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"a Universal Representation Of Rules"


Doctordick

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I will accept that it is possible for two separate explanations to interpret the same noumenaic information (as you call it) in the same way at least as far as is needed to derive the fundamental equation but unless we have uniqueness of a solution to the fundamental equation, that is uniqueness of our possible explanations for any fixed set of information, Why should I believe that the exact same information can't be interpreted in two different ways? Hasn't this become a very mathematical question and not one that has been answered here?

 

No, wait, what I meant is, "the exact same noumenaic information cannot be interpreted as meaning two different defined states by the same single explanation".

 

The constraint (and all the constraints) being referred to in FE is a constraint applying to a single (but arbitrarily chosen) explanation (i.e. a matter of self-coherence), it isn't meant to imply that different explanations would all interpret things the same way.

 

In other words, no explanation can contain definitions in a manner, where the same exact noumenaic information would be interpreted as different defined elements. Such a thing would entail a case where one would say some individual collection of information is two different but completely similar things simultaneously.

 

What you are saying sounds plausible but at the same time why should I believe that a great many approximations to the fundamental equation aren't being ignored by using the definitions of QM.

 

You shouldn't believe that, as there certainly are many other valid and useful approximations. Finding different kinds of valid approximations is an interesting and potentially very useful problem to solve, but it is not a necessary topic right now. You'll understand what would be the meaning of such endeavours once you understand how the QM stuff is derived.

 

On the other hand why should I believe that the notation has anything to do with the definitions, that is what you are ultimately talking about isn't it. Representing the consequences of the fundamental equation in the notation of QM.

 

Well no, what I'm talking about is basically that if you have a problem of generating a method to predict the future, without knowing anything about the meaning of the information you are judging your predictions on (which is a restatement of the problem of generating a world view from noumenaic information, or the problem of creating an absolutely general learning mechanism), it is always possible to handle and categorize the noumenaic information in a way, where its recurring features (any features that make it possible to generate useful probabilistic predictions) can be seen in terms of quantum mechanical particles.

 

They can be seen in terms of many other kinds of things just as well, if you are ready to approximate more, or just differently. For example, in terms of newtonian objects, etc.

 

That is the result that has got some interesting epistemological implications towards the role of physic definitions in terms of ontology & epistemology. I.e, why is it that we interpret reality in those terms (with very high validity in terms of predictions).

 

Just think about the fact that predictionwise validity is always the only judge of the "correctedness" of our ideas.

 

-Anssi

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It would be interesting to see such a thing however I don't think that it would make physics any less of a tautological construct it would just bring into question what definitions are being made and why.

 

In a sense you are right but I would put it in a slightly different way. I would say that it might be possible that they haven't found the appropriate context for the solution discovered: i.e., they would have to check the surrounding circumstances implied by the solution very carefully.

 

Shouldn't it be possible to choose definitions so that an explanation can behave in any way that is desired?

 

Yes, I think that is the implication.

 

Which seems to me to have limited implications as it would be impossible to say that it doesn't exist or that it exists, we could only say that it doesn't appear to be very useful.

 

Yes, I like that answer.

 

It all brings me back to a question that I think I asked some time ago although I'm not sure quite where, and that question is. “Will this all mean that a random universe would look like a Newtonian universe?” To apply Newtonian physics it seems that a certain amount of consistency is needed but if the universe is truly random why should such a thing exist and if it doesn't can definitions be defined in such a way that Newtonian physics might still hold anyway.

 

The correct answer here is, “it is all context and definition”. Force equals mass times acceleration says a very simple thing. The absence of acceleration means there is no change in velocity (which is a vector). Thus in the absence of acceleration an object travels in a straight line (the vector does not change). Thus “force” is defined whenever that vector changes. It is defined to change proportionally to the “acceleration” and “mass” is the constant of proportionality. It is itself a circular assertion. The other required definitions (coordinate frames and such together with their definitions) constitute the “context”.

 

Note that it does require “objects” (collections of elemental entities whose behavior, internal to the object, can be ignored). Such “objects” are absent in the standard description of the early universe; close to the “big bang” thus Newtonian physics is essentially meaningless. However, the physics community presumes that a more accurate approximation to my equation (quantum mechanics) still applies.

 

My imprecision is that anti-symmetric elements are needed to include all possible expectations and they are clearly needed for all explanations.

 

Again, I think you have a tendency to “put the horse on the wrong side of the cart”. The issue is, “are the existence of anti-symmetric and symmetric functions necessary?”. What are you missing is “necessary to what?” The answer is, “to the collection of all possible solutions!” My equation is supposed to be a constraint on “all possible solutions”. As structured, it is valid for both anti-symmetric and symmetric functions. If you want to discuss a solution which contains no anti-symmetric functions then you are looking at an approximation to my equation (you are presuming a certain collection of solutions are unnecessary). There certainly are physics problems which make that presumption and the solutions (which are clearly not to required to be universal) to those problems certainly do not require anti-symmetric functions.

 

How I understand it you added those hypothetical elements so that you could include any possible explanations.

 

Rather, so my representation could represent “all possible explanations”. I am afraid you have a tendency to be looking for solutions.

 

I am agreeing with this but why make it seem like the separation of real and hypothetical elements has something to do with it. I am seeing these as totally different issues.

 

All functions can be divided into a sum of anti-symmetric and symmetric components. The only issue internal to my deduction is the fact that, if multiple things are real (and thus there exist multiple elements which no explanation can omit), there must exist anti-symmetric components: i.e., anti-symmetric functions must be there. So, essentially the insertion of the requirement of those “spinner” operators allows the possibility that there exist multiple “real” things. Omitting them would make solipsism the only possibility: i.e., everything would have to be hypothetical. What you should comprehend is that being entirely hypothetical does not require the absence of anti-symmetric solutions; these are entirely different issues.

 

It seems to me to boil down to a simple idea, you say that the photon can only be shown to exist if we assume Maxwell's equations, OK good but is there any difference between this and assuming that a photon exists and then saying that this implies Maxwell's equations?

 

Maxwell's equations are an approximation to my equation (explicit approximations are made). Those approximations essentially presume other aspects of my equation can be ignored. A photon is a solution to Maxwell's equation. We are talking about consequences of deductions here. Explain to me how Maxwell's equations can be deduced from the existence of a photon. In order to perform that deduction, one has to know what a photon is. You cannot define a photon without starting with a context of some kind; i.e., starting from the presumption of a given world view (a presumed solution to the problem of understanding the universe). My equation presumes no understanding of anything other than the abstract concepts of mathematics itself.

 

... inadvertently making a preference of one of these two possibilities?

 

No! Including both possibilities makes a preference for neither. What are we making a preference of? We are including the possibilities, “what if it is all hypothetical?” and “what if it is not all hypothetical?” Do you have some other possibility you think should be included? Let me know what it is.

 

Alright but the real interest in physics seems only to start with the deduction of the Schroedinger equation, the only reason that physics is brought up in the deduction of the fundamental equation is because we have some idea of where we are going with it.

 

No, the only reason that physics is brought up is that physics is the only subject (other than mathematics) which has done a half way decent job of insuring that its concepts are internally self consistent. All the other fields are either based upon physics results as basic beliefs or they are openly inconsistent or tautological in their constructs.

 

Some how an explanation can be derived that can be used to predict the stock market but we haven't got any interest in that explanation or any others that might exist but we know there must be derivations of them. The reason that we don't have any interest in them is because we don't know how they are derived or what the explanation looks like to know if it is the same as physics.

 

Around twenty years ago (after a business I owned went down) I got myself into a graduate program in economics. My business convinced me that some of the concepts put forth by economists made sense and I thought it might be reasonable to learn more. Mostly I just fought with the professors on the irrationality of their presumptions. One day when I was in the graduate student lounge looking over some of my deductions of my fundamental equation a professor glanced over my shoulder and asked what it had to do with economics.

 

So I took my equation and used it to derive all the general relationships taught as basic economics. I gave it to one of the professors and didn't keep a copy for myself so I can't quote any of it to you; however, I did come up with a rather interesting observation. The approximations (which I had to make in order to convert produce that result) required two quite different concepts of “value” whereas economics presumes only one. Since economists always reckon value in dollars, I used “price” to refer to theirs and “value” for the second concept which they presumed to be the same.

 

The uncertainty principal of physics (and my fundamental representation) arose in economics. (And certainly, if anything needs to be seen as “uncertain” its economics.) At any rate, the uncertainty principal showed up between the the two representations I referred to as price and value. When the price is known exactly, the value is unknowable and when the value is known exactly the price is unknowable. The price of an item is known exactly when the market functions perfectly (the market being fast enough that the price is fixed everywhere and anything can be bought or sold at any moment). The value is known exactly when no market whatsoever exists (if you get rid of an item, it is gone and irreplaceable). Any other circumstance, an uncertainty exists in both. In order to derive the common rules of economics I had to make the approximation that price and value were perfectly proportional.

 

I only brought that up because I think it may very well be correct. If the value and price are the same, you should lease everything. I also note that Kensington economics essentially presumes there is no value in actually owning anything; why buy it if leasing it is of the same value.

 

Why should I believe that the exact same information can't be interpreted in two different ways?

 

If exactly the same information is interpreted in two different ways, it should have two different numerical labels in my representation. That is exactly Anssi's response above.

 

On the other hand why should I believe that the notation has anything to do with the definitions, that is what you are ultimately talking about isn't it. Representing the consequences of the fundamental equation in the notation of QM.

 

What I proved is that any valid explanation of anything can be interpreted in terms of elements defined by my equation. That QM is an approximation to my equation implies that most all explanations require that QM is essentially valid.

 

You should note that mathematics itself has ontological elements. If you think in terms of those specific ontological elements, a rather clear picture arises. Every element in my representation can be seen as a point in an (x,y,z,t) space: i.e. something exists at the point (x,y,z,t) (tau is not there because the elements position in tau is absolutely unknowable).

 

Thus, everything you can conceive of can be seen as occupying a collection of points in an (x,y,z,t) space. If “objects” are defined to be a collection of such elements where the internal behavior of those points can be neglected, then practically everything you think of as existing are “objects”. Now, if you want to talk about interactions of objects, that might easily be a clear function of that internal behavior you are ignoring. You and I are interacting so in a sense we are objects.

 

Thus, if you come up with a theory which accurately predicts the interactions between you and I, I suspect it will be consistent with my fundamental equation (the required internal behavior of those objects will obey my equation; which is approximately QM).

 

The interactions of all these objects which go to make up your ontology can be represented by context: the objects in your world view which are used to define your ontology.

 

Have fun -- Dick

Edited by Doctordick
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What you are saying is at the very core of this topic, actually.

 

As you probably noticed, my comment was "given the meaning that I intent to those symbols, 1 + 1 = 2".

-Anssi

Forgive me for again intruding, but i feel "Interpretation" is an important subject that (ha ha?)

is in need of interpretation.There is no way I can follow the argument in here,so I started the following thread: Philosophy of Matemathics

 

I appreciate if you can find time to visit,interprete ,question, comment or object.

Edited by Qfwfq
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  • 3 weeks later...

I found those threads created by Doctordick particularly interesting. Out of boredom at the office I have spent hours reading many of them. At a mininum he may be credited with an amazing ability to stir the pot!

 

Now some of his arguments seem absolutely right to me, while many seem to be completely meaningless. I have a specific question that I'd love to see answered.

 

Doctordick says his work is a tautology. In my mind, a tautology amounts to nothing more than an exercise in linguistics. If your logic is correct then what comes out is exactly what you put in, nothing more, nothing less.

 

With that in mind I find it strange that Doctordick makes claims of any kind, given that his presentation is not supposed to reveal anything that hasn't already been assumed. At the same time I find it amusing that people try to convince him he is wrong, which can't possibly be the case. Has there been something that I missed?

 

I'm asking this question about tautologies because, if I'm right, all those discussions here seem to be much ado about nothing. And that raises a particularly interesting issue for me.

Edited by bravox
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In other words, no explanation can contain definitions in a manner, where the same exact noumenaic information would be interpreted as different defined elements. Such a thing would entail a case where one would say some individual collection of information is two different but completely similar things simultaneously.

 

If by this you mean that no explanation can allow a single element to be represented by two different definitions or that a single element can represent two different definitions at the same time then I can agree. That is, no element is allowed to be two different elements at the same time as it would have to be given two different representations, but if by this you mean that there is only one possible definition for any element then I think that this has yet to be shown and seems to me to be most likely false. That is, there is nothing special about any particular definition and different definitions can be used to arrive at the same ends. It all seems to become questions of expectations and probability.

 

Well no, what I'm talking about is basically that if you have a problem of generating a method to predict the future, without knowing anything about the meaning of the information you are judging your predictions on (which is a restatement of the problem of generating a world view from noumenaic information, or the problem of creating an absolutely general learning mechanism), it is always possible to handle and categorize the noumenaic information in a way, where its recurring features (any features that make it possible to generate useful probabilistic predictions) can be seen in terms of quantum mechanical particles.

 

Just what do you mean by quantum mechanical particles? I would have said that it has a representation in the notation of quantum mechanics whether or not we are talking about the same types of elements seems to me to be a minor issue as far as if a representation exists.

 

Meaning that the existence of a representation is the issue of the derivation of the fundamental equation, the definitions used to represent something is a question of approximations needed to simplify and or limit the possible expectations. And the representation is a question of the notation being used and has nothing to do with the derivation.

 

Again, I think you have a tendency to “put the horse on the wrong side of the cart”. The issue is, “are the existence of anti-symmetric and symmetric functions necessary?”. What are you missing is “necessary to what?” The answer is, “to the collection of all possible solutions!” My equation is supposed to be a constraint on “all possible solutions”. As structured, it is valid for both anti-symmetric and symmetric functions. If you want to discuss a solution which contains no anti-symmetric functions then you are looking at an approximation to my equation (you are presuming a certain collection of solutions are unnecessary). There certainly are physics problems which make that presumption and the solutions (which are clearly not to required to be universal) to those problems certainly do not require anti-symmetric functions.

 

So we really have no interest in questions of minimum requirements to include a representation for all possible expectations, rather we are only interested in insuring that all possible explanations have a representation.

 

That is, we are interested in having a representation that can represent all explanations and since we know that any possible function can be represented as a sum of its symmetric and anti-symmetric parts we know that by allowing both symmetric and anti-symmetric elements we will not be constraining the possible functions by our choice of elements.

 

All functions can be divided into a sum of anti-symmetric and symmetric components. The only issue internal to my deduction is the fact that, if multiple things are real (and thus there exist multiple elements which no explanation can omit), there must exist anti-symmetric components: i.e., anti-symmetric functions must be there. So, essentially the insertion of the requirement of those “spinner” operators allows the possibility that there exist multiple “real” things. Omitting them would make solipsism the only possibility: i.e., everything would have to be hypothetical. What you should comprehend is that being entirely hypothetical does not require the absence of anti-symmetric solutions; these are entirely different issues.

 

But why cant we include the possibility of “real” elements with the use of only symmetric elements? Why would a symmetric element have to be hypothetical. You are including the possibility that it is all hypothetical but what if it is all real. Can the same thing be done with symmetric elements as can be done with hypothetical elements. It seems that the same things cant be done or there would be no need for them in the first place. In short are there some expectations that require the use of symmetric elements.

 

And just what “spinner” operators are you referring to here?

 

Maxwell's equations are an approximation to my equation (explicit approximations are made). Those approximations essentially presume other aspects of my equation can be ignored. A photon is a solution to Maxwell's equation. We are talking about consequences of deductions here. Explain to me how Maxwell's equations can be deduced from the existence of a photon. In order to perform that deduction, one has to know what a photon is. You cannot define a photon without starting with a context of some kind; i.e., starting from the presumption of a given world view (a presumed solution to the problem of understanding the universe). My equation presumes no understanding of anything other than the abstract concepts of mathematics itself.

 

OK but how I understand it you have shown that given the right context the maxwell equations are an approximation to the fundamental equation, what you acutely showed is that the Dirac equation is an approximation and how I am understanding it this leads to the maxwell equations. At the same time you showed that a photon is the necessary context for this to take place.

 

So are you suggesting that a photon is not needed for this to take place and that no definition is in fact needed and that only the context will suffice to show this? If not how can this not be interpreted as assuming the existence of a photon leads to the maxwell equations. Notice my use of the term interpretation.

 

Unless you are thinking of something different then I am when you say context, when I think context I am thinking of the past, that is the past is the context that we place an element in. A definition is then to me, any further information that we place on an element that we have no defense for associating to that element.

 

Of course we must ether assume the context or define an element to obtain an approximation to the fundamental equation and we must decide what we are going to look at. All that I am suggesting is that the context that we place an approximation in and the definition that we place on an element are a necessary part of the approximation that we are making in the first place, and has no indication to the idea of it being real or hypothetical.

 

No! Including both possibilities makes a preference for neither. What are we making a preference of? We are including the possibilities, “what if it is all hypothetical?” and “what if it is not all hypothetical?” Do you have some other possibility you think should be included? Let me know what it is.

 

As for something that seems left out, well, what if it is all real?

 

This does not seem to me to be a question of including all philosophical possibilities, but rather that of including a representation of all possible explanations which requires that all of the consequence of symmetry must be included and all the different types of elements that have been included must be included. This has been accomplished, but it seems to me that any questions of what can be hypothetical and what can be real are question of interpretation, Not question of definitions or of the derivation.

 

The question that I have more interest in is one of context, is it the context that decides when an element will obey a particular approximation that you have made or is there some other form of definition that must also be made. What will the past supply to an approximation. Are the mass energy and momentum operators that you have defined just the context of an elements' or something else that is not suppled entirely by the past that will have an effect on the possible explanations.

 

So I took my equation and used it to derive all the general relationships taught as basic economics. I gave it to one of the professors and didn't keep a copy for myself so I can't quote any of it to you; however, I did come up with a rather interesting observation. The approximations (which I had to make in order to convert produce that result) required two quite different concepts of “value” whereas economics presumes only one. Since economists always reckon value in dollars, I used “price” to refer to theirs and “value” for the second concept which they presumed to be the same.

 

Well I suppose that is how fore sight is sometimes, but I wonder what ever happened to the derivation. If I had to guess he probably ignored it and it wound up in the garbage somewhere or maybe filed away some where but I doubt anybody would ever recognize it as anything and not just ignore it.

 

Thus, if you come up with a theory which accurately predicts the interactions between you and I, I suspect it will be consistent with my fundamental equation (the required internal behavior of those objects will obey my equation; which is approximately QM).

 

In fact it seems that there must be an interpretation that would be consistent with the fundamental equation or the deduction is in error.

 

And this just brings up the question of when QM is a good approximation of the fundamental equation, but I don't think that this is a question to go into in this thread.

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If by this you mean that no explanation can allow a single element to be represented by two different definitions or that a single element can represent two different definitions at the same time then I can agree. That is, no element is allowed to be two different elements at the same time as it would have to be given two different representations, but if by this you mean that there is only one possible definition for any element then I think that this has yet to be shown and seems to me to be most likely false. That is, there is nothing special about any particular definition and different definitions can be used to arrive at the same ends. It all seems to become questions of expectations and probability.

 

I would not argue with that!

 

Just what do you mean by quantum mechanical particles?

 

What Anssi means is that the elements required to defend any argument regarding future prediction obey an equation quite similar to the equation required to describe most quantum mechanical solutions. What are commonly referred to as a consequence of “quantization of field equations”: i.e., “quantum mechanical particles”.

 

And the representation is a question of the notation being used and has nothing to do with the derivation.

 

I am afraid the representation (that the fundamental elements which communicate the information can be numerically labeled) is fundamental to the derivation. In fact, that is all the derivation is based upon. My deductions are pure consequences of the fact that the signals (signs, symbols, gestures, etc.) are arbitrary and may be numerically labeled. Nothing else has any significance whatsoever.

 

So we really have no interest in questions of minimum requirements to include a representation for all possible expectations, rather we are only interested in insuring that all possible explanations have a representation.

 

As far as I am concerned, this sentence embodies nothing except confusion. The central interest in my derivation is that I am attempting to establish the minimum requirements (the constraints) which will not fail to include all possible internally consistent explanations.

 

That is, we are interested in having a representation that can represent all explanations and since we know that any possible function can be represented as a sum of its symmetric and anti-symmetric parts we know that by allowing both symmetric and anti-symmetric elements we will not be constraining the possible functions by our choice of elements.

 

Now I would have said that “we will not be constraining the possible functions by our choice of symmetric and anti-symmetric elements”.

 

And just what “spinner” operators are you referring to here?

 

My fundamental equation is written (in all its glory)

[math]

\left\{\sum_i\vec{\alpha}_i \cdot \vec{\nabla}_i + \sum_{i \neq j}\beta_{ij}\delta(\vec{x}_i -\vec{x}_j)\right\}\vec{\Psi}=K\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}=ikm\vec{\Psi}

[/math]

 

where I define those alpha and beta operators as anti-commuting operators with a magnitude of one half. These are essentially quite analogous to the operators in quantum mechanics called “spinors”. (Sorry about that, I apparently misspelled the thing in that earlier post.)

 

But why cant we include the possibility of “real” elements with the use of only symmetric elements? Why would a symmetric element have to be hypothetical.

 

For the very simple reason that my derivation is invalid if ontological elements represented by symmetric functions are real. I am afraid you have a concept of “real” which is not well thought out. (Your definition of “real” is apparently the fact that you believe it exists.) My definition of real is quite simple: if something is “real” there can exist no explanation which omits it. Until you know “all possible explanations” you cannot possibly prove anything is real: i.e., “required by all explanations”.

 

You are including the possibility that it is all hypothetical but what if it is all real.

 

The classification “real elements exist” (i.e., some of it is real) includes the case “it is all real”.

 

It seems that the same things cant be done or there would be no need for them in the first place. In short are there some expectations that require the use of symmetric elements.

 

Some explanations require the use of symmetric elements. The issue here is, “does there exist a universal explanation which require no symmetric elements?” I have one for you, go check out “a simple geometric proof with profound consequences”. That solution requires no hypothetical elements at all and will yield expectations for absolutely any collection of circumstances including the universe we find ourself in.

 

At the same time you showed that a photon is the necessary context for this to take place.

 

Yeah, the photon is certainly a consequence of Maxwell's explanation of what are normally referred to as electromagnetic effects. Are you trying to assert that there exists no other possible explanation of those effects?

 

So are you suggesting that a photon is not needed for this to take place and that no definition is in fact needed and that only the context will suffice to show this?

 

I get the feeling that you are misinterpreting what I mean by “context”. What I mean by “required context” is the entire collection of circumstances (sans hypothetical elements) upon which your explanation is based. In actual fact, your explanation is probably based on what you think constitutes the entire collection of circumstances (which most probably includes hypothetical elements) upon which your explanation is based.

 

If not how can this not be interpreted as assuming the existence of a photon leads to the maxwell equations. Notice my use of the term interpretation.

 

Please let me know how you intend to define “a photon” without using any aspects of Maxwell's equations.

 

Unless you are thinking of something different then I am when you say context, when I think context I am thinking of the past, that is the past is the context that we place an element in.

 

Regarding “a photon” the context is everything you would presume to exist when you are thinking of ”a photon”. The “light” from which the photon comes and when and how it works. The path between the “light” and what detects the light and everything which goes into defining that path. The detector of that light, including everything presumed to make that detector work.

 

A definition is then to me, any further information that we place on an element that we have no defense for associating to that element.

 

What you are omitting is that you are requiring the assumption that your explanation is “correct”. No flaw in that explanation will ever be found.

 

...and has no indication to the idea of it being real or hypothetical.

 

There exists no way to prove anything is either real or hypothetical. The whole issue is a consequence of “belief”.

 

As for something that seems left out, well, what if it is all real?

 

“The classification 'what if it is not all hypothetical?' (i.e., some of it is real) includes the case 'it is all real'”.

 

... but it seems to me that any questions of what can be hypothetical and what can be real are question of interpretation, Not question of definitions or of the derivation.

 

Again, how do you define “real”. It seems to me that, from your perspective, belief is the only measure of that identification.

 

The question that I have more interest in is one of context, is it the context that decides when an element will obey a particular approximation that you have made or is there some other form of definition that must also be made. What will the past supply to an approximation. Are the mass energy and momentum operators that you have defined just the context of an elements' or something else that is not supplied entirely by the past that will have an effect on the possible explanations.

 

Context is a very simple concept. Everything conceived of by you includes a relevant “context”. I used to ask the question, “How do you tell the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen?” and nobody ever picked up on the issue. Suppose you had something traveling between two points A and B. How do you know what it is? You know by the “context”: i.e., all the other stuff which you have presumed to be around when you make the identification. The presumption of the existence of that context is overlooked by almost everyone.

 

Well I suppose that is how fore sight is sometimes, but I wonder what ever happened to the derivation. If I had to guess he probably ignored it and it wound up in the garbage somewhere or maybe filed away some where but I doubt anybody would ever recognize it as anything and not just ignore it.

 

I am sure he ignored it (and put it somewhere in his files) as I know he didn't understand it. His specialty was “The History of Economics” not “Economics” if you understand what I mean.

 

In fact it seems that there must be an interpretation that would be consistent with the fundamental equation or the deduction is in error.

 

Well, what it says is that any interpretation of anything must be consistent with the underlying quantum mechanical nature of our interpretation of the universe. That is the central issue of absolute internal consistency.

 

Have fun -- Dick

Edited by Doctordick
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...which can't possibly be the case.
Why do you say it can't?

 

...all those discussions here seem to be much ado about nothing.
This is actually quite a good description of these discussions. That's pretty much what I tried to point out.
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DEFINITION OF DOCTORDICK: Something is “real” if there can exist no explanation which omits it. Until you know “all possible explanations” you cannot possibly prove anything is real
OK, let us use this definition to determine if DoctorDick is "real". So, the question is, how do we as a forum prove that Doctordick is real ? Does anyone reading this make a claim that they know "all possible explanations" of Doctordick ?
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If by this you mean that no explanation can allow a single element to be represented by two different definitions or that a single element can represent two different definitions at the same time then I can agree. That is, no element is allowed to be two different elements at the same time as it would have to be given two different representations, but if by this you mean that there is only one possible definition for any element then I think that this has yet to be shown and seems to me to be most likely false. That is, there is nothing special about any particular definition and different definitions can be used to arrive at the same ends. It all seems to become questions of expectations and probability.

 

I meant the former, and I think you got it exactly right in your thinking.

 

Just what do you mean by quantum mechanical particles? I would have said that it has a representation in the notation of quantum mechanics whether or not we are talking about the same types of elements seems to me to be a minor issue as far as if a representation exists.

 

And I think you have this right as well. I.e., it is always possible to represent the inductive expectations in terms of defining "quantum mechanical particles", by which I mean elements that behave exactly the way that world has been defined in modern quantum physics. Which implies something about modern physics.

 

I found those threads created by Doctordick particularly interesting. Out of boredom at the office I have spent hours reading many of them. At a mininum he may be credited with an amazing ability to stir the pot!

 

Now some of his arguments seem absolutely right to me, while many seem to be completely meaningless. I have a specific question that I'd love to see answered.

 

Doctordick says his work is a tautology. In my mind, a tautology amounts to nothing more than an exercise in linguistics. If your logic is correct then what comes out is exactly what you put in, nothing more, nothing less.

 

With that in mind I find it strange that Doctordick makes claims of any kind, given that his presentation is not supposed to reveal anything that hasn't already been assumed. At the same time I find it amusing that people try to convince him he is wrong, which can't possibly be the case. Has there been something that I missed?

 

Well, it's what that tautologous nature implies about modern physics that seems to rub people the wrong way. E.g. the idea that the fundamental particles and concepts of modern physics don't amount to anything but a very useful and generic language to express inductively derived expectations. And not just that, it's also very hard to communicate how the argument actually proceeds, it seems to be very easy to misinterpret many things.

 

-Anssi

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OK, let us use this definition to determine if DoctorDick is "real". So, the question is, how do we as a forum prove that Doctordick is real ? Does anyone reading this make a claim that they know "all possible explanations" of Doctordick ?

I don't think you can prove that anything is real, in the sense you can prove a mathematical theorem. Proof is not a concept that applies to most things in our lives, certainly not anything perceived by our senses. Those are determined by those "squirrel decisions"; there is just too much data to be handled in a rational way.

 

Well, it's what that tautologous nature implies about modern physics that seems to rub people the wrong way. E.g. the idea that the fundamental particles and concepts of modern physics don't amount to anything but a very useful and generic language to express inductively derived expectations. And not just that, it's also very hard to communicate how the argument actually proceeds, it seems to be very easy to misinterpret many things.

There are other people who think that quantum mechanics is just a mathematical framework rather than a description of reality. For instance, check this: http://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec9.html

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There are other people who think that quantum mechanics is just a mathematical framework rather than a description of reality. For instance, check this: http://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec9.html

 

I quite enjoyed that, and even though I don't have the wherewithal to easily follow his exact arguments, he seems to be looking at the whole thing from a rather rational perspective. I think Scott Aaronson would have the wherewithal to follow DD's arguments relatively easily, and probably find the particular implications interesting. Few comments;

 

As a direct result of this "QWERTY" approach to explaining quantum mechanics - which you can see reflected in almost every popular book and article, down to the present -- the subject acquired an undeserved reputation for being hard. Educated people memorized the slogans -- "light is both a wave and a particle," "the cat is neither dead nor alive until you look," "you can ask about the position or the momentum, but not both," "one particle instantly learns the spin of the other through spooky action-at-a-distance," etc. -- and also learned that they shouldn't even try to understand such things without years of painstaking work.

 

Indeed. It irritates me when people pretend that QM is somehow something that normal minds cannot understand. I think having this aura just does a disservice to science. It also irritates me how relativity gets the same treatment. If these things were explained from a more rational perspective to the general public, I think there would be quite many minds having much less naive ideas of the world.

 

So, what is quantum mechanics? Even though it was discovered by physicists, it's not a physical theory in the same sense as electromagnetism or general relativity. In the usual "hierarchy of sciences" -- with biology at the top, then chemistry, then physics, then math -- quantum mechanics sits at a level between math and physics that I don't know a good name for. Basically, quantum mechanics is the operating system that other physical theories run on as application software (with the exception of general relativity, which hasn't yet been successfully ported to this particular OS).

 

Well, in some ways I like this analogy, but in some ways, I think it's little bit misleading. I'm saying that because, when you see quantum mechanics as a general platform to express inductive expectations, it's not very big leap into seeing all the physical theories as particular approximations of quantum mechanics. There may be aspects to those other theories that actually do require a specific kind of universe for them to be valid, but it is not trivial to distinguish between something being "known" about the universe, and something being part of the language we happen to use to "understand" the universe.

 

That is the issue he seems to refer to here;

More often than not, the only reason we need experiments is that we're not smart enough. After the experiment has been done, if we've learned anything worth knowing at all, then hopefully we've learned why the experiment wasn't necessary to begin with -- why it wouldn't have made sense for the world to be any other way. But we're too dumb to figure it out ourselves!

 

That is exactly what DD's work is set to demonstrate. I can see it very clearly in terms of special relativity, and reasonably clearly with general relativity and quantum mechanics. What is being demonstrated is exactly how those theories are actually epistemological frameworks for expressing expectations. We take inductively reasoned expectations, and we cast them into the framework of QM or relativity, and thus that is how we see the reality. But just because we "choose" to view reality that way, doesn't mean, that's the way it is.

 

I think Scott Aaron has come to see that fact from the perspective, that the core definitions of QM really just make that particular expression form of the world seem very strange, while at the same time there is really no reason to view those strange semi-idealistical aspects as features of the world, just features of our world views.

 

The only reason I can see for someone not finding such a thing possible is when they fail to view absolutely *all* the objects, particles and concepts we can think of, as part and parcel of the *language* of our world views.

 

Btw, one thing that DD's analysis demonstrates is also exactly how quantum mechanics and general relativity draw from the same underlying epistemological fundamentals, as two different languages that simply require slightly different sets of approximations. Thus, it is possible to investigate those approximations, and understand the conflict between the two in terms of what approximation(s) yield logical contradiction.

 

At any rate, there's no reason to see neither as the way the world is. Just as the way the world can be approximated.

 

-Anssi

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I quite enjoyed that

You may also enjoy reading the whole series. Some interesting thoughts on Godel, free-will, time travel. The link is at the top of the article.

 

It irritates me when people pretend that QM is somehow something that normal minds cannot understand.

I think the problem with QM is not to understand it, but to understand what it means. Anyone who understands what it means can explain what is happening with the double-slit experiment. I haven't seen anyone do that yet. Aaronson doesn't do it, and I haven't seen Doctordick do it (I may have missed it)

 

The way I understand it, the mystery surrounding QM is that those probabilities appear real, in a physical sense. A probability wave is just a mathematical concept, yet it is capable of creating interference patterns with other probability waves. To most people that is mind-boggling.

 

it is not trivial to distinguish between something being "known" about the universe, and something being part of the language we happen to use to "understand" the universe.

If there is no possible way you can't distinguish two things, then you are simply confused: the two things are the same. I'm inclined to think the language we use to describe the universe IS the universe. But that is a can of worms.

 

That is exactly what DD's work is set to demonstrate.

That is what I understood of it (that observations follow from definitions, therefore we shouldn't be surprised experiments agree with theories). As a matter of fact, I can't fathom why anyone would think differently.

 

But just because we "choose" to view reality that way, doesn't mean, that's the way it is.

That is the bit I find meaningless. It makes reality impossible to know, which is to say it is a figment of our imagination. This makes no sense, unless I'm missing something.

 

The only reason I can see for someone not finding such a thing possible is when they fail to view absolutely *all* the objects, particles and concepts we can think of, as part and parcel of the *language* of our world views.

If reality and language are the same thing, then this is much ado about nothing. Both sides would be right. Just a thought.

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I don't think you can prove that anything is real...
Well, perhaps I would agree with you, however, my point is that DD does believe it is possible to prove that anything is real, read again what he said about what is "real" and his use of the "proof" {DD..."Until you know “all possible explanations” you cannot possibly prove anything is real"}.

 

So, if we are to apply logic to understand the philosophy of DD it would be his claim that "Once you do know all possible explanations you can prove anything is real". However, I find this to be a nonsense claim because it rests on a false assumption that one can know all possible explanations (including those yet to be thought of) as a criterion for what is "real". The bottom line is that there is not a rational philosophy being offered by DD concerning the relationship between what is real and how we come as humans to know it. But, perhaps you have a different point of view ?

Edited by Rade
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I must say, Scott Aaronson has a mighty sense of humour but he doesn't aim to be accurate in his presentation. This makes him somewhat misleading and I wonder how tongue-in-cheek he means to be when he says experiment isn't necessary. I'm sure he is aware of the things he is glossing over and these are presumably what he means with his analogy of OS vs. application software and also the bit about sprinkling in physics to taste. I do get the idea he might be neglecting the universality of one empirical aspect of the quantum formalism.

 

BTW anybody seriously interested in the mathematical formalism common to all quantum physics might like to get their hands on a copy of the very first treatment which was by von Neumann in 1932 (in German) and translated into English in the 50's. By itself it wasn't complete but it was a very fundamental start and any discussion of these matters ought to be aware of it.

 

I quite enjoyed that, and even though I don't have the wherewithal to easily follow his exact arguments, he seems to be looking at the whole thing from a rather rational perspective. I think Scott Aaronson would have the wherewithal to follow DD's arguments relatively easily, and probably find the particular implications interesting.
Actually, I suspect he would have the wherewithal to spot exectly where Dick's arguments turn into crap.

 

I think the problem with QM is not to understand it, but to understand what it means. Anyone who understands what it means can explain what is happening with the double-slit experiment. I haven't seen anyone do that yet. Aaronson doesn't do it, and I haven't seen Doctordick do it (I may have missed it)

 

The way I understand it, the mystery surrounding QM is that those probabilities appear real, in a physical sense. A probability wave is just a mathematical concept, yet it is capable of creating interference patterns with other probability waves. To most people that is mind-boggling.

This is where I quite agree with you. And no, you haven't missed it at all.

 

But that is a can of worms.
Yes, it does sound like a can of worms and so do the metaphysical conclusions that people keep drawing in these threads.
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Well, perhaps I would agree with you, however, my point is that DD does believe it is possible to prove that anything is real, read again what he said about what is "real" and his use of the "proof" {DD..."Until you know “all possible explanations” you cannot possibly prove anything is real"}.

I didn't get that from the quote. Does he claim it is possible to know all explanations? (it might well be, to some extent)

 

I find this to be a nonsense claim because it rests on a false assumption that one can know all possible explanations (including those yet to be thought of) as a criterion for what is "real".

I think about it this way: It's possible to know something about an infinite set without knowing all the elements of the set.. For instance, I don't know every single number in the set of real numbers, but I know some things about all of them.

 

We cannot know all possible explanations for our experiences, but we can know something about explanations in general. For instance, I know that they must be self-consistent. I also know that any two self-consistent explanations can be mapped into one another, so any one explanation is enough. I could go on, but the problem is that it is just a lot of fluff as far as I can tell.

 

The bottom line is that there is not a rational philosophy being offered by DD concerning the relationship between what is real and how we come as humans to know it. But, perhaps you have a different point of view ?

I think we're on the same page. I don't think there can be any rational philosophy to prove what is or is not real, mostly because reality is not prone to formal definitions (Doctordick's claims notwithstanding)

 

My definition of real is quite simple: if something is “real” there can exist no explanation which omits it.

That is not a definition, just a requirement of an explanation. Probably part of what is causing confusion.

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Well I must say it's fun for a change to converse about this topic with someone who is already aligned to view the topic from an epistemological angle.

 

I think the problem with QM is not to understand it, but to understand what it means. Anyone who understands what it means can explain what is happening with the double-slit experiment. I haven't seen anyone do that yet. Aaronson doesn't do it, and I haven't seen Doctordick do it (I may have missed it)

 

Well there are two different topics embedded to the idea of "explaining double-slit experiment".

 

Most people are only looking at it from the topic of wondering about what is the "true ontology of reality"; they are asking themselves what kinds of elements and behaviours there really exist behind the double-slit experiment, so to produce such a mysterious behaviour. That is a question of ontology, and it is unanswerable already on the grounds that any valid ontology can always be translated into another logically equal ontology (only semantically different).

 

The other topic, completely overlooked by most people, is to think about the entirely epistemological reasons for why our conception of reality is such, that it contains quantum mechanical behaviour as a valid representation of expectations. The point that I think Aaronson is trying to make, and what DD is talking about, is related to this latter topic.

 

If you look at QM as a "data handling framework", i.e. as an immaterial mechanism to first categorize information into defined elements (potentially immaterial but very handy for mental image of reality), and then generate expectations according to some immaterial rules (rules that people concerned with ontology tend to view in terms of many worlds or transactional time relationships or wave function collapse etc), then there is a very explicit point to be made about the reasons why things in double-slit experiment occur the way they do. What needs to be kept in mind is that, the double-slit experiment itself is our language of something occurring in reality, and our actual observations of the particular states across the experiment, are connected by what our own conception of reality tells us was happening in-between.

 

The crucial key point here is that you need to really view QM exactly as a mechanism to categorize undefined information into some defined elements. If you start your thought experiments by imagining particles that actually move from one place to another, you are thinking in terms of the topic of ontology. You need to be able to think about the fact that, there exists some large volume of information underneath our idea that "there is a particle" and "now that particle has moved over here". DD's analysis implies that if you produce a method of generating expectations from underlying raw information (whose real meaning is not known at all), it is possible to generate those expectations via inventing a generally valid language, in which the information is handled in terms of QM particles. When, and only when you do that, that information will look to you like a quantum mechanical world, and all your experiments would validate your views.

 

That is why quantum mechanical particles appear to be influenced by each others in non-physical (idealistic) ways; the underlying reality behind the "particles" is probably not literally a swarm of particles with real identities to themselves floating around in real ontological space the way we mentally think of them. That is just an immaterial way to express expectations that are truly connected to some inductively arrived conclusions about some information, that is not in itself a swarm of particles.

 

I think this idea requires some mental wrestling for some people, but it's not really that complicated if you manage to look at it from the right angle (just think about philosophy of intelligence and understanding in general). DD's work is supposed to be an explicit demonstration of the logical mechanism behind the translation from undefined information to the language of QM, and in that sense it explains what "QM means", while it doesn't explain what the real ontology of reality is.

 

The way I understand it, the mystery surrounding QM is that those probabilities appear real, in a physical sense. A probability wave is just a mathematical concept, yet it is capable of creating interference patterns with other probability waves. To most people that is mind-boggling.

 

Yes, it is mind-boggling, to the extent that people think that the particles that those probability waves are affecting, are actually real particles. When you view them as part and parcel of your way to express some information (from reality), it becomes a much more sensible problem.

 

Of course it could be that reality really is like one of the QM interpretations, but the point is that there is no way to know, and even if reality isn't quantum mechanical, our representation of inductively arrived expectations can still be, in completely general sense, quantum mechanical. Realizing that ought to make people lose their motivation to believe QM particles are ontologically real. Exactly like the realization that godless universe would work exactly like the one we live in, can cause people to lose their motivation to believe in gods. In both cases, there is no explicit information to prove any of these viewpoints right or wrong. There is just understanding that can make one or the other viewpoint seem very naive to a person.

 

If there is no possible way you can't distinguish two things, then you are simply confused: the two things are the same. I'm inclined to think the language we use to describe the universe IS the universe. But that is a can of worms.

 

I think I understand how you mean that. In my mind I just think it's important to somehow communicate the fact that, while there are many different ways to represent the universe (i.e. many valid languages exist to express the same thing, it's just a matter of general semantics), there's still the same universe associated with all those different languages. So, that's why I'm just using the word "reality" to refer to the idea of some noumenaic reality associated with all the different ways to represent it.

 

That is what I understood of it (that observations follow from definitions, therefore we shouldn't be surprised experiments agree with theories). As a matter of fact, I can't fathom why anyone would think differently.

 

Well, some people do on the grounds that they are not viewing our world views as entirely immaterial data handling frameworks. Everyone who starts with the assumption that our world view tells us something about the actual structure of reality, and defends that view by various verifiable facts in our world view, is simply missing the big picture; that the entire world view is just a self-coherent language to express expectations.

 

Of course there is also a point to be made of the fact that, it is incredibly difficult to mentally analyze the problems starting from the epistemological fundamentals. It is much easier to just run a test, and after running the tests, and often after years and years of mental effort, someone comes to realize why the thing always had to be so, assuming that a host of other things in our world view was valid. For instance, special relativity was in many ways a result of realizing that the definitions already established in electromagnetism, had to lead into relativistic time relationships.

 

That is the bit I find meaningless. It makes reality impossible to know, which is to say it is a figment of our imagination. This makes no sense, unless I'm missing something.

 

Well it just means ontological questions cannot be answered, because what we are really asking when we ask an ontological question is, "is this language I am using now, the true language also used by reality". Even though all kinds of different language can be used to express the same thing.

 

I think a rational way to view that is to realize that, nature in itself probably is not concerned of any mental language. Any language we use to express expectations, is plagued by very many entirely immaterial features that are useful for us, but cannot be assigned to literally be features of reality. Many philosophers have already commented on that topic, i.e. "map is not the territory" and "whatever you think something is, it isn't". What they mean is, your idea of something cannot be assumed to be also the way reality is structured any more than you can assume that english words actually literally exist inside your mind, just waiting for you to use them.

 

-Anssi

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Anssi as usual you repeat the same lengthy arguments and I see what you are attempting to say but I see where you are so often barking up the wrong tree. In any case, even the parts of you are saying that I can agree with don't support Dick's arguments nor the conclusions you insist on drawing.

 

For one, you talk so much about the importance of communication, language and semantics and you keep ignoring what anyone except Dick repeatedly tells you. One thing I think I've told you, it would often be helpful to distinguish the word particle from corpuscle, seeing as the former isn't so necessarily the latter. That said, the only comment I will bother to make on your last post is:

Yes, it is mind-boggling, to the extent that people think that the particles that those probability waves are affecting, are actually real particles.
Even assuming you mean corpuscles, I repeat that not everybody insists on seeing it this way and that you don't really remove all difficulty by pointing this out. The whole matter is far more complicated than you think. At this point, believe what you like.
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