Truth value of a good theory

[ughaibu]

If a scientific theory produces useful predictions and remains unfalsified, ie it's a good theory, is it considered, by the law of excluded middle, to be true or is it considered to be undecided?

[Boerseun]

By definition, no scientific theory claims to be the Truth. Every single theory is open not only to falsification, but to be displaced by other theories that makes finer and more accurate predictions.

 

If I have a theory which predicts the value of some arbitrary measurement to be 13.99999998 (insert the unit of your choice here), and you come up with a theory that predicts it to 13.999999999999999999, then yours will displace mine not for mine being wrong, but simply for yours being more accurate.

 

There are cases where some theories are employed under different circumstances, for instance Newton works fine in the everyday world, but falls apart at high speeds where Relativity is used. Neither of them are considered "True", however, and will never be; but currently, they're accurate and useful enough for its particular application. But tomorrow someone might come with a theory that's even more accurate, and that will become the weapon of choice for calculator-wielding nerds.

[ughaibu]

Thanks, that's pretty much as I thought.

[Tormod]

If a scientific theory produces useful predictions and remains unfalsified, ie it's a good theory, is it considered, by the law of excluded middle, to be true or is it considered to be undecided?

 

You forgot to mention whether the theory in question has any evidence or not.

 

If not, I would say it remains an undocumented assumption, like most theories.

[ughaibu]

Dont useful predictions constitute evidence?

[Tormod]

Dont useful predictions constitute evidence?

 

No. Evidence is what you need to confirm a prediction. A successful confirmation of a prediction (usually through testing or experimenting) leads to a more rigorous theory.

[ughaibu]

Okay, I thought that was implied by my use of "useful". I'll try to be more explicit in future.

[Tormod]

Well, I interpreted "Useful" to mean "practical". It does not imply that the prediction has been observed yet (or falsified). Never mind, it's not something we need to fight over. :hihi:

[charles brough]

If a scientific theory produces useful predictions and remains unfalsified, ie it's a good theory, is it considered, by the law of excluded middle, to be true or is it considered to be undecided?

 

Using the word "true" is misleading in science. Everything we learn in science is "theory" and is never "the total, abstract Truth." That is why science will always be with us; we will never have "the final answer." The key to understanding and accepting this is that all we in science do is "increase the ACCURACY of what we believe."

 

The only reason we use the "truth" word is because somethings do not need to be regarded in stages of accuracy so that it is practical for us to regard them as "facts" and even "truths."

 

For example, "the Earth is round." That is "the truth" and "a fact" for practical considerations---even though it is not COMPLETELY round or globular. It is practical to use the terms sometime as long as we understand that ideally, there is no such thing as "fact" and "truth." It is just that we are saddled with the old concept because we brought it over from religion. Like "sin", "holy" and "evil," it has only religious meaning.

 

charles, HOME PAGE

[ughaibu]

When I initially asked this question I was involved in an argument, on a different board, about JTB as a theory of knowledge. JTB (justified true belief) claims that a person can only know things that are true, one of my complaints about JTB was that scientists can know things that are false, ie it is only falsified theories that can be assigned a truth value. This is aside from any facts used in formulating a theory, these are taken by me to qualify as true.

[Qfwfq]

...even though it is not COMPLETELY round or globular.

Is an egg round?

 

...scientists can know things that are false, ie it is only falsified theories that can be assigned a truth value.

If the statement A is false, then it's a true fact that A is false.

[ughaibu]

Qfwfq: Do you mean that it's false that it's true? Or perhaps that it's false that it's false that it's false? The value can be reversed so that the false is presented as true but I dont see how that's helpful in describing knowledge. My main objection to JTB is that it relies on knowledge, in that it must be known whether the proposition is true or false.

[Qfwfq]

Qfwfq: Do you mean that it's false that it's true?

No, I mean that it's true that it's false.

 

If A is false, then "A is false." is a true statement.

[charles brough]

Wouldn't it be easier and less a hassle if people would see "truth" as a confusing concept left over from religion and which therefore inhibits science and thinking? All we have is "knowledge"-theory-ideology, etc. but which---and this is the key, the important part---is of varying value depending upon which or what is the most accurate.

 

By this standards, we can easily see that whether "creationism" or evolution are 'THE TRUTH,' for example, is totaly meaningless. All that counts is that evolution is far more accurate. The more we know about nature, the more accurate our understanding of evolution becomes. At one time, the Genesis account of origins was far more accurate than those then prevelent in the Old World. It is all relevent and explains why it is an endless process. We will always need to have science and will never have "Truth."

[ughaibu]

Qfwfq: If the object of knowledge was true, JTB wouldn't insist on the requirement 'it's true that it's true', only that it's true, with "it's true that it's false" you are taking a meta-stance and introducing a new object of knowledge. In the same manner of "it's true that it's false", I could state that "it's false that it's true", both expressions state the same thing and neither effects the knowledge of the knower, thus the meta-object can also be known even if false.

[ughaibu]

Charles Brough: There are things that are "facts", commonly available without unreasonable exclusivity to most humans, by means of direct or indirect perception. I dont see any problem with describing such facts as being "true".

[Qfwfq]

with "it's true that it's false" you are taking a meta-stance and introducing a new object of knowledge.

I don't see why it would be a new object of knowledge, to a logician, or a meta-stance.

 

In the same manner of "it's true that it's false", I could state that "it's false that it's true", both expressions state the same thing

Which, to me, is why it defeats the point about stating something to be true vs. stating something to be false. I don't see why neither should affect the knowledge of the knower.

 

thus the meta-object can also be known even if false.

I really don't get your drift. :naughty:

 

I see the point about falsification which, having an essentially practical cause, cannot be argued on purely logical grounds without the axiom that experience could never exhaustively cover all instances of certain phenomenological classes.