An explanation of what I am talking about.

[Rade]

Hi AnssiH..

 

A few comments.

 

1. You said this.."Or yet another way to put it, if you had to build your entire world view based on nothing but TWO data points and nothing else, you could not in any way say how long it took between those two events"..

 

Sure you can. Consider that each data point (blink A and blink :D is called a "moment". Clearly this information could be used to build the worldview.

 

Now, if blink A and blink B appear on the wall in front of you at the same moment (the concept of the instantaneous) at different x-y position locations, then clearly you can say "how long it took between the two events"..logically the answer is that it took 0.0 units of "longness". You will agree that it would be a contradiction of logic to claim the two events occurred at the exact same x-y position on the wall in this new thought experiment you present.

 

But, if blink A and blink B do NOT appear in front of you at the same "moment", but at two different moments, it is easy to determine "how long between the two moments". It is measured by a unit

less magnitude you give to the "longless" of the first moment, of moment A. Nothing else is needed to build the worldview of the "between" concept, only blink A at x-y position at a different moment than blink B.

 

Thus, my definition of time holds.

 

2. You said this..."...I'd expect you to be interested about how the definitions for relativistic time relationships arise from entirely epistemological constraints?

 

Sure, this is where the Fundamental Equation plays an important role. If by relativistic you mean (at speed of light = c), then a relativistic definition for time represents what is called "planck time"--for just as there is nothing that exists that can move faster than c, there is no time shorter than planck time. It is the Fundamental Equation that provides the epistemological constraint by setting planck time as the time required to transform the past into the future.

 

Have to go now..will return.

[Doctordick]

Rade, I have been following your discussion with Anssi. As I said earlier, that discussion has been led off into the nether-nether land of specific explanations.

I can't complain about the fact that Anssi's attempts to clarify things has led the discussion astray as I myself have often been guilty of being drawn off subject by people's erroneous interpretations of my work.

I am quite sure that Anssi understands the situation but finds explaining your difficulties somewhat beyond his abilities. (No criticism of you Anssi as what I have been saying is apparently very difficult for most people to comprehend.)

1. You said this.."Or yet another way to put it, if you had to build your entire world view based on nothing but TWO data points...

Rade, the point you miss is that ”TWO data points” is itself an explanation!

Consider that each data point (blink A and blink :phones:...

Again, ”blink A and blink B” stands as an explained thing. The same thing goes for the expression, “a moment”. Think about it! Standing behind those expressions is a lifetime of learning and learning is little more than an explanation of your experiences.

Now, if blink A and blink B appear on the wall in front of you at the same moment (the concept of the instantaneous) at different x-y position locations, then clearly you can say "how long it took between the two events"..logically the answer is that it took 0.0 units of "longness".

Again, “different x-y position locations” is an explanation as is the question “how long it took between two events”. I could go on and on with regard to this issue but I know it is a complete waste of time as your belief in the validity of reductionism is so deeply embedded that that you can not conceive of it being an assumption. (Just as the priests of the middle ages could not conceive of “God” as being an assumption.

 

In essence, all of your arguments constitute epistemological constructs based upon presumed explanations of the ontology being explained and thus have utterly no bearing at all on my presentation.

 

The problem is very simple: you try to present things the way you do because you can not think about things without a model of what you are thinking about and that model, whatever it might be, constitutes an assumption as to what exists. So the question arises, how do we talk about things which we cannot even begin to think about? The answer is very simple: we cannot!

 

That, in a nutshell, is the problem I have solved. I do not ever talk about any explanation whatsoever. My work is entirely general and has utterly nothing to do with what it is that is being explained. It is, instead, a model of the concept “an explanation itself”; a model specifically designed such that it is applicable to absolutely any explanation conceivable. If that model is actually applicable to absolutely any conceivable explanation (the claim I say I have proved) we can then talk about the model without ever even considering what it is that is being explained.

 

By that subtle mechanism, I manage to side step the fact that reality is something we cannot even think about much less talk about! What we can talk about are our explanations of reality; a subtly different issue! If you cannot comprehend what I have just tried to express here, we are just wasting our time.

 

Anssi, I have been working out my presentation general relativistic transformations and the consequences. I will try to get it ready to post sometime this next month. I really suspect that our discussion is simply over everyone's head and that attempts to clarify the circumstance really are a complete waste of time. I would simply go over to private communications except for the fact that it is always possible that some bright person might accidentally comprehend the issue you and I have realized. Hope dies hard!

 

Have fun -- Dick

[Rade]

Hello DD...

 

Your summary of my lack of understanding makes no sense. When I was responding to AnssiH about the thought experiment HE presented about "two data points A and B", I was not whatsoever working from MY epistemological construct about these data points and light blinks as you incorrectly claim, but from the epistemological construct as presented by AnssiH--it is HIS construct, not mine.

 

And, I do completely understand how your fundamental equation has nothing at all to say about reality, but is, as you claim, "a model of the concept "an explanation itself”; a model specifically designed such that it is applicable to absolutely any explanation conceivable.". Yes, I agree. Your "model", as you call it, is designed such that it can be applied (that is "applicable") to the process of placing labels on undefined noeumena to transform them into ontological elements. This is all crystal clear--all I am saying is that the human application of your "model" (also known as concept formation) happens OUTSIDE OF TIME. It is strange situation..I understanding 100% of what you claim, yet you appear to understand 0% of what I claim ?? How to move forward ??...

 

So, OK...let us stop all dialog now, we both waste our time. I will just follow your posts so that I can use them to transform the future into the past within the present of my reading them via application of your fundamental equation--and all this will occur outside of time. Have a great end life....cordially.

[AnssiH]

I am quite sure that Anssi understands the situation but finds explaining your difficulties somewhat beyond his abilities.

 

Well, I'm trying

 

Rade, sorry it took me so long to reply, I've been quite busy once again. I read the rest of your post that I did not reply to yet, and your new post #69, and DD's post after that.

 

Note this part:

 

In essence, all of your arguments constitute epistemological constructs based upon presumed explanations of the ontology being explained and thus have utterly no bearing at all on my presentation.

 

The problem is very simple: you try to present things the way you do because you can not think about things without a model of what you are thinking about and that model, whatever it might be, constitutes an assumption as to what exists. So the question arises, how do we talk about things which we cannot even begin to think about? The answer is very simple: we cannot!

 

That, in a nutshell, is the problem I have solved. I do not ever talk about any explanation whatsoever. My work is entirely general and has utterly nothing to do with what it is that is being explained. It is, instead, a model of the concept “an explanation itself”; a model specifically designed such that it is applicable to absolutely any explanation conceivable. If that model is actually applicable to absolutely any conceivable explanation (the claim I say I have proved) we can then talk about the model without ever even considering what it is that is being explained.

 

Now, I suppose you are thinking that DD is saying that because he is just not seeing the relationship between your definition of time and his epistemological analysis, but that is not true. If you understood exactly how the definitions of time arise in his analysis as a function of the symmetries to the definitions for noumena, you would understand how it would be simply an error to talk about time durations between noumena. Exactly as with relativistic definitions it would be an error to think about something that measures time outside from relativistic spacetime. Like something that could simply perceive or measure relativistic time dilation happening to itself.

 

I think you are just trying too hard to align this with your definition of time. You keep thinking that there exists things like clocks or other devices or phenomena that give means to analyze the noumena directly - and that such measurements are giving the means to understand the noumena (to build a world view).

 

What we are talking about with DD, is how a worldview is a function of undefined, i.e. unknown information, and what consequences this has - that the information is unknown - to the resulting definitions. I.e. what sorts of symmetries are to be present in a flaw free world view.

 

Note that the means to measure "time-like" or "space-like" distances will be and must be a function of that data. That is to say, somehow you have to come up with good definitions for what does such measurements mean and how they are to be undertaken, and understood. Those definitions have something to do with how you interpret reality; it is the way you understand nature.

 

The moment you bring in anything "outside of the information" in order to analyze it, you are making a very obvious mistake. You are just taking something that is not part of the "data to be explained" at all, and considering it to be simply known information. That is exactly like analyzing relativity with an imaginary clock that is not tied to relativistic spacetime at all, i.e. that is not "a natural observer" and that can never be observed by a natural observer.

 

I think as a helpful first step, you should just stop trying to see the "unknown information" as a dynamic data stream that relates to your definition of time. I.e. as something that has got naive realistic "occurrence speed" to it. It is simply a representation of some finite amount of data that a worldview is built upon, and the symmetries that the fundamental equation is an expression of, are not consequential to any ideas about naive realistic time-wise lengths between data points.

 

I do have a real interest in how the Fundamental Equation relates to Theory of Knowledge.

 

Okay, so then do you understand how the shift symmetries apply to the expectation probabilities related to that unknown data? Regarding how the data itself is "unknown", and how the expectations must be a function of familiarities found in the recurring patterns to the data?

 

If you do, think about how that has got rather obvious consequences to how any data can be meaningfully interpreted.

 

Your worldview is meaningful, if means you can define objects that behave in predictable ways. This is not a matter of seeing in a naive realistic way that the world is made of objects that behave this or that way. This is a matter of becoming able to interpret unknown data in a way that makes it predictable. Whatever features are found to recur in the patterns of the data, will give you a possibility to define an object that behaves in predictable way. The shift symmetries ensure that there always exists a possibility of interpreting such things in terms of "newtonian objects", i.e. objects that obey newtonian physics (approximately).

 

That of course can entail definitions for objects that are not directly grounded to the noumena at all, but exist simply as an explanation as to why something in some particular context did not appear to obey newtonian physics (just as an example).

 

I.e. they are related to the "data to be explained" in an indirect way; only required by particular set of explanations. This is all related to what DD has called "invalid elements", or lately as "presumed elements".

 

Let me know if you are following any of that... I know I am being quite brief and blunt, but I recall you've followed many discussions related to this things earlier, so I hope you already have some idea of what I am talking about.

 

Anssi, I have been working out my presentation general relativistic transformations and the consequences. I will try to get it ready to post sometime this next month. I really suspect that our discussion is simply over everyone's head and that attempts to clarify the circumstance really are a complete waste of time. I would simply go over to private communications except for the fact that it is always possible that some bright person might accidentally comprehend the issue you and I have realized. Hope dies hard!

 

That sounds great! And yeah, it can't hurt to just get the thing out there in as clear form as possible, and I'll try to walk through the whole thing with a fine comb once again.

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

Hi AnssiH...

 

Very helpful response. However, I do not understand what you mean when you say that a meaningful worldview in no way depends on "seeing" unknown data (noumena) but starts with "becoming able to interpret unknown data in a way that makes it predictable". How can one "interpret" data not first "seen" ? I would suggest it is impossible to have any worldview = (to have understanding of undefined data), without first observation of the undefined. Thus, first must come observation then follows "interpretation" (which is for me the function of the Fundamental Equation), the process of transforming the undefined data (noumena) into the defined (ontological elements). This is what "interpretation" means to me---is this not correct ?

 

Also, I do not understand what you mean when you state that I...."use things like clocks or other devices or phenomena that give means to analyze the noumena directly - and that such measurements are giving the means to understand the noumena (to build a world view)". ??? What does this mean ??? I apparently am not making myself clear. One does not use a clock to analyze noumena directly, nor can a clock say anything at all to help understand the noumena = to build a worldview. The definition of time I use says nothing at all about noumena, time is nothing more than what is intermediate between moments---not what is between noumena.

 

So, as hard as I see we both try, there continues to be a wall of misunderstanding between us. I do find it frustrating since I clearly see how the Fundamental Equation provides expectations within the moment by transforming the future (what I expect to occur) into the past (what I know did occur), and again I must repeat myself---the process of providing expectation possibilities as relates to unknown data occurs OUTSIDE OF TIME--it is WITHIN THE MOMENT ! In short, the Fundamental Equation has absolutely nothing at all to do with time as measured by clocks..do you not agree ?

[AnssiH]

Hi AnssiH...

 

Very helpful response. However, I do not understand what you mean when you say that a meaningful worldview in no way depends on "seeing" unknown data (noumena) but starts with "becoming able to interpret unknown data in a way that makes it predictable". How can one "interpret" data not first "seen" ? I would suggest it is impossible to have any worldview = (to have understanding of undefined data), without first observation of the undefined. Thus, first must come observation then follows "interpretation" (which is for me the function of the Fundamental Equation), the process of transforming the undefined data (noumena) into the defined (ontological elements). This is what "interpretation" means to me---is this not correct ?

 

I'm not sure but there could be a conflict in the terminologies we are using. The reason I am not implying that the unknown data is "seen" or "perceived" is because in my terminology, "perception" means something you can be conscious of, i.e. something you can "think about", i.e. percetion = bunch of defined "things" or "features".

 

As oppose to this, what DD refers to with "noumena" is simply a finite amount of some sort of "information" that "is to be explained", and he takes no stance about what sorts of features of that information or data become connected to some definitions. He is only stating that the resulting definitions must contain some properties due to the symmetries that are in play in the problem of "producing a valid set of definitions", however that set of definitions may be produced, and whatever the "data to be explained" may be "like".

 

That is to say, the underlying "data to be explained" is not by itself directly (consciously) seen - by definition - and that is why it is analogous to the concept of "noumena". That is not to say that a world view wouldn't be related to that data; it is of course, it's just not a conscious process, and the specifics of such process are not part of this topic.

 

It is important to understand how low level fundamentals of epistemology we are talking about, because this is what is supposed to be sitting underneath the mechanisms that produce the first bit of "conscious perception", i.e. the first bit of "experimental observation" about reality. That very first "experimental observation" is already an interpretation in a terminology of some defined things, i.e. those defined things that appear to obey newtonian mechanics. Those things that we typically think are carrying ontological identity with themselves, allowing us to "perceive" them as if they are "real things" by themselves (things that individually and persistently exist independent of us doing some pattern recognition in a specific manner where those things have been defined).

 

While of course Kant already pointed out that "things in themselves" can't be supposed to be exactly aligned with our definitions...

 

And that's basically what DD keeps complaining about. The objections that are most commonly heard are essentially always something having to do with how "we know what reality is like by looking at it and experimenting with it". While actually, whatever experimentation people talk about, it is always by itself an interpretation in some terminology; i.e. entirely a function of what DD is talking about.

 

I just wrote a reply to Bombadil that touches this same subject, maybe that's helpful or interesting to you too:

http://hypography.com/forums/philosophy-of-science/20316-anybody-interested-in-diracs-equation-7.html#post294863

 

Also, I do not understand what you mean when you state that I...."use things like clocks or other devices or phenomena that give means to analyze the noumena directly - and that such measurements are giving the means to understand the noumena (to build a world view)". ??? What does this mean ???

 

I mean that it will turn out, that you can define things like "energy", "mass" and "momentum" in DD's terms, which will give you exactly the picture of modern physics on these things (regarding their relationships). That in turn will make it possible to analytically plot the expectations in a circumstance where there's a massless entity bouncing in between two massive mirrors - with all these things defined exactly like they are defined in common physics.

 

The dynamics of that construction is what is normally taken as a time measurement device, and its behaviour is not dependent on any sort of time durations in-between consequential data points in the data to be explained. (it is entirely an arbitrary choice that I am even talking about "data points", I could be talking about any sort of "thing/stuff" that one could conceive as "finite amount of information" in some sense, and that is what DD's "data point is a defined thing too" comment meant)

 

That is to say, whatever time durations you'd imagine inside the "data to be explained", would be entirely immaterial; the results for what this time measurement device or any other defined entity gives, is not affected by such a change at all.

 

What's more, DD's analysis will give us means to analyze how a known valid solution must transform if you are to plot some situation in terms of 2 different coordinate systems, that are moving in relation to each others. Turns out, that the solution must transform in a way that it will produce the expectation that the dynamic construction known as a clock must time dilate in special relativistic way. That is, it explains from the epistemological stand point why the objects we have defined, will behave that way. All of this is simply a function of those symmetries that are in the play when some "finite amount of data" is transformed into a self-coherent set of defined entities. Any comments about supposed time durations somewhere in-between the "data to be explained" is completely besides the point, and would imply an assumption has been made about the ontologoical nature of the "data to be explained". That would be an error.

 

I apparently am not making myself clear. One does not use a clock to analyze noumena directly, nor can a clock say anything at all to help understand the noumena = to build a worldview. The definition of time I use says nothing at all about noumena, time is nothing more than what is intermediate between moments---not what is between noumena.

 

If your terminology of "noumena" is the same as mine (i.e. referring to the finite amount of "information" that "is to be explained"), then your definition of time is something that is entirely immaterial and unobservable.

 

I am thinking that more likely, when you say "noumena", you refer to something subtly different than I am. I suspect what you have in mind is not valid for the purposes of DD's analysis, and maybe that is why I don't understand at all what you are saying in your last paragraph;

 

EDIT: I should clarify that I am equally confused about what you mean by "moments" now. Earlier I have gotten the impression that you are referring to something somehow "visible" in the accumulation of the raw data and its relationship with "t" (evolution parameter), but now I'm thinking you may be referring to a specific feature of a specific explanation, i.e. something that is visible in an interpretation for some data. This is really tricky thing to communicate and in either case, it would be off topic.

 

So, as hard as I see we both try, there continues to be a wall of misunderstanding between us. I do find it frustrating since I clearly see how the Fundamental Equation provides expectations within the moment by transforming the future (what I expect to occur) into the past (what I know did occur), and again I must repeat myself---the process of providing expectation possibilities as relates to unknown data occurs OUTSIDE OF TIME--it is WITHIN THE MOMENT ! In short, the Fundamental Equation has absolutely nothing at all to do with time as measured by clocks..do you not agree ?

 

I'm afraid I don't really understand what you are trying to say there.

 

I'm not sure what you mean by the fundamental equation "providing expectations within the moment by transforming the future into the past". The equation is an expression of constraints that are universal to the explanations of some unknown data patterns; it doesn't by itself "transform the future into the past". Specific expectations of a specific explanation come in the specific terms by which that specific explanation operates, and somehow your comment reminds me of the specific circumstance that is at play in quantum theory, about how additional information about the system affects the expectations immediately in spatially extended sense, but I guess that is not what you are referring to... I am just getting the feeling that something has been misinterpreted somewhere...

 

I guess you can say the fundamental equation has got nothing to do with time as measured by the clocks, but on the other hand the relationships it is expressing do play an integral role in the analysis that gives us the expectations about how clocks behave, in relation to the evolution parameter of the explanation(s) themselves... So I don't know if I should agree with your statement or not :)

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

Thank you AnssiH. I will keep trying--but I do see that we just may be defining words differently, in which case we logically must reach different conclusions. A very important statement you make:

 

If your terminology of "noumena" is the same as mine (i.e. referring to the finite amount of "information" that "is to be explained"), then your definition of time is something that is entirely immaterial and unobservable.

. Well, I would only modify to say that the set of all noumena is the finite amount of "unknown information" that "is to be explained". This is the difference between noumena and ontological elements, the noumena are unknown and the ontological elements are known (that is, the "past" is the set of all ontological elements).

 

Second, Yes ! My definition of time is immaterial--time is not a material that can be observed. Time is not a quantum entity, an observable. Time is a number, so, you can observe 100 sheep and 100 cows--time is NOT what is observed, time is as the number in the example, and it is related to number via "the future" = what is unknown <.......time........>, through the present, <.........time..........> to "the past" = what is known. Time is intermediate to what is known and unknown = knowledge (past and future). So, if the word "moment" is not clear, no problem, just think of time as that which is intermediate between the future and past, for, logically it must be that both are moments, and if one can think of two different moments, then one can think that there is something between them. My definition of time has no prior assumptions about existence other that IT EXISTS with potential of motion and that one use LOGIC in any attempt to explain it.

 

I mean that it will turn out, that you can define things like "energy", "mass" and "momentum" in DD's terms, which will give you exactly the picture of modern physics on these things (regarding their relationships). That in turn will make it possible to analytically plot the expectations in a circumstance where there's a massless entity bouncing in between two massive mirrors - with all these things defined exactly like they are defined in common physics.

Yes, this I understand (I think) is the importance of the Fundamental Equation. The equation of DD allows one to move from classical physics of observables to their corresponding quantum mechanical operators. So, of course the fundamental equation derives the "energy" for the Schroedinger Equation, it also is predicted to derive the position and momentum eigenvalues. And, it derives the mass from the kenetic energy eigenvalue that relates to the Schroedinger Equation--no where else the mass can be. Thus, it seems clear to me that the fundamental equation can never have anything to say about the nature of the measurement of any ontological "observable" which is associated with the "operator" (such as mass or energy or momentum)--it is limited such that it allows one to put in mathematical terms the eigenvalues of these attributes which satisfy the equation--satisfy the shift symmetry between the operator and the eigenvalues--is this not correct ? If not, I need some explanation.

 

But, my point has been in the previous posts that the fundamental equation also, in the same way as it relates to physics above, also "gives the picture", as you say AnssiH, about how the human brain associates ontology (existence) of observables [consider that observation itself is an "operator" on what is observed] to corresponding epistemological knowledge [consider knowledge to be an eigenvalue, such as energy] via the mental process of concept formation itself. And this process is in two stages, (1) differentiation (the placing different labels on nouemena to form ontological elements and (2) integration, the combining (a type of sum rule) of defined ontological elements to form new concepts. THIS PROCESS IS DEFINED VIA THE FUNDAMENTAL EQUATION--this is my understanding. So, I would need to have you explain why my understanding of how the fundamental equation is related to concept formation is incorrect ? Now, I am not saying this is how you and DD may apply it--it is how I apply it. Why is this a no-no ?

 

ps/ I also would appreciate if DD would read my post about the 1s energy shell under Physics part of forum. I understand that this is a topic he studied, and no one appears to understand what I am saying, as there are 0 reply. I just need the good Doctor to show me my errors in thinking.

[Doctordick]

Hi Rade, I am afraid our discourse is pretty much a waste of time but I am nonetheless moved to try and communicate why this is so. It is not any criticism of you personally but rather your inability to comprehend what I am doing. Don't feel bad about it as you are not at all alone within that dilemma. In fact Ansii seems to be the only person who comprehends the existence of the problem I have solved. And Anssi, if you are reading this, mass is not velocity in the tau direction; it is proportional to the momentum in the tau direction the proportionality being dependent upon the definition of the scale of tau.

 

But back to Rade..

I do not understand what you mean when you say that a meaningful worldview in no way depends on "seeing" unknown data (noumena) but starts with "becoming able to interpret unknown data in a way that makes it predictable". How can one "interpret" data not first "seen" ?

I have not the slightest idea as to how that can be done; but your presumption that it can be “seen” is a rather extreme step which seems to me should not be taken until after some kind of world view has been created. As I have said many many times, I have utterly no idea as to how that world view has been created but we apparently have the ability to create a world view nonetheless.

 

My concerns are purely with the logical constraints imposed on that world-view by internal consistency. But, back to your assertions.

I would suggest it is impossible to have any worldview = (to have understanding of undefined data), without first observation of the undefined.

Perhaps that assertion is true; however, I have no idea as to how one might prove it. You essentially propose it as an axiom; however, from my proof it is quite evident that such an axiom is unnecessary to derive modern physics. The significant fact in my analysis is that, how it is done is of utterly no significance whatsoever and that I find that to be a very interesting fact.

Thus, first must come observation then follows "interpretation" (which is for me the function of the Fundamental Equation), the process of transforming the undefined data (noumena) into the defined (ontological elements). This is what "interpretation" means to me---is this not correct ?

No it is not. When I use the term “interpretation” I am referring to language interpretation: i.e., any internally consistent explanation of anything can be interpreted as a collection of fundamental elements obeying my fundamental equation. I have put forth the abstract language where the description of an event can be represented by [imath](\vec{x}_1,\vec{x}_2, \cdots,\vec{x}_n,t)[/imath]. Your explanation, no matter what it is, can be represented by a finite collection of such expressions. My fundamental equation simply yields the required constraints on the probability of specific such expressions both internally consistent and consistent with what I know of your explanation.

 

There is no proof that this is a correct interpretation of your explanation; however, I can guarantee that it will be perfectly consistent with whatever it is that I know of [imath](\vec{x}_1,\vec{x}_2, \cdots,\vec{x}_n,t)[/imath] at time t. Personally, I find it quite astonishing that the interpretation so constructed requires your explanation to be totally consistent with modern physics (to a very great extent) since my deduction has absolutely nothing to do with reality at all. The implication is that modern physics has nothing to do with reality either. The physicists belief that they are describing reality is as firmly established as is the reality of the gods deduced by theologians. It is no more than a modern religion.

 

Oh, by the way, I have not been involved with physics since the 1970's so I would have no knowledge of the current picture of shell theory; however, your simplistic representation as fermions and bosons kind of leaves out a lot: i.e., you are presuming the absence of what could be significant interactions.

 

Have fun -- Dick

[lawcat]

mass is not velocity in the tau direction; it is proportional to the momentum in the tau direction the proportionality being dependent upon the definition of the scale of tau.

 

This here is of great interest and deserves its own thread; that mass is a function of lambda and frequency and some scale.

[AnssiH]

Well, I would only modify to say that the set of all noumena is the finite amount of "unknown information" that "is to be explained". This is the difference between noumena and ontological elements, the noumena are unknown and the ontological elements are known (that is, the "past" is the set of all ontological elements).

 

Okay, then it sounds like there indeed is a mismatch in our terminologies, and it is no wonder why the communication between you and DD has been failing...

 

Your definition of "noumena" is essentially the future data, and your definition of "ontological elements" is essentially the "past" data (the accumulated data).

 

When we have been referring to noumena, we have been referring to the data in its uninterpreted form. The future, the past, the present, whatever. It being "totally unknown" was referring to its meaning being totally unknown.

 

And when we have been referring to ontological elements, we have been referring to some interpretation of that same data, i.e. something that someone thinks the data "means", according to a set of definitions they hold. I.e. "a definition" is telling what some specific pattern is taken to mean (according to some world view that contains that definition), so "ontological elements" are those that can contain persistent identity to themselves, and they are what the person believes the reality is fundamentally (and persistently) "made of" (or at least what the person believes to be a valid way to model reality in their mind).

 

I personally find the term "ontological element" potentially confusing in that context, so I have been saying "defined ontological elements" instead, i.e. referring to a specific "presumed ontology", defined by some world view.

 

Think of it as an "electron" being a defined ontological element, and then think about the huge amount of (dynamic) information that is required before one can interpreted some circumstance as "there is an electron there". How would you discuss, or even think about that raw information without any definitions? That is why I am not saying the noumena is perceived; it is only the interpretation that you can "consciously perceive" so to speak. It is impossible to analytically refer to the underlying information "itself", because you could only talk about that information in terms of some well defined properties or features that you have a name and a language for. (Hence Kant's commentary about the situation)

 

The whole "problem" that DD is talking about has to do with universal constraints in the mechanisms that can generate expectations about the "noumena", via interpreting the noumena with a self-coherent set of definitions.

 

I have to cut my reply here, I just wanted to post this part quickly because it would surely cause complications to not get this clarified... (and btw this is very helpful, to be able to figure out what sorts of things most people mis-interpret in the attempts to communicate this analysis)

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

Second, Yes ! My definition of time is immaterial--time is not a material that can be observed. Time is not a quantum entity, an observable. Time is a number, so, you can observe 100 sheep and 100 cows--time is NOT what is observed, time is as the number in the example, and it is related to number via "the future" = what is unknown <.......time........>, through the present, <.........time..........> to "the past" = what is known. Time is intermediate to what is known and unknown = knowledge (past and future). So, if the word "moment" is not clear, no problem, just think of time as that which is intermediate between the future and past, for, logically it must be that both are moments, and if one can think of two different moments, then one can think that there is something between them. My definition of time has no prior assumptions about existence other that IT EXISTS with potential of motion and that one use LOGIC in any attempt to explain it.

 

I think I know exactly what you are talking about, you are essentially talking about how the ability to differentiate between two different "moments" implies those "moments" are not "infinitely close" to each others, and hence there is something "in between" them. I take that as an epistemological issue (essentially having to do with methods of handling information analytically, and sort of an arbitrary choice whether one wants to conceive the issue in that sense), and in that sense it is off topic and I think our terminology mismatch has made you think of something me or DD did not intent to say.

 

Just to get back to the terminology we were using, we were talking about the noumena, i.e. the information standing behind an explanation, and about its finite nature. So I think you can understand that an explanation for some information will probably contain definitions for time and space measurements etc, but as of the information itself, there is no functional purpose in saying that the information itself contains meaningful time durations (and variations of) in between "data points", or whatever word one might want to use to refer to some sub-sets of that data. That sort of assertion is not related to DD's analysis or the fundamental equation at all.

 

Yes, this I understand (I think) is the importance of the Fundamental Equation. The equation of DD allows one to move from classical physics of observables to their corresponding quantum mechanical operators. So, of course the fundamental equation derives the "energy" for the Schroedinger Equation, it also is predicted to derive the position and momentum eigenvalues. And, it derives the mass from the kenetic energy eigenvalue that relates to the Schroedinger Equation--no where else the mass can be. Thus, it seems clear to me that the fundamental equation can never have anything to say about the nature of the measurement of any ontological "observable" which is associated with the "operator" (such as mass or energy or momentum)--it is limited such that it allows one to put in mathematical terms the eigenvalues of these attributes which satisfy the equation--satisfy the shift symmetry between the operator and the eigenvalues--is this not correct ? If not, I need some explanation.

 

Your interpretation is incorrect. The point is not in being able to move from classical physics to QM, the point is in pointing out some pretty important (and surprising) epistemological issues about our ways of "understanding" reality (or about any explanation about anything).

 

I really would like to explain to you what is the importance of this analysis, but for that I think we need to take a step back to the time before we even knew that the fundamental equation will align with modern physics ->

 

In fact Ansii seems to be the only person who comprehends the existence of the problem I have solved.

 

The problem he is talking about is the classical chicken and egg problem between epistemology and ontology. I.e. how does one begin to generate "knowledge" about something whose meaning is totally unknown. To be able to generate knowledge about it requires that you are able to interpret its meaning, which requires you have already generated some knowledge about it. That's a problem begging for an explanation!

 

He is saying people don't seem to pick up on the existence of the problem, because a lot of people have settled for an unthoughtful "just is" answer, and thus have the tendency to imply there is no problem at all. That is, a lot of people think generating knowledge begins with a naive realistic premise of us somehow alreading being hard wired to see the nature around us at the get go. That is, well, either naive or off-topic.

 

When we talk about a common scientific experiment, we are generating knowledge about something whose meaning is already "known", i.e. we are already able to make a meaningful interpretation about the situation. The topic is, how does one first become able to interpret the situation in that, or in any manner at all?

 

The typical view is that our world view is - for the most part - a statement about the content carried by the noumena; somehow we have become able to "understand" its meaning, and our world view is related to the "actual" ontological form of "how reality has been built".

 

On the other hand, as we have been reminded by many philosophers (Aristotle, Kant, Kuhn);

Having a valid explanation does not entail you know the real meaning of the noumena; it just means you are able to generate valid expectations about the noumena in the terminology of your choice.

 

An explanation is valid if it can generate good predictions, and DD's attack is an analytical examination to universal constraints on any methods of generating expectations about information whose meaning is totally unknown (hence the focus on expectations based on inductive reasoning). This is not at all about being able to know the "true meaning" of the information, it is rather about becoming able to form a meaningful interpretation about the information.

 

The premise is, that any valid explanation - however it is to be achieved - must operate with a self-coherent set of definitions overlaying on top of the "information to be explained". The symmetry arguments are relying on that fact, and the fundamental equation is a statement about the symmetry arguments.

 

Now the importance of the fundamental equation is in the ways that the relationships of modern physics can be deduced from it. The logical arguments and the algebraic steps that are used, do not contain ANY assumptions about what the content of the "information to be explained" should or could be. The are merely arguments regarding how that data is to be ordered, i.e. definitions that can always be made (like the definition for mass etc).

 

You should think about that for a while...

 

First of all, we already know that the definitions of modern physics are, with great accuracy, a valid way to interpret reality. The typical view is that modern physics are valid because in our experiments we have become able to "understand" the actual meaning of noumena, but this result flies straight against that view.

 

This result is, first, a strong implication that those definitions of modern physics are valid simply because of how they are self-coherently related to EACH OTHERS. They are valid, given you accept the validity of the other associated definitions, and regardless of what reality is actually like, together they form a good way to interpret it, i.e. to ORDER THE DATA into a form that is simple and highly predictable, as per INDUCTIVE REASONING.

 

And second, since this result was achieved via exact algebraic work, it is an exact and explicit statement about HOW exactly those definitions are related to each others, and how exactly they arise from the fact that our definitions DO obey those symmetry arguments (as, indeed, they must).

 

Let me remind you that this does explain the most elusive and mystifying aspects of modern physics, including relativity and quantum mechanics, as per how they are aspects of a meaningful data ordering mechanisms. I think that is pretty meaningful thing for anyone to understand. (And if you know what those mystifying aspects are, I think you find this result all the more meaningful)

 

I think part of the reason this analysis has not been gaining attention is that it goes so completely against the intuitive thinking of most people, that modern physics may not have much to do with actual reality, but rather have to do with a good way to order data into predictable form. Physicists are trained to experiment with pre-existing definitions taken at face value, not with epistemological issues. The terminologies overlap, and the communication of the issue appears to be very bothersome, even when it is written down in very explicit algebraic terms...

 

I think if you understand what I am trying to say, you also understand how it goes completely against the grain to argue something about what time "is", while it does have a lot to do with how time can be meaningfully defined.

 

And Anssi, if you are reading this, mass is not velocity in the tau direction; it is proportional to the momentum in the tau direction the proportionality being dependent upon the definition of the scale of tau.

 

Oops, yes, sorry about my sloppy statement :)

I hope Rade got the gist of it though; "a definition that can always be made", rather like an arbitrary choice about how to order some data.

 

Personally, I find it quite astonishing that the interpretation so constructed requires your explanation to be totally consistent with modern physics (to a very great extent) since my deduction has absolutely nothing to do with reality at all. The implication is that modern physics has nothing to do with reality either. The physicists belief that they are describing reality is as firmly established as is the reality of the gods deduced by theologians. It is no more than a modern religion.

 

Rade, that is exactly the same thing that I am trying to explain there, I really hope you understand something about how it all works. I know it can sound very hard to believe, depending on the angle you are coming from.

 

I think if you've ever come to seriously try and walk through the chain of reasoning regarding how do you suppose you know something is so, i.e. "well A is so because of B, which is so because of C, which is so because of D", and ultimately come to ask yourself how do you even know the simplest of things, like "how do I know a tennis ball is a thing by itself?", then you can also appreciate how many of our beliefs about reality are really cases of circular reasoning. In the case of deductions about the existence of god, as well as the deductions about the existence of any supposed (defined) ontological entity. DD's work is quite telling about how the things defined by modern physics are simply the results of accepting other associated definitions as facts, without any real proof or verification grounded to any knowledge about the actual reality. "Ooops" and so forth.

 

This here is of great interest and deserves its own thread; that mass is a function of lambda and frequency and some scale.

 

Yeah well, I'm not sure what subtleties might lie in that investigation, but at least for me the main part of it is in how mass as a definition is related to other definitions, which explains its behaviour entirely. It behaves the way it does because that is how it, and its associated concepts, have been defined in self-coherent manner. (Read above)

 

You should read the OP of Schrödinger's thread carefully, and I hope you did not take DD's comment as an argument about reality. It was just a statement about how mass is to be defined in his framework of [imath]x,y,z,\tau[/imath]-space, so to be consistent with modern physics (so to be able to analyze its connection to other definitions).

 

-Anssi

[lawcat]

Yeah well, I'm not sure what subtleties might lie in that investigation,

I am certain some good reading and references would come out of it.

 

but at least for me the main part of it is in how mass as a definition is related to other definitions, which explains its behaviour entirely. It behaves the way it does because that is how it, and its associated concepts, have been defined in self-coherent manner. (Read above)

Yes, to a degree, but those energy equations are empirically proven, and by extension matter is a wave. The subtleties that follow would be interesting to read.

 

You should read the OP of Schrödinger's thread carefully, and I hope you did not take DD's comment as an argument about reality

No. I always understood DD's spin off on Schrodinger to be about information processing. I can even buy with ease DD's equation of state of information process output. The problem I have is with empirical justification of the equation. How do we measure conscious and unconscious inputs to test the outputs for the validity of DD's equation.

It was just a statement about how mass is to be defined in his framework of [imath]x,y,z,\tau[/imath]-space, so to be consistent with modern physics (so to be able to analyze its connection to other definitions).

Well, I am still not certain whether DD was speaking about mass in his information equation, or mass in physical universe. :confused:

[Rade]

Thank you both DoctorDick and AnssiH for working with me on my attempt to better understand. I will stop now with this forum topic, since it does appear we are not just talking past each other, but about two different topics. I do wish you the best getting your ideas into the peer review literature.

[AnssiH]

Yes, to a degree, but those energy equations are empirically proven, and by extension matter is a wave.

 

The subtleties that follow would be interesting to read.

 

Yes there are interesting points to be picked up from there, especially in that this explains why the objects defined by physics do exhibit wave-like properties. It doesn't explain what those objects are really "like" ontologically. It explains why our explanation of reality is that way.

 

But about what does it mean to empirically prove something, like I said in the above posts;

 

When we talk about a common scientific experiment, we are generating knowledge about something whose meaning is already "known", i.e. we are already able to make a meaningful interpretation about the situation...

 

...the definitions of modern physics are, with great accuracy, a valid way to interpret reality. The typical view is that modern physics are valid because in our experiments we have become able to "understand" the actual meaning of noumena, but this result flies straight against that view...

 

...This result is, first, a strong implication that those definitions of modern physics are valid simply because of how they are self-coherently related to EACH OTHERS...

 

The objections that are most commonly heard are essentially always something having to do with how "we know what reality is like by looking at it and experimenting with it". While actually, whatever experimentation people talk about, it is always by itself an interpretation in some terminology; i.e. entirely a function of what DD is talking about.

 

This topic has to do with coming up with a terminology (set of definitions) with which any scientific experiment can be understood and undertaken.

 

No. I always understood DD's spin off on Schrodinger to be about information processing. I can even buy with ease DD's equation of state of information process output. The problem I have is with empirical justification of the equation. How do we measure conscious and unconscious inputs to test the outputs for the validity of DD's equation.

 

I think you have misread him somehow. This is an analytical examination to the logical relationships in play between definitions, not directly an argument about the practicalities of world view building. To ask for empirical justification for it is like asking for empirical justification for any purely logical argument. Like asking for an empirical justification for the quadratic equation.

 

On the other hand, the relationships of modern physics have empirical justification to them, which gives this thing some pretty considerable weight when modern physics are traced down with it. But the point with that is rather in how those relationships are traced down from symmetry requirements without any connection to the actual content of the "information to be explained".

 

Well, I am still not certain whether DD was speaking about mass in his information equation, or mass in physical universe. :wink:

 

What he is saying has got implications to both. He is talking about mass as a definition for some circumstances seen in some "information to be explained", including in your explanation to reality. His result means that while it is valid to use that concept as part of your interpretation of reality, it is an extra assumption to say it is also part of the actual ontological nature of reality.

 

I'm not asking whether reality is idealistic. I am asking, that if you are able to refer to some circumstance as "there is mass there", does it mean that "mass" is part of physical universe, or is "mass" just a label to a specific circumstance? I mean, the simplest ontological question regarding "mass" is, is "mass" something that exists by itself, or is it something that is a valid concept only in terms of how it is related to other specific definitions like "energy" and definitions behind "space" and "time", and all those definitions that make up your idea of how "mass" is to be observed at all (because without those definitions, you have no way to refer to "mass", and no way to even define what "mass" is supposed to mean).

 

See how I'm talking about an interpretation of reality, i.e. our terminology of how we understand reality. If you take a lump of clay and toss it around in your hand and say "see, mass is real", you are still only referring to a well defined circumstance that is taken to mean "massive object" in your terminology.

 

On the other hand, if you are able to trace down the modern physics definition of "mass" - down to a tee - to an equation that merely displays constraints for a mechanism that generates expectations from unknown data source (via inductive reasoning), then I think you can be quite confident you have an answer to that ontological question

 

You know it is not an accident why our most accurate explanations to reality seem to exhibit idealistic properties... It is not because reality has got idealistic properties, it is because our explanations do. I think that should sound quite plausible to most people

 

-Anssi

[lawcat]

This is an analytical examination to the logical relationships in play between definitions, not directly an argument about the practicalities of world view building.

Great explanation, and I agree. I think I understood it that way as well.

 

To ask for empirical justification for it is like asking for empirical justification for any purely logical argument. Like asking for an empirical justification for the quadratic equation.

 

I still fail to see how practicalities can be disregarded, and hear me out. For example, if we place some logical input into DD's equation, then DD's system will return some value. Let's presuppose that inputs do not have to be tested for ontological truth because inputs can be arbitrary and by choice or chance are true, whether on, or off, or linear, or nonlinear; whatever they are, the inputs are themselves, the truth. Let's also presuppose that DD's equation is a valid model of the system. Then, the returned value should be trusted. But here is the kicker, we have no frame of reference to say whether we should trust the output at all. In other words, the output is true always--it must be. Thus DD's system is not susceptible to any challenge. It is not falsifiable without practical frame of reference. It is not science. That's my problem.

 

it is an extra assumption to say it is also part of the actual ontological nature of reality. . . . if you are able to refer to some circumstance as "there is mass there", does it mean that "mass" is part of physical universe, or is "mass" just a label to a specific circumstance?

 

Mass exists. Mass is also a model for piece of reality. It represents something measurable outside of us in physical terms. That which represents mass in our head, exists outside of us as a measurable as well. Ontologically it exists as a measurable, and as a model it is true and valid if it comports with measurable. The question is whether our model of mass is (1) complete explanation of the part of reality we wish to measure, and (2) properly understood or consistent with what we measure in real terms. Completeness and consistency.

 

As for completeness, the part of reality is never completely described by mass, for it can be described in other terms, like force, or volume, or speed. Which brings me to consistency, that which we measure as mass should have a correspondingly consistent model in our head which allows for chance of incompleteness or inconsistency. For example, we should not confuse mass with matter or volume, but we should also allow for a chance that our model of just mass is not complete universally even if it is empirically complete for the scale we test.

[lawcat]

Now, let me talk about completeness as it relates to DDs equation.

 

The Copenhagen Convention exclaims that every system can be "completely" described as a wave--in terms of the wave function. DD's equation is "consistent" with that.

 

But here is another kicker. Underlying the wave equation is an even more fundamental concept--numbers or symbols. So logically, per Copenhagen convention, every system can be "completely" described in terms of numbers or symbols. DD's equation is "consistent" with that as well.

 

Taking this a step further, bit representation, digital form, is a form of numbers or symbols. So, by extension, everything in the universe can be "completely" described in terms of 1/0 bit structure. Moreover, everything in the universe can be completely described by using "on" and "off" symbols. In essence, as long as you have some on/off symbol, you can describe anything you wish in the universe.

 

The choice of symbols, to describe something completely, is completely arbitrary. DDs equation satisfies this as well, as he chose Schrodinger. So DDs equation is consistent with everything we know about universe. It is also complete, if we are to follow Copenhagen. But whether it is actually good for predicting anything remains to be tested. For we have no idea whether DDs equation can predict anything, and he appears to not care about it either. The equation is there as a philosophical exercise, sitting and waiting for the time when we can measure all mental inputs and outputs, and then we can maybe test it and refine it.

[AnssiH]

Sorry to lose the interest of Rade, but nice to gain the interest of Lawcat :)

 

I still fail to see how practicalities can be disregarded, and hear me out. For example, if we place some logical input into DD's equation, then DD's system will return some value. Let's presuppose that inputs do not have to be tested for ontological truth because inputs can be arbitrary and by choice or chance are true, whether on, or off, or linear, or nonlinear; whatever they are, the inputs are themselves, the truth. Let's also presuppose that DD's equation is a valid model of the system. Then, the returned value should be trusted. But here is the kicker, we have no frame of reference to say whether we should trust the output at all. In other words, the output is true always--it must be. Thus DD's system is not susceptible to any challenge. It is not falsifiable without practical frame of reference. It is not science. That's my problem.

 

I am not entirely sure if I understand what you are saying, but it sounds like you are uncomfortable about the fact that we can't actually harness the equation by starting to generate meaningful expectations about some input data (so to see if it actually does something valid).

 

That is of course true, since the fundamental equation is not an equation for producing expectations. It is an universal equation about mechanisms that produce expectations. It can't generate expectations by itself at all. Like the universal turing machine is pretty useless as a practical machine - it's purpose is rather in the theory of computation, similarly the "universal explanation" (incl. the fundamental equation) is useful only in what it says about epistemology.

 

In order to have a system (a specific explanation) that can actually produce meaningful expectations, a lot more definitions would have to be made. What those might be, well there are a lot of options, and they are not controlled by the fundamental equation in any rigid manner (there's a lot of wiggle room, let's put it like that).

 

An interesting question then - which DD's analysis is set to answer - is what do you need to know about the nature of the data you are to explain, in order to create a valid set of definitions for valid explanation? (And logically, what can you even know prior to having an explanation?)

 

Mass exists. Mass is also a model for piece of reality. It represents something measurable outside of us in physical terms. That which represents mass in our head, exists outside of us as a measurable as well. Ontologically it exists as a measurable, and as a model it is true and valid if it comports with measurable.

 

I find that word "exists" a bit of a handful, because I just can't be sure what someone means by it exactly. That's a bit bothersome, but since you say "mass represents something measurable", I would continue on that by saying that, of course in order to measure it, you must have definitions for how such a thing is to be measured.

 

Then when we state those definitions, we are talking about the kinds of circumstances where "mass" becomes evident. It's about how things or objects are to react to each others in a defined reference frame, so to reveal something has got mass. And in doing so, we are also implying what is to be taken as "an object", etc. All of that is what ultimately ties your definition of mass to your definitions of very many other associated things, and those ties are what this topic is about.

 

So, just to get around that bothersome word "exists", maybe it's better to talk about whether some concept is valid for interpreting reality in its terminology. That way we keep it clearer in our minds that the validity of a definition also requires that one has understanding and agreement for very many associated definitions. And also that way we are not implying that the particular definition is a necessary part of all conceivable valid interpretations of reality. (we don't know)

 

Otherwise it's much like arguing that gravity exists by throwing a rock in the air and watching it fall down. First, that's an experiment that requires a specific definition for that rock and for space and time, until so-called "gravity" can be "observed" (it is obviously something whose behaviour is understood in terms of those other defined things). And second, we already know it is not a necessary part of a valid interpretation of reality, since in terms of general relativity, gravity does not exist as anything by itself. It's not defined as a fundamental force, it is just a side effect of the definitions of space, time, mass etc.

 

Like I said;

Having a valid explanation does not entail you know the real meaning of the noumena; it just means you are able to generate valid expectations about the noumena in the terminology of your choice.

 

Different explanations simply explain the same things in different ways; through different definitions.

 

It is bothersome that intuitively people see their interpretation of reality as something more than a valid way to understand reality; something grounded to the actual ontological meaning of "noumena". People forget that the validity of their view relies on the acceptance of many definitions that could be arbitrarily chosen (as long as the whole set of definitions is self-coherent).

 

It is not intuitively apparent what exactly can be arbitrarily chosen (i.e. what is merely tied to other man-made definitions) because the connections between definitions become a bit complicated, and they also make up our everyday interpretation of reality (we tend to take some definitions as self-evident). That is an issue that DD's analysis sheds light on. Being able to trace down the connections between definitions is quite telling.

 

So let's get back to that question; what do you need to know about the nature of the data you are to explain, in order to create a valid set of definitions? That question strikes to the heart of the matter. And after some logical work, the ways that Schrödinger's and Dirac's equations turned up means that they are valid regardless of the nature of the data they operate on. Meaning, that they (and the definitions behind them) operate on the level of ordering some information in a particular way, regardless of what that information is. They are valid, when the data is being interpreted according to the definitions they are associated to, which is an interpretation that is always possible for any data.

 

Yet, the practicalities of creating a system that generates expectations according to those particular definitions of modern physics, is equally off-topic. Nowhere in there does DD tell you the specifics of HOW some data is to be interpreted, so for those definitions to be valid. His result means that it is always possible to strike upon a set of definitions where the objects you define obey Schrödinger's equation and Dirac's equation, and that their usefulness arises from the way they are related to their associated definitions. (Ultimately because your definitions are self-coherent and based on inductive reasoning, i.e. what you know has to do with familiarities found from the data)

 

So for instance, you could ask whether a photon is an actual object without mass, or is it rather a label for a circumstance where one could say a massless object existed, AFTER having accepted what "mass" and "space" and "time" and "energy" (etc) are supposed to mean. A photon as an actual ontological thing is really kind of mystifying little creature, when you get down to its properties. But, if you understand exactly how and why things like momentum, energy, mass, space and time (as they have been defined by modern physics) are related to each others, you can understand "a photon" as a label for a specific circumstance, i.e. exactly the circumstance that is REQUIRED by its definition. All those mystifying properties are simply part of its definition, but not part of any real "thing" that carries a real "identity" to itself. E.g. it is not so much that a photon is "frozen in time", or "traveling 0 length" or "in superposition when we are not looking" or has constant speed when measured from any given inertial frame, as it is the specific definitions of time and space (etc) that are related to each others and to the specific definition of "a photon" that way. Just as an arbitrary example from the top of my head.

 

So what is the reality like behind the situation we call "a photon"? I have no idea, obviously :) I can only know why it is valid to conceive things in terms of photons and all its associated definitions.

 

An experimental verification never comes in play with this topic, much like in the understanding of why a given symmetry means a conserved quantity can be defined, has got nothing to do with experimental verification of such a thing. All that is required is that a person understands how certain relationships are connected by their very definitions (or are "tautologous"). And that's what DD's analysis is all about.

 

Hmmm, sometimes I wish I could be more succint...

 

-Anssi