The Most Critical Question!

[Qfwfq]

I knew it wouldn't be much use and it wasn't. I certainly won't go into each misunderstanding, but:

Clearly you have a mis-understanding about what I said. Let's put it this way, if we are looking for a general notation for expressing the defined entities of world views, is it more general to:

 

A: allow only one static "moment of time" to be expressed

B: allow either only one, or alternatively any arbitrary number of "moments" to be expressed

 

Effectively the objection reads "by allowing dynamics to be represented, you have made an assumption that dynamics exist". Well, then represent just one "t". Like I said to Modest, have a ball analyzing that possibility.

Clearly you have a mis-understanding about what I said. Let's put it this way:

 

A: I was NOT allowing only one static "moment of time" to be expressed

B: I WAS allowing either only one, or alternatively any arbitrary number of "moments" to be expressed

 

Modest and I were not in any manner suggesting you should restrict the notion of a world view like that. Modest and I weren't saying that you shouldn't assume such a thing as time existing because it doesn't, we just meant that you are tacitly assuming it from the start when you claim you don't; without this tacit assumption you can't give any meaning to things you always say, like defining your "future" as what you "don't yet know" (which you clarified you meant as the information has not been yet "received" at all) and even when you talk about change. We simply think you appear to have an ontological belief, and you sure were objecting to my points about the logical equivalence and in my dumb world view your replies boiled down to discarding them because there would be no such a thing as time and change, "all would be static" you said.

 

You are also overlooking something I had dwelt on, but it seems that's too complicated for any hope to get it across to you.

 

I haven't had a good time to focus onto the anti-commuting elements part on the other thread but I'll try to get around to it soon, then you could voice your concerns there.

I know you haven't, because I'm sure it would take you a mighty time to get it straight. This is what Modest was referring to when he talked about your understanding being inadequate to judge the case, just like I have said myself.

 

You would be surprised how many people have fought about this exact point, insisting that "information about the history can't be in the future!".

I don't see why anyone would think this, except by being utterly confused. I find it simple, suppose I will read something about history that I currently don't know. Why should people be refusing to understand such a trivial notion?

 

No, actually not. I mean, that's not the issue I was referring to.

And of course you failed to appreciate my point.

 

I mean, since DD defines the past as "the information you have accumulated", i.e. all the information that your explanation is based on, and the future as "the information you do not yet have", it just means that even if you do travel back in time with disastrous consequences, everything that has happened to you, including that "old present", then that "time travel experience", and then that "new catastrophic present", is still information in your personal past; your world view is still entirely a function of the information you have accumulated during those experiences, and nothing in that set of information changes "after the fact". (Albeit its interpretation can change)

Even if you don't exist? How could you have an interpretation at all, regarless of it changing due to the time travel, if you don't exist?

 

When that time traveller would say "crap, I changed the past", he is referring to the idea of some "ontological past", i.e. things he assumes to be so in terms of his world view. Nothing has changed in his personal past; he still remembers his childhood, and making the time travel, just like before.

So, by calling it some "ontological past", how are you solving the problem? Perhaps you simply don't see any problem and heck, of course, it's only in my world view that a cause can't have an effect in the past. The very reason for all our troubles of survival, to think it might be a mere illusion has strong implications indeed; if this were so, it would be a far better proof than mosquitoes that God not only does exist but is evil too. :rolleyes:

 

It would be helpful Anssi if you would clearly state your position on that. Would you seriously say the time ordering of cause and effect might be a mere illusion?

 

On the other hand, if your memory about your personal past does actually change - I'm sure you realize trivially - it would just mean you can't remember that anything has changed. Which just makes it a moot possibility; your world view needs to still fit that set.

No doubt that it's moot, I say it has no bearing. We could call it changing the world, not necessarily the world view.

 

I hope this also makes you roll your eyes and think what a trivially obvious point, because then you get what I'm saying. And then you would also be surprised how many people fight about this, Modest included.

Yes, those paragraphs are obvious, apart from the subtle points I've raised.

 

Exactly like the person who would insist that the information we get when sitting in the history class is information about the "past", would not, and are not, able to follow anything DD is saying.

Well then why are all those people wrong to insist that "information about the history can't be in the future!"? You're right, there are still things you say that I just can't match up. Could you try to be self coherent?

[modest]

DD has assumed that time is non-deterministic

 

He has not made that assumption anywhere.

 

I already quoted earlier in the thread from DD "Until that information is available to us, the outcome is in the future and is only determinable as a probability. Thus it is that the mechanism to be used is quantum mechanics which overtly recognizes probabilistic outcomes."

 

If you don't understand how "the future is only determinable as a probability" means "non-deterministic" then let me know.

 

...Doctordick claims that any explanation of anything requires the fundamental elements of that explanation to obey his equation so long as the explanation is internally consistent (I can give you quotes).

 

...it doesn't mean all valid explanations must use his notation in order to be valid.

 

Understand:

 

Classical mechanics DOES NOT obey Doctor Dick's equation, further, because classical mechanical probabilities are delta functions (no way around it), it would seem there is no mapping in which they would solve Doctor Dick's equation.

 

"no mapping"

 

The validity of that claim arises simply from the fact that "the FE in itself doesn't amount to any claim that isn't already painfully obvious to any thinking person". It's just few logical requirements for self-coherency.

 

You are not addressing the problem:

 

dick takes his symmetry constraints and moves to his "dirac-type" equation as if this is the only way to implement these symmetries. This is simply not true- there are many equations (with very different solutions) that obey the symmetry constraints that are not dirac type.

 

The steps in the derivation of the equation are not "requirements for self-coherency". Saying that they are... repeating that they are... having faith that they are... doesn't make them so.

 

The fundamental elements of classical mechanics do not and cannot obey his equation (for reasons that have been given a number of times)... therefore... the claim on which this thread is built is completely mistaken. It is shown mistaken by example.

 

[...]

 

The set of definitions that we call "classical mechanics", can be expressed in his notation if and only if you make certain appropriate ad hoc definitions. Effectively, it can be seen as an approximation of the FE.

 

No, no

 

It is *not* "ad hoc definitions" which makes classical mechanics an approximation.

 

Read:

 

As is well known, ad hoc approximations tend to break exact properties (e.g., symmetries, conservations laws, unitarity, etc) of a theory, while internally consistent approximations tend to preserve them, and so they are, in principle, preferable. (Classical mechanics is precisely an example of a consistent approximation, namely, to quantum mechanics.)

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0701/0701054v1.pdf

 

Classical mechanics is an internally consistent explanation that can exactly explain data in a flaw-free way. There is nothing "ad hoc" about it or the definitions it uses.

 

I like that you're trying to address the problem though.

 

To say it is an approximation is essentially the same as to say, that the translation from undefined information to the definitions of classical mechanics can be seen as slightly violating his equation.

 

This violation is in many cases negligible, just like ignoring relativistic corrections can be seen as negligible in certain circumstances.

 

An experiment which is designed to kill a person if classical mechanics is 'correct' and leave the person unharmed if quantum mechanics is 'correct' would reveal that the differences in expectations are not negligible.

 

Now when you (and Feynman and MIT professors) say "classical mechanics are perfectly self-coherent", you are not even talking about the same topic as DD is.

 

The topic is "is classical mechanics internally consistent?". The correct answer is "yes".

 

No one is arguing about what they say

 

If by "arguing" you mean "disagreeing" then, yes, this is disagreement:

 

Classical mechanics is internally consistent.

 

http://mit.edu/8.06/www/Landau.pdf

Newtonian mechanics are not self-consistent

 

Think of it this way... if I said that my house is painted red and you said that my house is not painted red then we would be expressing disagreement.

 

You are essentially referring to how those definitions, when taken at face value, do not conflict with one another. What DD is talking about is essentially whether they conflict with the symmetry arguments, which come to play only if you talk about a set of definitions that is generated to explain undefined information.

 

Nope. Classical mechanics explains data in a flaw-free way and it preserves symmetries as pointed out by one of the quotes above.

 

I'm sorry, but this really is a fire that you can't put out.

 

~modest

[Rade]

Is it the correct conclusion then that the "most critical question" of the OP is not even a question ?

[Qfwfq]

But Rade the OP doesn't even specify what the question is.

 

I tmight be helpful to point out some misunderstandings, in order to avoid the discussion between Modest and Anssi inflating needlessly.

 

Understand:

 

Classical mechanics DOES NOT obey Doctor Dick's equation, further, because classical mechanical probabilities are delta functions (no way around it), it would seem there is no mapping in which they would solve Doctor Dick's equation.

 

"no mapping"

I don't quite agree with Will there because that's not what the problem is, unless he means that, in the specific case, the Dirac equation doesn't have a classical analogue and so the classical limit is fudged. I'm not sure he meant that; talking about the probabilities and delta functions seems more like he wasn't thinking of the classical limit [imath]\hbar\rightarrow0[/imath], which in Dick's presentation (where he doesnt define Plank's constant) amounts to taking the phases down to zero.

 

The steps in the derivation of the equation are not "requirements for self-coherency". Saying that they are... repeating that they are... having faith that they are... doesn't make them so.

Actually, they seem to have been admitting to these ad hoc choices, their defence has been that the FE is "equivalent" to any other choice but they've supplied no proof of that.

 

No, no

 

It is *not* "ad hoc definitions" which makes classical mechanics an approximation.

Their drift is, granting their argument leading to the Dirac equation, that one can take the non-relativistic approximation (i. e. change the space and time symmetries) and then the classical limit. It is not my concern to argue against this reasoning and I can even overlook their lack of competence in stating many of the details. If one starts with a correct relativistic quantum description, a classical one can be recovered as I outlined above, applying the correspondence principle and with appropriate provisions where there is no classical analogue to the quantum picture (such as spin which is inherent in the Dirac equation). It is a very complicated topic and I would deem it far beyond the scope here.

[modest]

I'm not sure he meant that; talking about the probabilities and delta functions seems more like he wasn't thinking of the classical limit [imath]\hbar\rightarrow0[/imath], which in Dick's presentation (where he doesnt define Plank's constant) amounts to taking the phases down to zero.

 

The problem is not in the classical limit. Dick and Anssi have been saying that classical mechanics *approximately* obeys his equation to which I have not disagreed. To be specific,

 

The Heisenberg equations are appealing because they make formal contact with the Hamilton equations of classical mechanics. In classical mechanics functions on phase space represent the observables, and the time rate of change of an observable A is controlled by the Poisson bracket with the Hamiltonian:

 

[math]\frac{dA}{dt} = {A,H}[/math]

 

The formal correspondence with quantum mechanics is made via

 

[math]{A,B} \leftrightarrow \frac{1}{i\hbar} [A,B][/math]

 

where the observables are represented by functions on phase space on the left and operators on the right. This formal correspondence implies that expectation values will, in a suitable approximation, follow classical trajectories, a result known as Ehrenfest’s theorem.

 

To derive this theorem in the Heisenberg picture is quite easy. Take the expectation value of the quantum form of Newton’s second law,

 

[math]\frac{d^2X^i(t)}{dt^2} = \frac{\Delta V}{\partial x^i}(X(t))[/math]

 

and use the time independence of the state vector to obtain (exercise)

 

[math]\frac{d^2}{dt^2} \langle X \rangle (t)= \langle F \rangle[/math]

 

where F is the force. This result is Ehrenfest’s theorem.

 

Exercise: How would you derive this equation in the Schrodinger picture?

 

It is often said that Ehrenfest’s theorem shows that expectation values obey the classical dynamical laws. This slogan is not quite true. In particular, the expectation value of position does not necessarily obey Newton’s second law. A true version of Newton’s second law for the expectation value would read

 

[math]m \frac{d^2 \langle X^i \rangle (t)}{dt^2} = \frac{\partial V (\langle \vec{X} \rangle (t))}{\partial \langle X^i \rangle}[/math]

 

Of course, this latter equation is not what quantum mechanics gives...

 

Generally, Ehrenfest’s theorem does not imply that expectation values obey classical equations of motion. For example, consider

the potential,

 

[math]V(X) = \frac{1}{3}kX^3[/math]

 

We have in this case,

 

[math]\frac{\partial V (\langle X \rangle (t))}{\partial \langle X \rangle} = k \langle X \rangle (t)[/math]

 

which does not, in general, equal

 

[math]\left \langle\frac{\partial V (X (t))}{\partial X }\right \rangle = k \langle X \rangle (t)[/math]

 

Indeed, these two expressions agree if and only if the dispersion in X(t) vanishes – which it never does, strictly speaking. (On the other hand, one can find states which make the position dispersion arbitrarily small at the expense of a large dispersion in momentum.) Thus,according to Ehrenfest’s theorem, the expectation values of position for this cubic potential will only agree with the classical behavior insofar as the dispersion in position is negligible (for all time) in the chosen state. This result illustrates a general rule: classical behavior for particle motion arises

 

http://ocw.usu.edu/physics/classical-mechanics/pdf_lectures/16.pdf

 

To continue my example from the last post, someone being killed by an experiment is not a close enough approximation to their being unharmed by the experiment. The two explanations providing the two expectations are not equivalent.

 

Also,

 

If one starts with a correct relativistic quantum description, a classical one can be recovered as I outlined above, applying the correspondence principle and with appropriate provisions where there is no classical analogue to the quantum picture (such as spin which is inherent in the Dirac equation). It is a very complicated topic and I would deem it far beyond the scope here.

 

Quantum mechanics is AXIOMATICALLY REQUIRED to reproduce classical mechanics. Doctor Dick's system does not include the necessary axioms (essentially the correspondence principle + measurement). Quantum mechanics is MORE than just an equation- reproducing Schroedinger's equation DOES NOT mean you have reproduced quantum mechanics.

 

~modest

[Rade]

But Rade the OP doesn't even specify what the question is.

Yes, I know. I already posted the 4 different versions of "the question" as presented in quotes by Doctordick.

 

version #1 "The question is, How the hell can we manage to come up with a world view when we have nothing to work with ?"

 

version #2 "How to achieve a world-view is the critical question ?"

 

version #3 "How can one create a mental model of totally unknown and undefined information ?"

 

version #4 "What can one say about all internally consistent tautological constructs ?"

[Qfwfq]

Yeah Rade I was just making a dig at Dick's OP. :)

 

Modest I'm not so sure what your point is when you say;

The problem is not in the classical limit. Dick and Anssi have been saying that classical mechanics *approximately* obeys his equation to which I have not disagreed.

and I don't think there's much sense in going into details of complicated topics such as the correspondence principle, Ehrenfest and things. Note that I did not imply no approximations being necessary. I disagree with that author's semantic interpretation of what he calls "the slogan" because it means exactly what he gives as the result of Ehrenfest's theorem and plainly does not mean what he compares it to. I don't even get how a good quantum physicist should interpret the sentence as that incorrect formula; it's just a strawman. :shrug:

 

Mainly, I think it would serve Dick well enough (and Anssi, if ever possible) to get themselves clearer on various topics of quantum physics but it isn't the core thing for criticism of his claims and arguments in defence of them. It risks being a big wasted effort, especially because it runs into the objection that you are assumimg your worldview to be valid. :rolleyes:

 

To continue my example from the last post, someone being killed by an experiment is not a close enough approximation to their being unharmed by the experiment.

Certainly, but when I said appropriate provisions for cases not having a classical anologue I was being very brief and concise. :evil: To put it another brief way, it isn't an objection to that part of their argument, indeed it would be somewhat more back the opposite way.

 

Also,

I find the first sentence in your quote of Will objectionable and I don't consider that requirement as a defining axiom; the requirement is that it must agree with observation, including macroscopic experience. If taken literally it would be even more stringent than what you're objecting to, no approximations nor any further Ansatz would be necessary. Which, of course, isn't so.

 

In short, I've come to the conclusion that it's better to focus on more formal criticism of their claims, separately from discussing the sloppiness of Dick's conclusions concerning physics.

[modest]

In short, I've come to the conclusion that it's better to focus on more formal criticism of their claims, separately from discussing the sloppiness of Dick's conclusions concerning physics.

 

That is what I am doing. There is a reason that a counterexample is well suited to this thread. Consider, how do we know that reality is fundamentally of a quantum mechanical nature and not of a classical mechanical nature? Most especially, how would we know a priori, before any sensory input—or, put another way, without being able to trust our perceptions?

 

That is the question that the thread concerns itself with. Whatever answer you or I might give, we can set that aside for a second and focus on DD's answer:

 

What I have discovered is that I can guarantee you that, for any explanation of anything, there exists a totally consistent interpretation of the symbols used to communicate that explanation which will require the fundamental elements of that explanation to obey my equation so long as that explanation is internally consistent

Quite simply, any good and internally consistent explanation of any conceivable data set (for example, reality) will obey his equation.

 

So, let's put together a data set in x,y,z,t space... something very simple. Actually, let's put together two data sets. We shoot a single electron, at a high speed, toward a single wire repeated a few hundred times. In the first set of data the deflection of the electron makes an interference pattern and in the other it does not (it is classically deflected).

 

To keep with the theme of the thread, we need to explain the data. The first set of data can be explained well enough with quantum mechanics and the second can be explained with classical mechanics. Doctordick's central claim that is most relevant to this thread is that both explanations of both data sets will obey his equation.

 

In other words, if we express classical mechanics in a mathematically rigorous way (for example, Lagrangian mechanics) then the "symbols used to communicate that explanation" should be mappable into his fundamental equation. But, this is *not* the case with this specific example. Yet, Lagrangian mechanics obeys symmetry and is internally consistent as a mathematical system.

 

What we have, then, is a counterexample to the very claim which purports to solve the question of this thread.

 

Also, the waters here run deep. If you ask Anssi, he will tell you that Newton knew everything necessary to derive relativistic and quantum mechanics. Newton had all of the information necessary to derive modern physics. Do you see why he would make this assertion?

 

Most of us know that a finite invariant speed is a necessary axiom for the derivation of relativistic mechanics. Newton did not know there was a finite invariant speed (eg the speed of light). Newton, therefore, could have rationally derived both relativistic and classical mechanics. If an invariant speed existed then the former would be correct and if there were no invariant speed then the latter would be correct and Newton couldn't discern the two in his time.

 

But, if Anssi accepted and expressed what I just said then it would break his philosophical view (the same view that purports to solve the question of this thread). Do you see why it breaks his philosophical view?

 

~modest

[Qfwfq]

That is what I am doing. There is a reason that a counterexample is well suited to this thread. Consider, how do we know that reality is fundamentally of a quantum mechanical nature and not of a classical mechanical nature? Most especially, how would we know a priori, before any sensory input—or, put another way, without being able to trust our perceptions?

Not quite. I actually see it the opposite way around; a conjectural reality described by classical mechanics is a case included in the possible ones described by first quantization.

 

In this sense, the quantum formalism is more general, as well as by the fact that a quantum hamiltonian might not have a corresponding classical one (as indeed is so, in the case of the Dirac equation). A reality described by classical mechanics is therefore a restriction among the possibilities which the quantum formalism includes. That's why I found Will's point surprising; a classical description simply can be seen as having probability distributions confined to 0 or 1 (for dicrete spectra, else the Kronecker symbol gets replaced by a Dirac one) in the limit of ideal precision.

 

It is simpler if we consider a quantum case with classic analogue, in the classic limit the probabilities narrow down around and approach those of the classical description. This will definitely happen in the diffraction grating example you describe, work out how the interference patterns go in the limit of wavelength approaching zero.

 

Quite simply, any good and internally consistent explanation of any conceivable data set (for example, reality) will obey his equation.

No, shhhhhh! :zip: That is no longer what their claim is, after Minitrue rectified it due to the matter of arbitrary choices. They currently claim the FE is equivalent to anything one could arrive at without the same choices.

 

In other words, if we express classical mechanics in a mathematically rigorous way (for example, Lagrangian mechanics) then the "symbols used to communicate that explanation" should be mappable into his fundamental equation. But, this is *not* the case with this specific example.

Just as in the case of the Dirac equation, because it lacks a classic analogue. Apart from this, the classic limit isn't so simply defined in his presentation because he doesn't make a definition analogous to Planck's constant, which in QM mainly boils down to being part of the axiom for time evolution. Dick's approach differs egregiously there but the classic limit would still involve having all the phases approach zero.

 

What we have, then, is a counterexample to the very claim which purports to solve the question of this thread.

No and also, it has become less easy to demonstrate a counterexample after Minitrue rectified the claim.

 

If you ask Anssi, he will tell you that Newton knew everything necessary to derive relativistic and quantum mechanics. Newton had all of the information necessary to derive modern physics. Do you see why he would make this assertion?

Trust Anssi, he has such a great faith in Dick's argument that we common mortals could never hope to achieve. :rolleyes:

 

Do you see why it breaks his philosophical view?

Currently I can't say because, after Minitrue rectified the claim, I'm not perfectly sure if he still believes the Minkowskian nature of spacetime to be consequent to the symmetry constraints but I imagine he does due to believing in the equivalence; it is just a matter of choosing the world view according to which the FE holds, as far as I can make out. So the Ansatz that you rely on seems to be due to the mere choice of world view (which of course is one of the possible valid ones). If I'm guessing right about this being his current philosophical view, it isn't as simple to cantradict it as you reckon. Edited February 19, 2011 by Qfwfq
lost bit more or less restored, Minitrue must be hard at work here!!!

[modest]

Sorry for such an incomplete response. I don't have any free time today.

 

In this sense, the quantum formalism is more general...

 

That may be, but as Will noted, we are not working with QM.

 

That's why I found Will's point surprising; a classical description simply can be seen as having probability distributions confined to 0 or 1 (for dicrete spectra, else the Kronecker symbol gets replaced by a Dirac one) in the limit of ideal precision.

 

The classical limit involves [math]\hbar \rightarrow 0[/math] as I think you already mentioned.

 

Here is the equation under consideration:

 

[math] \left\{\sum_i \vec{\alpha}_i \cdot \vec{\nabla}_i + \sum_{i \neq j}\beta_{ij}\delta(\vec{x}_i -\vec{x}_j) \right\}\vec{\Psi} = K\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}. [/math]

 

with derivation and variables explained here:

 

http://web.archive.org/web/20070811215245/home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm

 

[also, Dick, if you want me to set those archived pages to be hosted somewhere permanent let me know]

 

I'm not sure if you mean to make [math]K = i \hbar[/math], but [math]K[/math] cannot be zero in the above equation. I don't see how you would propose mapping classical delta functions into this equation. Even as an approximate solution, I don't see, for example, how you can get to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation from the above equation by setting variables.

 

The claim is that the above equation maps any explanation, including classical mechanics (or, at least, that was the claim).

 

after Minitrue rectified

 

I laughed out loud at that one :hihi:

 

No, shhhhhh! :zip: That is no longer what their claim is, after Minitrue rectified it due to the matter of arbitrary choices. They currently claim the FE is equivalent to anything one could arrive at without the same choices.

 

If that is the case then the FE is not a solution to the question being proposed here.

 

~modest

[Doctordick]

Ok guys, let me try to lay out to you exactly what I have and have not done and Anssi, you are specifically excluded from any of my complaints!

 

First, I have specifically defined exactly what I mean by the word “explanation”; something everyone else refuses to do. You all prefer to work with emotional impressions of what you mean under the idea that everyone will accurately infer exactly what you mean (you are under the false impression that you are communicating with one another and would apparently prefer that impression not be disturbed).

 

Under my definition of an explanation, I have logically deduced that my fundamental equation is an accurate mathematical constraint on the expectations a valid explanation can produce (“valid”, “expectations” and “explanation” all being specifically defined). Qfwfq, you prefer to hide behind words you fail to define. You have used the word “model” a number of times without defining exactly what you mean and failing to comprehend that what you are talking about is exactly what is defined by my “i” indices (a collection of defined elements whose behavior is defined by the complete collection of those elements; the definitions being an open undefined collection other than the fact that as a set they constitute an explanation under my definition).

 

Everyone argues about the validity of my deductions essentially on the grounds that they disagree with me and at no point does anyone argue with any specific step in my deduction. All your arguments are emotionally based and totally devoid of logical analysis.

 

Finally, in view of the fact that my deduction is rather extraordinary, and could indeed contain errors, I resort to some rather extraordinary evidence that it is correct (extraordinary claims do indeed require extraordinary evidence). First, as should be quite evident to anyone competent in mathematics, a general solution to my equation is not a reasonable possibility (see many body equations) ( First I show that, under the common approximations used to define Schrödinger's equation, my fundamental equation also reduces to Schrödinger's equation with a very extraordinary implication: Plank's constant [math]\hbar[/math] is circularly defined (something not particularly evident in common physics presentations).

 

And there is another thing in that OP that Qfwfg should be aware of; an issue that he seems to totally ignore.

 

The future is a totally unknown issue. Our only defense of our expectations is that the volume of information which goes to make up the past is far far in excess of the next “present” (from our perspective): i.e., it would be rather ridiculous to conclude that anything in the next “present” would be sufficiently significant to be a major alteration to the net past (that would be “all the information we are trying to make sense of”).

 

I am here referring to his totally ridiculous post of Febuary 11

 

Anssi, I meant that the fundamental, most general assumtion is that the features of the data NOT be mere apophenia. Did I sufficiently emphasizse the not? I meant that in order to NOT be apophenia, they've gotta be due to something eh?

Note that, in my deduction, I did not assume that the underlying data was NOT mere apophenia; I merely assumed one had some data which was being explained. Even in any large finite collection of random numbers, if it is sufficiently large, patterns will exist and there may be an infinite number of explanations consistent with those "known" patterns (what I have defined to be “the past”: i.e., that which is known). It is you who is continually making assumptions which you cannot prove. Unless you can perhaps prove that such an assumption is valid.

 

What is extrodinary about my presentation is that I essentially show that making that assumption is not necessary; even if the data is totally random, a valid explanation (one consistent with the known data) the appropriate expectations still must obey my equation. And modest, that does not imply that your explanations obey my equation. It merely means that, if your explanation is indeed consistent with all the known data, your approximations to that data contain assumed relationships counter to what is actually known. You should be aware that it is well known by any decently educated person that classical mechanics is an approximation to the known information and does not yield universally valid expectations.

 

Gosh you make it tiring. When you wrote things like:were you not saying that it suffices to give the word future an ad hoc definition? What then did you mean by "not yet known" and why did you put it in quotes? How does it differ from comparing a known part of the data with what a model implies about it considering other parts of the data?

“Not yet known” implies “time” only in your rather restricted world view. Under my definition of time, “not yet known” means no more than the fact that the pattern of data being explained does not include the data being referred to and it may never include that data: i.e., the future is “unknown” in spite of your rather undefendable assumed conclusions (you apparently cannod tell the difference between your expectations and truth). Valid is defined as being consistent with ALL the known data. If your “model” does not give the correct answer for all known data, the explanation via that model is invalid! And that issue goes directly to modest's continual complaint about classical mechanics. It is a well known fact that Schrödinger's mechanics is perfectly consistent with classical mechanics once the appropriate approximations are made. But on to other issues.

 

I further show Dirac's equation can be shown to be equivalent to my fundamental equation when appropriate approximations are made. Furthermore Maxwell's equations fall out (again when the appropriate approximations are made). If you have the intellect to follow the representation, it should be clear to all that special relativity is also a consequence of my analysis. And that brings up some additional “extraordinary evidence”. I also deduce General relativity from my representation. The “extraordinary” issue there is that there is no conflict between QM and GR seen from the perspective of approximate solutions to my equation. This is extraordinary in view of the fact that the conflict between the two “theories” held by modern physics is one of the outstanding problems with modern physics.

 

I also once again comment that my results are not theoretical; they are no more than the consequences of my definition of “an explanation”.

 

I bring this all up for the very simple reason that the great majority of you all seem to think that the appropriate attack here is to find a counter example to my claims. That attack is totally bogus for the following reasons.

 

First, Physics (which is essentially shown to be an approximate solution to my equation) is one of the most carefully examined fields of scientific research. I know of no chemists who would consider any specific chemical result to constitute a counter example to Physics. And I know of no biologist who would regard any biological theory to be a valid counter example to either Physics or Chemistry. They would regard such a theory to be invalid on the face of the facts. Regarding that issue, Qfwfq, what part of your “Sudoku” example is inconsistent with modern physics?

 

My only conclusion is that none of you have the slightest idea as to what I am talking about. If you all want to just believe you are right and I am wrong, so be it. I certainly believe in freedom of religion; I just don't enjoy listening to people preach to me. :lol:

 

Have fun -- Dick

[Qfwfq]

I did say that the classical limit is not well defined in Dick's presentation and I was not by any means supporting the idea that one could recover CM from the FE, ideed I said that the Dirac equation (which Dick recovers from it) lacks a classic analogue and, also, the very reason Minitrue rectified the claim was when I argued its lack of universality. I have never attempted to examine a classical limit for Dick's presentation and I did not mean to define it as [imath]K=i\hbar[/imath], I only said it would involve the phases approaching zero; I hadn't specified anything more exactly about how and I think in the end it would boil down to adding the things in QM the aren't in his presentation. At that point, of course, it would become the von Neumann formalism instead of Dick's formalism. :doh:

 

Perhaps it is hard to follow my arguments because I'm saying a lot in few words and there are also various different ways people mean things, according to which courses they followed. To me, both classical and quantum mechanics are very general formalisms. The Dirac equation is one particular case of Schrödinger equation. I dunno, I get the idea we're talking apples for pears a little bit.

 

That may be, but as Will noted, we are not working with QM.

No, but I thought I was addressing what I had quoted. I did however leave out something I meant to include: Dick doesn't appear to be claiming a proof of reality being quantum rather than classical.

 

If that is the case then the FE is not a solution to the question being proposed here.

It hasn't ever been all that clear what question is being proposed here.

[modest]

I only said it would involve the phases approaching zero; I hadn't specified anything more exactly about how and I think in the end it would boil down to adding the things in QM the aren't in his presentation. At that point, of course, it would become the von Neumann formalism instead of Dick's formalism. :doh:

 

Right. Exactly. The FE, as it stands now, does not make allowance for such a thing.

 

My objection, and Will's objection, is that classical mechanics cannot be a solution of the FE as it is now (and Dick's claim is that "the symbols used to communicate any internally consistent explanation must obey the FE" as it stands now). Dick's presentation does not allow the introduction of new axioms. He proposes it as a tautology.

 

I did however leave out something I meant to include: Dick doesn't appear to be claiming a proof of reality being quantum rather than classical.

 

I don't think Dick is making any argument about reality (he is very carefully avoiding that).

 

Dick is, however, saying that a proper explanation of any data set must be quantum mechanical in nature (a notion for which I obviously disagree). I've, in fact, given a relevant quote of Dick's: "until that information is available to us, the outcome is in the future and is only determinable as a probability. Thus it is that the mechanism to be used is quantum mechanics which overtly recognizes probabilistic outcomes."

 

His FE bears this belief out.

 

It hasn't ever been all that clear what question is being proposed here.

 

I agree, but I've seen Anssi and Dick talk about the problem before many times, so it is not unfamiliar to me. The question is:

 

If we cannot know the true nature of reality then how can we develop a worldview that usefully represents that reality?

 

~modest

[AnssiH]

Clearly you have a mis-understanding about what I said. Let's put it this way:

 

A: I was NOT allowing only one static "moment of time" to be expressed

B: I WAS allowing either only one, or alternatively any arbitrary number of "moments" to be expressed

 

Focus:

 

I know you said "by pretending to not know some part of the data and generate expectations about that", but that is just semantics, it's the same procedure and yields the same conclusion about the uncertainty of the chosen terminology. What makes it non-general is that this procedure is only restricted to cases where all the undefined information is available at the get-go. (i.e. in terms of DD's analysis, like he said, that just means all the information appears in one "t"

 

Nothing makes it not general, because it applies equally well to both cases. Why do you think it's me that's restricting the matter when I'm being more general?

 

I was clearly referring to the case of "pretending to not know some part of the data whilst having all the data available".

 

If you don't have all the data available at the get go, you have this epistemological possibility of defining "future".

 

If you do have all the data at the get go, it amounts to an explanation of static nature. I.e. your world view must say "nothing is happening", as no information is accumulating.

 

Like I said before, I am using the word "future" for the simple reason that then it corresponds to what we all mean by "my personal future".

 

Modest and I were not in any manner suggesting you should restrict the notion of a world view like that. Modest and I weren't saying that you shouldn't assume such a thing as time existing because it doesn't, we just meant that you are tacitly assuming it from the start when you claim you don't; without this tacit assumption you can't give any meaning to things you always say, like defining your "future" as what you "don't yet know" (which you clarified you meant as the information has not been yet "received" at all) and even when you talk about change. We simply think you appear to have an ontological belief, and you sure were objecting to my points about the logical equivalence and in my dumb world view your replies boiled down to discarding them because there would be no such a thing as time and change, "all would be static" you said.

 

No I was not objecting to your point of logical equivalence.

 

On a general note, whenever I say something is a universal property of explanations or world views, you can be sure that I am referring to universal possibility of making such epistemological definition. I think me and DD have both been hammering continuously that this thing does NOT make any ontological claims, so if anything I say seems to you like a trivially undefendable ontological claim, just make an attempt to interpret it in terms of epistemological validity.

 

With that, do you have any questions about the epistemological validity of defining the "information you do not yet have", as "future"?

 

I don't see why anyone would think this, except by being utterly confused. I find it simple, suppose I will read something about history that I currently don't know. Why should people be refusing to understand such a trivial notion?

 

Indeed, sometimes it gets very frustrating :(

 

I think mostly it arises from refusal to use DD's definition of "future", but instead insisting on using what they think of as "the future of the universe", without undersatnding that it is entirely a product of their particular world view.

 

And of course you failed to appreciate my point.

 

No I quite agreed with your point, sorry if I wasn't clear about that.

 

Even if you don't exist? How could you have an interpretation at all, regarless of it changing due to the time travel, if you don't exist?

 

I don't understand at all what you are referring to and why, and in what sense do you mean "you don't exist".

 

At any rate, the essence of what I was trying to say was again pretty trivial; a world view never ever needs to be able to represent changes to the "past" data.

 

I,e, universally, we can handle the so-called "personal past" as a static set.

 

Again, you would not believe how many people fight about that, due to inability to follow DD's definition of "past", but instead insisting that past is what they think of as "the history of the universe".

 

I don't have time to respond more right now, I'll continue later if there's need.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

I still skimmed through the new posts and wanted to say to Qfwfq that I appreciate your efforts to talk with Modest, and wanted to confirm that it does seem to me that you are on many cases closer to understanding this thing correctly, than Modest is.

 

I trust you can also appreciate how difficult it can be to communicate this thing with all the semantical ambiguities involved. I feel Modest is completely set into his interpretation of what DD means, and is not really making an attempt to understand it anymore. I feel like he wants to seen an error in there and so he just wants to find a way to phrase things in a way that an error seems apparent.

 

I'd like to point out one common theme that seems to be persistent in the mis-interpretation of DD's message, and I believe you can understand my complaint;

 

Consider, how do we know that reality is fundamentally of a quantum mechanical nature and not of a classical mechanical nature?

 

Me or DD have not at any point made any arguments about what reality is like, it has only been argued, through relatively many logical steps, that quantum mechanical interpretation is valid way to interpret any recurring events.

 

I believe big part of the reason why Modest thinks an argument has been made about reality is because of an assumption that a world model is valid only if it corresponds to the actual structure of reality. And that issue goes directly to the complaint expressed in the OP, and to the fact that valid predictions do not mean our definitions are literally "true to reality"; i.e. a valid way to draw expectations does not necessarily entail any knowledge about the meaning of information (whose explicit meaning is unknown anyway).

 

 

On another note, I understand your comments about things getting ridiculously complicated to actually analyze if you get into details, and that I feel is just a reflection of having such a numerous ways to understand these matters, especially when you get into the details. I understand that when you are involved with these details, it gets increasingly frustrating to even communicate what one means when saying anything.

 

I think DD's post there phrases it rather clearly and trivially, but perhaps only I feel that way because I already understand the terminology correctly... The thing is that it's really quite unncessary to go into these counter examples and countless little intricacies when the mapping from a specific set of definitions to his notation is unknown (i.e. what are the necessary approximations), and when it's not really even possible to find out whether these specific examples are self-coherent (in terms of what DD means by self-coherent, which I won't spell out again, but it's all been defined).

 

For instance, judging by your comments, I trust you are able to see trivially, that we can universally represent our expectations about the "future" (as it has been defined) in terms of probability. And I believe you know how frustrating it is to have someone mis-interpret that and consequently ask you to explain 10 pages of Wikipedia, which they think are proving you wrong in some way.

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

Gosh Anssi, you keep getting into such semantic ambiguity, with consequent misunderstandings about ontological matters:

I believe big part of the reason why Modest thinks an argument has been made about reality is because of an assumption that a world model is valid only if it corresponds to the actual structure of reality. And that issue goes directly to the complaint expressed in the OP, and to the fact that valid predictions do not mean our definitions are literally "true to reality"; i.e. a valid way to draw expectations does not necessarily entail any knowledge about the meaning of information (whose explicit meaning is unknown anyway).

You see, I can't be sure of your meaning and it might be interpreted as if you say the features of the data are mere apophenia, or perhaps you just mean that whatever model we find to be valid is no more than a good model. Can't you sort it out and clarify?

 

I understand what you mean Modest, but I think we're talking two sides of the same coin. I already got out of them that the FE is arrived at with ad hoc choices, deliberately made to get the Dirac equation, so I don't see the point of beating a dead horse........

At least until Minitrue orders yet another rectification and the horse is no longer dead.

 

I don't think Dick is making any argument about reality (he is very carefully avoiding that).

In a sense he is; what he avoids is making any assumptions about reality, but what he claims is a constraint on any interpretaion of reality. The diatribe is over how tight the constraint could be, based only on his initial premises.

 

Dick is, however, saying that a proper explanation of any data set must be quantum mechanical in nature (a notion for which I obviously disagree). I've, in fact, given a relevant quote of Dick's: "until that information is available to us, the outcome is in the future and is only determinable as a probability. Thus it is that the mechanism to be used is quantum mechanics which overtly recognizes probabilistic outcomes."

 

His FE bears this belief out.

It's about as useful as pointing out pieces of the Bible which seem to contradict each other. :hihi: More seriously, I think his point there was more the problem of induction, so you could consider his reference to probability in a Carnapian sense. Also, don't forget that probabilities don't originate only from quantum formalism, strict determinism requires precision of boundary conditions and becomes hopeless in complex cases, especially with chaotic attractors.

 

Anssi, goodness. You're going round in circles and it gets to be utterly useless. I understand the conceptual distinction between "one's personal past" and an objective notion but you haven't been getting my points and there seems to be no hope of getting them across without you mistaking my meaning as usual. The tacit sine qua non then is the existence of the mind's before vs. after. There are however some tricky matters which you apparently fail to see. If you say you are not objecting to my point about the logical equivalence, then you ought to realize that if all the data is "in the past" and, considering that you apply the same analysis to a megasudoku type of a thing, with like conclusions being valid then, according to your claims, a world view of it would be valid in which the Dirac equation holds and the Minkowskian nature of spacetime, but you could arbitrarily choose whatever parts of the data as "past" and "future".

 

What are we to make of this? As with any hypothetical scenario of travelling back into the past, paradoxes would ensue that you could scarcely avoid without denying the existence of cause-effect relations and the familiar experience of them propagating only forward in time. This would prove, as I said, that God not only exists but is evil too; He's laughing His arse into bits as He watches all our painful strife and misery, which is all due to not being able to have any effect on the past nor even just use information we now know to exploit some past event in retrospective. Can you fathom the implications of this?

 

BTW if you really can't figure the reason for my question "Even if you don't exist?" you can find an example in a film entitled Return To The Future but, of course, gloss over a fewlittle matters that simply made it entertaining for the audience but aren't so logically strict (such as tha photo gradually fading and him feeling ever more freakish and then snapping back to as soon as his parents have become a couple). More logically, if the boy prevented them from producing him he wouldn't exist in the first place but, without existing, he couldn't prevent anything anyway; in short, it just couldn't happen. There is of course the alternative Ansatz but it isn't really much less freaky: the time traveller's actions would be constrained to not changing how things actually did go, from that past until the "departure" time. Question here is, who would make sure of that? God? Well, let's say it's at least as freaky as some aspects of QM.

 

On a general note, whenever I say something is a universal property of explanations or world views, you can be sure that I am referring to universal possibility of making such epistemological definition. I think me and DD have both been hammering continuously that this thing does NOT make any ontological claims, so if anything I say seems to you like a trivially undefendable ontological claim, just make an attempt to interpret it in terms of epistemological validity.

Sure, I have blind faith in Papal Infallibility.

 

Qfwfq, you prefer to hide behind words you fail to define. You have used the word “model” a number of times without defining exactly what you mean and failing to comprehend that what you are talking about is exactly what is defined by my “i” indices

Seems like you are addressing points of mine without in the least having followed my exchanges with Anssi. What do you think I meant? Did you not notice how, recently, I discussed the logical equivalence with him? I simply find it useful, and more general, to say "a model that all data complies with" but I can also call it a world view that is valid, once my drift has been understood.

 

Note that, in my deduction, I did not assume that the underlying data was NOT mere apophenia; I merely assumed one had some data which was being explained.

I did not accuse you of having made this assumption. I actually said you did not explicitly state either this nor the contrary, but it is a tacit assumption if one believes there is any use at all in drawing expectations based, in any whatsoever manner, on the past. You did not get my point any better than Anssi did.

 

Even in any large finite collection of random numbers, if it is sufficiently large, patterns will exist and there may be an infinite number of explanations consistent with those "known" patterns (what I have defined to be “the past”: i.e., that which is known).

Sure! Red Herring. What are we to make of it? Tell us also, what do you make of this example? Dick, it is a fact that I was reasoning on, I had even tried to get it into my discussion with Anssi, but to no avail. :doh:

 

It is you who is continually making assumptions which you cannot prove. Unless you can perhaps prove that such an assumption is valid.

Which assumption? Do you contend that we might be surviving on mere apophenia? :rolleyes: If you do, I can only wish the best of luck to you cuz you'll need plenty of it, and I really really really mean plenty, a great whopping lot. Trouble is we'll all need as much luck, if your opinion is true. But wait, why should I say "we" if all is apophenia? It would imply solipsism first of all and then scarce chances for the future.

 

What is extrodinary about my presentation is that I essentially show that making that assumption is not necessary; even if the data is totally random, a valid explanation (one consistent with the known data) the appropriate expectations still must obey my equation.

OMG it look like Minitrue has already rectified the claim back to what it was. What is certain is that the above has no bearing on the actual chances (which of course needn't be those given by the explanation if there is nothing in the source of the data which ensures its validity).

 

Another couple of Red Herrings:

“Not yet known” implies “time” only in your rather restricted world view. Under my definition of time, “not yet known” means no more than the fact that the pattern of data being explained does not include the data being referred to and it may never include that data: i.e., the future is “unknown” in spite of your rather undefendable assumed conclusions (you apparently cannod tell the difference between your expectations and truth).

On what do you think I was basing my own discussion with Anssi?

 

Physics (which is essentially shown to be an approximate solution to my equation) is one of the most carefully examined fields of scientific research. I know of no chemists who would consider any specific chemical result to constitute a counter example to Physics. And I know of no biologist who would regard any biological theory to be a valid counter example to either Physics or Chemistry. They would regard such a theory to be invalid on the face of the facts.Regarding that issue, Qfwfq, what part of your “Sudoku” example is inconsistent with modern physics?

Dick, strawman, I did not say the sudoku example is inconsistent with modern physics. Do you really think this is the criticism people are moving toward you?

 

My only conclusion is that none of you have the slightest idea as to what I am talking about. If you all want to just believe you are right and I am wrong, so be it. I certainly believe in freedom of religion; I just don't enjoy listening to people preach to me.

Yes Dick, and we just don't enjoy listening to people preach to us either. So, you have as much right to your delusion as we have to ours. :shrug:

[AnssiH]

You see, I can't be sure of your meaning and it might be interpreted as if you say the features of the data are mere apophenia, or perhaps you just mean that whatever model we find to be valid is no more than a good model. Can't you sort it out and clarify?

 

I can try.

 

I still don't know what you mean by "pure apophenia" so I can't tell if I'd subscribe to that suggestion or not.

 

But "whatever model we find to be valid is no more than a good model" is something I could well say. And I would be referring to our ability to model reality in many equivalent ways, using different sorts of defined entities. So more specifically, it is the actual existence of the defined entities that is always a matter of belief.

 

So if by "pure apophenia" you refer to the idea that the defined entities of our world model do not exist as things-in-themselves, then yes I would subscribe to what you call "pure apophenia".

 

On the other hand, if you mean "not connected to reality", no I would not subscribe to that. Certainly there is a connection, even if I view the defined entities of our world view as mere tools of trade for producing valid predictions. Obviously different sets of tools yield very different looking reality with the exact same measure of validity.

 

Hope that's helpful.

 

-Anssi