The Most Critical Question!

[AnssiH]

So would you guys agree that the only measure for the validity of our understanding, is our ability to produce valid expectations about the future?

 

That is how human worldviews tend to work.

 

No doubt about this, providing we don't forget it musn't be in conflict with past experience either.

 

Yes, not conflicting the past is indeed an important part of our definition of a valid world view. If it did conflict the past, it could not be seen as an explanation of reality. It appears we are understanding each others in this issue.

 

Let's continue with the baby steps, and next solve this issue;

 

I.e. Having a good explanation means we have some method of anticipating the future, and make useful survival choices accordingly?

 

No, that would be affirming the consequent.

 

There's really, really, no telling what type of worldview might be useful to an alien entity on some other planet or even in a different universe with different physics. 'Future' is a useful part of our worldview, but this does not necessitate that every useful explanation contain the concept 'future'.

 

Would you agree though, that an integral part of any world view is that it represents changes of some sort, in some manner?

 

Note that the alternative to this is that someone understands reality without the first dynamic component to it, as completely static construct. Would you agree that something like this would be outside of a sensible definition of "a world view", and thus outside of our analysis?

 

If you do, note also that I do not actually argue whether an alien world view would use very different concepts to represent those changes, but I would argue that it is sensible to view the validity of a world view as depending entirely on its ability to "track changes" correctly. I would argue that that's what a world view is for, regardless of how it conceptually handles that tracking.

 

Comments about this issue?

 

-Anssi

[modest]

Would you agree though, that an integral part of any world view is that it represents changes of some sort, in some manner?

 

Have I already explicitly agreed or disagreed with this? Do you know?

 

Note that the alternative to this is that someone understands reality without the first dynamic component to it, as completely static construct.

 

A cat will tell you that every object is either blue or green. The only alternative to blue is green.

 

This doesn't make the cat's worldview, in any sense of the term, 'correct'.

 

You think that either "change" is an integral part of a worldview or otherwise a worldview is impossible. I sympathize with your intuitive sense of how reality works, but the truth is that you cannot prove your intuitive sense of ontology.

 

It is entirely possible that other worldviews foreign to your own have different understandings of space, time, and causality. It is a mistake to assume that the way you see the world is the way the world must be seen.

 

Your view of reality may be sufficient for survival, but you cannot know if it is necessary.

 

The normal physicist would state clearly "If my assumption about causality is correct..." while you state something along the lines of "my assumption about causality is the only correct possibility, therefore..."

 

The typical physicist is more honest in this respect. I do not agree that DD's definition of time is necessarily a component of every useful worldview.

 

If you make no assumptions regarding reality then your idea that a worldview either utilizes your concept of change or otherwise it is useless is no different from the cat's worldview that either objects are blue or green.

 

I would argue that it is sensible to view the validity of a world view as depending entirely on its ability to "track changes" correctly.

 

Of course you do. That is consistent with your worldview.

 

~modest

[AnssiH]

Have I already explicitly agreed or disagreed with this? Do you know?

 

Not explicitly. Rather, I believe I have not managed to communicate what I'm trying to say, because you appear to be saying something I would pretty much agree with, but I am not referring to quite that issue.

 

You think that either "change" is an integral part of a worldview or otherwise a worldview is impossible. I sympathize with your intuitive sense of how reality works, but the truth is that you cannot prove your intuitive sense of ontology.

 

It is entirely possible that other worldviews foreign to your own have different understandings of space, time, and causality. It is a mistake to assume that the way you see the world is the way the world must be seen.

 

I am not saying anything about what sort of conceptualization is necessary or ontologically correct or anything to that effect.

 

What I am saying is that it is part of a sensible definition of what we mean by "a world view", that it is an explanation about some sorts of "changes", regardless of what they are called, and regardless of whether that worldview itself actually understands this issue in terms of "changes. It may just call it "motion", or it may call it "future", or it may call it "not yet known data", I am not really making any argument about what the specific method of handling that particular issue should be.

 

The only reason I call it "changes" is that it seems like it's the most neutral word. Note that I mean it in the epistemological sense, not in ontological sense. I am okay to call it anything else too. I did call it "future" before (also, in epistemological sense, not in ontological sense), but that had the unfortunate effect that you thought I meant that as a necessary concept. I did not.

 

So, if you review my previous post, I am merely noting that, since I am referring to "changes" in the broadest possible sense - as in referring to any type of issue at all that could be seen in terms of "something changing" in any way at all - the only alternative to that is "no changes". That is so by (epistemological) definition, not by assumption about reality.

 

Would you still say that it is entirely possible, that there exists a valid world view, which does not handle changes/motion/dynamics/future/new data (or however you wish to refer to the issue) at all?

 

Or to be more accurate, would you argue, that such a construct would still fall within a sensible definition of "a world view", and that not including that possibility to the analysis about "explanations", would lead to undefendable results?

 

-Anssi

[Doctordick]

DD and Anssi are assuming that DD's definition of time is a necessary component of both. I think we can easily enough prove that it is sufficient for one, but don't think we could prove it is necessary for both.

Do you not comprehend the difference between a "universally valid move" and a "universally necessary move".

 

At no point to I assert that my solution to the problem is the only solution (think “necessary”). All I claim is a valid general solution. That there exists no body of information which cannot be interpreted in a way which conforms to my representations: i.e., it is an explicit solution to the problem of creating a world view from any body of undefined data! Not the only solution. <_<

 

My problem is not so much with the abstraction, but the claims of necessity regarding the abstraction.

I don't claim necessity. If you have another solution to the problem, present it. Perhaps your solution might be better than mine. But don't claim no solution exists!! Not with everyone walking around with a solution in their head that seems to work pretty well (a world view that is). :angry:

 

Your view of reality may be sufficient for survival, but you cannot know if it is necessary.

Again, with this “necessary” crap. Universally valid is the byword of my procedure not universally necessary! And Qfwfq, you seem to be taking the same tack with regard to my use of non-commuting mathematical operators and perhaps with regard to complex [math]\Psi[/math]. Both of you seem to prefer the position that the problem (as stated by me) cannot be solved rather than taking the time to examine my solution.

 

By the way, regarding “universally applicable”, modest seems to just overlook a rather simple (and, in my mind, obvious) solution to his complaint concerning a supposed “eternalism” world view:

 

If my worldview were eternalism rather than presentism then I would have no idea what "new data" even meant.

Then you are talking about solving a problem stated as a single circumstance and thus indexing it is of no necessity. Yet it is still possible to refer to such a thing as a single case where t=1 (think universally valid). :P

 

But you should also note that my procedure used the index t to indicate order (if significant) so you are essentially presuming that order is also of utterly no significance in your world view and that is getting rather extreme (seems to tend towards the "what is" is "what is" explanation). Do you guys ever even read my definitions?

 

Have fun -- Dick

[Qfwfq]

Again, with this “necessary” crap. Universally valid is the byword of my procedure not universally necessary! And Qfwfq, you seem to be taking the same tack with regard to my use of non-commuting mathematical operators and perhaps with regard to complex [math]\Psi[/math].

I have called into question the universality of your FE and I suspect you would do well to understand how the terms necessary and sufficient are so often used in discussions of logic.

 

Let [imath]\cal{U}[/imath] be something granted to be universally valid. Let [imath]\cal{F}[/imath] be what you contend is equally universal; this contention entails [imath]\cal{U}\Rightarrow\cal{F}[/imath] which is often read as [imath]\cal{F}[/imath] being a necessary condition for [imath]\cal{U}[/imath] (modus tollens) or as [imath]\cal{U}[/imath] being a sufficient condition for [imath]\cal{F}[/imath] (modus ponens). This does not mean claiming [imath]\cal{F}[/imath] to be unique, there could well be [imath]\cal{G}[/imath] such that [imath]\cal{U}\Rightarrow\cal{G}[/imath] but, if [imath]\cal{U}[/imath] really is universal, then it would imply [imath]\cal{F}[/imath] and [imath]\cal{G}[/imath] being equivalant to [imath]\cal{U}[/imath] and therefore also to each other.

 

Both of you seem to prefer the position that the problem (as stated by me) cannot be solved rather than taking the time to examine my solution.

I have not stated this at all. I discussed how it is that our mind comes to have a worldview.

[Rade]

I would like to backtrack the discussion to the comment by CraigD that the most critical question we should be discussing, before we get to the question presented by Doctordick, is this most critical question, that logically must be prior to the "HOW" question asked by Doctordick:

 

What is I ?

 

There was a suggestion that we look to Descartes for the answer to this most critical question, and then perhaps we can see how Descartes perhaps would respond to the question that concerns Doctordick (in one of the 4 versions of the Doctordick question that have been presented).

 

-----------

 

So, WHAT IS I ?

 

Not sure how many know that Descartes modified his argument that he called the First Principle of Philosophy that he presented in his Discourse on Methods. The modification came in Meditations II. Here are the words Descartes used to change his First Principle of Philosophy:

 

"I think, hence I am" (Discourse on Methods)

 

changed to:

 

"I am, I exist" (Meditations II)

 

====

 

OK, how can this change in the wording of Descartes help us find an answer to the most critical question "WHAT IS I ?"

 

It is my opinion that when Descartes began writing Meditations II, he reviewed his prior Discourse on Methods and found a major error in his First Principle, namely that the concept THINK is secondary as relates to the question "What is I?". Before thinking there must first be the "I" = 'the mind by which I am what I am' (quote of Descartes). Hence the "I" can be viewed as a primary substance as understood by Aristotle, that which is fundamental to all that is inside and outside. He clarified in the Meditations II that the primary emphasis of his First Principle of Philosophy must be on the mind (the "I") as a primary substance outside the body, that has the secondary attribute of thinking (as the I...without quotes), since he made the claim in the Discourse on Methods after he introduced his First Principle "that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist".

 

Therefore, I argue that the answer to the most critical question "What is I?" is to understand that the English concept I represents a dialectic of two views of the concept I presented by Descartes, the first being the "I" (with quotes) which is 'the mind by which I am what I am", the second being the I (without quotes) by which "I am".

 

OK, if (perhaps a big if) I am correct, how does my interpretation of Descartes relate to the "HOW" question of Doctordick ? Well, the answer to the "HOW" question of Doctordick involves thinking. To provide answer to the "HOW" question requires that one make use of the I by which I am. But, according to Descartes, there is something more fundamental to thinking and asking "HOW" questions. It is the "I" that represents the primary substance of the mind by which I am what I am, for as concluded by Descartes "I see very clearly that in order to think [TO ASK HOW QUESTIONS] it is necessary to exist". (I add the [statement] that I think Descartes would add if he was trying to explain himself to Doctordick, that is, to explain to Doctordick why the answer to his most critical "HOW" question first requires an answer to the question "What is I").

 

 

--------

 

For your reading, I provide below first Descartes' Discourse on Methods, then his latter Meditations II. You can study how Descartes modified his thinking over time to answer the most critical question "What is I?"

 

======

Descartes....(Discourse On Methods, Part IV)

Accordingly, seeing that our senses sometimes deceive us, I was willing to suppose that there existed nothing really such as they presented to us; and because some men err in reasoning, and fall into paralogisms, even on the simplest matters of Geometry, I, convinced that I was as open to error as any other, rejected as false all the reasonings I had hitherto taken for demonstrations; and finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects (presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence, that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the Sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the Philosophy of which I was in search.

 

In the next place, I attentively examined what I was, and as I observed that I could suppose that I had no body, and that there was no world nor any place in which I might be; but that I could not therefore suppose that I was not; and that, on the contrary, from the very circumstance that I thought to doubt of the truth of other things, it most clearly and certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined had been in reality existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing; so that “I”, that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am, is wholly distinct from the body, and is even more easily known that the latter, and is such, that although the latter were not, it would still continue to be all that it is. After this I inquired in general into what is essential to the truth and certainty of a proposition; for since I had discovered one which I knew to be true, I thought that I must likewise be able to discover the ground of this certitude. And as I observed that in the words I think, hence I am, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist, I concluded that I might take, as a general rule, the principle, that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive.

 

=================

 

His second version is found in Meditations II. Here is the passage, I highlight where he uses "I am, I exist" in place of "I think, hence I am":

 

Descartes....(Meditations II)

 

3. But how do I know that there is not something different altogether from the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is impossible to entertain the slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some being, by whatever name I may designate him, who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind ? But why suppose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them? Am I, then, at least not something? But I before denied that I possessed senses or a body; I hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived; and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition (pronunciatum ) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.

 

4. But I do not yet know with sufficient clearness what I am, though assured that I am; and hence..

[LaurieAG]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Dodgson

 

Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (pronounced /ˈdɒdsən/, DOD-sən; 27 January 1832 – 14 January 1898), better known by the pseudonym Lewis Carroll (/ˈkærəl/, KA-rəl), was an English author, mathematician, logician, Anglican deacon and photographer. His most famous writings are Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and its sequel Through the Looking-Glass, as well as the poems "The Hunting of the Snark" and "Jabberwocky", all examples of the genre of literary nonsense. He is noted for his facility at word play, logic, and fantasy, and there are societies dedicated to the enjoyment and promotion of his works and the investigation of his life in many parts of the world, including the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, and New Zealand.

 

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I chose it to mean—nothing less, and nothing more."

 

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

 

—Alice Through the Looking Glass by Lewis Carroll

[modest]

I am not saying anything about what sort of conceptualization is necessary or ontologically correct or anything to that effect.

 

would that you weren't

 

I am referring to "changes"... the only alternative to that is "no changes". That is so by (epistemological) definition, not by assumption about reality.

 

We covered this.

 

To the cat, the only alternative to blue is green. The cat could define color such that blue and green are the only options, but it would be a mistake for the cat to assume that any and every worldview is consistent with that assumption.

 

Assumptions are not well hidden by definitions.

 

~modest

 

:phones:

 

My position is that a proper representation of reality has to do more than that; it has to provide for the exact nature of that boundary: the change from fixed static information (the past) into the unknown (the future} ~Doctordick

 

People like us who believe in physics know that the distinction between the past, the present and the future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion ~Einstein

 

:phones:

[modest]

Do you not comprehend the difference between a "universally valid move" and a "universally necessary move".

 

At no point to I assert that my solution to the problem is the only solution (think “necessary”).

 

Seriously?

 

Losing the ability to interpret those who do not agree with you can't be a good sign.

 

Your claim, in the most exacting language I could find, is:

 

What I have discovered is that I can guarantee you that, for any explanation of anything, there exists a totally consistent interpretation of the symbols used to communicate that explanation which will require the fundamental elements of that explanation to obey my equation so long as that explanation is internally consistent

 

Do you honestly not realize how "any explanation of anything... requires... obedience to my equation" implies necessity of the explanation?

 

Honestly?

 

Both of you seem to prefer the position that the problem (as stated by me) cannot be solved rather than...

 

I have explicitly said that I think building a useful worldview is possible, so I again have no idea what you're getting on about.

 

~modest

[AnssiH]

I have called into question the universality of your FE and I suspect you would do well to understand how the terms necessary and sufficient are so often used in discussions of logic.

 

Do you understand though what he means by "universally valid"?

 

If this was an analysis about the methods of counting fruits, and he'd say he is using the decimal number system and defends this choice by it being "universally valid", he is not saying it is the only valid choice. He is saying it is valid regardless of what fruits we will be counting. These choices being "universally valid" means exactly that their usefulness does not tell us anything about what the underlying data is.

 

Are we on same page about his meaning of "universally valid"?

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

Seriously?

 

Losing the ability to interpret those who do not agree with you can't be a good sign.

 

Your claim, in the most exacting language I could find, is:

 

What I have discovered is that I can guarantee you that, for any explanation of anything, there exists a totally consistent interpretation of the symbols used to communicate that explanation which will require the fundamental elements of that explanation to obey my equation so long as that explanation is internally consistent

 

Do you honestly not realize how "any explanation of anything... requires... obedience to my equation" implies necessity of the explanation?

 

Honestly?

 

Wow, I just read your responses Modest and I'm in awe. I have no idea how you were able to jump from what we were talking about to what you are quoting there. Honestly? Well, I can say that you have no idea what you are referring to, and I have no idea where I should begin. Don't expect a response from DD.

 

Before there is any hope that you'd understand what DD means by what he is saying there, you would have to understand exactly the topic and the definitions he is using in his analysis. And if you did, it would be blindingly obvious to you what the FE is and in what sense it is indeed "necessary" (i.e. in what sense the constraints that it states are trivially true by the very definitions he is using)

 

Before we have any hope of actually reaching that level, we have to establish mutual understanding and shared terminology regarding the fundamentals. I've been trying to proceed in very tiny baby steps, and the first goal I have in my mind is to establish agreement about what exactly do we mean by "a world view". In particular, how the validity of our world view can only be judged by its ability to generate valid expectations, and how that validity does not ensure in any way at all, that the world view is interpreting reality "correctly" (i.e. it does not ensure that the defined entities of a world view are "real").

 

So let's focus, this is where we were at;

 

So would you guys agree that the only measure for the validity of our understanding, is our ability to produce valid expectations about the future? I.e. Having a good explanation means we have some method of anticipating the future, and make useful survival choices accordingly?

 

What I'm saying there is essentially an argument about what do we sensibly mean by a world view. That is, when we say "world view", we mean "the mechanism which allows us to make good survival choices". And "every survival choice is a function of our ability to generate predictions".

 

I'm talking about agreeing with a definition.

 

The response I got from Qfwfq indicates that he has got no problems with that definition.

 

The response from Modest indicates he would only accept this as a definition of a "typical human world view", and maintains that an alien world view may be a mechanism that has got nothing to do with any dynamics of any sort. Which means it cannot have anything to do with any predictions either, nor can it make any "survival choices" or any "choices" whatsoever because, by the definition that nothing can ever "happen" in the terminology of this alien world view.

 

So, Modest, I applaud your attitude of open mindedness, but let's be clear; you are essentially not agreeing that world views could be defined as "mechanisms of generating predictions", because you think there can exist "world views" that are not "dynamic" nor "static". I suppose your inability to come up with an example is to be attributed to you also being only human with human thoughts. I find the argument hilarious considering that dynamic and static are also human definitions and mean exactly what we want them to mean, but apart from that, should I take it you think we are talking non-sense and you don't see reason to continue in the conversation?

 

Qfwfq, I would appreciate if you gave a comment about this "a world view which does not handle changes" idea, from the perspective of actually reaching an agreement about what "a world view" means. Maybe you can speak the same language as modest. Apart from that, can I go ahead and assume you do agree with this perspective about "world views", and continue onwards?

 

ps. Rade, since you keep asking, I would like to point out something very interesting about "self" and the hard problem of consciousness, but I would like to do so with other people actually understanding what I'm trying to say. So you might as well first comment on whether or not you agree on the sensibility of the discussed definition of "a world view".

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

If this was an analysis about the methods of counting fruits, and he'd say he is using the decimal number system and defends this choice by it being "universally valid", he is not saying it is the only valid choice.

If you are talking about base ten notation then I agree the choice has no bearing. This however is not akin to the choice he makes, which I refer to as the choice of Lie algebra.

 

If instead you consider the example I made, defending the choice of [imath]\mathbb{Z}_{15}[/imath] arithmetic in which 12 + 6 = 3 is correct, this isn't a choice of notation to represent the same arithmetic we are familiar with for counting as many things as we might need. It is a different arithmetic, perfectly valid in itself as a mathematical construct but not equivalent to the arithmetic of [imath]\mathbb{Z}[/imath] nor to that of [imath]\mathbb{N}[/imath]. That is more akin to my objection about the choice of Lie algebra.

 

And if you did, it would be blindingly obvious to you what the FE is and in what sense it is indeed "necessary" (i.e. in what sense the constraints that it states are trivially true by the very definitions he is using)

This is assuming Dick's argument to be conclusive.

 

Qfwfq, I would appreciate if you gave a comment about this "a world view which does not handle changes" idea, from the perspective of actually reaching an agreement about what "a world view" means. Maybe you can speak the same language as modest. Apart from that, can I go ahead and assume you do agree with this perspective about "world views", and continue onwards?

Well I don't know for sure what you are wanting me to agree with, but I had already commented about his point. The concept of change tacitly includes saome notion of time, at the very least a before and after distinction.

 

Suppose we slap a label on the set of data that is "already known", we call it the "past" data [imath]\cal{P}[/imath], and we call the "new" data [imath]\cal{N}[/imath], then we can say the complete, current set of data is [imath]\cal{C}\equiv\cal{P}\cup\cal{N}[/imath] and clearly [imath]\cal{P}\subset\cal{C}[/imath]. You could replace all the reference to past or before, and new or future with the set notation and there would be no logical reason to draw conclusions about what we call time.

[modest]

Wow, I just read your responses Modest and I'm in awe.

 

I know. I inspire that B) :bow_flowers: :hihi:

 

I have no idea how you were able to jump from what we were talking about to what you are quoting there.

 

I believe you. I believe you have no idea.

 

I'm reminded of the natives who just couldn't manage to see or rationally respond to Columbus' ships. The ships were just too far outside their reinforced belief system that they couldn't respond to what they were seeing.

 

Don't expect a response from DD.

 

I know! I'm reminded of... oh, wait, we already covered that... :hihi:

 

I've been trying to proceed in very tiny baby steps, and the first goal I have in my mind is to establish agreement about what exactly do we mean by "a world view".

 

And, there you've already skipped over the whole crux of the problem... as I and others have already pointed out to you at least a dozen times.

 

"What is a worldview" is exactly what needs solved. You can't just define it. Is that so complicated that you can't respond to it at all?

 

I'm talking about agreeing with a definition.

 

But, you are doing more than defining a word. You are asserting that every meaningful view of reality can be based on that definition.

 

Do you honestly not see how that assertion is problematic?

 

Do you think that every possible worldview (or explanation) agrees with your definition of a worldview (or explanation)? When you include things like how time works in that definition then you have defeated your very own purpose. You want to make conclusions without making assumptions about reality and you end up making conclusions based on problematic assumptions about *any possible reality*.

 

You're essentially saying that every explanation must be consistent with your definition of time because you have defined it that way. If you can't see the problem with that then I honestly don't think there's anything I can do to bring your attention to it. Columbus' ship is over there and I don't think you're going to see it.

 

~modest

[AnssiH]

If you are talking about base ten notation then I agree the choice has no bearing. This however is not akin to the choice he makes, which I refer to as the choice of Lie algebra.

 

If instead you consider the example I made, defending the choice of [imath]\mathbb{Z}_{15}[/imath] arithmetic in which 12 + 6 = 3 is correct, this isn't a choice of notation to represent the same arithmetic we are familiar with for counting as many things as we might need. It is a different arithmetic, perfectly valid in itself as a mathematical construct but not equivalent to the arithmetic of [imath]\mathbb{Z}[/imath] nor to that of [imath]\mathbb{N}[/imath]. That is more akin to my objection about the choice of Lie algebra.

 

I'm meaning to walk through the part where he uses anti-commuting elements for the second time soon, we could talk about it in more detail there. For now let it be said that his use of anti-commutation can be seen as a deliberate move to point out that we can always just choose to use them, and that plays a role in arriving at a representation that is direcly comparable to modern physics. You probably agree that either that move does require something from the underlying information, or it doesn't. If it does, then it can be seen as representing one of our "correct guesses" about the meaning of our information. If it doesn't, then it can be seen as representing one of our epistemological definitions having nothing to do with reality (just like base ten notation).

 

Okay, onto the important bit, we have to make sure we understand each others on these things;

 

Well I don't know for sure what you are wanting me to agree with, but I had already commented about his point. The concept of change tacitly includes saome notion of time, at the very least a before and after distinction.

 

Suppose we slap a label on the set of data that is "already known", we call it the "past" data [imath]\cal{P}[/imath], and we call the "new" data [imath]\cal{N}[/imath], then we can say the complete, current set of data is [imath]\cal{C}\equiv\cal{P}\cup\cal{N}[/imath] and clearly [imath]\cal{P}\subset\cal{C}[/imath]. You could replace all the reference to past or before, and new or future with the set notation and there would be no logical reason to draw conclusions about what we call time.

 

Yes, now, what I am getting at here is simply reaching an agreement about what is it that we are even trying to analyze.

 

Let me re-cap the whole argument:

 

- What some information means to you, must be a function of your world view.

- Your world view must be a function of what some information means to you.

 

We all agreed this far.

 

People typically have a tacit attitude, that the real purpose of a world-view is to explain the meaning of some information, and only when the correct meaning is understood, predictions become possible. For that reason, I pointed out that;

 

The ONLY measure of validity of our world view, is its ability to produce valid predictions.

 

Direct consequence of this is that, correct predictions DO NOT entail correct understanding of the meaning of the information. It only entails that there exists SOME mechanism of prediction, and the supposed "meaning" of the information can be seen as a side-product of that mechanism. (That is to say, our understanding can be seen as a model of reality, like you pointed out earlier)

 

For that reason, I would like to explicitly remove that tacit attitude that the purpose of our world view is to explain the meaning of some information, and instead of defining "a world view" as "a mechanism that attempts to explain the real meaning of some information", I would like to define it more generally as "ANY mechanism that generates valid predictions for some information".

 

Now, I thought we were all agreeing this far. But then I pointed out that, as a direct consequence of treating world views as "a prediction mechanisms", there is always something to predict (i.e. some information is "new" or "not known all the time"), and as long as there is something to predict, in our analysis we can refer to this issue as "changes" or "future" or "motion" or some other time-like notion (we are NEVER making ontological claims anywhere in there). At this point we found out that Modest disagrees with the definition of "world views as prediction mechanisms".

 

It's good to know this because there's no point in explaining any consequences any further to him, as long as he refures to think about this with this definition for a world view. I should comment that it is quite typical problem and it's exactly what DD refers to as "refusal to work with my definitions", or as "off-topic" issues. Usually it's just not at all clear, what is it exactly that the reader is not agreeing with, and where do they shoehorn their own perspective. Well now we know.

 

I should also comment that this particular refusal is related to the same thing as what DD refers to in the opening post, by saying "the idea that our world view is created to explain our perceptions is an absolutely ridiculous hypothesis". He is saying that people tend to think of world views more or less literally as explanations of the meaning of some information, as oppose to mere prediction mechanisms. Even when the same people understand perfectly well that they can only measure the validity of their predictions, not the validity of their individual definitions. Is it not then clear as the day, that "prediction mechanism" is MORE GENERAL definition?

 

I should also comment that DD's use of the word "future" is simply one of the universally valid choices he makes, and in my opinion he makes this quite explicitly clear. That is, as long as there can exist information that is "new", it can be simply called as "future", regardless of what reality is actually like. And, there always is information that is "new", as long as the measure of the validity of our world views is in its prediction abilities.

 

The only way to argue with that is to simply choose to understand world views as some unknown things that are nothing like what we usually call "world views". Of course there exists all kinds of constructs that are nothing like what we call "world views". My bicycle is one. But those are off the topic of what we want to discuss, and that is NOT in any way an assertion about what reality is like.

 

If you find the above text rational, I'd like to point out some further consequences.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

You're essentially saying that every explanation must be consistent with your definition of time because you have defined it that way.

 

I have not defined time! I have defined world views as "prediction mechanisms". Do you realize that you are simply arguing about whether or not world views can be seen simply as "prediction mechanisms". In your opinion, there may well exist world views that do not make predictions. And I'm saying that there exists plenty of constructs like that, but they are not part of a sensible definition of a world view. To me, you are saying "there may well exist ducks that are exactly like crocodiles".

 

Maybe if you had not set your mind yet you might make an attempt to understand something about what I'm saying.

 

-Anssi

[modest]

Do you realize that you are simply arguing about whether or not world views can be seen simply as "prediction mechanisms".

 

 

You assume they *must* be seen as "prediction mechanisms" (a concept which requires you to define time). You assume many things about what this "worldview" or "explanation" is and how it works then conclude that every useful worldview and every useful explanation must be consistent with those assumptions.

 

It is circular logic. It does not solve the problem you think it solves.

 

~modest

[AnssiH]

 

You assume they *must* be seen as "prediction mechanisms" (a concept which requires you to define time). You assume many things about what this "worldview" or "explanation" is and how it works then conclude that every useful worldview and every useful explanation must be consistent with those assumptions.

 

It is circular logic. It does not solve the problem you think it solves.

 

Hehe this is hilarious, and it's also great that you apparently know what I'm trying to get at before I'm even close.

 

I hope you realize that you should have raised that same objection the moment I said "What some information means to you, must be a function of your world view." Since you think it is an error to define what we mean by a world view, then you should say "Maybe there are world views that don't have anything to do with establishing what some information means to you".

 

The same objection easily applies to anything I or anyone could ever say about world views, or about ANYTHING. So your answer to the poll should be "no, as it cannot be answered", on the grounds that we can't even define what is it that we want to discuss. I.e. your stance is that it is not possible to communicate because we can't reach the same language!

 

I'm reminded of an excellent picture:

http://thechive.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/best-photos-ever-16.jpg

 

EDIT: Just so you realize this completely, you have said that it is only "human world views" whose validity is judged by the validity of their predictions, and thus you think it is undefendable to limit our analysis to those constructs whose validity is judged by their predictions, on the notion that someone might want to define what a world view is in some completely different way that what we "humans" mean by "a world view". I.e I want to be explicitly clear we have not in any way yet came across what sorts of definitions a world view itself may or may not make.

 

-Anssi