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An explanation of what I am talking about.


Doctordick

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I was made aware of the power of symmetry arguments.

 

For strong interactions, yes. For continuous symmetries and Noether's theorems, yes. For perturbative treatments, yes by default. Physics fundamentally assumes the universe and its mirror image function identically.

 

For weak interactions, empirically no. For discontinuous symmetries and Noether's theorems, mathematically no. For perturbative treatments, failure by default. Physics is rich with parity violations "outside" derived theory, from teleparallelism to Yang and Lee to right hand rules. One might argue that the whole of physical theory is a simplified heuristic crippled by its parity-even symmetry assumptions, then decorated with a pile of parity-odd exceptions. Perhaps it's wrong from the start.

 

Gravitation is specifically constrained to be symmetric - Newton, Newton and Green's theorem; metric gravitation with spacetime curvature in pseudo-Riemannian spacetime; BRST invariance in string theory. However... Quantized gravitations add a parity-odd Chern-Simons term to parity-even Einstein-Hilbert action. Teleparallel gravitation is spacetime torsion (parity-odd!) in Weitzenböck spacetime.

 

Talk, talk, talk. There is a simple experiment using commercial materials in existing apparatus: Do left and right shoes vacuum free fall identically? Do chemically and macroscopically identical, opposite parity atomic mass distributions violate the Equivalence Principle? Do lumps of left- and right-handed quartz fall identically?

 

PURSUING THE LIMITS OF FAILED SYMMETRY

http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/erotor1.jpg

Somebody should look.

 

Theory predicts what observation tells it to predict.

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...As you comment, I define "the past is what you know": i.e., the facts which stand behind your world view. The issue being that what those facts are is not the issue in my analysis; that is why I use simple numerical reference labels to talk about them. My deductions are true no matter what those things are (I presume you comprehend what a tautology is). The fundamental equation says absolutely nothing about ontology, the definition of the ontology is left as an entirely open issue (that is why I refer to the ontology via undefined numerical labels). You can not “define” those ontological elements without presuming some sort of explanation...
Thank you DoctorDick, perhaps the first civil exchange we have had in some two years now, (well, except for your comment about tautology, that is, I presume you comprehend what an insult is). But hey, who's counting, for I view one insult/exchange with you as close to zero as one can hope for.

 

But, let us move forward ...because.....

 

above you did not answer (directly) my question...I asked, how do you define "to know", or if you like "knowledge" ? But, it does appear you have in a round about way provided an answer, so I will see if I am on the correct path to how you define "to know".

 

Above you have restated how you define "the past", which now takes the form:

 

===

 

" the past represents the facts which stand behind your world view".

 

===

 

This is very clever because what you have very nicely done is remove the word "know" from your original definition of "the past is what you know". So, what once was the concept "know" in your definition of the past you have transformed into a bunch of words [the facts which stand behind your world view], and so, you then (indirectly) define what "to know" must mean to you as:

 

===

 

"to know" means "to have a world view based on a specific fact or facts from the past".

 

===

 

Now, I think you will agree that the term "world view" is a fancy way of saying that a person has a mental grasp of something. So, we can then modify your definition of "to know":

 

===

 

"to know means to have a mental grasp of a specific fact or facts(s) from the past"

 

===

 

But, a minor problem in your word use. Now we must have you define what you mean by "a fact". To say there is a fact, means there must be something that exists on which the fact is based. Thus, it is a fact that a 12 inch ruler is 1 foot. The "fact" derives from the thing that exists, the ruler.

 

And, good news, we read above you completely agree with this because you said..."My deductions are true no matter what those things are"

 

Yes, I completely agree, your deductions depend that "Some Thing(s) Must Exist", but it does not matter what specifically those things are, only that we all are in agreement that THINGS EXIST. So, DoctorDick, I agree with you, your deductions demand that THINGS EXIST and your deductions are true no matter what those things are.

 

===

 

So, now, we must refine your definition of knowledge and bring in these "things" you talk about, so we now have:

 

===

 

"to know means to have a mental grasp of a specific fact or facts of some aspect of reality (things) from the past".

 

===

 

OK, a good start.

 

Next you state that ...."The issue being that what those facts of reality are [fact(s) about things] is not the issue in my analysis"....

 

OK, what you are saying is, listen, my analysis (which depends on a definition of time and the past being what you know) demands that "fact(s) about things" that I have a mental grasp of (that is, the past is what I know) must exist in Reality--BUT IT DOES NOT MATTER EXACTLY WHAT THOSE FACTS OF REALITY ARE, OR HOW THEY ARE, OR WHAT THEY ARE MADE OF, IT ONLY MATTER THAT FACTS IN REALITY EXIST (that THINGS EXIST], and that they "stand behind" any world view that any human can have. That is, your "analysis" begins with the fundamental axiom that "FACTS IN REALITY EXIST".

 

OK, --- I completely agree with you.

 

===

 

Next you state...."The fundamental equation says absolutely nothing about ontology"....

 

And I completely agree, it is not possible for the fundamental equation "to say" anything about "ontology" for the simple reason that the fundamental equation is based on the fundamental axiom [THINGS EXIST], that is, the fundamental equation is "derived" from ontology, and it is logically impossible for any equation to say anything about that from which it is derived. And as you must understand, because the statement [THINGS EXIST] derives from the more basic axiom [EXISTENCE EXISTS], and this is a tautology, and because your fundamental equation is derived from this tautology, then of course your fundamental equation must itself be a tautology.

 

===

 

Then you state...."the definition of the ontology is left as an entirely open issue".

 

Well sure, for 2000+ years folks that call themselves philosophers have made attempt to find a "definition of ontology". Here it is clear you have absolutely no interest in such thinking, it is for you an open issue, which is fine. But, for many it is not an open issue but a closed issue and there are in fact many definitions of ontology. Of course I understand you have absolutely no interest in such things, because whatever definition of ontology anyone may hold, as you say above...."The fundamental equation says absolutely nothing about ontology", for as we have deduced above, the fundamental equation is derived from ontology.

 

===

 

Finally you state....."You can not “define” those ontological elements without presuming some sort of explanation..."

 

Here you use the term "ontological elements", which are the "things" from which the "facts" that "stand behind" your "world view" refer to. So, what you are saying is, it is possible to define ontological elements (or things) by presuming you have some sort of explanation of them. Suppose I wish to define a specific ontological element, call it X. How is this done ? Well, first is formed a "concept" of X, which is done putting X into your definition of "to know" that we deduced above:

 

"to know X means to have a mental grasp of a specific fact or facts of some aspect of the reality of the thing X from the past" (it is your ..the past is what you know..)

 

When you so form your world view of X you integrate all the facts of X that you have a mental grasp of and you form a mental "concept" of X. It is this process DoctorDick, of transforming your mental grasp of fact(s) of some aspect of reality, that represents "an explanation". That is, we can define "explanation" as the mental integration of ALL facts of "things" (your ontological elements) from the past in such a way that these facts are transformed IN THE PRESENT as a mental interpretation (your expectation of the reality of the facts) to form a "concept" of X. Then, as you say, it is only after the concept of X (the explanation) has been formed, that you next place a definition on X, and it is only after you have this definition that you can EXPLAIN (communicate your expectation) your concept of X to others. So, again, I agree with you, definitions demand that first there is an explanation, that is, a mental concept derived from your world view where you made a conscious effort to integrate the facts of some aspect of a thing that existed in the past (or as you claim....the past is what you know).

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So, again, I agree with you, definitions demand that first there is an explanation, that is, a mental concept derived from your world view where you made a conscious effort to integrate the facts of some aspect of a thing that existed in the past (or as you claim....the past is what you know).

I agree so far. This not only applies to reality (in the past) but to anything of which I have a concept, e.g. unicorns. Before I can communicate an idea, I have to form a statement about it. To form a statement about it, I must have a concept of that thing (whether it be a horse, that is real, or a unicorn, which is imaginary). But then for you to understand what I say, you too must have a similar concept. I say similar, because there is no guarantee that our concepts will exactly match. But a partial match is generally sufficient for you to get the gist of my meaning. Once we have communicated that much, we can refine our commmon understanding by communicating other statements about the concept. And so on...

 

Fine. This is about communication. I think it is valid. Communication is based on common concepts about what exists (or not). However, the core of Doctordick claims is that his equation goes beyond communication of things known into predicting the unknown from what is known (without specifying the rules of how you do that). Where does that fit into this analysis? I just wonder where this analysis is going...

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Hi Jedaisoul, thank you for the reply. I read it earlier and I was pleased because it gave me the impression that you are at least on the right topic. That is refreshing :eek_big:

 

I didn't want to respond immediately with quick and sloppy post that would just make things more confusing.

 

I will respond out of order:

 

The rules are quite dependent upon what is presumed to exist and, likewise, what must exist is quite dependent upon what the rules are.

 

Note: He says "The rules are quite dependent upon what is presumed to exist", i.e.he is clearly discussing presumed existence. But he follows that with "what must exist is quite dependent upon what the rules are", which appears to be making a statement about reality. If he meant "what must be presumed to exist is quite dependent upon what the rules are", then, presumably, he would have said that. So we cannot take that as his meaning.

 

That was quite sloppy language from DD, and "what must be presumed to exist is quite dependent upon what the [presumed] rules are" is actually what he is trying to say there. (There's a reason he prefers to communicate with math :umno:)

 

I.e. "how the defined (persistent) things behave" and "what sorts of (persistent) things are defined" are related to each others. When you have defined set of specific rules, you also have defined a specific ontology in your head...

 

...can I presume you understand what that means, and have an idea about why that is so? From your comments, I'm guessing "yes".

 

I must admit that I have not read all the references you gave. I came to the conclusion that I was wasting my time. Not because I doubt the validity of Doctordick's equation, but because I am largely indifferent to it.

 

Actually, it is fair to say that you are doubting that the results can be valid. So much so that you even doubt he could be claiming what he actually is claiming. Let me explain;

 

Compare the following statement from the OP of this thread:

It is very important that the reader realize that there is utterly no content in that equation. It is no more than a exercise displaying the tautological consequences of the definitions brought forth in that paper.

 

and from his paper:

It should be clear that, in order to analyze an actual explanation (a process of no interest here)...

 

with the claim:

I show that my construct (which is constrained in no way) requires all the ontological elements standing behind any explanation to obey classical mechanics in the classical limit. It follows that classical mechanics itself must be a tautology: i.e., classical mechanics must be true by definition.

 

Classical mechanics, QM and relativity etc. all make claims about reality. Hence their truth is not simply a matter of definition, it depends upon how well they describe reality. So it seems clear that he is NOT claiming that the truth in such cases is a matter of definition only, but these words, to me, offer no other meaning.

 

He is, in fact, claiming exactly that their "(ontological) truth" is a matter of definition only :eek_big: Don't jump into hasty conclusions, I know it is not immediarely obvious what is going on there, i.e. how someone could even think about claiming such a thing. But I think I can explain it.

 

Just as a side-note, I think this situation is analogous to the disbelief people had to the theory of evolution, thinking that "obviously" a natural process without any guidance is just random and cannot produce highly complex organisms, and "clearly no one in their right mind would claim otherwise". The trick is to understand with better detail what exactly is being claimed and why. (Kuhn would say "a paradigm change" :D)

 

Okay, first clarification to the texts you quoted, just to be sure;

 

It is very important that the reader realize that there is utterly no content in that equation. It is no more than a exercise displaying the tautological consequences of the definitions brought forth in that paper.

 

That means, that the "fundamental equation" is not dependent on the content of the raw data at all. I.e. its validity does not hinge upon what will be explained. Its validity hinges on the fact that the resulting definitions - whatever they may be - are not contradicting themselves. Consequences springing from facts such as "one particular pattern cannot be defined to mean two different things in arbitrary fashion", etc.

 

It should be clear that, in order to analyze an actual explanation (a process of no interest here)...

 

"an actual explanation" refers to a specific worldview. I.e. one instance of all the valid possibilities. He is not interested of analyzing some particular set of definitions, but only those generic constraints, which yield surprisingly constrained results when brought together. Including; "all the ontological elements standing behind any explanation obey classical mechanics in the classical limit."

 

Or perhaps more properly put; it is always possible to interpret any raw data in a manner where the defined entities obey classical mechanics, because classical mechanics arise from the (probabilistic) symmetries to the transformation process from "unknown patterns" to "persistent entities". (And such interpretation is bound to be a simple/useful representation of the data)

 

I'm saying that because certainly one can transform any representation into something equally valid but looking very different; something one might not call "classical mechanics" anymore. So it's clearer to say instead that "the rules of classical mechanics are embedded to the symmetry arguments."

 

Okay, next let's dissect the following intuitively held conception;

Classical mechanics, QM and relativity etc. all make claims about reality. Hence their truth is not simply a matter of definition, it depends upon how well they describe reality.

 

Certainly the common view is that, for instance, classical mechanics is found from experimenting with reality. But you should not forget that the epistemological analysis has to do with the foundations of a worldview, i.e. forming a comprehension of what is it to "experiment with reality" in the first place (how to interpret any sensory data meaningfully).

 

So, let's think about what does classical mechanics claim about reality. Of course its rules refer to how (defined) "objects" behave, i.e. it's rules also dictate what are its presumed ontological things. "When you have defined set of specific rules, you also have defined a specific ontology in your head."

 

Now I take it that you understand, that it would be possible to carefully define such rules, that would change the classical perspective quite a bit, but still be valid. What would be in classical mechanics understood as a single tennis ball, might become understood as a passing manifestation arising from some set of entities obeying very different rules. Or it could be understood as one thing at one particular moment, and as a different thing(s) altogether at another moment.

 

You probably also understand that such view would probably be very very complicated. Lots of rules, and lots of objects. Yet, if it is meticulously made to fit all the past data (in an extreme case every instance of anything can be seen as a different thing via having a different context as it exist in the different part of all the accumulated data), it is also possibly how reality ontologically is. (Possibly, but undefendably)

 

 

I presume you have some understanding of the above because you commented you are largely indifferent to the results. "Of course one can do that, so what?"

 

Well, the fact that the relationships defined by quantum mechanics, classical mechanics, electromagnetism, relativity etc. can be pulled out from the symmetry arguments means that they are not actually dependent on the content of the data to be explained either. Which means they are useful interpretations always available to us as a useful way to understand/order any raw data. Whatever they appear to claim about reality (content of the data) is consequential either to their particular definitions (that can always be made), or to the symmetry requirements to the set of definitions (self-coherence).

 

That should bring up a light bulb to anyone who's thought about, for instance, what does the validity of QM say about reality? What does it mean, that Bell inequalities are violated according to experiment? Most people try to imagine what is reality like, so to give rise to that sort of behaviour. "Many worlds", "consciousness collapses wave function", "transactional interpretation" etc, these are all just a matter of transforming some relationships into different set of undefendable "rules&elements".

 

Let's think a bit about how are we interpreting any Bell experiment. We understand it in terms of entities we defined as part of a useful view of reality (may it be many words or whatever). The symmetry arguments require QM relationships to be valid (given few definitions that can always be given), which requires that Bell inequalities MUST be violated in our experiments - against most peoples intuition - and that has got nothing to do with what reality is like, but everything to do with how we can define persistent entities in useful manner.

 

None of that is to say that reality is idealistic, it is to say that the entities we defined reality to be made out of, must behave that way as part of their very definition (The algebra traces explicitly why). Intuitively that QM behaviour seems elusive because we went ahead and assumed those defined entities are also some ontological things that really carry metaphysical identity with them, i.e. that with our definitions we did strike directly upon ontological reality.

 

That intuition arises directly from the deeply rooted (but undefendable) assumption that reality must be made of "things" one way or another, blind to the fact that whatever things we see is a matter of defining some rules; a matter of saying what is meant by "a thing", and what does it mean to have a (presumed) ontological identity to something.

 

It helps to understand "identity" as an epistemological facet and remain indifferent of its ontological meaning.

 

Clearly he has not deduced anything of the sort! To claim that he has created a model in which any information can be put is very different from claiming that he has specifically deduced QM from fundamental concepts. Yet, again, these words, to me, offer no other meaning.

 

Yet the latter is the claim :singer: Anyway, I don't want to seem like I'm forcing you to start looking at the actual math; I don't think it is absolutely necessary in order to understand what is being claimed and how it can "possibly" be a valid claim. Looking at the math would only become necessary when you'd like to convince yourself that it is not only "possibly valid" but "absolutely valid" and how it works in detail.

 

I think you have some idea of what I'm talking about, you just find it hard to interpret it properly because you are too quick to think I cannot mean what I seem to be saying. Ehhh, you know what I mean, I hope :D

 

However, the core of Doctordick claims is that his equation goes beyond communication of things known into predicting the unknown from what is known (without specifying the rules of how you do that).

 

The "how you do that"-part would go directly into the algebra :shrug:

 

-Anssi

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He is, in fact, claiming exactly that their "(ontological) truth" is a matter of definition only :thumbs_up Don't jump into hasty conclusions, I know it is not immediarely obvious what is going on there, i.e. how someone could even think about claiming such a thing. But I think I can explain it.

Well, thanks for explaining that, but your further explanation is pointless. You, and DD it seems, have a completely different concept of reality from me. Hence we are talking past each other.

 

For me, reality exists outside our perception of it, and it is not dependent on our ontologies (or DD's equation) to make it real. Our ontologies (and "rules of nature") ARE human constructs, so are dependent on our "world view". But the universe is the way that it is irrespective of whatever theories I may hold about it, including DD's theory.

 

As they say, if a tree fell in the forest with no one around to hear it, would it make a noise? My answer is a definite "yes". I'm guessing yours, and DD's, would be "yes, if you defined it that way, no if you didn't". That, to me, is simply hubris.

 

So there really is nothing to discuss, but thanks for the effort that you put into explaining that DD really does believe that reality itself, as opposed to our models of it, is simply a matter of human definitions. You, and he, are free to believe that if you wish. I don't.

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Well, thanks for explaining that, but your further explanation is pointless. You, and DD it seems, have a completely different concept of reality from me. Hence we are talking past each other.

 

A little bit apparently, but don't be hasty! :thumbs_up I've been trying to put emphasis on the fact that I am not really making any claims about reality, i.e it's not about "what's real" but about what's merely part of our interpretation of reality (and of the fact that it includes more than one might at first expect)

 

So;

 

For me, reality exists outside our perception of it, and it is not dependent on our ontologies (or DD's equation) to make it real.

 

Yes!

 

Our ontologies (and "rules of nature") ARE human constructs, so are dependent on our "world view".

 

Yes!

 

But the universe is the way that it is irrespective of whatever theories I may hold about it, including DD's theory.

 

Totally yes!

 

As they say, if a tree fell in the forest with no one around to hear it, would it make a noise? My answer is a definite "yes". I'm guessing yours, and DD's, would be "yes, if you defined it that way, no if you didn't". That, to me, is simply hubris.

 

I would say "it does whatever it does, and that "whatever" is what we interpret as "noise", while other worldviews could validly perceive it as something completely different", and I have the feeling that you would agree with that?

 

So...

So there really is nothing to discuss, but thanks for the effort that you put into explaining that DD really does believe that reality itself, as opposed to our models of it, is simply a matter of human definitions.

 

...that's a misconception. It is interesting that you interpreted it that way, I guess there's much to improve in communicating the work... :I

 

I guess the reason it is easy to interpret it that way is that we talk a lot about such facets of human worldviews, that people intuitively take as ontological beliefs, like "space" and "time". So people jump to conclude that we are making claims about reality. But actually what is being referred to are the epistemological roots of our ability to define such things in exactly the way they have been defined by modern physics (and other approximations of the same epistemological roots being newtonian view etc, etc,)

 

-Anssi

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...that's a misconception. It is interesting that you interpreted it that way, I guess there's much to improve in communicating the work...

Well, I'm glad that you agree that DD is not talking about reality per se. He's talking about Special Relativity, QM and classical mechanics as theories, rather than the behaviours they describe.

 

But he's still claiming that their truth is a matter of definition, not a correlation to reality. I disagree with that as well. The truth of statements about reality depends on how well they correlate to reality, not how self-consistent they are. It is perfectly possible to imagine an entirely different universe based on different "laws" (i.e. with different behaviour patterns). Entirely self consistent, but bearing no resemblance to reality.

 

I have little interest in such pastimes. I've enough to think about trying to make sense of my understanding of reality. I suspect that you will suggest that DD's equation would help me, but I beg to differ. I've already spent more time than I wish to on this topic. So please do not feel offended if I do not reply further. I really am not interested in DD's theories.

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....I've been trying to put emphasis on the fact that I am not really making any claims about reality, i.e it's not about "what's real" but about what's merely part of our interpretation of reality...
Hi again. Sorry to keep popping up, but I may be the only one left in the forum that has any interest in what DD and you are trying to explain. I recently asked DD for his definition of the concept "to know", and provided my attempt to derive it from his philosophy (a few posts ago). Perhaps you can help, since, as you know, DD and I have very stressed relationship.

 

And also, your comment above to Jedaisoul....

 

I do understand this part of the DD thinking, he really does not have any interest at all in making any "claims" about reality. That is fine. But, imo, what frustrates folks, is that they really do want to think (philosophize) about making "claims" about reality, and as soon as they find out the the DD fundamental equation (that is, EXPLANATION itself) has nothing whatsoever to do with making such claims, they tune out.

 

Myself, I stay with it, because I believe (well, maybe I am wrong) DD has done something mathematically that no philosopher has ever done. What ? imo, DD has presented an "equation" that addresses an area of thinking called "concept formation". This is a difficult and controversial topic. It is directly related to the topic of "definitions". imo, DD has put in a mathematical form how the human mind, any mind, forms "concepts". In history of philosophy this has never been done before (as far I know). It makes sense to me that a very intelligent Ph.D. Nuclear Physicist would do this, because they have training in mathematics, reality (what DD calls ontological elements), and logical thinking (the big three--math, science, philosophy).

 

I also offer this. When you said above...."it's not about "what's real" but about what's merely part of our interpretation of reality". Why use the word "merely" ? Better to say "is", the fundamental equation "is" part of our interpretation of reality--correct ? And then, why say "part" ? Perhaps I am missing something, but as I understand DD, there is no other "part" needed outside the fundamental equation (that is, it is self contained, consistent). So, better to say, imo, what I will state as an axiom:

 

The Fundamental Equation of DoctorDick "is" our Interpretation of Reality.

 

Again, to those that wonder, why is this of any interest ? Because, imo, no human has ever put in mathematical form how the human mind (any mind) makes an interpretation of reality.

 

Finally, my thinking on this has lead me to what may seem a rather strange statement. That I believe the action or movement of the fundamental equation, that is, our interpretation of reality, is outside of time (what most think of as being time), but is within what physicists call "Planck Time". I find this hard to explain, the best I can offer is that, imo, the fundamental equation "is" when the future (what is "unknown" to any human, or collective humanity) is transformed within a Moment or the PRESENT or the NOW (it is a quantum event) into the past (what is "known" to any human, or collective humanity). The fundamental equation "is" mathematically this "process" (but, perhaps not the best way to put this), and it is limited (constrained) to Planck Time (and thus Planck Space).

 

Any feedback, AnssiH, is appreciated.

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Rade, you surprised me with your last post. I had not expected such a thing; you seem to show some real interest in what I am doing and not just looking for reasons to ignore it as I thought. I still think your position is a bit wide of the mark but it is certainly worth responding to. I don't think I have actually put “how the human mind (any mind) makes an interpretation of reality” into mathematical form. How the mind does it is another matter (though I suspect I see the possible process).

 

What I have done is examined what the universe would look like if one's expectations were defined by the statement, “the universe is a completely random collection of events and future events are simply the most probable collection of events consistent with the known past”. That statement clears up the problem quite succinctly and, if it is true (and I think my proof demonstrates that there is no evidence it is false), makes the problem of how a mind might generate such expectations in a straight forward manner quite approachable. That approach is also quite consistent with what is observed in some of the brain experiments being done today. See the “Science News” article, “Single brain cells selectively fire in response to specific thoughts”. If you don't have access to “Science News”, take a look at the “Discover” article for June 2009.

 

UncleAl has brought up the issue of “parity” which is essentially mirror image symmetry. Professional physicists will invariably insist on the “fact” that parity violations exist in their actual physical experiments. Back when I was a graduate student, this was one of the first issues which convinced me that professional physicists simply do not examine their definitions carefully. They have a bad habit of just assuming that someone else has already proved that there are no flaws in their underlying assumptions.

 

Anssi, I know that you fully comprehend the issue I am talking about; however, I am also aware of your lack of education in physics. The issue of mirror image symmetry is as fundamental as any other symmetry if you actually go back to the fundamental information being explained: i.e., if you find parity violations, you must have defined some parity dependent structure before you got to the actual experiment checking for parity violations (otherwise, you could not define the parity checking equipment).

 

There is another issue here which often bothers me excessively. The issue is the meaning of the word “ignorant”. Ignorant is often presumed to mean “lack of knowledge” and that is not the central issue of the word at all. The word ignorant is derived from the word “ignore” which actually means not paying attention to things which can be demonstrated. It turns out that some of the most educated people in the world are also some of the most ignorant.

 

Going back to the parity issue, if you examine the parity experiments carefully, you will discover that the parity violations arise in the exchange forces when the exchanged boson is replaced with its antiparticle: i.e., weak nuclear interactions explicitly violate parity. As UncleAl comments, “quantum field theories (QFT) with hermitian Hamiltonians are invariant under the Poincaré group containing spatial reflections. Parity is a spatial reflection and parity is not a QFT symmetry.” This is quite true for the standard geometry used by the physics community; however, it is certainly not true in the geometry I use: i.e., the four dimensional (x,y,z,tau) geometry I structure my equation within. In my case, the fact that the exchanged boson is massive yields a significant geometric difference between exchange of a given massive boson and its antiparticle; that difference being the angle between the propagation direction of the source and the exchanged boson. It turns out that this difference can be seen as the source of the observed parity violation.

 

And that brings up another issue of serious import. Much is made of the “fact” that Euclid's geometry is not the only possible geometry which can be conceived of; however, before one can actually make such a statement, one must first answer the question, “exactly what is the purpose of your geometry?” If the purpose of your geometry is to provide a method of plotting data so as to observe possible correlations internal to that data, there is a very serious issue which only Euclid's geometry takes account of. That issue is the intersection of orthogonal axes. If the purpose of the geometry is to plot data without imposing any presumed internal relationships, the axes should be orthogonal: i.e., the geometry should be capable of displaying all possible values for a given variable no matter what the values of the other variables are.

 

If you allow the coordinate axes of your geometry to intersect, you are asserting that there exists values for one coordinate which do not allow variations in a second coordinate. Such a geometry can certainly be used after the fact the data analyzed and it is confirmed that such a constraint is indeed embedded in the data; however, prior to analysis of the data, such a move is a rather extreme presumption. This issue is clearly addressed by the fact that similar phenomena can generally be represented by a “surface” in a geometry of higher dimensionality.

 

Of interest, the Minkowski geometry (the idea that one axis should be “imaginary”) is a presumption that some very important relationships are true. A nice geometry to use if those relationships are indeed true; an issue I have brought up in my discussion of special relativity. But not a necessary factor if your purpose is simply to plot data for analysis.

 

People need to think these things out. If they don't they are being ignorant.

 

Have fun -- Dick

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I've already spent more time than I wish to on this topic. So please do not feel offended if I do not reply further. I really am not interested in DD's theories.

 

Okay, don't worry about it. This exchange started from your assumption that DD is making an argument about how reality itself is, and it seems we at least managed to clear out that issue, so I'd say that was one step forward. And on the same note I should comment that it's not really fair to call it a theory; it's algebraic exposition about the definitions of modern physics being tautologous to few symmetries. I've just been commenting what its validity means. Anyway, thank you for your attention.

 

Then, for the benefit of lurkers, I'll make few more comments, hopefully to get over the next bump.

 

But he's still claiming that their truth is a matter of definition, not a correlation to reality.

 

Jedaisoul's interpretation about the claim, is correct; we are indeed talking about how the relationships expressed by modern physics are not embedded into the content of the data-to-be-explained, but are a result of ordering a plethora of unknown data into useful and simple form, in self-coherent manner. (=obeying the symmetry arguments; "not letting the unknown/undefendable aspects of the data affect the probabilities")

 

But we are not saying that it's the exact presentation form of modern physics that's somehow embedded to the data ordering mechanisms. Just the essential relationships, and there always exists many ways to express the exact same relationships (via many different types of assumed ontologies).

 

Thus...

 

I disagree with that as well. The truth of statements about reality depends on how well they correlate to reality, not how self-consistent they are. It is perfectly possible to imagine an entirely different universe based on different "laws" (i.e. with different behaviour patterns). Entirely self consistent, but bearing no resemblance to reality.

 

...his objection goes a bit off the mark in the important details that simply need to be understood first. Much like how the ID proponents' objection "random processes produce random results, not highly complex organisms" is missing the actual argument of the theory of evolution altogether. And while I can "explain the eye", some people will only see readily apparent contradictions to some firmly held beliefs (which they see as "obvious facts"), and thus decide there's no reason to look further.

 

Well, for everyone who are willing to look further, I'm sure you'd like to see this issue explained, so I will:

 

The truth of statements about reality depends on how well they correlate to reality, not how self-consistent they are. It is perfectly possible to imagine an entirely different universe based on different "laws" (i.e. with different behaviour patterns).

 

Of course it is possible to imagine different looking universe. What is probably confusing people here is the statement "all the ontological elements standing behind any explanation obey classical mechanics in the classical limit."

 

That statement doesn't mean that the standard presentation form of "classical mechanics" is strictly the only valid way to interpret any data. Like I said before, of course it is possible to transform the representation known as "classical mechanics" into something that looks very different but remains equally valid (as long as it preserves some essential relationships). And like I said before, it is perhaps more proper to state that "classical mechanical interpretation for any unknown data patterns is always available to us."

 

Or that "the essential relationships expressed by classical mechanics are embedded into the symmetry arguments". Where "symmetry arguments" are essentially statements of the symmetries existing for ANY transformation mechanism from "unknown patterns" to "defined entities".

 

It means, that classical mechanics itself is a function of how the unknown data is ordered into simpler form.

 

That means, that the statements of classical mechanics are not statements about the reality standing behind the data, but they can more properly be seen as statements about what sorts of data patterns can become seen as persistent objects in the first place.

 

Yet another way to put it is to say that the prediction-wise validity of classical mechanics is a function of having defined "persistent objects" out of some unknown "storm of activity" in a self-coherent manner.

 

When you are looking at a tennis ball, what is it that makes you think of that "portion of reality" in terms of "a single object"? Epistemologically speaking, it is a specific behaviour which can become interpreted in that form. Ontologically speaking, it is unknown.

 

Now pay extra attention to this:

different "laws" (i.e. with different behaviour patterns).

 

In this context, "different laws" is not the same thing as "different behaviour patterns". The patterns underlying the worldview are not seen directly; "they are what they are" (unknown), and the data ordering mechanisms yield the comprehension of those patterns in a form of "persistent objects" (your perception). Regardless of what the patterns are like, they can still become interpreted in terms of "classical mechanics"

 

Please look closely now; The symmetry arguments and the fundamental equation, and absolutely everything in the epistemological analysis, refers to that transformation process from "unknown patterns" to "defined persistent entities", and it makes absolutely no difference what the ontological laws are behind those data patterns; that transformation process still has to occur!

 

If the algebra of the epistemological analysis is without a flaw, it means that when that transformation process is executed accordingly to a worldview that contains no undefendable assumptions about any "true ontological laws behind the data patterns", but instead merely models the patterns into a form of persistent entities according to those symmetries, classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, electrodynamics and relativity fall out as features of that transformation process.

 

And suddenly all the elusive features of QM & relativity are explained also in a very realist sense (not idealistic). I would think that should put some considerable weight into this argument.

 

Few more comments;

"All information can be described by what you already know, and a set of rules for predicting what you do not yet know."

 

Which is fine, but does not get us very far because he has cleverly defined those rules as part of the information to be modeled, rather than part of the model. Thus relieving himself of the onerous task of defining those rules. But without those rules, what do we have? What rules are there for defining rules, apart from saying that they are dependent upon your existing knowledge?

 

There are those symmetry arguments, referring to that transformation process. I.e. we know that certain features of our definitions cannot affect the probabilities of our expectations. One might be quick to think that few symmetries can never amount to much, but then they should look at the algebra to trace exactly how they amount to modern physics.

 

So it appears that he is defining probabilities about knowledge, not knowledge itself. Hence the above meta-statement becomes:

 

"The probability that all information can be described by what you already know, and a set of rules for predicting what you do not yet know, can be described by the equation given."

 

He is very much working with probabilities in terms of what sorts of things cannot change the probabilities of expectations.

 

It would help me at this point of the discussion if DoctorDick would please define what he believes the definition of the word "to know" is. For example, his concept of time is defined, in part, by this statement...."the past is what you know". But, I have no idea how he defines "to know", or "knowledge". What exactly is "known"--would it be his "ontological elements" ? Is he saying that in the past of each entity with potential for knowledge was a quantum type interaction with some specific "ontological element", and after this transformation "knowledge" was the result ? If so, then I would think the fundamental equation has much to say about both ontology and epistemology.

 

When he says "the past is what you know", he is referring to the data you have accumulated thus far, i.e. the data you work with to build your world conception. He doesn't make a statement about what that data is like or where it is coming from or whether there exists any identities there etc.

 

So in that context the word "know" can be quite confusing; of course you never really "know" what the data means or is ontologically. But in some sense there is something to work with, even if the conscious comprehension of it is always a statement expressed in terms of some human definitions in some sense.

 

English words are sloppy! :( At any rate this is related to the fact that analytically, the probabilities we can objectively assign to any future events, are inductive; function of a finite amount of past data one way or another. And that is especially important when the analysis comes down to quantum mechanical relationships and the so-called collapse of the wave function, because the wave function is shown to be essentially the "expectation function" arising from inductive reasoning based on modeling random data according to those symmetry arguments...)

 

Really, there are so many ways to see the validity of this whole thing that it's almost amusing :I

 

-Anssi

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Hi again. Sorry to keep popping up, but I may be the only one left in the forum that has any interest in what DD and you are trying to explain. I recently asked DD for his definition of the concept "to know", and provided my attempt to derive it from his philosophy (a few posts ago). Perhaps you can help, since, as you know, DD and I have very stressed relationship.

 

Heh, yes. I made a comment to your first post, and now I read your second post and I have one comment to make;

 

Yes, I completely agree, your deductions depend that "Some Thing(s) Must Exist", but it does not matter what specifically those things are, only that we all are in agreement that THINGS EXIST. So, DoctorDick, I agree with you, your deductions demand that THINGS EXIST and your deductions are true no matter what those things are.

 

It is not necessary to suppose that "things" exist per se, i.e. it's not necessary to suppose that reality is ontologically divided or united or anything like that; divided, united, discrete, continuous, these are all a matter of chosen presentation form; they are conceptions that arise when you tack identity onto some features of reality.

 

I'm just saying that because people have this need to try and figure out "what sorts of parts reality is made of", which is already a case of making an undefendable assumption that reality ontologically folds into the type of presentation form that we naturally handle in our minds (we comprehend and track things in terms of a set of discrete "objects" or "things")

 

It is easy to succumb to that mistake because it is exactly "how we think". You can't even begin to think of anything, without having defined "what it is" (already having made a meaningful division)

 

On that same note, the "past" or the "facts standing behind your worldview" are not necessarily a set of "things". That is not known information, and it is not necessary for the deductions to make that assumption. What is known is that, at least AFTER those "facts" (noumena) are transformed into a worldview, they are presented in a form of "set of things".

 

And it is the features of that transformation process that are under discussion; regardless of what reality is behind those "facts" ("things" or something else).

 

So:

 

Noumena -> Self-cohernet transformation into "defined ontological elements" according to symmetry arguments -> Fundamental equation must be valid to the associated probability functions -> Relationships of modern physics must be valid to those defined ontological elements (and to the definitions of macroscopic elements that they yield).

 

I do understand this part of the DD thinking, he really does not have any interest at all in making any "claims" about reality. That is fine. But, imo, what frustrates folks, is that they really do want to think (philosophize) about making "claims" about reality, and as soon as they find out the the DD fundamental equation (that is, EXPLANATION itself) has nothing whatsoever to do with making such claims, they tune out.

 

That is probably true and it is really unfortunate because, against their intuitive expectations, they would still find something that explains quite a bit about why the reality appears to be how we conceive it.

 

You've probably heard these musings from physicsts wondering, how is it that the universe seems to be so nicely and accurately fine-tuned to contain stable things like it does. "Just one little parameter slightly off and none of the elements we are made of, would be stable".

 

Well, could it be this is why? Because those parameters arise from analytical definitions that can always be made, due to them being consequences of symmetry arguments. In simpler terms, it's because WE solved how reality CAN BE expressed in terms of a set of (immaterial) parameters related to things we defined all by ourselves, while reality itself is not a function of how we choose to express it!

 

To me that musing about the amazingly fine tuned universe just rings exactly like the amazement about "how lucky it is that there exists exactly 10 numbers! Makes it so easy to count with our fingers!"

 

I also offer this. When you said above...."it's not about "what's real" but about what's merely part of our interpretation of reality". Why use the word "merely" ? Better to say "is", the fundamental equation "is" part of our interpretation of reality--correct ? And then, why say "part" ? Perhaps I am missing something, but as I understand DD, there is no other "part" needed outside the fundamental equation (that is, it is self contained, consistent). So, better to say, imo, what I will state as an axiom:

 

The Fundamental Equation of DoctorDick "is" our Interpretation of Reality.

 

Again, to those that wonder, why is this of any interest ? Because, imo, no human has ever put in mathematical form how the human mind (any mind) makes an interpretation of reality.

 

Well the fundamental equation itself is just a succint algebraic expression of those symmetry constraints. The constraints by themselves are fairly simple and could just as well be expressed individually, except that we are interested of what happens when a worldview obeys ALL those constraints.

 

So the fundamental equation is much like a hub from which individual relationships or expressions of modern physics are derived (see the OP of various "derivation of..." threads; they all basically start with the fundamental equation)

 

Those derivations often make new definitions that can always be made. A resulting expression - such as Schrödinger's Equation - is in the view of physicists usually associated with an interpretation or interpretations about reality. I.e. the expression seems to say something about reality. But having derived the expression from fundamental equation means that the expression is a function of the symmetry constraints, and merely contain some extra assumptions (that can always be made), that constrain the view into some specific ontology, yielding "a specific interpretation about reality".

 

(And then we get these crazy fights between different but equally undefendable ontologies that all explain the exact same data only semantically differently, and people just choose the one that tickles them the best according to their personal beliefs of what reality ought to be)

 

So in that sense, many of those different interpretations of reality should be validly transformable into the interpretation expressed by the fundamental equation by itself, where all defined elements are seen as moving in constant velocity (against an evolution parameter) in the [imath]x,y,z,\tau[/imath]-space (where [imath]\tau[/imath] is smeared over), but that form too is completely immaterial abstraction. It is quaranteed to be valid in analytical sense but would probably be very difficult to wrap your head around in everyday life :D

 

Anyhow, I just laid down all that to point out that, depending on what you mean by "interpretation", fundamental equation is not strictly "our interpretation of reality".

 

-Anssi

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....It is not necessary to suppose that "things" exist per se, i.e. it's not necessary to suppose that reality is ontologically divided or united or anything like that; divided, united, discrete, continuous, these are all a matter of chosen presentation form; they are conceptions that arise when you tack identity onto some features of reality.
Thanks for all your replies, and to DD also. Concerning above, I would agree, but I used the term "things" because, if you read post previous, it is the term used by DD. I agree with you, it is not "things" that exist per se, it is existence that exists per se. Do you see the critical difference ? So, I agree with you that problems can arise when you attempt to "tack identity onto some features of reality"--Existence is Identity, identity is not tacked on to reality by the human mind, it has been there all the time.

 

...On that same note, the "past" or the "facts standing behind your worldview" are not necessarily a set of "things". That is not known information, and it is not necessary for the deductions to make that assumption. What is known is that, at least AFTER those "facts" (noumena) are transformed into a worldview, they are presented in a form of "set of things". And it is the features of that transformation process that are under discussion; regardless of what reality is behind those "facts" ("things" or something else).
This is very interesting comment, for you define here what it means "to know". You really did not do that the last post where you made attempt to explain how DD defines "to know"--but here you do, so this is very useful to me. That is, to know is when noumena (what you call "facts") become transformed into a world view. What I think you are saying is that, while we all agree that existence exists, the only thing that can be known about existence are the facts that come to us from the evidence of the senses, which we then have the ability to transform (the process of thinking) into a mental grasp of EXISTENCE (that is, what you call a world view). So, looks like we are in complete agreement about the relationship between existence, noumena (facts about existence), and knowledge.

 

Noumena -> Self-coherent transformation into "defined ontological elements" according to symmetry arguments -> Fundamental equation must be valid to the associated probability functions -> Relationships of modern physics must be valid to those defined ontological elements (and to the definitions of macroscopic elements that they yield).
I agree, except you forgot the most important bit of information, i.e., where noumena come from. So, just a small addition is needed---so---(unknown & undefined ) Existence ---> noumena --> Self-coherent transformation -->defined ontological elements...etc

 

I now finally understand how you and DD view "ontological elements"--all along I thought these had priority to facts (noumena), now I see I was incorrect. Facts about Existence are prior to ontological elements, and of course, nothing is prior to Existence.

 

...Anyhow, I just laid down all that to point out that, depending on what you mean by "interpretation", fundamental equation is not strictly "our interpretation of reality".
OK, that is fine with me. You have made it clear from above that the FE is between nomena and ontological elements, which has nothing whatsoever to do with reality.

 

Perhaps better then to say....the Fundamental Equation is our interpretation of how nomena are transformed into ontological elements and has absolutely nothing to do with reality.

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Rade, you surprised me with your last post. I had not expected such a thing; you seem to show some real interest in what I am doing ......
Thank you, yes I really am interested.
... This is quite true for the standard geometry used by the physics community; however, it is certainly not true in the geometry I use: i.e., the four dimensional (x,y,z,tau) geometry I structure my equation within
So, the physics community works within a different geometry--I assume it is (x,y,z,t), with t = time ? That is, in your geometry, where you structure your fundamental equation, you replace time (t) with tau ? And, the physics community does not accept this. But, given that your approach derives many of the tools used by the physics community, such as Schrödinger Equation, it seems odd the cold response you get. Please let me know if I have poor understanding.

 

One, other question comes to mind. It is known that there are two general forms of the Schrödinger Equation used by the physics community, (1) time-independent Schrödinger Equation (which does not contain time (t), but describes the stationary-state wave function), and (2) time-dependent Schrödinger Equation (the evolving wave function). Does your (x,y,z,tau) approach derive (1) or (2) or both ?

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Hi Rade, sorry I'm slow to reply.

 

Thanks for all your replies, and to DD also. Concerning above, I would agree, but I used the term "things" because, if you read post previous, it is the term used by DD.

 

Great, I thought that might be the case :) It is a bit annoying that there's no good way to refer to the undefined "stuff", without implying something "about" them/it, that leads to unfortunate communication problems...

 

I agree with you, it is not "things" that exist per se, it is existence that exists per se. Do you see the critical difference ? So, I agree with you that problems can arise when you attempt to "tack identity onto some features of reality"--Existence is Identity, identity is not tacked on to reality by the human mind, it has been there all the time.

...

I agree, except you forgot the most important bit of information, i.e., where noumena come from. So, just a small addition is needed---so---(unknown & undefined ) Existence ---> noumena --> Self-coherent transformation -->defined ontological elements...etc

 

I don't really understand what you mean by stating "existence" there in the beginning. Is it just to point out, that reality exists? I think that kind of goes without saying; since we are trying to be careful to not imply anything about the nature of that "reality" (i.e. even if it was solipsistic, it would still "exists" one way or another), you are really just stating "something exists".

 

...On that same note, the "past" or the "facts standing behind your worldview" are not necessarily a set of "things". That is not known information, and it is not necessary for the deductions to make that assumption. What is known is that, at least AFTER those "facts" (noumena) are transformed into a worldview, they are presented in a form of "set of things". And it is the features of that transformation process that are under discussion; regardless of what reality is behind those "facts" ("things" or something else).

This is very interesting comment, for you define here what it means "to know". You really did not do that the last post where you made attempt to explain how DD defines "to know"--but here you do, so this is very useful to me.

 

Be careful with that; looks like I used the word "know" in little bit different context there... Let me take a step back; my answer to your original question about what DD meant by "know" in the statement "past is what you know", was:

 

When he says "the past is what you know", he is referring to the data you have accumulated thus far, i.e. the data you work with to build your world conception. He doesn't make a statement about what that data is like or where it is coming from or whether there exists any identities there etc.

 

So in that context the word "know" can be quite confusing; of course you never really "know" what the data means or is ontologically.

---

 

Maybe it would be a good idea to re-state that in some way where the word "know" is not needed. Like, "your worldview is a function of a finite amount of accumulated data. Let us call that data "the past". (as oppose to all sorts of worm-hole/time traveling schemes, where your personal accumulated knowledge is not the definition of "past")

 

Then, what you quote;

...On that same note, the "past" or the "facts standing behind your worldview" are not necessarily a set of "things". That is not known information [that there are ontologically discrete things], and it is not necessary for the deductions to make that assumption. What is known is that, at least AFTER those "facts" (noumena) are transformed into a worldview, they are presented in a form of "set of things".

 

I.e. while we do not "know" anything about the meaning of the accumulated data, we really concretely know something about how that data needs to be ordered into a sensible worldview, IF that world-view is without self-conflict (for instance, if it does not define one particular pattern to mean 2 different things in arbitrary fashion etc.)

 

We know that if the transformation from "unknown reality" to "defined elements" is done self-coherently, the associated probability functions will not react to certain changes of the input statements.

 

For instance, we know that changing the origin of "space coordinates" in your statement of some situation about revolving planets, cannot change your answer about whether some planets will collide or not. If it does, you have made such (undefendable) assumptions about the meaning of the data, that your resulting definitions are such that shift-symmetry is not applicaple to your world-view.

 

Why this is so is walked through in fairly analytical manner and I won't go to detail. But you can probably readily understand, that our current comprehension of reality indeed comes in a form that includes facets that can always arbitrarily chosen, without changing the expectations of the situation.

 

The derivation of special relativity is exactly a statement about similar circumstance, regarding the ability to freely choose the velocity of your coordinate system, and still having to come up with the same expectations for the same situations.

 

When you factor in the symmetry requirements and few definitions that can always be made, you get the common definitions of electromagnetism. When the expectations of a given situation are not allowed to change (the probability function is not allowed to react to the act of re-stating the same problem in different coordinate system), we also find that the specific definitions of electromagnetism very concretely MUST lead to such solutions, where "massless oscillators" (clocks) count different amount of cycles as a function of chosen coordinate system. Exactly like is stated in special relativity, only in special relativity that behaviour is called time-dilation, instead of explicitly seen as a feature of your explanation of reality, with the simple need of self-coherence when choosing arbitrary inertial frames.

 

I now finally understand how you and DD view "ontological elements"--all along I thought these had priority to facts (noumena), now I see I was incorrect.

 

I usually try to remember to say "defined elements" to clarify when I am talking about something that exists only in a particular world view.

 

Perhaps better then to say....the Fundamental Equation is our interpretation of how nomena are transformed into ontological elements and has absolutely nothing to do with reality.

 

I guess you could say that. It is the constraints to the probability functions, leading to some particular expressions of modern physics.

 

-Anssi

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So, the physics community works within a different geometry--I assume it is (x,y,z,t), with t = time ? That is, in your geometry, where you structure your fundamental equation, you replace time (t) with tau ?

 

You were replying on DD's commentary about the issue of parity, but since you brought up the relationship between "t" and "tau", I'm guessing you have the analysis about special relativity in mind. So I thought I'd continue from what I already said in previous post about that, I think you might be able to wrap your head around this;

 

"t" is simply a parameter that gives meaning to time-wise dynamics of your solution (to reality). Thus it is also referred to as "the evolution parameter".

 

Think about it this way; if you imagine the propagation of electromagnetic waves (or a photon) in your mind, you are already imagining "motion" in terms of that evolution parameter. I.e. you are thinking of motion of some defined stuff/things. And how you expect a clock to work, is of course a function of your careful definitions of electromagnetism (clock is an electromagnetic apparatus).

 

In other words, "t" is basically a time-wise parameter of your solution, underlying your definitions of how clocks work in the first place. I.e. "t" is not a parameter that something one can just "measure" by itself. It's purpose is to be a tool in worldview, handling the tracking of how microscopipc (and why not macroscopic) things are expected to move, and where and "when" they are expected to interact.

 

Note that also in common physics, C (a speed paramater) appears in the definitions of electromagnetism, while on the other hand, it is electromagnetic devices that are taken as "clocks".

 

Note that the definition of "mass" was derived in Schrödinger's thread, in a way that it co-incides exactly with the definition of mass in standard physics. Using that definition so to find out our expectations for construction of "a massless oscillator bouncing between 2 massive mirrors" (i.e. "a clock"), when our solution must allow one to freely choose the velocity of the used coordinate system and still come up with the same expectations regarding which things end up in interaction (same expectations about causality), it is explicitly found that an electromagnetic "clock" must be plotted to count different amount of clock cycles in relation to the underlying evolution parameter, depending on chosen coordinate system velocity.

 

I.e. the construction does whatever it does (or "is whatever it is"), but your solution about reality must expect its cycle count to appear to "time-dilate" upon choosing different inertial frames, otherwise your end results vary incoherently when changing something that is completely immaterial aspect of the input arguments (the velocity of a chosen coordinate system).

 

After that is said and done, "t" which gives meaning to the motion of the microscopic objects constituting that clock, will not co-incide with what the clock measures. The fact that "tau" in DD's definitions co-incides exactly with what clocks measure is of course also ontologically immaterial aspect of the analysis; it is best taken as a very useful feature of the definitions of x,y,z,tau space. (There's a reason DD has decided to call that axis "tau")

 

Btw, that whole story co-incides exactly with the common history of special relativity. First, the definitions of electromagnetism were giving seemingly different results depending on which frame you chose to plot the situation in:

Moving magnet and conductor problem - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

To be able to get symmetrical results, Einstein constrained the speed of the propagation of EM to be plotted as exactly the same to all directions in each coordinate system. That move can certainly be done because it will turn out to be completely immaterial choice (by the very definitions of macroscopic objects, there can be no macroscopic device that can measure the two-way speed of light). It also meant, that simultaneity was not universally definable, as with these definitions, each coordinate system carries its own notion of simultaneity, obviously.

 

And then that whole thing became to be commonly treated in terms of relativistic spacetime, with all sorts of ontological arguments and implications being made about its existence etc. (let it be said here that there are many other ways to solve the original moving magnet and conductor probem, so to get "the same answers", some of them having nothing to do with isotropic speed of C)

 

-Anssi

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So, the physics community works within a different geometry--I assume it is (x,y,z,t), with t = time ?
Not exactly. There are actually two different geometries used in common physics. The first is the old fashioned three dimensional Euclidean geometry (usually referred to in terms of three orthogonal axes x, y and z). That is the same geometry commonly used to analytically describe physical things like houses (house plans), machines (mechanical drawings), mountains (terrain maps), etc.

 

Newton introduced the idea of physical things changing in time. Such things can be seen as a sequence of three dimensional entities changing in time (like a movie sequence). In that case, one can use the parameter “t” to identify which specific three dimensional drawing describes the entity at time t. Our minds can only comprehend such a thing as a changing three dimensional thing (essentially as a movie sequence) not as a physical drawing; however, if the thing being described is essentially one dimensional (for example, the displacement of a pendulum bob from a central point) we can make a two dimensional drawing which displays x (the displacement) on one axis and displays t on a second axis. Newton made much use of such drawings. When looking at such drawings, one can mentally cast “t” as a dimension (in the drawing) but, with regard to Newton's picture of what is going on, one should always remember that t is actually a parameter used to specify change (t merely defines which particular displacement in x is being talked about).

 

Now Newton discovered that one hell of a lot of mechanical problems could be solved with some very simple mechanical laws (Newton's laws of physics) and Newton became the central authority on “how to do physics”. Years later, electromagnetic effects came into physics as physically measurable phenomena (prior to the eighteenth century the area was considered more of magic then physics). Eventually Maxwell put forth his equations (essentially very analogous to Newton's equations for mechanical things) and some subtle problems arose.

 

Essentially the problem revolved around the fact that Maxwell's equations yielded light as a wave phenomena with a constant velocity (independent of your frame of reference). This destroyed Galileo's relativity (always taken as a fundamental issue of physics). It was quickly realized that the central problem was that Newton had assumed that clocks could be set to agree. Very quickly people began to work on the problem of taking in to account the issue setting those clocks and they could not find a decent representation of reality which was consistent with what was known, relativity and a universal fixed speed of light. The problem was very much seen as, “how in the world do we get relativity back into the description”.

 

Einstein solved the problem using a geometry developed by Minkowski. He let “t” be an imaginary coordinate of his geometry essentially coming up with a four dimensional geometry with coordinates x, y, z and ict (that is “i” times “c” times “t”) where “i” was the square root of minus one and “c” was the speed of light. In that geometry relativistic relationships between non accelerating frames work out fine. It was quite a bit later that he worked out a geometric way of obtaining consistency with relativity in general (commonly known a “General Relativity).

 

This was Einstein's “space-time continuum”; a four dimensional space (x,y,z,ict). Since then, the problem has been considered solved and few people question his solution.

 

Now to my solution. When I was ten years old, my father bought a book by Gamow called “One, Two, Three, Infinity” which was meant to explain Einstein's relativity to the layman. I read it; but I totally misinterpreted what Gamow intended to say. He gave examples of describing simultaneity on a moving train by a rest observer (how they would set their clocks differently) and also discussed what people call the twin paradox. My interpretation of what he said was, “Oh, clocks don't measure time!” I took that interpretation because, to me, being the same place at the same time meant one could interact and clocks apparently couldn't serve that purpose (I had Newton's old parameter of motion concept of time embedded in my head).

 

Now Gamow explained that “time” (what clocks measure) was another dimension orthogonal to x, y and z. He also commented that clocks actually measured “proper time”, a thing Einstein called “tau”. So, in my head, Einstein's four dimensional space was x, y, z and tau (or c times tau; c being a mere parameter of scale). I still understood “t” to be a parameter of mechanical evolution (I utterly had no concept of Minkowski geometry).

 

The last thing which I again misinterpreted was the reason tau (which I saw as a dimension exactly analogous to the other three axes) was not observable. Now I was only ten years old so my interpretations were not exactly sophisticated. Gamow had said something about Plato or Socrates suggesting that we don't actually see reality but rather we see the universe as if as shadows on the wall of a cave. So I simply presumed the tau axis was the direction of that projection.

 

At any rate, my mental picture of the world was through that four dimensional picture together with time as an evolution parameter and the tau axis being projected out. It gave all the correct answers with regard to relativity so I presumed it was what Einstein had in mind. I never studied special relativity until I got into college (back then relativity was not a high school subject) at which time it became clear that my picture was not at all what Einstein had in mind. Nevertheless, it still gave exactly the same results that his picture gave so I continued to use it (remember, I had been using my picture for almost ten years on a daily basis and I was totally familar with the consequences). Some problems were easier in Einstein's picture and some were easier in my picture so I always used the picture most convenient to the problem in front of me (note that my picture was esentially a four dimensional Newtonian picture which allowed Newtonian dynamics to give valid answers not an easy problem in Einstein's picture). The projection issue was, in my head, just a subtle trick which made the picture work. As a matter of fact, I was firmly convinced that my picture, though mechanically useful, was obviously the wrong attack.

 

I never studied quantum mechanics until I got into graduate school. When I was taught quantum mechanics, it seemed to me that setting mass to be momentum in the tau direction was a simple solution to that projection problem. People have often asked me why momentum in that particular direction should be quantized. The answer is quite simple: we live in a universe constructed of massive fundamental entities. Without any massive entities how it the devil could persistent entities exist?

 

So all our experiments are performed with objects made of entities momentum quantized in the tau direction and they are performed in laboratories constructed of entities which are also momentum quantized in the tau direction. It is no more than a simple selection of data imposed on us by the requirements of our existence.

That is, in your geometry, where you structure your fundamental equation, you replace time (t) with tau ? And, the physics community does not accept this. But, given that your approach derives many of the tools used by the physics community, such as Schrödinger Equation, it seems odd the cold response you get. Please let me know if I have poor understanding.
I think their problem is that my attack is far too simple and they just can't comprehend the solution being that simple: i.e., I must be wrong.
One, other question comes to mind. It is known that there are two general forms of the Schrödinger Equation used by the physics community, (1) time-independent Schrödinger Equation (which does not contain time (t), but describes the stationary-state wave function), and (2) time-dependent Schrödinger Equation (the evolving wave function). Does your (x,y,z,tau) approach derive (1) or (2) or both ?
Both! They are not actually different equations but rather different boundary conditions to be applied to the solutions. One (the time-dependent form) is what must be used in dynamic situations (where things are changing) and the other (the time-independent form) is what must be used to explain static structures (where the solutions don't change in time).

 

Sorry I have been so slow but I have been quite busy lately.

 

Have fun -- Dick

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Symmetry is great. One thing to think over is that this existence can only be one way, this way. Being that time is relative, this could imply that the past, present, and future are relative as information changes so to can time. View it this way, the particle and its field are stationary while Space-Time moves.

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