Well, A Sign Of Intelligence!

[AnssiH]

Rade, about post #28, it seems like you keep harping on that same idea that we are talking about explanations of perceptions. When it's more appropriately the translation mechanisms whose end results are perceptions, that is called "an explanation". I.e., "an explanation of undefined information". Undefined, as in, whatever it is, that is taken to "mean" something. Even the simplest perception you can think of, is already a definition of meaning of something.

 

I don't want to try and elaborate on it, you need to review past exchange to find out what I mean.

 

I would be very interested if you would begin a new thread on this topic, because I have no idea what you mean. Do you mean those that think QM is a formalism do not consider it to also be a theory ? As you say, if you wish to respond, I think it best to start a new thread topic.

 

He just means that some people consciously avoid suggesting that the validity of quantum mechanical definitions implies the validity of whatever ontological implications those definitions have. What those implications supposedly are, is a subject to interpretation (also called, quantum interpretations). He doesn't want to dwell on that subject because it is full of subtleties and it is difficult to communicate, and I wouldn't really blame him.

 

Regarding your post #30, I have no idea what you are thinking. Maybe you can elaborate, what are you thinking when you say "I would be shocked if any large set of regularities of something undefined did not obey defined laws of physics" (because I seriously doubt you are thinking of the issues I've been referring to)

 

Also in your last post you are very much referring to definitions. If you can measure something, you have to define what it is that you are measuring. That entails you have defined what some information means to you. Underneath all that, there is some collection of information. Prior to defining what that information means, it is "undefined". It's pretty simple, I suspect your problem is that you just want to somehow visualize what such a thing could be like in some sense. The point is, that that very act is already an attempt to explain something by generating a specific terminology.

 

So, then, what is your notion of "a quantum mechanical world view"?

 

Any world view that is compatible with (or an interpretation, or an extrapolation of) quantum formalism.

 

The issue that I was referring to was that there are pretty explicit epistemological reasons to the validity of the formalism, i.e., to the validity of expressing inductive expectations via a terminology of quantum mechanical objects = in terms of any type of world view whose defined objects obey the quantum formalism to the tee.

 

Of course, if you still remember any details, there are very specific approximations that play a role in that argument. It is important to understand what those approximations are, in order to understand what this whole argument means.

 

Who? Me?

 

No, I mean an average response. You always seem to assume I think very little of you :I

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

Any world view that is compatible with (or an interpretation, or an extrapolation of) quantum formalism.

And which formalism do you have in mind? That of von Neumann or some other one?

 

What you say after that appears grounded only on Dick's claims.

[AnssiH]

And which formalism do you have in mind? That of von Neumann or some other one?

 

Absolutely any given flavour of quantum mechanics. I mean, what difference does it make? They are all different terminology expressions of essentially the same expectations, i.e., they are all just slightly different perspective on the same underlying information.

 

Different favours may contain slightly different approximations of course, which can cause subtle differences in their expectations, but the point I was making obviously applies to any representation form we can ever generate.

 

So why are you asking, do you have some point in mind that you would like to make?

 

What you say after that appears grounded only on Dick's claims.

 

Yes

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

Rade, about post #28, it seems like you keep harping on that same idea that we are talking about explanations of perceptions. When it's more appropriately the translation mechanisms whose end results are perceptions, that is called "an explanation".

AnissH..I keep harping on it because I do not agree with your definition of "translation mechanism". You claim that the translation, whose end results are perceptions, occurs within consciousness and thus involves what you call an explanation. I completely disagree. I claim that the translation occurs within the unconsciousness, that the mechanism is automatic. Our disagreement on this point is fundamental, and one (of many) reasons we offer differ interpretations of what DD has presented. Let me again make it clear (I think ? you already know this), I happen to agree and find very useful the approach taken by DD, in particular his claim that "mass" should be related to his concept of the "tau dimension" at the quantum level of probability.

 

Even the simplest perception you can think of' date=' is already a definition of meaning of something.[/quote']Again, I do not agree. At the time the perception is given to the consciousness and enters the process of "thinking" is it 100% undefined.

 

I don't want to try and elaborate on it' date=' you need to review past exchange to find out what I mean.[/quote']I know what you mean, I do not agree with it.

 

...what are you thinking when you say "I would be shocked if any large set of regularities of something undefined did not obey defined laws of physics" (because I seriously doubt you are thinking of the issues I've been referring to)

Laws of physics are constraints' date=' thus I would be shocked if any large set of regularities received as sensations undefined were not constrained.

 

If you can measure something, you have to define what it is that you are measuring.

Here I agree and disagree. I agree when you measure objects that have attributes that can be measured. For instance, humans can measure the distance between the earth and moon to a number humans cannot visually comprehend as to extent (120,000 miles), but we can understand each time we glance at our feet. But I disagree with your claim when the measurement involves the translation mechanism of forming concepts within the mind. For that type of measurement no knowledge of definitions is required.

 

I suspect your problem is that you just want to somehow visualize what such a thing could be like in some sense. The point is' date=' that that very act is already an attempt to explain something by generating a specific terminology.[/quote']I have no such problem, your suspect is not valid. You of all people should understand the importance of not trying to suspect what others are thinking, mostly leads to misinterpretation of what the other person is saying. But, if you wish, define what you mean by "somehow visualize a thing" and we can discuss.

 

Finally, as with all the many threads concerning the presentation of DD on this forum, we move so far past the OP topic that we reach a point of re-hash of arguments and explanations presented often many times in the past. If you wish to respond to my comments here, great, I'll read and let you know where I disagree. Perhaps we should try an approach where we both are in 100% agreement with all claims made, that should be instructive ? But, where to begin ? What single logical statement would you suggest we could both agree with to begin such a discussion, with the only constraint being that the primary statement (let's call it the Primo Axoim) must be capable of being either true or false.

[Qfwfq]

Absolutely any given flavour of quantum mechanics. I mean, what difference does it make? They are all different terminology expressions of essentially the same expectations, i.e., they are all just slightly different perspective on the same underlying information.

 

Different favours may contain slightly different approximations of course, which can cause subtle differences in their expectations, but the point I was making obviously applies to any representation form we can ever generate.

In this manner, you are not giving any meaning to what you had said, that "quantum mechanical objects are not realistic objects".

 

Yes

Which leaves it quite unsupported.

[Doctordick]

So why are you asking, do you have some point in mind that you would like to make?

Anssi, the problem here is quite obvious. There is an issue which both you and I consider to be obvious which is simply beyond the comprehension of both Rade and Qfwfq.

 

That issue is that understanding an explanation requires understanding the language used to communicate that explanation. You and I consider the problem of understanding an explanation to include understanding the language: i.e., one can not presume that the language is an understood issue as it is, in reality, no more than an explanation of the phenomena used to communicate. The assumption that one's interpretation is the only possibility can not be accepted as it implies that no alternate interpretation exists. Thus the possibility of alternate interpretation of the language must be included in the analysis. In a very important sense, the underlying information upon which the language in which the explanation is expressed is based is part and parcel of any explanation under discussion.

 

It is an issue they both insist on totally omitting.

 

I suspect such an idea is simply beyond their intellectual comprehension and you are beating a dead horse. :shrug:

 

Have fun -- Dick

[AnssiH]

AnissH..I keep harping on it because I do not agree with your definition of "translation mechanism". You claim that the translation, whose end results are perceptions, occurs within consciousness and thus involves what you call an explanation. I completely disagree.

 

Good, because I haven't claimed that :)

 

I've just been trying to explain to you, what is "it" that I am talking about. If you don't want "it" to be called "translation mechanism", you are completely free to think up another word for it. It is not at all important what word I am using, just as long as you'd accept what exactly it is, that I am referring to. And I am NOT referring to our conscious effort of explaining something. I am referring much more fundamental aspects of epistemology. Please read my previous posts to figure out better what is it that I am referring to.

 

I claim that the translation occurs within the unconsciousness, that the mechanism is automatic.

 

I have no objection to that.

 

Again, I do not agree. At the time the perception is given to the consciousness and enters the process of "thinking" is it 100% undefined.

 

You are just disagreeing with my use of the word "definition". "Definition of a definition", if you will :D

 

And again the word is not important, just try to pick up what I mean by my communication.

 

Laws of physics are constraints, thus I would be shocked if any large set of regularities received as sensations undefined were not constrained.

 

What does that mean?

 

Here I agree and disagree. I agree when you measure objects that have attributes that can be measured. For instance, humans can measure the distance between the earth and moon to a number humans cannot visually comprehend as to extent (120,000 miles), but we can understand each time we glance at our feet. But I disagree with your claim when the measurement involves the translation mechanism of forming concepts within the mind. For that type of measurement no knowledge of definitions is required.

 

Distance is a concept that we comprehend with our mind. Can you think of a measurement that does not require an understanding of some concept? Can you think of a concept that doesn't depend on definitions as to what that concept means? :)

 

I'm referring to pretty simple things, so I'm not quite sure what you are thinking of exactly when you say the kinds of things you say just above.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

In this manner, you are not giving any meaning to what you had said, that "quantum mechanical objects are not realistic objects".

 

Why, did you think I was trying to argue for or against some particular perspective(s) on quantum physics? And to follow-up, why would you think that?

 

Consider an analogy;

-"Religions are collections of undefendable beliefs".

-"Uh, which religions do you mean?"

-"All of them"

-"If you mean all of them, that doesn't mean anything."

-"Well, excuse me, but I was not trying to argue for or against any particular religion."

 

Consider the following;

-"All versions of quantum mechanics are just different language expressions of the same underlying information"

Yes, I do mean all of them, obviously.

 

Then consider the following;

-"All versions of quantum mechanics can be shown, at their core, to be a general method of expressing inductive expectations of undefined events"

 

Another way to say that is that the collection of defined objects of ANY version of quantum mechanics, is just a different way to express some inductive expectations. That means there is no merit to argue for or against the ontological status of any version. In other words "quantum mechanical objects are not realistic objects".

 

That is the meaning of what I wrote. And yes it was a reference to the implications of DD's argument.

 

Which leaves it quite unsupported.

 

Yes. Good thing logic is not a popularity contest. That's not to say there can't be errors in DD's logic. But it is to say, let's argue on the logical arguments, not on sociological measures.

 

You know I do know your current point of objection, regarding the use of anti-commuting elements. I asked you what kind of undefendable assumption do you figure that their use constitutes towards the meaning of the information-to-be-explained. You responded that you don't think that question is meaningful. Why would you say so?

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

Actually Dick, the real problem is that you and Anssi's language is totally undefined.

 

Why, did you think I was trying to argue for or against some particular perspective(s) on quantum physics? And to follow-up, why would you think that?

No I did not think that. What I do think is that you were equivocating. You were talking about formalisms but it seems you meant interpretations.

 

In other words

In other words... anything you please. I won't address these non sequiturs, even the anaolgy about religions fails because they are not all equivalent to each other in some manner, but you leap from thence to the matter of empirical equivalence between QM interpretations. I do see what you are trying to say, but your language is so ill-defined that it makes no sense to discuss whether a proposition is true or false. We maight as well be arguing about which complex numbers are green and which are purple. Are the angels male or female?

 

Yes. Good thing logic is not a popularity contest. That's not to say there can't be errors in DD's logic. But it is to say, let's argue on the logical arguments, not on sociological measures.

Strawman. I was implying nothing of the sort.

 

I don't want to get into further miscommunication and it is no use asking me to clarify my points about things such as the lie algebra when you not only lack competence but you refuse to follow even the simplest ones and doggedly pay lip service to Dick's claims about them. Good thing logic is not an act of loyal faith...

[Rade]

Good, because I haven't claimed that :)I've just been trying to explain to you, what is "it" that I am talking about. If you don't want "it" to be called "translation mechanism", you are completely free to think up another word for it.

Hello again. OK, it does appear we agree. I can accept your "translation mechanism" (which involves the formation of perceptions) given your position that "it" is "NOT referring to our conscious effort of explaining something".

 

I am referring much more fundamental aspects of epistemology.

Yes' date=' so am I, so we agree then.

 

I have no objection to that.

OK, we agree again. Just to summarize, we both agree that the "translation mechanism" is automatic and prior to consciousness.

 

You are just disagreeing with my use of the word "definition".

? Perhaps not. Once again' date=' what is your definition of the word definition. Given our agreements above, it is possible I would agree with your definition.

 

What does that mean?

Well, I worded my thoughts two different ways, and it seems I have failed to communicate with you both attempts. Perhaps if you let me know what does not make sense to you ?

 

Can you think of a measurement that does not require an understanding of some concept?

No' date=' that is what I was trying to say. I also cannot think of a concept of an entity that does not require a measurement.

 

Can you think of a concept that doesn't depend on definitions as to what that concept means?

Yes, that was my point. Here are three examples of mental concepts that do not depend on definitions:

 

[^^^^^^^^], [-4,-2,0,+2,+4], [____ __________ __ ______] The measurement that your mind must apply to form these three concepts does not require any knowledge of how to define the specific units involved. Does this make any sense to you ?

 

I'm referring to pretty simple things

I know what you mean' date=' I am thinking also of simple things.

 

Finally, do you have no interest in my final request in my last post ? Here it is again..

 

Perhaps we should try an approach where we both are in 100% agreement with all claims made, that should be instructive ? But, where to begin ? What single logical statement would you suggest we could both agree with to begin such a discussion, with the only constraint being that the primary statement (let's call it the Primo Axoim) must be capable of being either true or false.

[AnssiH]

No I did not think that. What I do think is that you were equivocating. You were talking about formalisms but it seems you meant interpretations.

 

You thought I was originally saying "Quantum mechanical objects of different formalisms are not realistic objects"? What would that even mean?

 

I really had to go back and see what on earth did I write to give you that impression... I was referring to some text about constructivism, saying;

 

"Does he [the author] mean that the student literally creates reality, or does he mean that the way the student understands reality is entirely created by the student... [that] would be more in line with what DD and me have been talking about. It means, for instance, that quantum mechanical objects are not realistic objects"

 

I'd find it quite obvious that that refers to any given flavour of quantum mechanics (or any given flavour of a world view in general); in terms of QM, of course any interpretation regardless of what formalism one wants to connect that interpretation to (for whatever reason), constitutes someone's understanding of reality.

 

I even clarified separately that I did not intent to make reference to quantum mechanics especially, but really to any representation of reality; it is an epistemological issue, not quantum mechanical issue per se.

 

The very fact that you find it troublesome that you don't know whether I mean quantum formalism or quantum interpretations tells me that you are not on the same topic.

 

In other words... anything you please. I won't address these non sequiturs, even the anaolgy about religions fails because they are not all equivalent to each other in some manner, but you leap from thence to the matter of empirical equivalence between QM interpretations.

 

Yeah I didn't really say anything of the sort but whatever.

 

Strawman. I was implying nothing of the sort.

 

If by "What you say after that appears grounded only on Dick's claims. Which leaves it quite unsupported." you did not mean to imply that not a lot of people support the claims, maybe you should be little bit more careful with your words because I'm sure a lot of people read it that way, and I'm sure you are well aware of that.

 

I'm very sorry you find my language ill-defined, but the way I see it is that you are just on somewhat different topic, possibly confusing your discussion with Rade with what I was talking about (that's where you brought up the difference between formalisms and interpretations).

 

Also;

 

doggedly pay lip service to Dick's claims about them. Good thing logic is not an act of loyal faith...

 

I find that offensive. If you find that me and DD tend to say the same things, I guarantee you it's not because I go find my responses from his posts. It's because we are actually thinking of the same thing with similar terminology. I do actually go find my responses from my own understanding of the issue.

 

My answer to your concerns about the use Lie algebra or any other logical tools is; does its use represent an assumption about the underlying information, or does it represent an arbitrary notation choice? What I believe you were saying before was that you thought it represented an undefendable assumption, but I never got it out from you what kind of assumption do you take it to be -> in what sense does it limit what can be represented? If that question can be answered, it would possibly have some interesting epistemological implications.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

Hello again. OK, it does appear we agree. I can accept your "translation mechanism" (which involves the formation of perceptions) given your position that "it" is "NOT referring to our conscious effort of explaining something".

 

Exactly. That, btw has been clarified many times explicitly, but I suppose it easily gets buried to all the other verbose. If you can point out good ways to clear that out at the get-go of the presentation, that would be quite useful.

 

Especially since, getting that point wrong, would twist the intention of everything that follows quite awry.

 

? Perhaps not. Once again, what is your definition of the word definition. Given our agreements above, it is possible I would agree with your definition.

 

Sounds like you understood why I said what I said. Indeed, when we refer to "a definition", we do not necessarily refer to a consciously defined thing. Basically we refer to any kind of representation of "noumena". By definition, noumena is the undefined form; it is whatever is being represented. Thus, anything that we consciosly perceive, is also what we call "a representation of something". Thus, by "definitions", we refer to some supposed "meanings" , associated with some kind of translation mechanisms that was employed to end up with some representation form, whatever it may be.

 

I think since you now understand how we mean this, DD's arguments would probably make a lot more sense to you. That being said, I'm sure there are other assertions that are easy to misunderstand. It would be useful to map what those assertions are.

 

Well, I worded my thoughts two different ways, and it seems I have failed to communicate with you both attempts. Perhaps if you let me know what does not make sense to you ?

 

I don't understand what do you mean when you say it is intuitively expected that a large set of regularities (i.e. inductive expectations) would follow the laws of physics. The reason I suspect you are not thinking what I am thinking is because the connection is buried beneath quite a few logical steps, and even then the actual laws that are being represented, is a function of what kinds of approximations are used. So what I am saying is, while it appears to be true that laws of physics are just an efficient way of representing inductive expectations, I don't think that result is in any stretch of imagination "obvious".

 

No, that is what I was trying to say. I also cannot think of a concept of an entity that does not require a measurement.

 

And that leads to somewhat of an interesting problem doesn't it? Well, ultimately it just boils down to the same old and well known issue of our inability to know whether our world view is ontologically correct. I think for that reason, it is quite meaningful to turn our attention to the issue of self-consistency of representations (of inductive expectations).

 

Yes, that was my point. Here are three examples of mental concepts that do not depend on definitions:

 

[^^^^^^^^], [-4,-2,0,+2,+4], [____ __________ __ ______] The measurement that your mind must apply to form these three concepts does not require any knowledge of how to define the specific units involved. Does this make any sense to you ?

 

No, I don't understand what you are referring to. Maybe you are referring to the idea that we attempt to generate some idea as to what something means, even if it means nothing?

 

Finally, do you have no interest in my final request in my last post ? Here it is again..

 

Perhaps we should try an approach where we both are in 100% agreement with all claims made, that should be instructive ? But, where to begin ? What single logical statement would you suggest we could both agree with to begin such a discussion, with the only constraint being that the primary statement (let's call it the Primo Axoim) must be capable of being either true or false.

 

Well how about mapping which statements are only capable of being true. I would say that virtually all the important statements of DD's argument are like that, if only they are actually understood correctly. That is what makes it an epistemological argument.

 

For instance, let's start with the idea that;

 

"A valid explanation of undefined collection of events, cannot contradict itself"

 

The only problem that could arise with that statement is in understanding what it means. Understanding what it means, requires understanding what is meant by "valid", "explanation of undefined collection of events", and what is taken to constitute "a contradiction". Correct understanding of the intention of the statement, would allow the reader to easily conclude that a valid explanation that contradicts itself, is simply logically oxymoronic. It is like saying "a statement that is true, can be false".

 

Do you think you have the correct idea as to what that statement means? (i.e does it sound like a trivial logical argument?) I can continue with few more if you like.

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

If you can point out good ways to clear that out at the get-go of the presentation, that would be quite useful. Especially since, getting that point wrong, would twist the intention of everything that follows quite awry.

AnssiH, I agree, a very clear explanation of initial "translation mechanism" is most critical. Thinking about it more, I have a question.

 

Would you say this initial translation mechanism occurs within consciousness (within an area of it not related to explanation) or does it occur within unconscious ? Knowing this would be important to help clarify the point. I like to place it within the unconscious and thus allow a role of differentiation of undefined events to be processed and filtered before being presented to the conscious, but I am open to alternative ideas.

 

One suggestion is to make it clear from the get-go that this initial "translation mechanism" (wherever it occurs) does NOT refer to any conscious intent of "explaining" something, but, depending on your answer to the above question, may or may not refer to other areas of conscious experience.

 

..when we refer to "a definition"' date=' we do not necessarily refer to a consciously defined thing. Basically we refer to any kind of representation of "noumena".[/quote']OK, I understand your position, but the problem I see is that your definition of the word "definition" is not the common sense meaning of the word. Normally we would say that a definition does refer to something that has been acted on consciously.

 

Also, same question as above, are you saying the process of definition (your representation of a noumena) is within consciousness or is it an unconscious act ?

 

From dictionary, a definition implies an action that gives a result that is clear, decisive (yet can change over time). However, your presentation allows a definition to be "any kind" of representation of noumena, that it can be fuzzy, unclear. For me, a definition would be a very specific and directed kind of representation of any noumena. Also, recall that Kant proposed an opposite to the concept of noumena (which is undefined), what he called the phenomena (which is defined). Your definition of the word "definition" would not allow a "phenomena" to be defined, yet according to Kant it must be, by definition.

 

I'm sure there are other assertions that are easy to misunderstand. It would be useful to map what those assertions are.

I completely agree.

 

Maybe you are referring to the idea that we attempt to generate some idea as to what something means' date=' even if it means nothing?[/quote']No, all three of the mental concepts I presented have similar meaning dealing with how recognition of pattern does not require definition.

 

what I am saying is' date=' while it appears to be true that laws of physics are just an efficient way of representing inductive expectations, I don't think that result is in any stretch of imagination "obvious".[/quote']Does it become more obvious if you substitute the words "laws of physics" with the word "constraint" ? So, would it be obvious that constraint of variety is an efficient and useful way of representing expectation ? If yes, that is another way for me to explain what I am talking about.

 

ultimately it just boils down to the same old and well known issue of our inability to know whether our world view is ontologically correct. I think for that reason' date=' it is quite meaningful to turn our attention to the issue of self-consistency of representations (of inductive expectations)[/quote']First, if your worldview begins with the axiom existence exists, then you know it has a begin that is ontologically correct. Also, inductive logic can only lead to probable though fallible conclusions from premises. Also are representations of expectations that are deductive, where the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion. An expectation can be correct inductively yet false deductively. Example:

 

a. There is smoke,

b. Therefore, it is my expectation there is fire.

 

===

 

Well how about mapping which statements are only capable of being true. I would say that virtually all the important statements of DD's argument are like that' date=' if only they are actually understood correctly. That is what makes it an epistemological argument.For instance, let's start with the idea that;

 

"A valid explanation of undefined collection of events, cannot contradict itself"[/quote']

 

First, why put the constraint of not mapping statements that are capable of being false ? Are you saying that a valid explanation of defined collection of events is not possible, or that such would contradict itself ?

 

Second, your statement is very complex (you mention all the issues). Could we please begin with something simpler.

 

Here is another option for discussion based on your statement:

 

1. Single events exist and may occur as a collection of events (a set)

 

If you can agree with this statement, what would be added to it next in your presentation ? Validity, definition, knowledge, explanation, logic ?

 

ps/ I'll be offline 4-5 days.

[Qfwfq]

You thought I was originally saying "Quantum mechanical objects of different formalisms are not realistic objects"? What would that even mean?

I don't know what it would mean because it isn't what I thought you were saying.

 

The very fact that you find it troublesome that you don't know whether I mean quantum formalism or quantum interpretations tells me that you are not on the same topic.

No, what I find troublesome is that you never get my meaning and that one needs to learn your own personal dictionary in order to make any sense of some of the things you say.

 

If by "What you say after that appears grounded only on Dick's claims. Which leaves it quite unsupported." you did not mean to imply that not a lot of people support the claims

Eh? Not a lot of people? I don't care how many people "support" Dick's claims; even if he had an entire sect of followers, many more than you and a couple of hesitant ones, I would still consider his claims no more supported than those of homeopathy, Bach flowers, astrology or New Age fads.

 

I'm very sorry you find my language ill-defined, but the way I see it is that you are just on somewhat different topic, possibly confusing your discussion with Rade with what I was talking about (that's where you brought up the difference between formalisms and interpretations).

If I were on a different topic I'd be aware of it; what I said to Rade isn't the point, you might well have read it, but it remains that you do confuse things that you talk about.

 

I find that offensive.

Sorry but you have repeated Dick's opinion about a few things I said, which you are aware of knowing nothing about. When I made a simple example that you could easily have followed, looked up and sorted out, you didn't. You repeated Dick's retort about base of numeration, in lieu of something which is not a choice of notation. For one, if my parable had been an example of what Dick mistook it for, my character's claim would have been he owed 13 and not 3; how could one cliam he owes only 3 by choosing base 15 numeration? And how could it be equivalent to 18? It is not such a terribly complicated thing to figure.

 

My answer to your concerns about the use Lie algebra or any other logical tools is; does its use represent an assumption about the underlying information, or does it represent an arbitrary notation choice?

I actually had said, quite clearly, that it is not a mere choice of notation the way a base of numeration is.

 

I never got it out from you what kind of assumption do you take it to be -> in what sense does it limit what can be represented?

I think I already replied that there's no point asking this. It's an abstract choice, ain't it? What other label is there to attach to it?

[AnssiH]

AnssiH, I agree, a very clear explanation of initial "translation mechanism" is most critical. Thinking about it more, I have a question.

 

Would you say this initial translation mechanism occurs within consciousness (within an area of it not related to explanation) or does it occur within unconscious ?

 

I'm referring to the entire process; I'd say most of it is something we are not consciously aware of. That is important bit to understand. Whatever conscious brooding we do, is a function of "what we think we know", i.e, the results of some process we are not consciously aware of.

 

I.e., even if your definition of "an explanation" is just the conscious part, it is a function of some unconscious part. DD's definition of an explanation refers to the entire translation from undefined events. And that is why he cannot and does not make arguments as to what that translation is, he only establishes logical constraints that are universally true to any kinds of explanation processes. (i.e. any processes that can generate valid explanations, in any given terminology of choice)

 

OK, I understand your position, but the problem I see is that your definition of the word "definition" is not the common sense meaning of the word. Normally we would say that a definition does refer to something that has been acted on consciously.

 

Yes, and also, the same problem seems to plague the word "explanation". In both these cases, I think me and DD both have just found it impossible to separate the two, because, as I said, whatever we think of consciously, is a function of the results of the unconscious part. So the definitions we are consciously aware of, are related to how we consciously perceive something, which is related to something we can't explain, apart from doing so via those same definitions that we are consciously aware of. It's that same old ontology vs. epistemology problem again.

 

So it just seems that to try and separate the definitions we are aware of consciously, and the definitions we are not, would just lead into an impossible semantical entanglement, which in terms of DD's analysis would just be entirely meaningless noise.

 

Also, same question as above, are you saying the process of definition (your representation of a noumena) is within consciousness or is it an unconscious act ?

 

Both; I hope the above answered this one.

 

From dictionary, a definition implies an action that gives a result that is clear, decisive (yet can change over time). However, your presentation allows a definition to be "any kind" of representation of noumena, that it can be fuzzy, unclear. For me, a definition would be a very specific and directed kind of representation of any noumena. Also, recall that Kant proposed an opposite to the concept of noumena (which is undefined), what he called the phenomena (which is defined). Your definition of the word "definition" would not allow a "phenomena" to be defined, yet according to Kant it must be, by definition.

 

Kant's phenomena refers to exactly the same thing as what me and DD would refer to as "perception".

 

Does it become more obvious if you substitute the words "laws of physics" with the word "constraint" ? So, would it be obvious that constraint of variety is an efficient and useful way of representing expectation ? If yes, that is another way for me to explain what I am talking about.

 

If I understand what you are saying, then I would just add that the unintuitive part is that the "laws of physics" appear to be quite specific and superficially, they seem to represent a very specific kind of universe. I'm sure you have seen physicists often talk about different kinds of possibilities as to how the universe could be. They would all find it very surprising to find out that it is always possible to translate any collection of undefined events, into a representation whose defined elements behave exactly like we see our universe.

 

First, if your worldview begins with the axiom existence exists, then you know it has a begin that is ontologically correct. Also, inductive logic can only lead to probable though fallible conclusions from premises. Also are representations of expectations that are deductive, where the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion. An expectation can be correct inductively yet false deductively. Example:

 

a. There is smoke,

b. Therefore, it is my expectation there is fire.

 

Remember that the inductive logic I am referring to, starts from applying it to the collection of undefined events. That is, the idea that there is such a thing as "fire", or "wood", or "smoke" etc, all these elements are definitions associated with undefined events, and they must have been by themselves been arrived at via some inductive logic.

 

E.g., any idea that there is some object just sitting there in your perception, not doing anything, is in this sense a result of the inductive reasoning of some collection of undefined events, in some sense, staying the same. That gives you the reason to expect, that they will stay there in your near future also. Likewise, a constant change to something gives you reason to expect that such a thing will continue.

 

Once you have established a fair amount of ideas about reality, all the other types of logic come to play, but they are ultimately also a function of whatever it is you inductively arrived at.

 

So here again, it is important to remember that we are talking about the entire translation process, starting from the unconscious processes.

 

First, why put the constraint of not mapping statements that are capable of being false ? Are you saying that a valid explanation of defined collection of events is not possible, or that such would contradict itself ?

 

No, I mean, of course a specific explanation always uses assumptions that can be false, but if you want to map what universal constraints there exists to explanations (i.e. to discuss the arguments DD is using to establish the "fundamental equation"), then only the statements that must be logically true, are meaningful.

 

Second, your statement is very complex (you mention all the issues). Could we please begin with something simpler.

 

Here is another option for discussion based on your statement:

 

1. Single events exist and may occur as a collection of events (a set)

 

I think it's important to view this explicitly from an epistemological standpoint, and rather say that any explanation is based on some collection of undefined events.

 

I'm just saying that because I would not like to imply that I'd view the world ontologically as a set of events. I just take a set of events as universally valid representation of "something that our world view is based on". What there really is out there, I have no idea, of course.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

For one, if my parable had been an example of what Dick mistook it for, my character's claim would have been he owed 13 and not 3; how could one cliam he owes only 3 by choosing base 15 numeration? And how could it be equivalent to 18? It is not such a terribly complicated thing to figure.

 

I actually had said, quite clearly, that it is not a mere choice of notation the way a base of numeration is.

 

I think I already replied that there's no point asking this. It's an abstract choice, ain't it? What other label is there to attach to it?

 

Yes it is an abstract choice. So, what does it mean in your mind, that he makes this choice? I mean, clearly you think it amounts to an error of some type, right?

 

About the different numeration choices, I don't understand what is the point you are getting at. Different definitions can lead to different meanings to the same symbols; I suppose you are saying that DD makes that kind of jump somewhere? Do you mind explaining that a bit better?

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

I mean, clearly you think it amounts to an error of some type, right?

No. I said that his equation is not fundamental and universal. One could make other (equally valid but non-equivalent) choices, leading to equations from which he would not get the same quantum physics stuff.

 

Different definitions can lead to different meanings to the same symbols; I suppose you are saying that DD makes that kind of jump somewhere?

I was not even remotely thinking of different glyphs for the same thing, what would be the point of that? I did not say Dick does that, I made an example hoping it would be much simpler for you to follow. Apparently you have no intention of following my arguments.