What is Science?

[SidewalkCynic]

From Karl Popper's 1959 "The logic of scientific discovery":

 

Don't let this quote fool you that Popper was supporting inductivism. In the book he's very critical of it. I agree with the quote, and it's something that is voiced throughout the thread. Science is not only only knowledge (i.e. information), and a logical system of understanding that knowledge (or, as SidewalkCynic might say: "defining it"), but also a particular method (the scientific method) for assuring that the system works consistently with our world of experience.

 

~modest

Looks like a good read, thanks.

 

Now then, is scientific method a deductive process, or would it be better described another way?

[Mercedes Benzene]

Now then, is scientific method a deductive process, or would it be better described another way?

You're treading into philosophical waters.

Now, since the "scientific method" is not very well defined, it might be best to examine some of the origins of modern sciences.

 

Descartes was considered the first "modern philosopher" when it comes to mathematics and physics. There really was no such thing as the "scientific method," but rather, Descartes used many scientific methods. He questioned whether it is really possible for us to know anything for sure. So, in order to rehabilitate human reason, he decided it would be a good idea to start with the basics. He used urban planning as a metaphor: If one sets out to plan a city, one should not look at old cities. One should start from scratch. Rebuild the city with organization and credibility. This was how he planned to restore society... ignore past authority, and examine things himself.

His method was deductive.

1. Simplify complex problems into small, simplistic parts
   
2. Subdivide problems
   
3. Guide thoughts in an orderly way. Start with the simplest
   
4. Establish rules, so as to not omit anything
   

(See "Discourse on Method")

Basically, Descartes' ideas focused on the theoretical. Work through problems logically (Euclidian philosophy).

So is this most like the modern scientific method? Is it primarily deductive.

 

We can also look at the work of Bacon. Bacon's goal was to distinguish between sound and unsound knowledge. Unlike Descartes, Bacon thought it better to ignore deduction. Don't start by splitting up a large problem, don't start with math, and don't jump to general conclusions. Bacon's method is entirely inductive.

 

Now obviously, neither of these embodies modern scientific method completely, since it has drawn from so many different philosophical ideologies. I'm personally of the opinion that modern scientific method is more inductive than deductive, although both obviously play some role. I also think it is entirely dependent on the circumstances. Some situations lend themselves better to deductive reasoning, while others lend themselves better to inductive reasoning.

 

The main problem is: we can't decide on a precise definition for modern scientific method, so how can be definitively decide how it operates?

[SidewalkCynic]

The main problem is: we can't decide on a precise definition for modern scientific method, so how can be definitively decide how it operates?

Well, if this is true, as I previously assumed, then, "scientific method," or any term devised to refer to scientific method, cannot be apart of the definition of science.

Now obviously, neither of these embodies modern scientific method completely, since it has drawn from so many different philosophical ideologies. I'm personally of the opinion that modern scientific method is more inductive than deductive, although both obviously play some role. I also think it is entirely dependent on the circumstances. Some situations lend themselves better to deductive reasoning, while others lend themselves better to inductive reasoning.

Is it possible that a deductive scientific method, and an inductive scientific method, can be segregated and isolated, and both then, described consistantly?

Or then, does it become a problem in each specific field?

[modest]

Looks like a good read, thanks.

 

No problem. The book definitely worth the read if you're in to this sort of thing. It's really-highly praised in philosophy of science. "Original" and "landmark" and all that. It introduced the idea of falsifiability of scientific theories because observations can't prove that a theory is universally true (only that it isn't yet falsified). It's one of those things that seems so obvious that you can't imagine its such a modern concept.

 

Now then, is scientific method a deductive process, or would it be better described another way?

 

Yeah, good call. While Mercedes Benzene is surely correct that it's neither entirely inductive or deductive, Popper's rendition of it was written as a rejection of the inductive method (which was the name for the old scientific method).

 

He called it the hypothetico-deductive method. So, I'd say you could describe it as a deductive method, and you're in fact spot on seeing how it is named that. The idea is essentially:

hypothetico-deductive method

 

Scientific method whereby science should set up testable hypotheses and then try to falsify them, rather than trying to confirm them directly by accumulating favourable evidence.

 

Hypothetico-Deductive Method

 

And wiki says:

Karl Popper (1902-1994) is generally credited with providing a context for major improvements in scientific method in the mid-to-late 20th century. In 1934 Popper published The Logic of Scientific Discovery which repudiated the classical observationalist-inductivist account of scientific method and advanced empirical falsifiability as the criterion for distinguishing scientific theory from non-science. According to Popper, scientific theory should make predictions (preferably predictions that are not made by a competing theory) which can be tested and the theory rejected if these predictions are shown not to be correct. Following Peirce and others, he argued that science would best progress using deductive reasoning as its primary emphasis, known as critical rationalism. His astute formulations of logical procedure helped to reign in the excessive use of inductive speculation upon inductive speculation, and also helped to strengthen the conceptual foundation for today's peer review procedures.

 

History of scientific method - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

It really is the modern scientific method.

 

~modest

EDIT: Of course, creating an hypothesis in the first place is mostly going to be an inductive affair.

[SidewalkCynic]

Okay, I found this in the history of scientific method article:

An Egyptian medical textbook, the Edwin Smith papyrus, (circa 1600 BC), applies the basic components of scientific method: examination, diagnosis, treatment and prognosis, to the treatment of disease.

Now, in each of these four steps, I can identify that the doctor ("scientist") is reliant upon referencing defined information. He cannot examine, if he cannot identify the consistently defined physiological components and recognize the consistently defined diagnostic anomalies to prescribe a consistently defined treatment; where as, he finally reaches the stage where he can make an educated guess as to how well the treatment will effect the patient, so as to assist in the subsequent examination and any further exercise of repeating the defined method.

 

In this example, I would be more inclined to categorize the doctor in the same category as engineers. I see the "consistently defined" information the doctors and engineers reference as being the result of science. And this, analysis of mine, should not be incongruous with that of the general population, who when freely associating terminologies, incorrectly refer science to the listing of information found in the categories of physics, astronomy, life sciences, earth sciences, and the etc., which should be understood as technology, because it is information used as a tool.

[modest]

The question, If you'll indulge me SidewalkCynic, is how does one know that any given definition is consistent with reality? There are many different logically consistent definitions which might apply to something like "mass" or "lightning". How do scientists, in a practical sense, decide on any given logically consistent description of a thing?

 

~modest

[lemit]

I don't know where to start with this. I've been away from this thread for a few days and am very dismayed at what I've found.

 

I thought somebody would correct the misimpression of research libraries before now. I'm sure I'm not the only Hypography member who knows Library of Congress classification has been the standard for 40 years or so. I'm sure I'm not the only one who knows Library of Congress is abbreviated LC.

 

I hope I'm not the only one who knows that Dewey was abandoned in research libaries many years ago because it is too vague and can't be adapted to new and developing research. I hope I'm not the only one who knows that while LC classification has its weakness, its beauty is in its standardization: an application for copyright starts the process of assigning an LC call number. The verso of the title page of all books on which a copyright is at least pending gives information about that call number. What that means is that you can go to any library in the country (except a few special libraries and school libraries, although most of them have ongoing conversion projects) and find the book under pretty much the same call number as in your local research or public library. And you can find related books much more easily than the somewhat primitive Dewey system allowed.

 

In the last few days, while this discussion was going on, I recommended Hypography to several of my friends who work in a research library where I worked close to 20 years. I'm really embarrassed.

 

I wonder, how do serious researchers not know how to use a research library? Are the rest of the posters here junior high school students? And why has this thread survived this long? It seems to be an attempt at prepublication promotion of a book. If you look at it as something more serious, it evaporates in a way that should be given serious study. I can tell you how to find books on evaporation.

 

I'd rather give a tutorial on research libraries on an appropriate thread, but lots of people inexplicably seem to be looking at this thread. I say inexplicably because there wasn't much here to begin with and then it turned into a discussion of an obsolete classification system. I had thought this was a serious science site and recommended it to my friends as such, even showing them how they could find me here. If any of them is reading this, I'm sorry.

 

--lemit

[Larv]

Rigorous peer review is really what science is all about. Peer review is the "natural selection" of the scientific process, wherein "unfit" ideas are tested and sent off for extinction, while others more defensible survive for another round of testing. Without peer review science would be just another religion.

 

As such, skepticism is the strongest muscle on the scientific body politic. Skepticism, formally executed in a peer review, often engages Occam's Razor to shave off needless fluff. Many scientists don't like the peer review process because they might see their fluff shaved off and rudely dispatched. The Internet forums on science, including this one, are great places to watch the fluff fly and see what survives.

 

Ya gotta by tough and wear Kevlar shorts to be a scientist.

[SidewalkCynic]

The question, If you'll indulge me SidewalkCynic, is how does one know that any given definition is consistent with reality? There are many different logically consistent definitions which might apply to something like "mass" or "lightning". How do scientists, in a practical sense, decide on any given logically consistent description of a thing?

 

~modest

Yeah, that's what I would like to clear up. And I think that my plan to encourage local districts to devise taxonomies consistent with their understanding of knowledge, and comparing them with other taxonomies and the demographic indexes that can be measured, perhaps patterns can be distinguished and eventually some form of better consistency can be evolved, or progressed.

 

I thought that scientists had some type of system that maintained a logical consistency - the only discrepancy I am aware/concerned about is the definition of science, but I have to read Popper, yet. I believe the ambiguous definition of science is just a result of previously inadequate analysis, and an over-zealous feud to distinguish science from religion. I am more inclined to suggest that religion employs science, and organized theist religions have a tendency to maintain antiquated applied social science practices. Where as, most atheists are so overwhelmed with the over-zealous feud that they have developed and impose a faulty social construct on the science industry and/or community. In other words, where we recognize that gods are used in an ambiguous manner to fulfill whatever matter need be by the theists, atheists use "science," and "reason," in just the same manner.

 

And all I want to do is to begin straightening out the discrepancies so as to begin progressing non-theist culture as for the better evolution of mankind. Yeah, it's going to be very difficult for atheists to accept what is on the horizon, but that is too bad - collectively they claim to have the open minds compared to the theists. I think they are just as dogmatic.

[SidewalkCynic]

I don't know where to start with this. I've been away from this thread for a few days and am very dismayed at what I've found.

So, what's your point in going any further?

 

I thought somebody would correct the misimpression of research libraries before now. I'm sure I'm not the only Hypography member who knows Library of Congress classification has been the standard for 40 years or so. I'm sure I'm not the only one who knows Library of Congress is abbreviated LC.

 

I hope I'm not the only one who knows that Dewey was abandoned in research libraries many years ago because it is too vague and can't be adapted to new and developing research. I hope I'm not the only one who knows that while LC classification has its weakness, its beauty is in its standardization: an application for copyright starts the process of assigning an LC call number. The verso of the title page of all books on which a copyright is at least pending gives information about that call number. What that means is that you can go to any library in the country (except a few special libraries and school libraries, although most of them have ongoing conversion projects) and find the book under pretty much the same call number as in your local research or public library. And you can find related books much more easily than the somewhat primitive Dewey system allowed.

Well, if you cannot say anything nice about the Dewey Decimal system why aren't you trying to dismantle it in favor of universal Library of Congress system?

 

In the last few days, while this discussion was going on, I recommended Hypography to several of my friends who work in a research library where I worked close to 20 years. I'm really embarrassed.

Why, do you think Hypography has the social networking capabilities designed to solve problems that other Internet, or otherwise, systems do not have?

 

I wonder, how do serious researchers not know how to use a research library?

Sounds like you are adding another method to the scientific method.

 

Are the rest of the posters here junior high school students? And why has this thread survived this long? It seems to be an attempt at prepublication promotion of a book. If you look at it as something more serious, it evaporates in a way that should be given serious study. I can tell you how to find books on evaporation.

Well, you are building a rhetorical battle with the participants in this thread - do you participate in every thread and make evaluations about the participants? You would better serve yourself if you participated in threads that you are sincerely interested in and ignore the threads you find beneath your intelligence level. Unless, of course, you were to enlighten us all with your enormous intellect of what is right and what is wrong, and how to progress a more perfect world.

 

No, it is not being used as a prepublication of a book. It is being used to fix the definition of science, and encourage others to devise classification systems they believe would be more beneficial to mankind.

 

I'd rather give a tutorial on research libraries on an appropriate thread, but lots of people inexplicably seem to be looking at this thread. I say inexplicably because there wasn't much here to begin with and then it turned into a discussion of an obsolete classification system.

What obsolete system?

 

I had thought this was a serious science site and recommended it to my friends as such, even showing them how they could find me here. If any of them is reading this, I'm sorry.

 

--lemit

Grow up, lemit - or be gone.

 

But, just in case, here's an opportunity to prove yourself.

 

lemit's discussion on research libraries

[modest]

I thought that scientists had some type of system that maintained a logical consistency - the only discrepancy I am aware/concerned about is the definition of science, but I have to read Popper, yet. I believe the ambiguous definition of science is just a result of previously inadequate analysis, and an over-zealous feud to distinguish science from religion.

 

Ah, but logical consistency isn't the pertinent question. Religion can be logically consistent with itself. It can be internally consistent just like science. If the definition of science were "Logically consistent system of knowledge" then religion could apply. But, science is more than that. If you do read Popper then you'll see it often stated: the system of "science" must maintain a mechanism for comparing the system of knowledge with reality to ensure it is not only logically consistent, by also not wrong. Information and predictions of theory must agree with experiment and observation. Religion requires no such thing. This is the key aspect that distinguishes them, and the definition of science should and does include this necessary component of falsification.

 

In order to make this idea a little more precise, we may distinguish three requirements which our empirical theoretical system will have to satisfy. First, it must be synthetic, so that it may represent a non-contradictory, a possible world. Secondly, it must satisfy the criterion of demarcation, i.e. it must not be metaphysical, but must represent a world of possible experience. Thirdly, it must be a system distinguished in some way from other such systems as the one which represents our world of experience.

 

But how is the system that represents our world of experience to be distinguished? The answer is: by the fact that it has been submitted to tests, and has stood up to tests.

This means that it is to be distinguished by applying to it that deductive method [the scientific method] which it is my aim to analyze, and to describe.

 

The logic of scientific discovery - Google Books

 

~modest

[SidewalkCynic]

Rigorous peer review is really what science is all about. Peer review is the "natural selection" of the scientific process, wherein "unfit" ideas are tested and sent off for extinction, while others more defensible survive for another round of testing. Without peer review science would be just another religion...

I think, I'm with that, as far as defining the "science community/industry." Because, essentially, when speaking of religion, social organization is implied, especially when referring to religion as a grouping - "just another religion."

 

But, I do not think it is fit for defining science, as something other than the grouping of scientists and what they do to promote their grouping.

[lemit]

SidewalkCynic,

 

Thanks for the prompt response.

 

I don't expect people to agree with me all the time, or even a lot of the time. It's good that you took the time to read carefully what I'd written.

 

Please let me apologize for the tone of my post. You must understand that a lot of the criticism wasn't directed at you. It was directed at people who, I thought, weren't really giving the kind of researched responses they should have.

 

So, you use libraries that still have the Dewey Decimal System? I'm surprised. Could you let me know where they are, in a PM if you think that would be appropriate? I'd really like to know, since what I said was actually based on about 25 years' experience, including quite a bit of work with the Library of Congress itself on preservation and classification projects.

 

You've suggested a lot of things I wasn't aware of. I really am here to learn. Please help me.

 

Again, thanks.

 

--lemit

[Doctordick]

I have occasionally read this thread, though I don’t think I have ever made any comments, and I am currently moved to make a few comments as issues close to my work have arisen. First, Mercedes Benzene has brought up the significance of deductive and inductive reasoning. These two modes of reasoning are essentially quite analogous to what I call “logical thought” and “squirrel thought” which I have defined in my thread “Defining the nature of rational discussion!”. Essentially, the following paragraph defines the single most important difference between inductive and deductive conclusions.

In essence, there are two very different ways of "understanding the universe". There is that emotional feeling that something makes sense; that you understand what is going on and have no doubts as to the validity of your expectations. Then again there is a very different kind of understanding which allows you to logically defend some set of analytical expectations in intimate detail; even in cases where no emotional feeling exists to defend the validity of those expectations (here I am talking about all those totally counter intuitive deductions so common in analytical work).

I think it might be useful to take a look at that post in order to understand the real difference between deductive and inductive reasoning and the absolute necessity of both.

 

The problem with the common discussions of deductive and inductive reasoning is that their essential differences are not really addressed: all deductive reasoning is based on axioms arrived at through inductive conclusions and all inductive reasoning is analyzed through deductive analysis. That is to say, the analysis generally fails to actually separate the two. My analysis, based on the division into “logical” and “squirrel” thought, provides a method of segregating and isolating the two modes of reasoning into consistently analyzable concepts.

 

Then, as modest says,

...observations can't prove that a theory is universally true (only that it isn't yet falsified).

That is exactly why I use the term “flaw-free” meaning that there exists no data which contradicts the theory. That brings up another subtle issue: the idea of “prediction”.

According to Popper, scientific theory should make predictions (preferably predictions that are not made by a competing theory) which can be tested and the theory rejected if these predictions are shown not to be correct.

The absolute first requirement of any scientific theory is that there cannot already exist information able to falsify it: i.e., it must be one hundred percent consistent with all known facts. In a sense, it must produce predictions consistent with the known past.

 

That brings up a subtle issue I have never seen brought up by anyone. The moment any experiment designed to produce a prediction of (as yet) unknown data is actually performed, the result of that prediction is then a component of the known past; it is then “known data”: i.e., if the prediction is correct, the theory is no more than simply consistent with the known past. It remains “flaw-free”.

 

The issue being emphasized there is that “the fact” that a theory “predicts the future” is always an inductive conclusion. It is that exact point which makes my work so interesting. The only inductive conclusions I use are the conclusions that the essence of logic and mathematics will continue to be flaw-free. Absolutely everything else I do is deductive. (That is why I continue to point out that my construct is a tautology, not a theory.) With regard to my conclusions, I doubt it is possible to get closer to Popper’s ideal of avoiding inductive reasoning.

 

As modest says (in his edit), ” Of course, creating an hypothesis in the first place is mostly going to be an inductive affair.” That is the reason that I make such a grand effort to keep my “model of an explanation” totally un-constraining: i.e., my purpose is to make sure that each an every possibility for an actual theory is left entirely open.

 

Have fun -- Dick

[lemit]

I have occasionally read this thread, though I don’t think I have ever made any comments, and I am currently moved to make a few comments as issues close to my work have arisen. First, Mercedes Benzene has brought up the significance of deductive and inductive reasoning. These two modes of reasoning are essentially quite analogous to what I call “logical thought” and “squirrel thought” which I have defined in my thread “Defining the nature of rational discussion!”. Essentially, the following paragraph defines the single most important difference between inductive and deductive conclusions.

I think it might be useful to take a look at that post in order to understand the real difference between deductive and inductive reasoning and the absolute necessity of both.

 

The problem with the common discussions of deductive and inductive reasoning is that their essential differences are not really addressed: all deductive reasoning is based on axioms arrived at through inductive conclusions and all inductive reasoning is analyzed through deductive analysis. That is to say, the analysis generally fails to actually separate the two. My analysis, based on the division into “logical” and “squirrel” thought, provides a method of segregating and isolating the two modes of reasoning into consistently analyzable concepts.

 

Then, as modest says,

That is exactly why I use the term “flaw-free” meaning that there exists no data which contradicts the theory. That brings up another subtle issue: the idea of “prediction”.

The absolute first requirement of any scientific theory is that there cannot already exist information able to falsify it: i.e., it must be one hundred percent consistent with all known facts. In a sense, it must produce predictions consistent with the known past.

 

That brings up a subtle issue I have never seen brought up by anyone. The moment any experiment designed to produce a prediction of (as yet) unknown data is actually performed, the result of that prediction is then a component of the known past; it is then “known data”: i.e., if the prediction is correct, the theory is no more than simply consistent with the known past. It remains “flaw-free”.

 

The issue being emphasized there is that “the fact” that a theory “predicts the future” is always an inductive conclusion. It is that exact point which makes my work so interesting. The only inductive conclusions I use are the conclusions that the essence of logic and mathematics will continue to be flaw-free. Absolutely everything else I do is deductive. (That is why I continue to point out that my construct is a tautology, not a theory.) With regard to my conclusions, I doubt it is possible to get closer to Popper’s ideal of avoiding inductive reasoning.

 

As modest says (in his edit), ” Of course, creating an hypothesis in the first place is mostly going to be an inductive affair.” That is the reason that I make such a grand effort to keep my “model of an explanation” totally un-constraining: i.e., my purpose is to make sure that each an every possibility for an actual theory is left entirely open.

 

Have fun -- Dick

 

I think it's a sign of how lost we've got here that an obvious duality of science has mostly been ignored.

 

Where would we be if Einstein hadn't been curious about what seemed weird in the Newtonian world; if he had been too busy doing calculations on that train to notice something strange about the passing landscape? Is there any real scientist who doesn't find the greatest joy in the weirdness of the world, and then understanding and explaining that weirdness?

 

What should separate the scientist from people who are themselves weird is inductive rigor applied to that deductive feeling that something strange is happening. We don't want technologists, but we don't want Arthur Conan Doyles either.

 

My world has been writing and editing and the analysis of writing and editing, particularly journalism. What I've always loved about good journalists is that while they might be among the worst gossips in the world in the newsroom or in the always convenient bar--collecting information is their job--they also know they need to verify information before they pass it on. In other words, good journalism should be good science.

 

(Wow! If I'm right, I've been doing science just like I wanted to when I was a kid.)

 

--lemit

 

p.s. According to Australian television, police in New Zealand have confirmed reports of the death of actor Jeff Goldblum. He reportedly died after falling from a cliff during the filming of a movie.

 

Goldblum, in an appearance on "The Colbert Report," was unable to confirm or deny the reports of his death since he had been in New York at the time of the incident.

[Larv]

p.s. According to Australian television, police in New Zealand have confirmed reports of the death of actor Jeff Goldblum. He reportedly died after falling from a cliff during the filming of a movie.

 

Goldblum, in an appearance on "The Colbert Report," was unable to confirm or deny the reports of his death since he had been in New York at the time of the incident.

This news item is well suited for The Onion. I can't help mentioning Mark Twain's famous remark: "The reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated."

[lawcat]

The absolute first requirement of any scientific theory is that there cannot already exist information able to falsify it: i.e., it must be one hundred percent consistent with all known facts. In a sense, it must produce predictions consistent with the known past.

 

I must disagree with this categorical statement. And not to beat a dead horse, but as everyone knows, science is probabilistic. For example, take Octet Stability Rule which is well accepted Materials Science and Engineering/List of Topics/ Octet Stability by Electron Sharing - Wikiversity. The rule states that satellite atoms will combine to form 4 bonds with the central atom. Yet, this is not always true. For example, in Sulfate Hexafluoride (SFl6), Fluorides form 6 pair-bonds with the sulfate atom. There are exceptions. The SFl6 is inconsistent with Octet Rule, yet the science is probabilistic and accepts this theory.

 

 

The issue being emphasized there is that “the fact” that a theory “predicts the future” is always an inductive conclusion. It is that exact point which makes my work so interesting. The only inductive conclusions I use are the conclusions that the essence of logic and mathematics will continue to be flaw-free. Absolutely everything else I do is deductive. (That is why I continue to point out that my construct is a tautology, not a theory.) With regard to my conclusions, I doubt it is possible to get closer to Popper’s ideal of avoiding inductive reasoning.

 

As modest says (in his edit), ” Of course, creating an hypothesis in the first place is mostly going to be an inductive affair.” That is the reason that I make such a grand effort to keep my “model of an explanation” totally un-constraining: i.e., my purpose is to make sure that each an every possibility for an actual theory is left entirely open.

 

Have fun -- Dick

 

Induction does not follow causality, that is why it presents some deductive problems. For example, inductive reasoning would be: Since all Earth oceans have waves, then all Oceans in the universe have waves. The conclusion is rationally related to evidence, yet it does not follow from the evidence. The conclusion is probabilistic--it is likely that all oceans have waves.

 

Deduction on the other hand is digital--the statement is either true or false. This presents an inductive problem, since many things have exceptions and are therefore probabilistic.

 

So, at the bottom, every conclusion--whether inductive or deductive--must comport with likelihood of evidence--satisfactory probability that it is true. Prefering deduction over induction thus makes little sense in science where testing of theories is feasible. But, if only a theory is being advanced, then deductive reasoning certainly provides much needed clarity.

 

In other words, deduciton is crystaline, but it is easy to destroy if there is a crack--a falsity anywhere: Falsus in unius, falsus an omnibus. Deduction is brittle.

 

Induction is fluid. It can take any shape and hold true. A fault in a fluid does not destroy the fluid.

 

So What makes Science Science?

 

I would say its evidentiary nature. Without evidence, there is no science.