"a Universal Representation Of Rules"

[bobbycarlos]

Hi, please forgive my English as it is not my first language.

 

I have been following this thread for quite some time and i just want to express my view through a simple analogy: How to solve an Optical Illusion.

 

What DoctorDick is doing is that he gives us a way to arrive at a conclusion using internally consistent mathematical expressions instead of guessing our conclusions based on what we perceive.

[Rade]

I have been following this thread for quite some time and i just want to express my view through a simple analogy: How to solve an Optical Illusion. What DoctorDick is doing is that he gives us a way to arrive at a conclusion using internally consistent mathematical expressions instead of guessing our conclusions based on what we perceive.

Hi, welcome to this thread.

 

Concerning your analogy of "how to solve an optical illusion". Consider the example of a straight stick held in air then dipped into a pool of water such that it is fully submerged and now looks to be bent. The bent condition of the event is the illusion.

 

Here is how I explain optical illusion for this example. First I hold that the object perceived (call it a stick) is independent of the person perceiving it, and that the sensory quality of the form of the object (straight vs bent) is a mental concept created for one external feature of the object. The geometric condition of being straight or bent can be put into mathematical form.

 

Next I find to be true that what is called the optical illusion of the event of dipping a stick into water is also a concept formed by the mind created by the possibility that sticks may take one of many possible geometric forms based on the conditions in which it is perceived (air or water, etc.) This leads to the conclusion that the concept of illusion of the stick results from past similarities of perceptions of objects bent, not limited to sticks.

 

Thus, to have an optical illusion event one must perceive a given attribute of something that exists in a form that is not the one commonly perceived for that attribute of the thing. In the stick example, without a prior mental concept of "bent" derived from things other than sticks, there would not be any optical illusion that would occur by dipping a stick into water. In summary, the role of mathematics in optical illusion is to quantify the geometric relationship between the form of an object that exists normally, to changes that may occur to that form under different conditions in which the form can be perceived. Conclusions of optical illusions based on perception are not guesses, but derive from the fact that what is perceived can be put into mathematical form.

[AnssiH]

Let me say it again in case you missed it again: you are the only person Dick believes can understand his analysis because he attributes misunderstanding to everyone who is critical of his analysis and you are the only one supporting it wholeheartedly.

 

It's more like, I'm the only one who has actually carefully stepped through it, and as a proof of that, I believe I'm the only one who pointed out mistakes in it, which is something that anyone else should have been able to do, had they followed it.

 

There really is no sense in "supporting" and "not supporting" it, it's all has to do with whether or not the math is valid. And before that, indeed, whether or not the intention of the math is understood. If you misunderstand it, you can easily get the sense that this thing depends on whether or not you believe something to be true or not. But what we are really talking about is aking to whether or not "1 + 1 = 2" given specific self-coherent meaning to those symbols "1", "+", "=" and "2". There's no two ways about it, given the meaning that I intent to those symbols, 1 + 1 = 2, believe it or not. Given the meaning that DD intents to his arguments, there is no two ways to go about it, at least not in such a trivial manner as you seem to view it.

 

I can only assume your comments is sparked by the idea that there is a room for undefendable beliefs in the analysis.

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

It's more like, I'm the only one who has actually carefully stepped through it, and as a proof of that, I believe I'm the only one who pointed out mistakes in it, which is something that anyone else should have been able to do, had they followed it.

You stand on very shaky grounds in saying this. Others haven't bothered with non-essential details in the calculus when there are greater problems with the whole thing, it's a matter of judgement.

 

There really is no sense in "supporting" and "not supporting" it, it's all has to do with whether or not the math is valid. And before that, indeed, whether or not the intention of the math is understood.

There is the matter of non-sequitur conclusions. By doggedly dismissing the objections I have raised, you are indeed taking the whole thing on faith. As Modest says, Dick equates this with you being the only one that understands him.

[modest]

It's more like, I'm the only one who has actually carefully stepped through it, and as a proof of that, I believe I'm the only one who pointed out mistakes in it

Yes, that is exactly the same unsubstantiated, egocentric, dogmatic, and masochistic premise that I keep pointing out... harmful to the discussion. My whole point is the problem with that assumption and your first sentence is to repeat it uncritically? Seriously? The only thing that comes next is insult, and Q is right. I'll leave you to it.

[Bombadil]

I will first respond to a few of the comments that AnssiH made and then go into Doctordick's response.

 

Even when an explanation has defined that element with the assumption that it follows its world line in a continuous manner, we can still express the epistemological constraint "no two defined elements can be in the same observable state simultaneously" via requiring anti-symmetry under exchange between such elements.

 

I can kind of follow what you seem to be saying but without a definition of the observable state I'm somewhat shooting in the dark. I assume that you are talking about [math] \vec{\Psi}^\dagger\cdot\vec{\Psi} [/math] when referring to the state, that is the state is simply the explanation when viewed as a function of only one element a sort of probability field, if field is the word to use I am hesitant to use the word field because it sounds too much like we are discussing physics. You would also need to define what you mean by defined elements.

 

But it seems to me that we are starting to wander and are talking about explanation here.

 

Note that they are never in the same observable state simultaneously. They are simply elements, whose definitions particularly requires they are taken to pass the same states along their trajectories (in terms of quantum mechanical statistics). We only observe those elements via some observable states associated with A-elements implying that they are there, via us interpreting the circumstance that way, as per our explanation.

 

I might be willing to accept this as I have no reason to disagree with it but at what point did we start accepting quantum mechanical statistics as the right solution to the problem. Isn't quantum mechanics based on what we observe and so if we ask a question that we haven't observed “from the perspective of quantum mechanics” we will have to say “we never see that anyway so it makes no sense to ask”. But this derivation really has nothing to do with quantum-mechanics so we might as well ask such questions.

 

So what I am asking is why can't they be observed, by which I can only conclude that you mean an observed element is one that must be included in every explanation, since it would seem to be the only definition that makes sense.

 

My point is that isn't this assuming that things from quantum-mechanics will have to be included in every possible explanation. I can only conclude that quantum-mechanics is being used here almost exclusively to justify what you are trying to say.

 

How I understand it Doctordick has shown that quantum-mechanics can be derived from the fundamental equation, not the converse! but I am getting the impression that the converse has been assumed here and in other places. I suggest that someone ether prove that it is equivalent, which I hope we can at least agree is probably not true in general or forget about quantum-mechanics until we are interested in the derivation, or at least stop assuming total generality of quantum mechanics until it is shown to be general. Otherwise I am having a hard time understanding the difference between this and discussing the color of green dinosaurs.

 

Of course Doctordick showed that quantum-mechanics is true by definition, any interesting explanation would have to be, and of course if we are discussing quantum-mechanics everything that is part of quantum mechanics is represented in some way. But has it been shown to be true without definitions?

 

The issue of my proof is, what are the constraints implied by the definition of “an explanation” and nothing else. That has to be approached as an absolutely universal issue. Making any attempt to clarify the definition of “an explanation” beyond the issue of answering questions is to place additional constraints on what is being talked about (which, by the way, is exactly what Rade always wants to do). Apparently everyone is driven to see my intention as divining a means of discovering explanations which it most definitely is not. I have a strong suspicion that you are also trying to see my proof as a method of discovering explanations.

 

Your derivation of the fundamental equation clearly has nothing to do with deriving explanations, from there I really don't think that it could be used as a means of deriving explanations, not in the way that I think most people would think of the idea in any case. Rather I see it as a question of what definitions imply about how something is being explained. Or putting it in a more straight foreword manner what our definitions of something imply about how we must expect our expectations to behave.

 

The last part I want to be clear on if I can because I see it as a place for misunderstanding, what I am talking about is how our representation of our expectations of something must behave based on the definitions that we use. Not the element that we are defining and not the probability that we place on any possible arrangement of elements, but the representation of our expectations that are a direct consequence of the definitions being used.

 

More then this (and I doubt that you will like this) I think that you may need to face the fact that if someone thinks that they can do something chances are that they will find a way. In other words if your fundamental equation ever becomes common place in any field of research someone will find a way to use it to derive a new explanation of something or at the vary least use it as a building block. That is just the way people think. Except it or hide from it. Personally I think that you over react about this to people sometimes, people will think what they will. You make your stance quite clear, if they have their own thoughts on something that is how new ideas happen. You on the other hand seem to take offense when such things are even suggested. My suggestion, just point out to people that you have no interest in discussing this topic and how you see it, and if you must, ignore the parts of peoples posts that deal with this topic, and make sure that they understand what you see them as discussing, and that you want nothing to do with it.

 

Your derivation has nothing to do with deriving explanations, other peoples work eventually will!

 

Try not to take this the wrong way.

 

No, that is not true. You simply have the problem totally backwards. The issue here is that the numerical labels refer to elements required by the explanation being represented. They are assigned only if a specific explanation is being represented and I have utterly no interest in how those labels are assigned; I am merely concerned with the fact that it is possible to assign them. The existence of computer facilitated communication pretty well assures the fact that any message is representable via numerical labels. Go back to the Chinese room problem.

 

I get the impression here that you think I want to start assigning labels to the information. This is not what I was thinking. Rather, I was saying that it must be possible to assign the labels is such a way that they can be distinguished mathematically as different labels or different sets of labels.

 

Beyond that you make it sound like the labels can be assigned before an explanation has been defined. This seems clearly false the labels whatever they are must satisfy any flaw free explanation and so whatever labels are used they must be a function of the explanations that are considered to be flaw free.

 

If I have a specified circumstance to represent and I add an additional fictitious element, that act in no way constrains what can be represented. In fact, what it does is expand the field of what can be represented beyond what is actually to be explained (fictitious elements are, in fact, elements of the explanation). A little thought should convince you that explanations are, in general, ripe with fictitious elements (note that I define elements as fictitious if you cannot prove they are necessary without assuming the explanation is correct.) A good example is God in any religious argument. Even religionists admit the fact that the existence of God must be taken on faith and cannot be proved by any physical experiment.

 

Your definition of a fictitious element, though, seems no different then a hypothetical element. You added hypothetical elements so that the explanation could be consistent with any possible future information and so they seem to be the same as how you are now defining a fictitious element, which is there only because they are needed for the explanation. That is, if they weren't needed for the explanation then, by how you have defined them, they would never have been included and they would be completely absent. Since, if they are there you have to have an explanation that includes them in it, so in order for you to not include them, they can't be in the information being explained.

 

Of course to go any further I have to face the question of solipsism to which I suggest the stance of ignorance, that is I suggest that there is a set of elements that must be included in every explanation (that is the set of real elements by definition) even if that set is empty. We are ignorant of if there is something that we are explaining or if the whole thing is just a flaw free explanation composed of hypothetical elements and nothing more.

 

In short I don't really see the reason for not just calling the fictitious elements hypothetical elements. Aren't they the same thing when it comes right down to it?

 

Photons fall into exactly the same category, their existence must be taken on faith and cannot be proved by any physical experiment without presuming their existence: i.e., presuming electromagnetic theory is correct. This presumption is exactly equivalent to Ptolemy's presumption of the physical existence of the celestial spheres, a presumption Newton later showed to be completely unnecessary.

 

But are there any elements not like this? That is, is there anything that we can say is not a consequence of the explanation being used. The only interesting case here is of course a hypothetical element that would satisfy this condition. If such elements exist (in the sense of being included in the set of elements being explained) then the idea of fictitious elements would make some sense to use. The problem that I see is that there is no way to say what elements are needed and what elements were added just because it made sense to add them at the time. We still have to deal with the impossibility of proving solipsism one way or the other.

 

We could show that an element that is antisymmetric can only be added if it is needed for an explanation, and there is no explanation in which such elements can be observed but this will only complicate issues because we would have to define what is meant by observed which will be different for different explanations.

 

In short why can't we just say a real element is what is if there are no hypothetical elements and hypothetical elements are any elements that are added so that our explanation is flaw free. And forget about the separation of symmetric and antisymmetric elements until it is needed to include any possible solutions to the fundamental equation and then call them something totally different that can't be confused with real and hypothetical elements.

 

Notice that I am calling real elements what is if there are no hypothetical elements but I am at no time implying that there are any elements that need satisfy this condition. That is, there may very well be no elements before elements are added so that an explanation might be flaw free.

 

This real and hypothetical division arises only because of the fact that most all explanations contain what I call fictitious elements (elements which are required only if one believes the explanation is correct). What is real and what is hypothetical must be seen as a totally open issue. If that issue is not kept open, Solipsism is removed as a possibility and the representation is no longer universal as it is a well known fact that proving Solipsism is invalid is impossible (invalidity of Solipsism is a faith issue). On the other hand, the possibility that some elements are in fact not fictitious and are required whether the explanation is correct or not must also be handled (if the issue is not handled, the representation is not universal).

 

I'm not saying not to use the definition or that it has no place or even that I can see any alternative to accepting these definitions. Rather that I can see little use in referring to a real element or a hypothetical element.

 

Now here is where I get the impression that you think my fundamental equation is offered as a mechanism for uncovering explanations, which appears to be the central issue creating that distorted perspective everyone is so fond of. That is not what I am doing. What I am doing is creating an absolutely universal mathematical representation of any possible explanation. Every conceivable explanation is clearly representable in my notation.

 

What I was trying to point out is that we could call elements which have symmetric exchange Bosons and antisymmetric elements Fermions but that every time this is brought up someone tries to start discussing physics.

 

Your derivation clearly has nothing to do with physics it also has nothing to do with ontology which it removes completely, and it makes little to no sense to discuss the topic.

 

What it has to do with is firstly how an explanation can be represented. That is, that any possible explanation has a representation in your notation that can satisfy the fundamental equation. Note that this is not the same as saying that any possible representation of an explanation satisfies the fundamental equation which is not true. Which I think is one of the biggest things that Qfwfq hasn't grasped.

 

Secondly your derivation has the ability to give consequences to definitions. This is clearly not something you intended and I think that you would rather not bring this possibility up because if you bring this possibility up people will start to think that you are discussing a means of deriving new explanations.

 

This is not the case, the fundamental equation is not capable of giving an explanation of anything !!!

 

It is an ordering mechanism used to define how an explanation can be represented, and by making definitions we are no longer working with the fundamental equation as you show in your derivation of the Dirac equation but are rather working with a new constrained representation of an explanation. But it is important to remember that the fundamental equation is not a means of generating new explanations there is no reason to choose any definitions over any other definitions.

 

And again, you make a statement that you cannot prove (note the above).

 

I actually thought that it could be used as the definition of a real element. I had no intention of proving the statement.

 

You have defined the elements so that any element that is not hypothetical is a real element and since the hypothetical elements are added so that the explanation could be consistent with any possible expectations it only seems sensible to conclude that the real elements are the elements that made up the past before any hypothetical elements were added if such a thing can exist.

 

But of course we can't prove this. If we could we could prove Solipsism as true or false, which we can't.

 

You are thinking in terms of functions of one variable. Partial differential equations are quite different. The partial differential is defined to be the standard differential under the assumption that all the other variables are constants. That means that you have a great number of boundary conditions to establish the specific function: one boundary condition for every set of such “constants”. Fitting a set of points in a plot becomes such a boundary condition.

 

I hate to say it but I think that you missed what I posted or maybe I did a bad job of stating it. The boundary condition to a Partial differential equations as I understand it, is even worse then what you are suggesting. The boundary condition is in-fact a function of the variables which make up the boundary so it would actually take an infinite number of points to define the boundary position after one of the variables is set to whatever value it has at the boundary, but the past can only have a finite number of points for each element. What makes it worse is that you aren't setting one of the variables to the boundary since the past is just any information that is known.

 

This seems like a sticky problem. The only solution that I can see is to fill in the rest of the boundary condition with hypothetical conditions ( not elements but rather a probability function at some boundary) of course I have no idea how you would insure how this would also satisfy the past. This would seem to suggest that even a finite number of elements might have an infinite number of explanations that they will satisfy. Of course I have no idea of how you can find that boundary condition since as I said you have not defined a boundary only a past which seems to only make the problem more complex.

 

But if we look at the issue carefully, it becomes quite obvious that everyone of those other ontological elements are defined in terms of peripheral circumstances. For example, consider an electron going from point a to point b. How do you know it is an electron? Well, the answer is, because of the surrounding peripheral circumstances leading up to that event. The problem is that any careful examination of those peripheral circumstances (element by element) result in the same question with the same answer. The result is, the ontological element “position” is the only element absolutely required.

 

Can you expand on this idea some. From a perspective of how the fundamental equation has been defined it makes sense that the issue of position is all that is used to define the past. And so all possible information that any explanation can be based off of must be contained in the positions of the elements (AKA the past). But things like the mass momentum and energy don't seem to be entirely defined in the past. I am speaking of these things as you have defined them not as they are used in physics. The problem seems to be that one of these things, in particular the mass, was a consequence of the need for a tau axis, so can't we give it any value we want. As for the momentum we only have a finite amount of information that makes up the past so there is no chance at all of finding the values of the derivatives. All that we could do is make a guess, the same go's for energy, this seems to be what physics is doing, making guesses and hoping to get lucky.

 

The reason that I am asking you to expand on this some is it seems to me that the derivatives are what tells us what an element is, not the location, all that the location tells us is what the past is. On the other hand if the boundary condition for the elements totally defines the boundary condition for any solution to the fundamental equation. This might make sense but is this even true. Can we be sure that the derivatives won't be a necessary part of any solution to the fundamental equation, in which case there are going to be an infinite number of possible futures even for a finite past.

 

I'm not trying to discus solutions to the fundamental equation here. What I am trying to ask is, are you sure that the boundary problem is a well-posed problem because I don't see it as having to be a well-posed problem.

[Doctordick]

So what I am asking is why can't they be observed, by which I can only conclude that you mean an observed element is one that must be included in every explanation, since it would seem to be the only definition that makes sense.

 

It is exactly my definition and, as you say, it is the only definition which makes sense. It is important that one hold in mind that the fact that it must be included in every explanation in no way implies we have a way of identifying an “observed element”. Two issues come to bear on that question: first, if any “observed elements” can be identified as definitely existing, Solipsism has been proved false and, second, if you can prove an element must exist in every explanation, you must be aware of the entire infinite set of possible explanations (you must include all explanations to be invented in the future and that would make you “all knowing” a rather extreme assumption).

 

It is the requirement that that all such elements must be included in every explanation which demands that they be identifiable. Since, to be open to all possibilities, the representation must be capable of representing such a thing. In order to include the possibility of “true observed elements” (if one could prove none existed, that would prove Solipsism was correct) we must handle a subtle consequence. It is that requirement that led to the introduction of anti-symmetry as a mechanism to guarantee that positions in a space (together with that hypothetical tau axis) could carry the information of multiple occurrences. Without such a construct, the information contained in an arbitrary collection of numbers [math](x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n)[/math] cannot be mapped into a set of points (a single point can not represent multiple occurrences of a specific number as the number of occurrences will be lost). Thus the inclusion of anti-symmetric states in the representation is a necessary step, not merely a possible step.

 

My point is that isn't this assuming that things from quantum-mechanics will have to be included in every possible explanation. I can only conclude that quantum-mechanics is being used here almost exclusively to justify what you are trying to say.

 

In a sense, your criticism is accurate; however, there is a second issue here which many people clearly confuse with the proof itself. That has to do with everyone's overwhelming urge to resort to simple minded counter examples. I have shown that quantum-mechanics is an approximate solution to my equation under some very specific approximations (approximations always accepted as valid in any quantum-mechanical solution anyway) and Anssi's arguments are essentially directed at that issue: i.e., counter examples to my equation must be counter examples to quantum-mechanics. That is a very important issue considering the wide acceptance of quantum-mechanics as a valid solution to the explanation of reality.

 

Just trying to fulfill Truzzi's, “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence”, adage. My evidence that my fundamental equation is valid is the fact that most all of modern physics can be derived from that equation and that is quite extraordinary collection of evidence!

 

Your derivation of the fundamental equation clearly has nothing to do with deriving explanations ...

 

Again, you seem to have a firm handle on the central issue. A very important point that I try to make clear is that it cannot be used to derive explanations because one of the central constraints applied to the deduction is that no valid internally consistent explanation can be eliminated. If my equation can be used to deduce an explanation, that means it eliminated some alternate explanation which means the derivation is in error.

 

More then this (and I doubt that you will like this)...

 

No, I am not bothered at all.

 

You make your stance quite clear, if they have their own thoughts on something that is how new ideas happen. You on the other hand seem to take offense when such things are even suggested.

 

No, I don't take offense, I merely try to point out the fact that, if such a purpose can be achieved it would essentially amount to a disproof of my equation as such a thing, if actually valid, would imply one of two possibilities. Either that the deduced explanation is the only possible explanation (which I sincerely doubt) or I have made an error in my deduction. Oh, they might find another approximation which could be applied to my fundamental equation which would yield useful results but that is an entirely different issue.

 

Regarding that last point, it would be very interesting to discover a valid exact solution to my equation which could be experimentally proved false. That result would imply that there actually do exist constraints on the universe which are observable; a very interesting possibility. To date I have discovered no such solution; that is why I often refer to modern physics as a tautological construct.

 

Try not to take this the wrong way.

 

I don't think I take it in the wrong way; what I am suggesting is that the results suggest a very different view of the universe and how to approach explanations. In particular, the only valid approach appears to expect the future to look like the past (to the extent that the issues or relationships we are interested in are similar to issues or relationships we have already experienced). The puts a rather specific and tight constraint on what our rational expectations should be and I have one very significant actual fact which people should look at. Something rather interesting if anyone ever grasps what I have proved.

 

I get the impression here that you think I want to start assigning labels to the information. This is not what I was thinking. Rather, I was saying that it must be possible to assign the labels is such a way that they can be distinguished mathematically as different labels or different sets of labels.

 

I am afraid I have no idea as to what you are trying to say. My position is simply that the elements of the explanation can be given numerical labels. However, by using mathematics as a given language, I have introduced some serious ontological elements: i.e., numbers and points in a geometry. The concept of space and time is impossible without these ontological elements an issue most all physicists fail to comprehend.

 

Most people on this forum simple presume the “reality” of those ontological elements are absolutely necessary; a rather simple minded approach to the issue: i.e., they are assuming mathematics (the study of internally consistent systems) is necessary but not necessary to understand.

 

Once those labels are assigned, they simply replace the symbols used in the explanations base language. If they can not be distinguished mathematically, then the elements cannot be distinguished in the base language; certainly a clear possibility: consider explanations based upon the elements fire, earth, wind and water. It just means the explanation is quite limited (and probably not valid). Certainly not a problem I have any interest in. My representation must handle all explanations and that issue should not be forgotten.

 

Beyond that you make it sound like the labels can be assigned before an explanation has been defined.

 

My only assertion is that, if an explanation can be expressed, labels can be assigned. They are no more than an entirely general symbolic representation of the required communication. I don't have to know the explanation in order to come to the conclusion that the symbolic representation of it can be converted to numbers.

 

Comprehending the definitions used in the explanation is a totally different issue. That is a problem to be solved: i.e., solving that problem constitutes understanding the explanation which is essentially of no interest to me. My position is that the numerical labels must, in the final analysis, obey my equation. All that is required to understand the explanation is that sufficient information is embedded in the available data to solve that problem.

 

Your definition of a fictitious element, though, seems no different then a hypothetical element.

 

You are absolutely correct, they are equivalent definitions. I also suspect you understand the issue of Solipsism and required elements also; at least I hope you do.

 

The problem that I see is that there is no way to say what elements are needed and what elements were added just because it made sense to add them at the time.

 

This comment implies that you fail to comprehend the deduction. I added hypothetical/fictitious elements for very specific purposes (in order to represent the information as points in a geometric space). The specific elements I add are needed to make sure my representation can represent all possibilities. That in no way implies they are needed in any specific explanation.

 

This is divided into two posts because I have apparently run into an underlying limit.

Edited May 28, 2014 by Doctordick

[Doctordick]

We could show that an element that is antisymmetric can only be added if it is needed for an explanation...

 

That is a false statement! Anti-symmetric elements must be part of my representation or the representation is not universally applicable to all possible explanations: i.e., you are apparently ignoring the necessity of including all possible explanations with the representation.

 

, and there is no explanation in which such elements can be observed but this will only complicate issues because we would have to define what is meant by observed which will be different for different explanations.

 

How do you intend to prove that there are no explanation which require antisymmetric representation? As I said, I think you tend to get the horse on the wrong side of the cart.

 

In short why can't we just say a real element is what is if there are no hypothetical elements and hypothetical elements are any elements that are added so that our explanation is flaw free.

 

I have a distinct feeling that you totally overlook why hypothetical elements were introduced. You are using the phrase “flaw free” quite differently than the way I use it. I used hypothetical elements to make my deduction flaw free, not the explanation (you should comprehend that these are totally different issues).

 

And forget about the separation of symmetric and antisymmetric elements until it is needed...

 

Again, the separation of symmetric and antisymmetric elements was necessary to maintain the deduction universally general. You cannot derive my equation without such a separation.

 

I'm not saying not to use the definition or that it has no place or even that I can see any alternative to accepting these definitions. Rather that I can see little use in referring to a real element or a hypothetical element.

 

They are essential to my derivation and I can only conclude that you cannot follow the deduction.

 

What I was trying to point out is that we could call elements which have symmetric exchange Bosons and antisymmetric elements Fermions but that every time this is brought up someone tries to start discussing physics.

 

That is their problem. They clearly have not followed my deduction. Why shouldn't I call them Bosons and Fermions? The statistics such entities must obey are very clearly discussed in many physics texts and those statistics are a very important issue. Would you bar me from using the word “function” because people would then think I am talking about mathematics?

 

Your derivation clearly has nothing to do with physics it also has nothing to do with ontology which it removes completely, and it makes little to no sense to discuss the topic.

 

But physics is an explanation isn't it? So it must be representable via my equation or my deduction is in error!

 

What it has to do with is firstly how an explanation can be represented. That is, that any possible explanation has a representation in your notation that can satisfy the fundamental equation. Note that this is not the same as saying that any possible representation of an explanation satisfies the fundamental equation which is not true. Which I think is one of the biggest things that Qfwfq hasn't grasped.

 

Here I think you are absolutely correct; however, I would have said, “how any explanation can be represented”.

 

I hate to say it but I think that you missed what I posted or maybe I did a bad job of stating it. The boundary condition to a Partial differential equations as I understand it, is even worse then what you are suggesting. The boundary condition is in-fact a function of the variables which make up the boundary...

 

This is why I commented about the need for a formal education in the subject

 

That means that you have a great number of boundary conditions to establish the specific function: one boundary condition for every set of such “constants”. Fitting a set of points in a plot becomes such a boundary condition. ... As I said long ago, if you really want to understand this stuff you need some serious professional education. More than I can present on this forum.

 

In particular, the word “boundary” as used in the phrase “boundary conditions” in a discussion of partial differential equations and the word “boundary” as a division between geometrically defined spaces are not at all the same thing; in a very real sense they are not even related to one another. I have looked around on the internet and found no source which covers this issue decently. Most presentations don't even bother to bring the issue up and instead only deal with situations where the two definitions overlap. The field is a very serious issue and why I advise you to seek professional help.

 

This seems like a sticky problem. The only solution that I can see is to fill in the rest of the boundary condition with hypothetical conditions ( not elements but rather a probability function at some boundary) of course I have no idea how you would insure how this would also satisfy the past.

 

The problem you see does not exist. The boundary conditions to be imposed on a complex partial differential equation can be a finite set of points where the function has a specific value. Consider for example a flexible diaphragm stretched over a dozen point in a three dimensional space. The shape of such a surface satisfying the partial differential equation describing its shape is constrained by that finite number of points. You don't need an infinite number of points. (Time evolving surfaces can also be specified via a finite number of points evolving in time.

 

Of course I have no idea of how you can find that boundary condition since as I said you have not defined a boundary only a past which seems to only make the problem more complex.

 

The Past in my representation is a finite number of points in that “x,tau,t” space I have fabricated to represent the known data.

 

But things like the mass momentum and energy don't seem to be entirely defined in the past. I am speaking of these things as you have defined them not as they are used in physics. The problem seems to be that one of these things, in particular the mass, was a consequence of the need for a tau axis, so can't we give it any value we want.

 

No, but we certainly can assert that it must be quantized: i.e., position in tau must be absolutely uncertain. By the way, who is bringing up physics now?

 

As for the momentum we only have a finite amount of information that makes up the past so there is no chance at all of finding the values of the derivatives.

 

So what? The explanation has to come up with those things. All I am saying is that those differentials must exist in my fundamental equation with the connections asserted. It is a consequence of the necessity that the representation can not be a function of the numerical labels used for the elements.

 

All that we could do is make a guess, the same go's for energy, this seems to be what physics is doing, making guesses and hoping to get lucky.

 

It is the relationships required by the fundamental equation, not the values which are required. And there certainly are an infinite number of possibilities for the future (and even for the past: possibilities for those points not included in the “known” past). Again, it is the relationships defined by the fundamental equation which are required.

 

Every explanation amounts to an alternate solution and even those presumed explanations yield lots and lots of infinite possibilities when the whole universe is included (the correct realm of my fundamental equation).

 

I'm not trying to discus solutions to the fundamental equation here. What I am trying to ask is, are you sure that the boundary problem is a well-posed problem because I don't see it as having to be a well-posed problem.

 

I think you need to study partial differential equations and their solutions.

 

Have fun -- Dick

Edited May 28, 2014 by Doctordick

[Rade]

It is important that one hold in mind that the fact that it must be included in every explanation in no way implies we have a way of identifying an “observed element”.

OK, here you claim that an "observed element" does not have an identity, that they cannot be identifiable. But then, you lapse into your oft use of contradictory logic to try to argue your presentation

 

It is the requirement that all such elements (e.g. "observed elements") must be included in every explanation' date=' [b']which demands that they [e.g., "observed elements] be identifiable.[/b]

So,your worries about Solipsism and requirement to be all knowing are moot since they derive from use of contradictory logic. Thus, contrary to your claim, there are no problems with Solipsism and knowing and the fact that "observed elements" by definition have Identity.

 

For you to get back on logical track, you need to define exactly what is meant by (1) observed (2) element (3) exist as used in your presentation. Only then can anyone rationally reach a decision if such have property of being identifiable.

[Doctordick]

Rade, you clearly have utterly no comprehension of what I am talking about and thus have absolutely no understanding of the problems which are to be handled. It is a complete waste of time for both you and I for you to post on any thread I have started.

 

Just go away; Please!

[Rade]

Rade, Just go away; Please!

I would be happy to, however, my expectation that it would be a truth condition that not going away would be a waste of my time is represented mathematically by the number 0. Perhaps it best that you just go away given that your expectation that you are completely wasting your time, given the high possibility that I will post a reply, is represented mathematically by the number 1. An alternative solution to your problem would be for you to place my name back to your ignore list...what on earth made you take my name off that list in the first place ? So, please, just ignore me, and I will direct my future posts not directly to you, but to others that read the threads you start.

[Qfwfq]

XYZ, you clearly have utterly no comprehension of what I am talking about and thus...

Dick, you should try to keep up with current times, we're in the age of CD players; vinyl disks, with worn grooves that repeat things over and over again, are a thing of the past. If you really have to do this, why don't you go away and do it elsewhere?

[AnssiH]

Sorry I'm slow to respond, been spending my time in the process of selling an apartment and buying a house (among other things).

 

I can kind of follow what you seem to be saying but without a definition of the observable state I'm somewhat shooting in the dark. I assume that you are talking about [math] \vec{\Psi}^\dagger\cdot\vec{\Psi} [/math] when referring to the state, that is the state is simply the explanation when viewed as a function of only one element a sort of probability field, if field is the word to use I am hesitant to use the word field because it sounds too much like we are discussing physics. You would also need to define what you mean by defined elements.

 

Well, when I say "observable state" I could be referring to some defined states (as per the definitions of an explanation), or to whatever it is that corresponds to those defined states in noumenaic sense. Since either way, the exact same noumenaic information cannot be interpreted as meaning two different defined states.

 

Btw, I find it rather suitable to view this whole thing from the point of view of general learning mechanisms. Think about the requirements of a general AI, when it needs to become able to generate predictions based on some information being passed to it in some arbitrary format that it does not know how to interpret.

 

I might be willing to accept this as I have no reason to disagree with it but at what point did we start accepting quantum mechanical statistics as the right solution to the problem.

 

It's not really "the right solution" per se. It is highly valid though, and for that reason it is common that people would ask why is it then that a higly valid explanation contains elements that are in the same state simultaneously. So, I just wanted to point out that the keyword here is still "observable" state.

 

I'm sure there exists very many alternative ways to express expectations in highly valid manner, but the reason DD's derivations lead to QM is just to demonstrate how QM definitions are an epistemologically general way to express expectations. Only thing that is required is an appropriate translation process, to express various recurring noumenaic features in the particular terminology of quantum mechanics.

 

Again, think about that from the point of view of a general learning mechanism, coming up with its own terminology with which to interpret some data in predictive manner.

 

At any rate, the detals of that is something that we come across later, so don't worry about how this aligns with QM yet.

 

-Anssi

[sigurdV]

1 + 1 = 2, believe it or not.

-Anssi

 

I believe that statement,but also that 1+1=1, for example when adding infinities.

AlephNull + AlephNull = AlephNull!

An example where one object added to itself only gives itself.

 

Numbers are supposed to represent objects and the alephs dont behave as ordinary objects satisfying "1+1=2", instead they satisfy "1+1=1".

 

There are infinitely many objects satisfying the equation x+x=x...

And they all are in a sense not actualised. (has no "real" object as an interpretation)

Similarly to the two mathemathical solutions 0 and 1/0

 

What ,if any, connection with the topic this has, ill leave to you :)

 

PS I suppose there might be other interesting values of n in: x+x=nx,

but i havent checked.

[AnssiH]

What ,if any, connection with the topic this has, ill leave to you :)

 

What you are saying is at the very core of this topic, actually.

 

As you probably noticed, my comment was "given the meaning that I intent to those symbols, 1 + 1 = 2". Likewise, you look at the whole paragraph I wrote, you can probably see that I'm trying express, that disagreement over the definitions that DD is using, is effectively a case of disagreeing over a communications protocol. The definitions are there just so that certain important relationships can be expressed, and there are certainly many ways to express the same relationships. The only reason why I could see someone arguing against them is if the reader confuses DD's definitions as arguments towards some kind of "the only true ontology". That is exactly as ridiculous as looking at some mathematical proof in base 10 form, and then saying it is invalid because it is not necessary to view things in base 10 form. What I'm saying is that, that was not even the argument.

 

-Anssi

[sigurdV]

I thought so...

Thanx for your kind evaluation :)

What you are saying is at the very core of this topic, actually.

 

-Anssi

 

Im a worker on foundations so this thread

immediately caught my attention...But...

 

What?

 

Maths,Maths and Maths again!

This possibly relevant topic unfortunately is way over my head!

 

While examining absolutes , searching for their common origin...

 

What if they ALL are not "real" objects in the sense that they satisfy the equation x+x=x which,

mathematically seen, only have two roots sharing the same defect(?)

 

It took some courage to return and print, but im happy I did :)

 

Theres a second reason:

 

I dont think Dr Dick will consider it, but couldnt some summary and highlightning of the more interesting stages in the development of the argument be constructed with us interested laymen in mind?

 

Strategically placed so we dont miss it if we try to read from the beginning?

[Bombadil]

In a sense, your criticism is accurate; however, there is a second issue here which many people clearly confuse with the proof itself. That has to do with everyone's overwhelming urge to resort to simple minded counter examples. I have shown that quantum-mechanics is an approximate solution to my equation under some very specific approximations (approximations always accepted as valid in any quantum-mechanical solution anyway) and Anssi's arguments are essentially directed at that issue: i.e., counter examples to my equation must be counter examples to quantum-mechanics. That is a very important issue considering the wide acceptance of quantum-mechanics as a valid solution to the explanation of reality.

 

It seems that we might take this a step further and note that a counter example can't be constructed from the past as this would imply that there is something that can't be represented in the coordinate system that you have constructed, and it can't be constructed from a possible solution to the fundamental equation as any elements might be added to modify the expectations of the future, which would eliminate any simple counter examples as no matter how many elements make up the past any number of elements may be used in the explanation to modify the expectations.

 

Regarding that last point, it would be very interesting to discover a valid exact solution to my equation which could be experimentally proved false. That result would imply that there actually do exist constraints on the universe which are observable; a very interesting possibility. To date I have discovered no such solution; that is why I often refer to modern physics as a tautological construct.

 

It would be interesting to see such a thing however I don't think that it would make physics any less of a tautological construct it would just bring into question what definitions are being made and why. And I think that it is more likely impossible to prove that such constraints can exist as whatever definitions are being used by physics it is these definitions that are needed. Shouldn't it be possible to choose definitions so that an explanation can behave in any way that is desired?

 

So it wouldn't be a solution that could be experimentally proved false but a definition that doesn't exist or perhaps evidence of a mistake in the definitions being used currently by physics. Which seems to me to have limited implications as it would be impossible to say that it doesn't exist or that it exists, we could only say that it doesn't appear to be very useful.

 

I don't think I take it in the wrong way; what I am suggesting is that the results suggest a very different view of the universe and how to approach explanations. In particular, the only valid approach appears to expect the future to look like the past (to the extent that the issues or relationships we are interested in are similar to issues or relationships we have already experienced). The puts a rather specific and tight constraint on what our rational expectations should be and I have one very significant actual fact which people should look at. Something rather interesting if anyone ever grasps what I have proved.

 

This appears to be the simplest approach at any rate and the basis for all of modern physics although I don't really see it as necessary for any step in the derivation. It all brings me back to a question that I think I asked some time ago although I'm not sure quite where, and that question is. “Will this all mean that a random universe would look like a Newtonian universe?”. To apply Newtonian physics it seems that a certain amount of consistency is needed but if the universe is truly random why should such a thing exist and if it doesn't can definitions be defined in such a way that Newtonian physics might still hold anyway.

 

That is a false statement! Anti-symmetric elements must be part of my representation or the representation is not universally applicable to all possible explanations: i.e., you are apparently ignoring the necessity of including all possible explanations with the representation.

 

Correct, if we want to be able to represent all possible explanations then we must include anti-symmetric elements, this seems clear. But what is not so clear (at least to me) is, are they needed to include all possible expectations for the future. Clearly this seems to be something that must be included as well, at least for any possible finite number of expectations for the future of the real elements. But are anti-symmetric elements needed to include them or are anti-symmetric elements only needed so that we can represent all possible explanations? Either way this seems like a minor issue. My imprecision is that anti-symmetric elements are needed to include all possible expectations and they are clearly needed for all explanations.

 

I have a distinct feeling that you totally overlook why hypothetical elements were introduced. You are using the phrase “flaw free” quite differently than the way I use it. I used hypothetical elements to make my deduction flaw free, not the explanation (you should comprehend that these are totally different issues).

 

This is a bad use of the term flaw free as the only thing that it must be consistent with is the past to be “flaw free” and the way I am using the term I am saying that any possible explanation must be consistent with an explanation that satisfies the fundamental equation.

 

How I understand it you added those hypothetical elements so that you could include any possible explanations.

 

Again, the separation of symmetric and antisymmetric elements was necessary to maintain the deduction universally general. You cannot derive my equation without such a separation.

 

I am agreeing with this but why make it seem like the separation of real and hypothetical elements has something to do with it. I am seeing these as totally different issues. Try to prove that a real element is an antisymmetric element, I can't see this as possible why couldn't an antisymmetric element be a real element. But this seems to be built into the deduction as an assumption of real elements.

 

They are essential to my derivation and I can only conclude that you cannot follow the deduction.

 

The idea is essential to your deduction but the result is that some elements are needed in our explanations and some elements are needed for our explanations and any one that thinks that they can tell the difference isn't paying attention.

 

It seems to me to boil down to a simple idea, you say that the photon can only be shown to exist if we assume Maxwell's equations, OK good but is there any difference between this and assuming that a photon exists and then saying that this implies Maxwell's equations? I can see nothing as being gained or lost in ether of these views and I see no way to distinguish them. In fact your derivation seems to show that they are equivalent.

 

If we are referring to real and hypothetical elements in any way other then to derive the fundamental equation i.e explane what is being explained and how and to satisfy certain philosophical conditions resulting from the need to include sophism aren't we inadvertently making a preference of one of these two possibilities?

 

That is their problem. They clearly have not followed my deduction. Why shouldn't I call them Bosons and Fermions? The statistics such entities must obey are very clearly discussed in many physics texts and those statistics are a very important issue. Would you bar me from using the word “function” because people would then think I am talking about mathematics?

 

I actually think that calling them Bosons and Fermions makes a lot of sense as there is little confusion of what is being talked about and they are simple terms to use and it makes it relatively clear what property we are talking about.

 

I just have this feeling that unless every one using these terms knows how not to refer to physics we are going to quickly have a hard time telling what is being disused ourselves and we will constantly be wondering if the other is talking about physics. Of course this isn't so different from how things are now a lot of the time so I don't see any problem with using these terms, it's really up to you.

 

But physics is an explanation isn't it? So it must be representable via my equation or my deduction is in error!

 

Alright but the real interest in physics seems only to start with the deduction of the Schroedinger equation, the only reason that physics is brought up in the deduction of the fundamental equation is because we have some idea of where we are going with it.

 

Some how an explanation can be derived that can be used to predict the stock market but we haven't got any interest in that explanation or any others that might exist but we know there must be derivations of them. The reason that we don't have any interest in them is because we don't know how they are derived or what the explanation looks like to know if it is the same as physics.

 

The other problem seems to be that not only do we not have an approximation to the fundamental equation that is not consistent with physics the only approximations that we are looking at, are physics at least approximately and we don't have any way to compare those to any other approximations.

 

Well, when I say "observable state" I could be referring to some defined states (as per the definitions of an explanation), or to whatever it is that corresponds to those defined states in noumenaic sense. Since either way, the exact same noumenaic information cannot be interpreted as meaning two different defined states.

 

I will accept that it is possible for two separate explanations to interpret the same noumenaic information (as you call it) in the same way at least as far as is needed to derive the fundamental equation but unless we have uniqueness of a solution to the fundamental equation, that is uniqueness of our possible explanations for any fixed set of information, Why should I believe that the exact same information can't be interpreted in two different ways? Hasn't this become a very mathematical question and not one that has been answered here?

 

I'm sure there exists very many alternative ways to express expectations in highly valid manner, but the reason DD's derivations lead to QM is just to demonstrate how QM definitions are an epistemologically general way to express expectations. Only thing that is required is an appropriate translation process, to express various recurring noumenaic features in the particular terminology of quantum mechanics.

 

I just don't know enough about quantum mechanics to give a meaningful response to this. What you are saying sounds plausible but at the same time why should I believe that a great many approximations to the fundamental equation aren't being ignored by using the definitions of QM. On the other hand why should I believe that the notation has anything to do with the definitions, that is what you are ultimately talking about isn't it. Representing the consequences of the fundamental equation in the notation of QM.