Is there any free will?

[ughaibu]

The debate at hand is one that pits free will against causal determinism. Nothing you have presented demonstrates your alleged free will is free from a causal process

I'll assume this post is addressed to me. Explain how determinism or causal processes are incompatible with free will.

You have made a claim but not proved it so it is nothing more than a claim

On the contrary, I defined my terms and demonstrated an exemplification.

[Nitack]

I dont know, do you have an objection to my demonstration?

 

I have an objection to your definition of determinism. :phones:

 

By my definition, free will means you have a choice in all conscious actions you make while determinism implies that some (fictitious) omnipotent being already made the choice and you only have an illusion of choice.

 

To me they are antithetical concepts, yet the Churchies will spout all day about Gods plan while in the same breath saying that you have free will.

[Pyrotex]

I would like to point out that before Ughaibu posted his contentious demonstration of free will, he privately told me that normally when he gives this experiment, he chooses "B". And that for a variety of reasons, including tradition, habit, and a strong fondness for rounded characters, he would once again choose "B". The fact that he didn't, is strong evidence that he did indeed demonstrate free will.

 

Pyro the Cogito Ergo

[CraigD]

I define free will as the ability to freely chose between subjective alternatives, without a bias, that slants you one way.

I would define free will as the ability to chose one alternative even though your bias is to choose the other;)

Definition: free will is the ability to exercise conscious choice from among realisable alternatives.

Containing as they do the undefined – and arguably philosophically undefinable – terms “freely”, “chose”, and “conscious” – I’m discontent with these and most other definitions – including the negative definition “free will is the absence of determinism” – because they lack testable, scientific objectivity.

 

As I’ve stated a couple of times in the many discussions of free will that have appeared in the forums, my preferred definition of freewill is this pragmatic one:

Even if our behavior is completely deterministic, we practically have free will if no other entity can predict our behavior with sufficient accuracy to gain advantage. If no one can know what you’ll do next, your choice of what you do next can’t reasonably be attributed to anyone but you.

Containing such poorly defined terms as “entity”, “sufficient accuracy”, “advantage”, and “you”, this definition is still far from a scientific one, but, I think, tending more than most toward one.

 

I’d like to articulate here yet another definition of free will in this thread, but would first like acknowledgement of understanding of this previous “pragmatic” one, the shortcoming arising from poorly defined terms in it and others in this thread, and consensus on the goal of moving toward a more objective definition.

[C1ay]

I'll assume this post is addressed to me. Explain how determinism or causal processes are incompatible with free will.

 

If your choice is not a choice at all but the result of a causal or deterministic process that yields specific outputs dependent on the input then it is not really the result of free will.

 

Both may well exist but a proof of free will would show that it actually is what it is claimed to be and not a determined result.

 

I defined my terms and demonstrated an exemplification.

 

Your apparent demonstration is just that and does not prove that your choice is truly the result of free will. The free will vs determinism debate has gone on for millennia and is not simply resolved with, "I imagine a choice between a or b and I choose a".

 

Quantum mechanics has proven that the predictability required of determinism does not exist but even a disproof of determinism is not a proof of free will.

[ughaibu]

a proof of free will would show that it actually is what it is claimed to be and not a determined result

Determinism is true if at any time the world has a definite state and the transformation of states is exactly fixed by natural law, this is a minimal definition of determinism. If I'm presented with a neutral choice, for example between A and B, or between 01 and 10, the number of states of the world supporting each option is likely to be approximately equal, so in a determined world I would be expected to choose each about 50% of the time. The same applies to a fair coin, when tossed it produces approximately 50% of both heads and tails, as the number of states of the world supporting each is pretty much equal. So, it is the case that in a determined world the number of states of the world that support heads and my choice of A constitute about 25%, the same for tails and B, but I can, of course, look at the result of tossing the coin and choose accordingly, every time for any arbitrary number of times, if determinism were true, the probability of this occurring would be infinitely small. Thus the probability that human choice is determined is infinitely small.

[CraigD]

The debate at hand is one that pits free will against causal determinism.

The pitting of free will against causal determinism only occurs if one affirms incompatibilism. Incompatibilism is not the only, the dominant, or IMHO the most interesting belief concerning free will.

If I'm presented with a neutral choice, for example between A and B, or between 01 and 10, the number of states of the world supporting each option is likely to be approximately equal, so in a determined world I would be expected to choose each about 50% of the time. The same applies to a fair coin, when tossed it produces approximately 50% of both heads and tails, as the number of states of the world supporting each is pretty much equal. So, it is the case that in a determined world the number of states of the world that support heads and my choice of A constitute about 25%, the same for tails and B, but I can, of course, look at the result of tossing the coin and choose accordingly, every time for any arbitrary number of times, if determinism were true, the probability of this occurring would be infinitely small. Thus the probability that human choice is determined is infinitely small.

The systematic counting in this argument is incorrect.

 

In systematic counting, the sum of the probabilities of all possible outcomes at a given moment is required to always be 1. For example, using ughaibu’s example of a fair coin toss and a neutral choice being made, the outcome probabilities at each moment are:

Moment  Coin 1  Choice 1  Coin 2  Choice 2  p
1       heads   A                           1/4
1       heads   B                           1/4
1       tails   A                           1/4
1       tails   B                           1/4
2       heads   A         heads   A         1/16
...
2       tails   B         tails   B         1/16
etc.

If only one outcome (eg: all coins must be heads, and the choice must always be A) is possible if determinism is true, that outcome is know, and shown not to occur, determinism is proven not to be true. If only one outcome is possible but not known, it is known that determinism is not true, then as the number of moments increases, the probability that determinism is true discarding the knowledge that it is not becomes, as ughaibu argued, small.

 

However, that the only possible outcome if determinism is true is known is neither a given not proven. If determinism is given to be false, then the argument’s proof that the probability that determinism is true is small is unneeded.

 

More importantly, as I see it, the terms “neutral choice” and “fair coin” are not adequately defined for a useful proposition to be made using them.

 

In trying to wrangle the philosophical Gordian knot that is the question of free will, I think the question of utility is important. Some quirky religionists have derived some utility from the question - for example, the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, which holds that one’s decisions and actions are ultimately unimportant, but is valid only if free will does not exists. Under this doctrine, the lack of existence of free will implies that various measurable personality traits are very reliable predictors of behavior – ie: one who behaves as a reprobate is a reprobate and can be counted on to continue behaving as one. Though only certain religionists accept such logic, and it is, IMHO, wrong, it nonetheless promises great utility.

 

The utility I’d like from the question of free will are principles of use in understanding human thought and behavior, and mimicking it with computer programs. From this perspective, the question is less one of the existence or non-existence of a difficult, possibly impossible to define and/or prove quality – free will - than of the physical location and mechanism of ordinary (free or not) will. In short, whatever is responsible for determining the behavior of a human or other animal evidencing human-like behavior, where, and what, in a scientifically measurable sense, is it?

 

In this context, the existence or non-existence of a quality we might equate to either free will or uncomputability is very important, because its answer may place requirements and restrictions on what sort of computer hardware is capable of running programs that behave like humans. The question of free will in this context is the same as the question of “Strong AI” vs. “New Mysterianism” (about which I’ve expounded, or, depending on your point-of-view, yammered and babbled, at length in these fora).

[ughaibu]

Sorry, I dont understand how your objection addresses my argument.

The systematic counting in this argument is incorrect.

But it appears to be the same as yours. There's a 25% probability for each of heads and A, and tails and B, a total of 50%, if the experiment is performed n times the probability of agreement will be one over two to the power of n.

However, that the only possible outcome if determinism is true is known is neither a given not proven. If determinism is given to be false, then the argument’s proof that the probability that determinism is true is small is unneeded.

As my argument is a response to the suggestion that my choice of A or B might be determined, it specifically concerns the possibility that determinism is real.

More importantly, as I see it, the terms “neutral choice” and “fair coin” are not adequately defined for a useful proposition to be made using them.

I dont see any problem with these definitions, but if one were submitting for publication in an academic journal, I agree that something more formal would be appropriate.

the existence or non-existence of a quality we might equate to either free will or uncomputability is very important, because its answer may place requirements and restrictions on what sort of computer hardware is capable of running programs that behave like humans

This article might interest you: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/physics/pdf/0504/0504215v1.pdf

[CraigD]

Sorry, I dont understand how your objection addresses my argument.

…

There's a 25% probability for each of heads and A, and tails and B, a total of 50%, if the experiment is performed n times the probability of agreement will be one over two to the power of n.

If the choice is “neutral”, and the coin fair, then they are independent and each have a probability of .5 of either of their two outcomes. There’s therefore also a .25 probability of a heads and B, and a tails and A, for a total of 1.

 

I sense I’m failing to understand something important in your argument, ugh. Is there some reason that the coin and the choice must always agree?

 

If so, they aren’t independent, and the probability of heads and A is not .25, but .5.

This article might interest you: http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/physics/pdf/0504/0504215v1.pdf

It does – thanks for the introduction to Mark J Hadley. He appears to have a lot of well thought-out and thought-provoking ideas, such as those on his academic staff webpage Provocative views of modern physics, which promise to be some interesting reading and study. :naughty:

[ughaibu]

If the choice is “neutral”, and the coin fair, then they are independent and each have a probability of .5 of either of their two outcomes. There’s therefore also a .25 probability of a heads and B, and a tails and A, for a total of 1.

Yes, I know, sorry if that was unclear. If we designate heads as A and tails as B, that accounts for 50% of the total, and if we class a choice of A when the coin has landed heads up or a choice of B when it has landed tails up as "agreement", the probability of us agreeing with the coin is 50%.

Is there some reason that the coin and the choice must always agree?

There is no reason at all. What we're interested in is "conscious choice" and I can look at the result of the coin and choose to agree with it, and as I can do this every time for any arbitrary number of times, the probability of my choice being determined is infinitely small.

Deniers of free will dont usually find this argument convincing, they claim that the result of the coin somehow causes my choice, though I could equally well ignore the coin, or choose A on every occasion, etc. However, there is a stronger version, if I correctly understand the prevailing view on radioactive decay.

If radioactive decay is determined, it is non-locally determined, this means that causal relations have no temporal order. If I choose a suitable amount of radioactive substance and suitable time periods, I can set up a Schroedinger's cat type situation with 50% chance of A and 50% chance of B. If I can choose to "agree" with the radioactive material, non-locality requires that my choice is as much the cause of the radioactive event as that event is the cause of my choice, in other words, both events (my choice and the decay or lack of decay) "just happen", and the probability of this, if determinism is true, is infinitely small.

[C1ay]

What we're interested in is "conscious choice" and I can look at the result of the coin and choose to agree with it, and as I can do this every time for any arbitrary number of times, the probability of my choice being determined is infinitely small.

 

What do you think the probability is that your apparent choices are, or are not, the result of a process in the mind that is itself dependent on previous events in your life? IOW, is it possible that your choices are not really choices at all but the results of a subconscious process that is driven by previous events in your life even if you believe them to choices of free will? Note, I am not asking if this is the case, only if it is possible.

[ughaibu]

is it possible that your choices are not really choices at all but the results of a subconscious process that is driven by previous events in your life even if you believe them to choices of free will?

This seems to me to be objection 3 from post 14:

3) all conscious activity has been completed unconsciously

There are those who hold that the work of Libet, Haynes, etc, show that all conscious mental activity has been completed unconsciously, that is to say, there is no conscious thought and consciousness is the perception of mechanically completed unconscious thought. I think if this were the case there would be no free will deniers. As all healthy adult humans operate under the assumption that they have free will, what deniers call the "illusion of free will", they, at least, unconsciously hold free will to exist. If the above Libet action potential based conjecture were correct, this unconscious acceptance of free will would mechanically prevail consciously, in effect, it requires free will to deny free will.

[Pyrotex]

I might venture to suggest that if one cannot devise any test between observed behavior and some idealized model of free will behavior that distinguishes the two, then the observed behavior is indistinguishable from free will behavior, and therefore equivalent to free will behavior.

 

The trick is, of course, coming up with that idealized model of free will behavior. :hyper: This may, in fact, be impossible.

[neomoppy]

Is time travel Possible, If it where it brings up the Grandmother paradox, i.e what would happen if you went back and killed your mother when she was a child, that means you could not of been born in the first place to go back and kill your mother meaning she still gave birth to you, meaning you went back and killed her and so on and so forth.

Howeer one way round that is the theory of Parallel universe, I.E an infinite number of parellel universe's, and with every "free will" decision which has ever been made, there is a universe for each outcome/choice.

 

Therfore there is no free will as the alternate choice's which are not made split off in a new parellel universe, so in efect our choice's are not free at all, and predetermined and are predetermined in each universe.

 

Hopefully someone with a bit more knowlegde can explain this better then me.

[Tormod]

Therfore there is no free will as the alternate choice's which are not made split off in a new parellel universe, so in efect our choice's are not free at all, and predetermined and are predetermined in each universe.

 

This argument is fallacious in that you require a hypothetical agent (other universes) to have a given property (absolute determinism), but there is no way for you to prove either.

 

If universes branch off simply because of the possibilities of our actions, then what happens if I throw a bucket of dry sand in the air?

 

Determinism is IMHO impossible simply because of the underlying randomness in the universe. Like Brownian motion shows - it is easy to track the paths of a grain in a glass of water, but it is impossible to predict it due to the incredibly huge amount of atoms which affect it.

[Pyrotex]

Free will is a contentious topic. :)

Despite what some claim, no mathematical analysis of FW has ever been done; and it's probably impossible to do anyway.

No reputable physicist has ever provided a proof that FW is possible / impossible; and it's probably impossible to do anyway.

FW is quite likely one of those indecidable propositions that plague humanity when there's nothing more important to do.

 

But Tormod makes a valid point.

 

(2) You can trace cause-and-effect of one of your actions back to childhood experiences, brainwashed biases, experiential bias, nutritional limitations when you were a child, chemical affects in the womb, genetic stresses at conception, and so on and so on.

(3) But your action was triggered by electrical signals in the brain, and those signals arose from chemical activity at the molecular and atomic scale and quantum uncertainty plays havoc at that scale.

 

And there is no way to relate the cause-and-effect thread in paragraph (2) to the effect-and-action thread in paragraph (3). !!!!!!!!!!!!!

 

Somewhere in the middle -- all the causes that went into your construction and formulation on one side -- all the effects that arise out of your brain's chaotic sea of molecular and electronic causes on the other side -- lies a featureless and unpredictable region that resists all attempts to describe or analyze.

 

If anything, this middle region seems to support free will, in that it is dominated by processes that are random and chaotic.

[C1ay]

Actually the existence of randomness and/or a lack of predictability does not disprove causal determinism and disproving determinism would not necessarily support free will either. It's like trying to prove creation by disproving evolution, a pointless exercise.

 

When it comes down to it there are a variety of interpretations of determinism ranging from Hard Determinism to Soft Determinism. Only hard determinism is incompatible with free will and requires strict predictability. Soft determinism still holds that all events are caused by previous events even though predictability is limited by a lack of information or excessive complexity. Compatibilists believe that the two ideologies can be reconciled while incompatibilists believe it must be one or the other. IMO, we cannot and will not ever know the ultimate truth so I'll remain agnostic about the whole debate.