up by his grandmother on a steady diet of old Danish legends. In 1014, Brian Boru, Irish High King and youngest son of the first person to call himself Cennetig (Kennedy), defeated the Danish king of Dublin in the (Battle of Clontarf) sack of Dublin. The Danes are still the tallest national grouping in europe (along with Croatians) and the Irish social structure of the time was based on many levels of kings (i.e. all were like Jacks in a deck of cards).

 

(B) This represents the speech made by the severed head of the Green Knight in the anonymous Welsh tract called 'Sir Gawain and the Green Knight'. I suspect this was written as a veiled threat to wayward lords as I would summarise the whole story as 'For all that amounts make good honest accounts lest ye could lose more than just lucky underpants', if you consider the undeclared present of a fox hide wrapped around sir Gawains loins (as lucky underpants) being the main pivot point of the second part of the story.

 

Does your interpretation change?