Conservation Of Inherent Ignorance!

[Doctordick]

C'mon OM, be a sport, will you?

So I should let you sucker me in again? I know responding to your post is a utter waste of time but, being a sucker at heart, I will respond.

 

This per se is a fair enough claim, leaving aside subtleties about your own definition of "explanation", the correspondence being bijective and why that equation ought to be The Fundamental One.

The subtleties of my definition? Please show me some of these “subtleties” you perceive existing within my definition. In fact, why don't we stop right here as, if you have indeed a valid complaint about my definition the whole thing crumbles anyway there is no reason to go any further until this question is settled.

 

In fact, I am going to open a new thread called “Answering Qfwfq” on the “Watercooler” forum since there doesn't appear to be a “Logic” forum. Suppose we just shift this discussion over there and get serious about your complaints.

 

I will keep a file consisting of the rest of your post and we can answer the questions one at a time.

 

See you at the watercooler? -- Dick

[Qfwfq]

since there doesn't appear to be a “Logic” forum

Logic is a topic of philosophy and I'm quite reasonably familiar with it.

[Doctordick]

Logic is a topic of philosophy and I'm quite reasonably familiar with it.

Meaning you have no intention of clarifying your complaints concerning the logic of my definitions? Apparently you are of the common thought that philosophy need not be well defined or logical.

 

If that is indeed the situation, It seems to me that talking to you is a simple waste of time and I don't have a lot of that left.

[Qfwfq]

Apparently you are of the common thought that philosophy need not be well defined or logical.

I don't see how you get that from what I said.

[AnssiH]

Anssi, unfortunately it seems like we can't effectively communicate unless you can bridge your gaps, you track Dick in mistaking my efforts of offering you help in this for being a member of the Holy Office.

 

I don't recognize myself doing that... Well, if it seems like I'm just ignoring some things you are saying, it's probably because I perceive them as being irrelevant to the topic, and in those cases my respond would be just an attempt to get back to the topic, so perhaps it feels like I'm not listening...

 

It also seems you mistake me for having claimed that Shimony's article does the same thing that Dick does; this is false, I see gross differences

 

Great!

 

but I was trying to make a few points.

 

My impression of what you were saying was that they are focusing onto observables and their (quantum mechanical) effects onto expectations in a rather abstract level, rather than talking about specific defined elements (like electrons or photons etc). Is that so?

 

It would be helpful if you specified exactly which two remaining ontological assumptions you refer to.

 

Those a-priori definitions behind the idea of "locality".

 

I didn't complain about that in order to just be bickering about whatever tiny issue I could find. Like I said, it is absolutely imperative that these definitions are not laid down at the get-go. Because a valid definition of exactly those things arises as a consequence of the universal constraints and definitions.

 

To insist on a definition of (ontological) space at the get-go of this analysis would be like insisting on a newtonian definition of time (on the merit that "it makes sense") while trying to work out whether the relativistic definitions are valid.

 

I believe you agree that these are indeed undefendable assumptions, and like you said, it is typical approach for a physicist to "cheat" a bit and make these shortcuts. Basically making something akin to "educated guesses" and trying to work out valid models.

 

My impression is that some physicist assume more ontological reality to their work than others, but even when a physicist is not supposing any ontological implications to the models he works with, he is still not really trying to solve what DD is trying to solve. A physicist is involved in coming up with a valid predictive model any way he can, while DD is focused on investigating the consequences of universal epistemological issues. In that sense, you could say it was initially kind of unexpected that DD's approach would ever turn out to have anything to do with modern physics at all, let alone explain the epistemological reasons behind the validity of the most fundamental expressions of modern physics.

 

It's a smite more than following the calculus and seeing no mistakes.

 

Of course I had to understand the premise, in order to see exactly what is tautologous to what (and to understand how such a result can be seen as plausible at all)

 

Mathematics is a pure exercise in logic, I've needed to make sense of what Dick is claiming about his equation's bearing on interpreting reality and it takes more patience than most people have. You've had more of it and perhaps a few less important other things to occupy your time with. I think I see what you mean about interpretations of reality but I doubt your ability to judge without having bridged your gap and, when you say:

But I think there's some truth to him saying that it's my lack of familiarity with physics that actually made it easier for me, as in, I don't have the tendency to interpret his work in terms of what it superficially looks like in terms of physics.

it runs the risk of meaning that you lack some elements on which to form judgement.

 

I would say there are some subtleties to the conclusions that I might not see because of not knowing what physicists typically think the validity of such and such physical relationships imply about nature, but I think I can form a pretty solid judgment on understanding, in detail, the algebraic steps between the discussed symmetries, and a fundamental expression of quantum mechanics and relativistic time relationships.

 

Especially on the latter subject I feel that I have a pretty complete understanding (at least on special relativity).

 

What I meant was more complicated but I think you'd have to bridge your gap before you could convince me of much. In essence I don't see how Dick's basic notation can conclusively add anything. I have often tried to get clarifications from him but he takes my queries for injunctions from the Holy Office.

 

My impression of that issue is that, when you ask a question about how something in his work relates to such and such specific issue of physics, you are thinking it is a legit question because you are thinking that the ability to answer that would test the validity of his work.

 

From his perspective you are directly off the topic, because you are:

1. Not working exclusively with his definitions

2. Wanting to work out a valid mapping of a very specific thing involving very many definitions, while he is just concerned of proving that any valid view can be expressed in that mapping (proving that universality of the notation is all that matters to get to his results)

3. Potentially presuming a-priori that the specific issue or definitions related to it are epistemologically and/or ontologically valid (see, if it and all the definitions associated with it are not epistemologically valid representation of recurring patterns it cannot be validly mapped either)

 

I think you can see that a lot of the time it would be as difficult to work out as it would be to produce a quantum mechanical description of an entire planet. Better to convince yourself about the validity of his definitions, and their connection to the most fundamental issues of physics, rather than trying to work out a specific mapping of some sort of complex situations (involving complex definitions).

 

Of course if that can be done, then whatever can be seen as representable by quantum physics (practical or not), can be also seen representable by his definitions (and following from the same epistemological issues)

 

It's hard to even make sense of his presentation and arguments, how was I to get over parts that struck me non sequitur and potentially hiding assumptions? There were some parts where, from his replies, it was hard to make out whether his intention is of adding some fact or drawing it as a consequence.

 

Yes I know. I think he and I often presume the other party understands more about his analysis than they do, and we communicate things accordingly off. I have often said something about some conclusion, thinking that the other party understands I mean this is what his work implies, and just gotten a "what, you can't make such an assumption!" as a response.

 

And sometimes those responses can seem like the other party has just made up their mind without bothering to examine the proof.

 

Considering most of your recent posts, it looks more and more to me as if he does nothing more than is included in theoretical physics, just in his own little way.

 

If that were true, we simply wouldn't have people wondering why quantum mechanical behaviour is what it is... :shrug:

 

That may seem like a bold claim if you think I mean it in that people would know what reality is like... I don't mean to say that at all. I just mean they would understand why quantum mechanics is valid representation of recurring things, exactly like they understand why such and such symmetries allow you to validly define a conserved quantity (just as an example).

 

It is hard though to sort things out where he appears to be making some very bold claims about his fundamental equation; I'm no longer 100% sure that you and him perfectly understand each other.

 

That is probably because I am intentionally trying to explain the same things from slightly different perspective(s), because different people respond differently to different explanations. If you understood exactly what I was trying to communicate, you would also understand that we are indeed talking about the exact same issues (except perhaps for some subtleties that he has got a better hang of).

 

For the rest, Anssi, I see many of your points and you make much better clarifications than Dick does.

 

Thanks, I just thought of another clarification that you might find helpful, since you found it implausible that different kinds of universes could be represented by the same concepts (of modern physics).

 

If you think about a regular wave on a surface of a pond, it's essentially a "recurring pattern" that we have a name for. Whatever there's "really" going on there in reality, doesn't really matter, as long as some sort of recurring activity of some type can be recognized. We cast a defined object called "wave" onto some recurring activity, and that's our comprehension of the situation. It doesn't mean that that wave is suddenly a real object by itself, it just means we can understand a large amount of information via thinking it is a wave and having appropriate expectations to that thing.

 

That is of course true to everything we can define (including things that are typically thought to "really" contain identity to themselves); as far as we can objectively judge, the ontological reality behind the definitions is not known.

 

Then what would it mean if his proof is valid; if modern physics indeed arises from entirely universal issues when representing ANY recurring activity. I believe you are thinking, how could a different sort of reality be representable by the same exact concepts that we are using right now, since it is so easy to imagine a differently behaving universe.

 

It means that, just like with that wave on water surface, some recurring activity has been cast onto the definitions of modern physics, while we don't really know whether or not there are real identities behind anything we have defined (and the defense of that argument is in the steps done in the algebra). And it means that any recurring activity can be cast onto the same definitions, i.e. "if it looks like a photon, it's a photon" is absolutely true for any reality. DD's work is aiming to prove, for instance, that the definition of a photon is indeed universally applicable as an interpretation issue (basically a matter of data-ordering). This all just means that different aspects of that "other reality" would be cast onto the same moulds.

 

If that sounds implausible, think about how there's this transformation from "undefined activity of some sort", onto an imaginary coordinate system where the associated expectations appear in shift symmetrical fashion. I think it's easy to convince oneself that that shift symmetry (i.e. momentum conservation) can be seen as an interpretation aspect; applicable to any recurring activity. To convince onself of the more complicated issues of physics being also this way means thinking through the steps done in algebra.

 

With the above I'm not hoping to convince you of the validity of his claims, I'm just hoping to make you see the plausibility of them.

 

Although I still can't be sure of exactly what you mean by all the things you say, I recognize things in them which I also find in theoretical research methodology where you think Dick is unique. I also see parts where you might be neglecting facts that can be considered as supported by observation and,

 

What does it mean that something which is basically an interpretation issue, is supported by an observation? I mean, that comment strikes to me as if you were suggesting something can be observed "in-itself", while I also think you understand that such a thing is oxymoronic, so I'm not really sure what you are saying...

 

I think current theoretical methodology is less dependent on undefendable ontological assumptions than you put it. I've already tried to point out some semantic issues, but researchers certainly vary about these things;

 

Well, my impression is that it is the mainstream physics publications that are especially bad at the topic of undefendable ontological issues (I can hardly read them without getting bothered by their bad language), and certainly that professional physicist vary (once again those physicists that write and appear in mainstream publications tend to use especially bad language).

 

You are still saying "less dependent", and what I'm saying is valid as long as there is any undefendably ontological ideas to their work. I.e, they are not trying to draw epistemological consequences, but instead they are working with something they think is applicable to "this reality".

 

Concerning the Bell inequalities, I'm not 100% that you are distinguishing between saying that, according to a formalism, we "do not expect them to" hold and saying that we "expect them not to" hold.

 

I'm thinking about the latter; My (rather mainstream) interpretation of that issue is that, via accepting the validity of QM, we expect Bell inequalities to be violated. I mean, that's what Einstein et al pushed forward as an argument against the correctness of quantum mechanics; that the formalism requires things to work in a fashion that he thought cannot be considered realistic.

 

I'm not fully sure of what you mean when outlining your understanding of these things. For the weaker of these two propositions, it is sufficient not to hold the opinion of Einstein et al. (and translate it the way Bell did) so Dick's formalism certainly isn't necessary for this. The stronger proposition is consequential to applying some very basic aspects of QM formalism to certain phenomenological circumstances and I don't see how this can be said to depend on ontological assumptions, unless my internal mapping could be adjusted in such a way that I can even choose what kind of lingerie Claudia wears in my dreamy worldview.

 

If I understand you correctly, then we are talking about that stronger proposition. Your example of the lingerie thing is a bit confused one, you should be focused onto the steps between epistemological symmetries and the most fundamental definitions/relationships of physics. A circumstance involving different lingerie is just far too complex (with all the required definitions involved), although admittedly more fun.

 

I'm sure you can understand, that being able to interpret different data streams in terms of the same concepts, is entirely different issue from being able to interpret a high-level situation like that in terms of some single "high-level" object being changed arbitrarily...

 

The Bell inequalities that are explicitly based on assumptions and their violation obviously implies by modus tollens that those assumptions can't be quite right. How does Dick improve on this?

 

Well I would say his work implies that when we are looking at a an entanglement situation, we should not assume there are real entities there that are really moving from one location to another. I'm saying that because it looks like very large amounts of information can always be represented/interpreted in a terminology, where we see "such and such entangled entities" behaving that way. I.e. without those actual entities being real, just the recurring information behind them is "real", if you will.

 

Like I said before, it doesn't explain what reality is like, it just explains why it can be represented that way.

 

Has he even shown the same kind of discrepancies for similar phenomenological examples?

 

I don't understand what you mean by that.

 

Much can be said about mappings and different choices. If you had the basics of analytical mechanics, I could make an amusing point about what you say concerning simpler and more convoluted ones and which ones are more useful, but you likely would want to know what canonical transformations and the Hamilton Jacobi method are. It is a point about the difference in perspective between the mathematician (to whom analytical mechanics is a purely mathematical exercise and who doesn't care about what material contraption it could describe) and the physicist (who commits the crime of having a worldview and might apply this method to a physical system). The choice that makes it mathematically trivial to solve the equations of motion (by fully exploiting the so called prime integrals), under which the mathematician would call the problem already solved because the solutions are those with constant values of the coordinates, but is the one you referred to as convoluted because it is typically meaningless to the physicist, who will need to carry these solutions back through the inverse of the transformation in order to make any sense of them.

 

I don't really understand the above, but I am getting the impression that you misinterpreted what I said... By convoluted and complex world views I meant to point at the fact that it's the rules of how things work that sort of define what constitutes "a thing". That we can generate simple rules doesn't mean reality by itself is simple.

 

Sorry about the length, this is what happens when I just have the text open on the PC and I type stuff down bit by bit. I don't expect you to respond to every point, and take your time, because I certainly will :D

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

My impression of what you were saying was that they are focusing onto observables and their (quantum mechanical) effects onto expectations in a rather abstract level, rather than talking about specific defined elements (like electrons or photons etc). Is that so?

Put it this way: they are not being dogmatic, except for the sin of believing what they are seeing. :hihi:

 

Those a-priori definitions behind the idea of "locality".

OK, so they can't really be called "remaining" assumptions when they're quite what is being put under questioning, and...

Like I said, it is absolutely imperative that these definitions are not laid down at the get-go.

Via Appia was the same when one went from Rome toward Brindisi as going from Brindisi toward Rome. Even the two branches were both called Via Appia, going through Taranto or Bari. However, lacking the same enlightenment as you possess...

Because a valid definition of exactly those things arises as a consequence of the universal constraints and definitions.

I have difficulty following the logic to infer this. I'm not sure if you mean definitions in Dick's formalism or those of the physicist.

 

To insist on a definition of (ontological) space at the get-go of this analysis would be like insisting on a newtonian definition of time (on the merit that "it makes sense") while trying to work out whether the relativistic definitions are valid.

 

I believe you agree that these are indeed undefendable assumptions, and like you said, it is typical approach for a physicist to "cheat" a bit and make these shortcuts. Basically making something akin to "educated guesses" and trying to work out valid models.

The basic QM formalism doesn't require the notion of space; position is just an example of an observable when it is applied to specific "systems" such as that which we still call "a particle" out of habit. Actually, position is one of the examples having continuous rather than discrete spectrum, i. e. one of those that stresses the formalism because Hilbert space isn't adequate; one needs a more complicated framework to have things mathematically hold up!

 

As for the sin that physicists commit, yeah, I know, they're just like the pineapple heiress in the musical Chicago. She says "Whaddya mean you're alone in bed, there's two girls with you!" and after he asks "Are you gonna believe what you see or what I tell you?" she promptly pulls the trigger three times, once for each cranium; she was making some mighty ontological assumptions. Gee that was a hilarious scene.

 

...he is still not really trying to solve what DD is trying to solve.

Of course not, else "a physicist" wouldn't be what he is. Nevertheless, philosophers are not neglecting facts that are known from physics. Actually it is a subtle matter, if one keeps the historic perspective in mind. It is the modern nature of the physicist that differs from the old nature of the natural philosopher; the lads such as Shimony and d'Espagnat and back through Bell, Bohm to EPR and other early quantum physicists could definitely be called natural philosophers. Kant, of course, is usually considered a metaphysician although some have considered him an epistemologist.

 

I would say there are some subtleties to the conclusions that I might not see because of not knowing what physicists typically think the validity of such and such physical relationships imply about nature, but I think I can form a pretty solid judgment on understanding, in detail, the algebraic steps between the discussed symmetries, and a fundamental expression of quantum mechanics and relativistic time relationships.

 

Especially on the latter subject I feel that I have a pretty complete understanding (at least on special relativity).

This strikes me somewhat like me claiming to understand enough of Dick's presentation to judge that his overall argument is not formally conclusive.

 

I find that you don't correctly describe my stance in discussing these topics. I'm trying first of all to make a sense of Dick's definitions that I find satisfactory enough to be useful at all, including to the purpose of it making sense to decide upon the logic and calculus being conclusive, and to make sense of the claims which you guys consider consequent.

 

Yes I know. I think he and I often presume the other party understands more about his analysis than they do, and we communicate things accordingly off. I have often said something about some conclusion, thinking that the other party understands I mean this is what his work implies, and just gotten a "what, you can't make such an assumption!" as a response.

 

And sometimes those responses can seem like the other party has just made up their mind without bothering to examine the proof.

This description fits cases where each of the following holds to some degree:

 

• Lack of clarity in presentation of argument, by which thesis might come across as further hypothesis.
  
• Opponent not finding argument conclusive enough to consider it a thesis rather than a further hypothesis.
  

 

If that were true, we simply wouldn't have people wondering why quantum mechanical behaviour is what it is...

Uhm, my words "in his own little way" comprised my doubts about parts of his whole overall presentation. If I said this without these doubts, I couldn't have any disagreement with your above statement. :shrug:

 

The meaning of that "wondering why" in your consideration above is very subtle. The most formal framework of QM starts by simply being universal enough to accomodate what is needed. Were it not for optical aspects, with destructive as well as constructive interference, there would be no need for those complex values; without limitations on what is observable and predictable, there wouldn't be the limitation of calculating probability rather than actual outcome. IOW without these things classical mechanics would be fine for treating corpuscles and whatever, according to our everyday experience. This can be discussed as the classical limit of QM or principle of correspondence, a topic which can be quite complicated to appreciate, but is basically along the lines of saying that "things are quantum iff Planck's constant is not zero" and this is not ruled out by any purely logical argument I know of and I don't see it following from Dick's presentation either.

 

I just mean they would understand why quantum mechanics is valid representation of recurring things...

Let's examine the English word why in there. I don't have any problem with QM being a "valid representation of recurring things" so I don't see what's the buzz. What I can't fathom is how dick's presentation can determine any more than von Neumann, giving or discarding the same "hard facts" which, in the usual QM case (general, rather than for specific phenomenology) and following what I said above, are certainly not abundant and not even all that sinful.

 

Perhaps all that you say and all Dick says are compatible but my dumb mind just got a few impressions of actual discrepancies here and there. But of course they get lost in the lack of semantic resolution.

 

10 quote limit exceeded... next post coming soon.

[Qfwfq]

Thanks, I just thought of another clarification that you might find helpful, since you found it implausible that different kinds of universes could be represented by the same concepts (of modern physics).

Eeeeeeegash, you're not correctly describing my stance here. Stripping away what is observed, the hard facts, one obviously has less restrictions on what a universe could be like. What folks cling to is logical, mathematical consistence.

 

Let's look at your example of the concept of a wave through those blindfolds that we dumb physicists wear. Ever since my second year general physics course, I learned the basic model of a continuum of coupled oscilators. It is not difficult to work out how a chaotically jostling collection of "molecules" in the state known as "liquid" and subject to "gravity" (or having "weight") with an "upper surface" can be approximated by that general model. It is a useful model for describing a broad phenomenological class of "oscillations of displacement (or some other quantity) that propagate across position over time" due to the difference between situations at nearby positions contributing to determine the changing of these over time. It has no trace of giving identity to "a wave" despite that even so called solitons can be described with it. This is one aspect where, if you were hoping to enlighten, you simply had misjudged my outlook.

 

If that sounds implausible, think about how there's this transformation from "undefined activity of some sort", onto an imaginary coordinate system where the associated expectations appear in shift symmetrical fashion. I think it's easy to convince oneself that that shift symmetry (i.e. momentum conservation) can be seen as an interpretation aspect; applicable to any recurring activity. To convince onself of the more complicated issues of physics being also this way means thinking through the steps done in algebra.

Now here is an example of where I can't say you are judging the implications on physics with sufficient competence. For one, you implicitly apply Noether's theorem where no dynamics were defined.

 

With the above I'm not hoping to convince you of the validity of his claims, I'm just hoping to make you see the plausibility of them.

I'll put it like this. His premises are included in the most basic part of the formalism "used for" QM (I hope the wording helps to avoid confusion with things that come later in physics topics), with no less assumptions. What comes after these (his definitions for computing expectetions) has always struck me as containing arbitrary choices which seem ad hoc and, as far as I could make out his arguments, hidden assumptions. Ultimately I find it difficult to make out exactly what is claimed, or in what sense it is meant.

 

What does it mean that something which is basically an interpretation issue, is supported by an observation? I mean, that comment strikes to me as if you were suggesting something can be observed "in-itself", while I also think you understand that such a thing is oxymoronic, so I'm not really sure what you are saying...

You appear to be making an undefendable assumption in calling them interpretational issues. That is not what I'm suggesting. Would you agree that what we observe places some restrictions on what reality could be like?

 

Well, my impression is that it is the mainstream physics publications that are especially bad at the topic of undefendable ontological issues (I can hardly read them without getting bothered by their bad language), and certainly that professional physicist vary (once again those physicists that write and appear in mainstream publications tend to use especially bad language).

This sounds like you are discarding them because you don't understand there language (or definitions?), like me presuming to judge Dick's claims without understanding his definitions. It is not easy to understand the utterances of researchers, with their jargon and all, it can be difficult for physicists in different fields to understand each other's jargon. When I said "you should see" I meant it figuratively, you would need a tutor taylored to your purpose.

 

I'm able to spot assumptions in theoretical physics which aren't strictly observational and I'm also able to see them as models rather than assumptions. Of course physicists aren't doing exactly what Dick does, but I'm able to relate wht I understand of the latter to the former. In the end, it is within the scientific method that physicists are looking at what is observable. The trouble lies in interpretation and that is where, I agree, many tend to draw conclusions that aren't always the unique possibility. It's even worse in divulgation; an example of something folks take far, far too literally is virtual particles "popping in and out of existence". Seriously folks, it's a model, Feynman graphs are an instrument for sorting out mathematical computation.

 

I'm thinking about the latter; My (rather mainstream) interpretation of that issue is that, via accepting the validity of QM, we expect Bell inequalities to be violated. I mean, that's what Einstein et al pushed forward as an argument against the correctness of quantum mechanics; that the formalism requires things to work in a fashion that he thought cannot be considered realistic.

So you understand that QM is the source of the stronger statement (in given phenomenological cases, in which it makes sense to pose the question) and I don't think you would claim that Dick's presentation leads to any more than the weaker one, unless one progresses from it to the same kind of phenomenological cases. This was what I meant when I said that Dick doesn't enlighten me about those topics.

 

Yes, the real bearing of Bell inequality violations is not "Oh, how odd QM is" but simply that Einsteins cherished hidden variables can't solve his problem, that the "collapse" description in QM is correct even when this implies a non local nature, despite the local causality tenet being fundamental for the rest. It doesn't appear to be an irresolvable contradiction, just a tricky puzzle to solve. If you can show me that Dick's presentation in some manner makes it easier to sort this puzzle out, I'll be all ears as long as I find arguments satisfactory.

 

If I understand you correctly, then we are talking about that stronger proposition. Your example of the lingerie thing is a bit confused one, you should be focused onto the steps between epistemological symmetries and the most fundamental definitions/relationships of physics. A circumstance involving different lingerie is just far too complex (with all the required definitions involved), although admittedly more fun.

 

I'm sure you can understand, that being able to interpret different data streams in terms of the same concepts, is entirely different issue from being able to interpret a high-level situation like that in terms of some single "high-level" object being changed arbitrarily...

We are in the full swing of nebulous semantics here, as well as the complexity you mention. Interpretation, world view, internal mapping, data ordering... I would need to understand exactly what in your opinion can be seen as depending on them. Yeah, Claudia Schiffer knocking on my door tommorow moring all anxious to fondle and cuddle and bury me in effusions... Do you mean it is only a matter of overwhelming complexity but it must be so in principle? Like, it would take mostruous computing power to make myself see the same reality according to this worldview? Between that and the most fundamental things that we call physics, I can't guess where your opinion stands. Even where you have made statements about "according to which QM is valid" I would need to know exactly what you mean because I'm unsure of your ability to distinguish the part of QM based on pure logic and math from what complies with observation.

 

Well I would say his work implies that when we are looking at a an entanglement situation, we should not assume there are real entities there that are really moving from one location to another. I'm saying that because it looks like very large amounts of information can always be represented/interpreted in a terminology, where we see "such and such entangled entities" behaving that way. I.e. without those actual entities being real, just the recurring information behind them is "real", if you will.

I find that is possible to conclude the "shouldn't assume" from QM formalism. It was Einstein et al. that attempted the approach of assuming hidden variables, Bell showed it doesn't solve the riddles they were concerned with.

 

Like I said before, it doesn't explain what reality is like, it just explains why it can be represented that way.

If "that way" means QM formalism, I find existing arguments satisfactory enough for "why it can be".

 

When I asked if Dick has shown "the same kind of discrepancies for similar phenomenological examples" I was just trying to figure about whether his claims are sufficient to show what Bell showed. The way you put these things, it always seems to be full of if's which relate to interpretations/world views.

 

I don't really understand the above, but I am getting the impression that you misinterpreted what I said... By convoluted and complex world views I meant to point at the fact that it's the rules of how things work that sort of define what constitutes "a thing". That we can generate simple rules doesn't mean reality by itself is simple.

I think you might find analytical mechanics interesting, if presented properly, as a mathematical topic and with references to physical things appropriately done. You might find the Hamilton-Jacobi method amusing as to what can be called simple vs. complicated.

 

However, I also get what you mean here too, it doesn't come as a new idea new to me.

[AnssiH]

Responding out of order, more important things first...

 

I also see parts where you might be neglecting facts that can be considered as supported by observation and,

What does it mean that something which is basically an interpretation issue, is supported by an observation? I mean, that comment strikes to me as if you were suggesting something can be observed "in-itself", while I also think you understand that such a thing is oxymoronic, so I'm not really sure what you are saying...

You appear to be making an undefendable assumption in calling them interpretational issues. That is not what I'm suggesting. Would you agree that what we observe places some restrictions on what reality could be like?

 

and:

 

I'm sure you can understand, that being able to interpret different data streams in terms of the same concepts, is entirely different issue from being able to interpret a high-level situation like that in terms of some single "high-level" object being changed arbitrarily...

We are in the full swing of nebulous semantics here, as well as the complexity you mention. Interpretation, world view, internal mapping, data ordering... I would need to understand exactly what in your opinion can be seen as depending on them.

 

By interpretation I'm NOT referring to a transformation between "everyday perception" and "a quantum mechanical representation", but to the transformation between UNDEFINED, and any mentally comprehensible view (including "everyday perception" and QM models etc).

 

It should be obvious to you why I call that interpretation; the meaning of undefined information is not explicitly known, but it can be interpreted in multitude of ways. Whenever someone says something is "supported by an observation", they are talking about a specific behaviour of specifically defined things. And that includes "seeing something with your own eyes" (your visual perception too is a mental comprehension built in terms of DEFINED things...)

 

There are surprisingly many people who can't get this point at all, insisting that their perception of reality is "direct perception", which is essentially just them expressing their faith towards their conceptualization of reality being ontologically correct. It's typically the same people who claim to understand how a mental idea of reality is not the same thing as reality itself, so I seriously doubt they understand how deep that issue really is...

 

Anyhow, back to the track, as I'm sure you know, the fundamental equation is supposed to express the symmetries to the expectations, when UNDEFINED information is transformed into a set of defined objects (that transformation has already been performed if you have a mental comprehension of any sort).

 

And as you know, DD is trying to prove that those symmetries are tautologous to Schrödinger's equation and via that route, to newtonian mechanics (something close to our everyday view), when appropriate approximations are performed. That means that the equation can be seen as representing the (unknown) mechanisms that transform undefined sensory information into the everyday "newtonian" definitions.

 

And if those appropriate approximations are indeed universally applicaple, it means that those "everyday definitions" can be formed without making any guesses/assumptions about the meaning of that undefined information; the definitions are entirely anchored to whatever recurring features might be recognized. I.e. we are expressing recurring features in a terminology that is chosen because it is very effective/suitable for such task.

 

And if that's valid, that solves the chicken&egg problem of epistemology/ontology (how to build knowledge without knowing anything), and it should also be quite expected that those mechanisms can be found and exploited by survival machines.

 

With the above in mind, let me give more direct responses to your questions:

 

You appear to be making an undefendable assumption in calling them interpretational issues.

 

Calling them interpretation issues is to say that we don't know the explicit meaning of the information "from reality", or to say we don't know the actual ontology of reality, or that the information that our mental definitions are based on, is undefined prior to us making any definitions (well doh). I'm sure you agree, that's not undefendable assumption. Note how "believing what you are seeing", is (referring to your first comment).

 

Would you agree that what we observe places some restrictions on what reality could be like?

 

Depends on how you mean that. "No" in the sense that an observation is always a specific interpretation of something undefined, and when we make an observation, we have never exhaustively analyzed all the possible interpretations of that UNDEFINED. "Yes", if observations are seen as confirmations to self-coherence of our definitions, or validity of our derivations (like confirmations of theoretical physics).

 

But I think you are trying to ask whether I think observations can be seen as outlining or limiting possibilities regarding the ontological structure of reality. And to that I must say "no", we certainly should not suppose something like that (and it seems to be a common assumption)!

 

Think about this; it does appear that recurring features of any kind can be transformed into a set of definitions that behave exactly as our so-called "direct observations" behave. So if that's valid, then even the most basic observation is potentially (and likely) just an interpretation of recurring features of any arbitrary kind of reality. See what I mean by "interpretation issues"?

 

Like they say, probing into the structure of an atom, required already having a model about the atom (having an idea of what the measurements supposedly mean). It's not the probing that gave us the model of the atom. The same is true for all observations.

 

I have things to say to your other comments and questions too, but I'll get to it a bit later. In the meantime, it would be nice to simply hear if you understand better what I mean by "interpretation issues", and consequentially, what I would mean if I said "there is no such thing as direct observation".

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

It may surprise you Anssi, but:

a transformation between "everyday perception" and "a quantum mechanical representation"

was not the way I was understanding your talk of interpretation and:

the transformation between UNDEFINED, and any mentally comprehensible view (including "everyday perception" and QM models etc).

was the way I understood it.

 

I think this misunderstanding of yours stemmed from me trying to probe your opinion about to what extent the choice may be restricted by experience. This is the very, very subtle issue.

 

It should be obvious to you why I call that interpretation; the meaning of undefined information is not explicitly known, but it can be interpreted in multitude of ways. Whenever someone says something is "supported by an observation", they are talking about a specific behaviour of specifically defined things. And that includes "seeing something with your own eyes" (your visual perception too is a mental comprehension built in terms of DEFINED things...)

It is certainly obvious to me and it has been for a long time, the same goes for how the mind can check whether the reality it perceives exists out there at all. I had my first solipsistic reflection some time around grade 1 elementary. Granting that a reality does exist, to discuss the arbitrarity of interpretations for a given data is a complicated matter in which a bit of information theory would be useful. What you say about recurring patterns has a lot to do with information entropy.

 

And as you know, DD is trying to prove that those symmetries are tautologous to Schrödinger's equation and...

Is this a clue to what I've been trying to get out of Dick in the other thread? Or is it a discrepancy between the two of you? Or is it just a different part of his whole presentation?

 

And if that's valid, that solves the chicken&egg problem of epistemology/ontology (how to build knowledge without knowing anything), and it should also be quite expected that those mechanisms can be found and exploited by survival machines.

It is quite obvious that the interpretation we have results from natural selection, going back through our ancestors, hominids, primates, mammals and prvious animal forms. To some extent we form it by experience early in life and our neurology even has substantial flexibility in cases of menomation, but the best cases are the result of a good genome and appropriate stimulus soon after birth. This is why my unrealistic dreaming about Claudia Schiffer is not likely to get me anywhere in life, and why I doubt that even a re-wiring of my brain would make it fine. Thou hast said: survival machines.

 

Calling them interpretation issues is to say that we don't know the explicit meaning of the information "from reality", or to say we don't know the actual ontology of reality, or that the information that our mental definitions are based on, is undefined prior to us making any definitions (well doh).

This is clear except for the survival machines, they imply that there's such a thing as fact supported by observation. You were assuming the facts I mentioned to be the ding an sich but that wasn't what I meant. We get so confused and I can't even go into details because we lack common knowledge to communicate through. I think this is why we disagree about undefendable assumptions.

 

Depends on how you mean that.

Goodness, after having wrote replies to points starting from here, while reviewing things, I realize I should have worded it differently. Instead of "what reality could be like" I should have said "how we may interpret reality" with the 'may' understood as from the survival machines' point of view. Considering this goof, I revise my response; I was therefore much confused by your point:

"No" in the sense that an observation is always a specific interpretation of something undefined, and when we make an observation, we have never exhaustively analyzed all the possible interpretations of that UNDEFINED. "Yes", if observations are seen as confirmations to self-coherence of our definitions, or validity of our derivations (like confirmations of theoretical physics).

So I need your reply to the corrected question: Would you agree that what we observe places some restrictions on how reality could be interpreted? The survival machines and physics experiment are not all that logically different, after all.

 

But I think you are trying to ask whether I think observations can be seen as outlining or limiting possibilities regarding the ontological structure of reality. And to that I must say "no", we certainly should not suppose something like that (and it seems to be a common assumption)!

No that wasn't quite what I was asking (due to the goof above?). I was talking about your hypothetical interpretations of the same reality and to what extent you believe they are arbitrary.

 

Think about this; it does appear that recurring features of any kind can be transformed into a set of definitions that behave exactly as our so-called "direct observations" behave. So if that's valid, then even the most basic observation is potentially (and likely) just an interpretation of recurring features of any arbitrary kind of reality. See what I mean by "interpretation issues"?

The survival machines seem to have disappeared now (I'm not sure this is due to the goof above). It is a matter of to what extent the interpretation can be chosen, without inconsistence appearing.

 

Like they say, probing into the structure of an atom, required already having a model about the atom (having an idea of what the measurements supposedly mean). It's not the probing that gave us the model of the atom.

This is not how it happened and I would be cautious in concluding the same for all observations.

 

In the meantime, it would be nice to simply hear if you understand better what I mean by "interpretation issues", and consequentially, what I would mean if I said "there is no such thing as direct observation".

I hope this is due to the misunderstanding caused by my wording that I rectified above.

[AnssiH]

It is certainly obvious to me and it has been for a long time, the same goes for how the mind can check whether the reality it perceives exists out there at all. I had my first solipsistic reflection some time around grade 1 elementary.

 

I should comment, that I don't view this issue as a question about solipsism or realism (it's not really an interesting question to me), I think of it more as a question about what constitutes "a real object", and what's just "a useful definition"? And thinking about the consequences of our ignorance to that exact issue.

 

(Maybe you've had a reflection about how it's the properties of objects that define what we consider to be that object at all, and if so you probably thought about what that implies about "how do we know what's an object at all in the first place?")

 

On that note;

Let's look at your example of the concept of a wave through those blindfolds that we dumb physicists wear. Ever since my second year general physics course, I learned the basic model of a continuum of coupled oscilators. It is not difficult to work out how a chaotically jostling collection of "molecules" in the state known as "liquid" and subject to "gravity" (or having "weight") with an "upper surface" can be approximated by that general model. It is a useful model for describing a broad phenomenological class of "oscillations of displacement (or some other quantity) that propagate across position over time" due to the difference between situations at nearby positions contributing to determine the changing of these over time. It has no trace of giving identity to "a wave" despite that even so called solitons can be described with it. This is one aspect where, if you were hoping to enlighten, you simply had misjudged my outlook.

 

I wasn't suggesting that physicists are making the mistake of thinking a wave is a "real object". I was pointing out that we conceptualize "objects" all the time without knowing whether they are "really" objects, and that that is true for any given defined object.

 

I think you agree with that, but if you disagree, it would be useful to understand what objects you take as "real objects" and why.

 

More important point that I was trying to get at with that example, was to make an analogy to DD's shift symmetry constraints & universal definitions he makes. You can view those universal definitions as choices regarding data ordering, in that any data can be ordered according to those same rules. And if there exists a set of universal rules that yields defined objects whose properties are exactly the properties of the fundamental entities defined by modern physics, what would you suppose that means?

 

i.e. "...just like with that wave on water surface, some recurring activity has been cast onto the definitions of modern physics... ...it means that any recurring activity can be cast onto the same definitions... ...This all just means that different aspects of that "other reality" would be cast onto the same moulds."

 

Because a valid definition of exactly those things [space and time] arises as a consequence of the universal constraints and definitions.

I have difficulty following the logic to infer this. I'm not sure if you mean definitions in Dick's formalism or those of the physicist.

 

Definitions of DD's formalism & the definitions he makes further down the road.

 

This is why Dick views coordinate systems as simply data plotting tools, and from an epistemological perspective, the space that is part of our conception of reality, is the coordinate system containing our defined entities. How the modern physics definition of space and time arises from his notion is further down the road (and not immediately obvious IMHO), no reason to worry about that yet, if you can just work exclusively with his definitions in the meantime and not pre-suppose anything too early, not even that space and time exist as we see them.

 

And by that, I am not asking you to consider the possibility of solipsism; it's rather once again more about the question of what constitutes the "real" identity of something. If you have had that reflection in your youth about how it's the properties of objects that define what we consider to be an object, then you probably have also thought how it's the defined objects that suggesting us something about the existence/properties of space.

 

If so, you can probably also see how those defined properties contain a lot of mental facets to them (like the idea of some location of space containing identity to itself, while at the same time no such thing can be observed, nor does even such definition make sense when taken independently from other definitions in our world view)

 

I would say there are some subtleties to the conclusions that I might not see because of not knowing what physicists typically think the validity of such and such physical relationships imply about nature, but I think I can form a pretty solid judgment on understanding, in detail, the algebraic steps between the discussed symmetries, and a fundamental expression of quantum mechanics and relativistic time relationships.

 

Especially on the latter subject I feel that I have a pretty complete understanding (at least on special relativity).

This strikes me somewhat like me claiming to understand enough of Dick's presentation to judge that his overall argument is not formally conclusive.

 

Why, because you are concerned that I might not spot some hidden assumptions? Certainly that is possible, but I meant that I can understand the steps he is making, i.e. I understand the logical connection between the epistemological certainties he starts with, and the relativistic time definition of modern physics.

 

I'm trying first of all to make a sense of Dick's definitions that I find satisfactory enough to be useful at all, including to the purpose of it making sense to decide upon the logic and calculus being conclusive, and to make sense of the claims which you guys consider consequent.

 

Well you shouldn't jump to conclusions too quickly, and I apologize for getting ahead of things and talking about aspects that are not at all apparent at this state of the presentation. Like you already said: "...all I could say is that shift symmetry is a translation of the whole universe; its total momentum is conserved. I don't see the great discovery in this single aspect.... ...I have no trouble with the existence of the shift symmetry."

 

I think that's pretty much the gist of it at this point of the presentation. I think it would be pretty hard to convince yourself of the further conclusions at this stage, but I hope I can at least align the terminology between you, me and DD little bit...

 

If that were true [modern physics viewing QM as a valid representation of any type of reality], we simply wouldn't have people wondering why quantum mechanical behaviour is what it is...

The meaning of that "wondering why" in your consideration above is very subtle. The most formal framework of QM starts by simply being universal enough to accomodate what is needed.

 

What is needed then, in their opinion?

 

I only know that DD's presentation starts with what is needed for self-consistency of a world view, and what is needed to represent those requirements to expectations in a universal way.

 

Do they start with a similar thing, or do they make decisions that are supposedly supported by observations, and if so, what do they mean by that? (is it possible to give an example that I would understand?)

 

Were it not for optical aspects, with destructive as well as constructive interference, there would be no need for those complex values; without limitations on what is observable and predictable, there wouldn't be the limitation of calculating probability rather than actual outcome. IOW without these things classical mechanics would be fine for treating corpuscles and whatever, according to our everyday experience.

 

Yes but those optical aspects are behaviour observed from and with defined things, so that just gets us back to that question about what constitutes "a real object". And again, in DD's analysis it gets us to the point of the wave-like characteristics of those objects being apparently embedded to their underlying definitions... Sort of like how special relativity was already embedded to the definitions of electromagnetism, but really, this aspect too is very far from obvious at this stage of the presentation, so don't worry about trying to understand how it all plays out yet.

 

Stripping away what is observed, the hard facts, one obviously has less restrictions on what a universe could be like. What folks cling to is logical, mathematical consistence.

 

Here again I have problems with the implication that something about reality can be considered to be "a hard fact", I don't understand what such a thing would be, because some undefined information has to be interpreted in some way for anything to be perceived at all, and then you are basically perceiving your own defined entities (or perceiving "something" in your own terminology). At that point I don't know what aspect about it can be considered "hard fact".

 

Maybe you could open up your thoughts about this issue a bit more. (but please read the rest of the posts first because I discuss my alignment to this issue more)

 

If that sounds implausible, think about how there's this transformation from "undefined activity of some sort", onto an imaginary coordinate system where the associated expectations appear in shift symmetrical fashion. I think it's easy to convince oneself that that shift symmetry (i.e. momentum conservation) can be seen as an interpretation aspect; applicable to any recurring activity

Now here is an example of where I can't say you are judging the implications on physics with sufficient competence. For one, you implicitly apply Noether's theorem where no dynamics were defined.

 

Actually I had your comment in mind when I wrote that: ...all I could say is that shift symmetry is a translation of the whole universe; its total momentum is conserved. I don't see the great discovery in this single aspect.... ...I have no trouble with the existence of the shift symmetry.

 

Like I said, I never went through the trouble to work out the subtleties of Noether's theorem because it was not required to understand what DD means by shift symmetry.

 

I'll put it like this. His premises are included in the most basic part of the formalism "used for" QM (I hope the wording helps to avoid confusion with things that come later in physics topics), with no less assumptions. What comes after these (his definitions for computing expectetions) has always struck me as containing arbitrary choices which seem ad hoc and, as far as I could make out his arguments, hidden assumptions.

 

We should discuss how you view those choices and what do you think is a hidden assumption in them. I have a feeling that those discussions will have to involve clarifications about the premise itself, if you jump too far ahead and make assumptions that are not included in his definitions.

 

But if you see his ideas valid, GIVEN his definitions, and ONLY his definitions, then let us know that too, even if you don't see any great discovery in anything at this stage... (There is no great discovery until some modern physics has been derived in rather exact form)

 

Well, my impression is that it is the mainstream physics publications that are especially bad at the topic of undefendable ontological issues (I can hardly read them without getting bothered by their bad language), and certainly that professional physicist vary (once again those physicists that write and appear in mainstream publications tend to use especially bad language).

This sounds like you are discarding them because you don't understand there language (or definitions?), like me presuming to judge Dick's claims without understanding his definitions.

 

Nah, it's not that, I'm just criticising that use of language which gives the impression that everything about physics models is something that suggests such and such ontology. It's always "physicists have found that time doesn't exist" or something like that. I think the reason for that languge is simply that there are a lot of people who just love to read stuff like that without bothering to understand what that given model actually is about. Simply put, it sells to the mainstream. I don't know what the professional publications are like.

 

In the end, it is within the scientific method that physicists are looking at what is observable. The trouble lies in interpretation and that is where, I agree, many tend to draw conclusions that aren't always the unique possibility. It's even worse in divulgation; an example of something folks take far, far too literally is virtual particles "popping in and out of existence". Seriously folks, it's a model, Feynman graphs are an instrument for sorting out mathematical computation.

 

In here, when you say "physicists are looking at what is observable", I don't understand what that is, because I don't understand how to observe without comprehending it via some definition. I don't understand what's the crucial difference between virtual particles and any other observable thing, that makes the one more real than the other... Both are valid definitions, how do you see ontological correctness in either one?

 

I'm thinking about the latter; My (rather mainstream) interpretation of that issue is that, via accepting the validity of QM, we expect Bell inequalities to be violated. I mean, that's what Einstein et al pushed forward as an argument against the correctness of quantum mechanics; that the formalism requires things to work in a fashion that he thought cannot be considered realistic.

So you understand that QM is the source of the stronger statement (in given phenomenological cases, in which it makes sense to pose the question) and I don't think you would claim that Dick's presentation leads to any more than the weaker one, unless one progresses from it to the same kind of phenomenological cases. This was what I meant when I said that Dick doesn't enlighten me about those topics.

 

By "phenomological cases", are you suggesting certain circumstances (experiments)? If so, you are also implying a set of defined objects. Without first asking why and how are we interpreting those circumstances the way we are.

 

And I am actually claiming that DD's presentation has to do with the stronger statement, because if the quantum mechanical expectations can be pulled out from universal aspects of building a world view ("defining persistent entities") out of recurring patterns, then yes we must expect those defined entities obey exactly the kinds of Bell inequality violations as the quantum mechanical definitions require them to obey. Look at it this way; if DD's analysis is valid, it means those expectations are embedded to the definitions of those entities. Remember that each entity is a product of a huge number of associated definitions, and they are not at all "real entities" by themselves, they are just products of interpreting some information in specific ways.

 

So, the world view of particle physics does not have to be "realistic" at all, in order to be valid. The apparent quantum strangeness arises when a person views the entities of particle physics as "real objects" by themselves, as oppose to being simply valid definitions for making predictions.

 

It is much like being able to predict a toy reality, just something someone built into a computer. If you manage to express some recurring patterns of it via certain universally useful definitions, and those definitions just so happen to yield quantum mechanical behaviour, that doesn't mean those definitions actually represent how the toy world has been built. It just means, you can represent valid expectations that are anchored to recurring patterns of some sort. The actual translation between can be very very mindbogglingly complex. (And is outside the scope of DD's analysis)

 

Yes, the real bearing of Bell inequality violations is not "Oh, how odd QM is" but simply that Einsteins cherished hidden variables can't solve his problem, that the "collapse" description in QM is correct even when this implies a non local nature, despite the local causality tenet being fundamental for the rest.

 

Yeah, and the purely epistemological reasons for these ideas being valid (regardless of what ontological reality is like) can be understood by understanding DD's analysis.

 

...continues...

[AnssiH]

It doesn't appear to be an irresolvable contradiction, just a tricky puzzle to solve. If you can show me that Dick's presentation in some manner makes it easier to sort this puzzle out, I'll be all ears as long as I find arguments satisfactory.

 

Well I think it solves it (epistemologically, not ontologically), but I think the best way to actually discuss how that is (apart from what I'm saying above already) is to perhaps proceed with the rest of the steps of his analysis. Is there something in the OP of this thread that you think sounds wrong, if you only consider the definitions he has given (i.e. without worrying about where this is supposedly leading)

 

We are in the full swing of nebulous semantics here, as well as the complexity you mention. Interpretation, world view, internal mapping, data ordering... I would need to understand exactly what in your opinion can be seen as depending on them. Yeah, Claudia Schiffer knocking on my door tommorow moring all anxious to fondle and cuddle and bury me in effusions... Do you mean it is only a matter of overwhelming complexity but it must be so in principle? Like, it would take mostruous computing power to make myself see the same reality according to this worldview? Between that and the most fundamental things that we call physics, I can't guess where your opinion stands. Even where you have made statements about "according to which QM is valid" I would need to know exactly what you mean because I'm unsure of your ability to distinguish the part of QM based on pure logic and math from what complies with observation.

 

I mean that I don't think it makes any sense to consider examples that have to do with anything else but the most fundamental relationships of the most fundamental things defined by modern physics. There is just no way to analyze something as complex as what you are suggesting when we are starting from universals. I mean, perhaps it is possible to interpret things that way, but probably not; you'd probably run into unresolvable inconsistency issues. At any rate, it is not a good way to view DD's analysis, and immediately out of scope.

 

I find that is possible to conclude the "shouldn't assume" from QM formalism. It was Einstein et al. that attempted the approach of assuming hidden variables, Bell showed it doesn't solve the riddles they were concerned with.

 

Indeed, because they were very much concerned with making certain undefendable assumptions fit together, while those assumptions just were inconsistent with each others. And - as it turns out - unnecessary.

 

And as you know, DD is trying to prove that those symmetries are tautologous to Schrödinger's equation and...

Is this a clue to what I've been trying to get out of Dick in the other thread? Or is it a discrepancy between the two of you? Or is it just a different part of his whole presentation?

 

I took a quick look at that other thread where you are asking about what is tautologous to what, and yes this is the same issue that he is referring to, albeit I am being a bit sloppy. I was actually thinking about whether to put that word "tautology" in there for quite a while, and in the end decided to write "...trying to prove that those symmetries are tautologous to Schrödinger's equation when approppriate approximations are performed"

 

Notice the slightly oxymoronic nature of that sentence? It's not purely a tautology if it requires appropriate approximations, which is why I was hesitant to use the word, but figured you can probably read through the sloppiness... Anyway, that was just another case of assuming you knew more about DD's presentation than you do, so let me explain in my own words;

 

- I suppose you understand his universal notation, and what it means that a world view is being expressed in its terminology.

- I suppose you understand that, in the absence of undefendable assumptions and self-conflict, any world view must exhibit those few discussed symmetries.

 

The fundamental equation is an exact combined expression of those symmetries. So you could say, the fundamental equation is tautologous to those necessary symmetries; expressing one or the other, is really a case of expressing the same issue.

 

In a separate thread DD is discussing the derivation of Schrödinger's equation, i.e. getting from the fundamental equation to Schrödinger's equation. If you get around to examine that post, the important bit about it is the definitions and approximations he makes in order to get to Schrödinger's equation. As long as those steps are such that they do NOT require a specific type of information-to-be-explained to be valid, they are essentially universally applicable interpretation choices. These universal definitions end up having very specific relationships between each others, BECAUSE of the fundamental equation. I.e. because the symmetry requirements are "limiting the possibilities" at each step of the derivation.

 

So, the relationships (of modern physics) that you end up with - those things that are typically viewed as properties of reality - are in fact yielded by the symmetry constraints, i.e. they are in that sense tautologous to the symmetry requirements. You could say that Schrödinger's Equation is another way to express those symmetry requirements; it's just the expression you get if you use certain (universally useful) definitions to "categorize" your data with.

 

About what I referred to as "slightly oxymoronic nature of that sentence", is that in order to actually express things in exactly the same terms as modern physics does, those universal approximations need to be made. So in that sense you can't really directly compare the fundamental equation with Schrödinger's equation; they are not "the same thing" in that sense.

 

And I can confidently say there is practically zero discrepancy between me and DD about this, but we may appear to be talking about different things if you are interpreting one or the other wrong... (It is pretty difficult to discuss this unambiguously)

 

It is quite obvious that the interpretation we have results from natural selection, going back through our ancestors, hominids, primates, mammals and prvious animal forms. To some extent we form it by experience early in life and our neurology even has substantial flexibility in cases of menomation, but the best cases are the result of a good genome and appropriate stimulus soon after birth. This is why my unrealistic dreaming about Claudia Schiffer is not likely to get me anywhere in life, and why I doubt that even a re-wiring of my brain would make it fine. Thou hast said: survival machines.

 

I would like to comment, just in case, that DD is not set to prove how any specific mechanism would categorize the recurring features of some data in useful ways.

 

It's just to prove that there exists, somewhere in the possibility space (of logical mechanism), some procedures that yield meaningful expectations for some information, by categorizing its recurring aspects according to some immaterial definitions. His further derivations to modern physics and to newtonian mechanics are an attempt to prove, that those interpretations of reality (that we use all the time) are in fact results of exactly that type of categorization procedure (as oppose to actual knowledge about reality).

 

This is clear except for the survival machines, they imply that there's such a thing as fact supported by observation. You were assuming the facts I mentioned to be the ding an sich but that wasn't what I meant.

 

Yes I did assume that, and as I'm writing this, I don't understand what you meant...

 

We get so confused and I can't even go into details because we lack common knowledge to communicate through. I think this is why we disagree about undefendable assumptions.

 

Yes but also I would expect you to agree with the validity of the moves that DD does if we were consistently using the same terminology.

 

Goodness, after having wrote replies to points starting from here, while reviewing things, I realize I should have worded it differently. Instead of "what reality could be like" I should have said "how we may interpret reality" with the 'may' understood as from the survival machines' point of view.

 

I.e. the same thing as what in DD's terminology is "valid explanation", producing "valid expectations".

 

So I need your reply to the corrected question: Would you agree that what we observe places some restrictions on how reality could be interpreted?

 

No I wouldn't, because first I have to consider what is it really behind what was observed. I'm not thinking about solipsism, I'm thinking about what information was there for me to make the interpretation that I'd call my perception or my observation (whatever it is that I would say I observed), and what transformation allows me to consider the existence of something I defined (If I can mentally understand it, it has been defined). And since I don't know what information there was and how it was transformed to be mentally comprehensible, I also don't know what any given observation "really is".

 

There are some semantical pitfalls here though, and certainly you should limit my answer to refer to what fundamental entities one could consider to exist. Thinking about whether a traffic accident can be interpreted as if there wasn't one is directly out of scope (like Claudia's clothing) because it requires such a huge amount of definitions (and once again would lead to inconsistency issues pretty quickly).

 

The best way to actually comprehend this problem of "impossibility of direct observation" is to consider the idea that the definitions of the most fundamental entities of modern physics can be anchored entirely to a specific way to categorize recurring patterns. That categorization can be just a matter of keeping track of those patterns in efficient ways, and different kinds of realities could thus produce similar looking entities (as containers to those patterns).

 

Whatever happens then, in terms of those defined entities is a different topic.

 

The survival machines and physics experiment are not all that logically different, after all.

 

Me and DD might say, they are mostly different only by the approximations & universal definitions they make.

 

The survival machines seem to have disappeared now (I'm not sure this is due to the goof above). It is a matter of to what extent the interpretation can be chosen, without inconsistence appearing.

 

I think inconsistencies would appear pretty quickly if one was considering a rearrangement of some "high level" definitions, instead of rearrangement of the most fundamental definitions.

 

Like they say, probing into the structure of an atom, required already having a model about the atom (having an idea of what the measurements supposedly mean). It's not the probing that gave us the model of the atom.

This is not how it happened and I would be cautious in concluding the same for all observations.

 

Well I was just quoting Andrew Pickering or maybe it was Steven Weinberg who said something to that effect. Well, whichever it was, he was essentially referring to that same problem about how any observation needs to be interpreted, and we are interpreting with pre-existing definitions. Yes that is very much a universal problem. You can view the the first pages of Pickering's book at:

http://www.amazon.com/Constructing-Quarks-Sociological-History-Particle/dp/0226667995#reader_0226667995

And/or see his wikipedia page.

 

Not that I'm relying on authority, I just find his comments rather fitting to this topic. There's a nice summary of that book, with related commentary, on John Gribbin's "Schrödinger's Kittens", and I would like to quote a bit:

 

...The way scientists interpret the outcome of an experiment (especially the kind of experiment used to probe the structure within the proton) depends in large measure upon their theoretical understanding of how the experiment works, and any imperfection of theory may be reflected in an imperfection in the experiment (or at least, our understanding of the experiment) itself. Then again, physicists have to decide just what it is they are measuring...

 

...physicists refer to the property they are investigating as 'signal', just as they refer to background interference as 'noise'. It is impossible to eliminate every trace of noise, so again a subjective judgment has to be made about when the experiment is good enough for the required purposes...

 

...By interpreting quarks and so on as real entities, the choice of quark models is made to seem unproblematic: "If quarks really are the fundamental building blocks of the world, why should anyone want to explore alternative theories?" - even if, as may well be the case, alternative theories can also explain the experimental results...

 

...protons behave as if they contain three quarks; but that does not prove that quarks "really exist"...

 

...protons, neutrons and other subatomic particles are also hypothetical entities projected into reality out of our heads by our models. Yes, there may be simpler way of modelling what goes on at the level of physical phenomena now conventionally explained in terms of the quark model; but that would not be the way things "really" are, just another model of reality, in the same way that Maxwell's wave equation and Einstein's photons are both good models of the reality represented by the phenomenon of light, and the billiard-ball model and the 'planetary' model of the atom are both good models, depending on which problem you are trying to solve...

 

...Today, nobody worries about quarks having charge two-thirds or one-third as big as the charge of the electron, but in 1964 'everybody knew' this was impossible... ...Like Gell-Mann, he [George Zweig] realized that the properties of particles such as protons and neutrons could be explained by treating them as triplet composites of other particles, which he called 'aces'... ...rather than receiving recognition for his insights, Zweig was on the edge of being tarred with the brush of crankiness. In 1980 he told an international conference that:

"The reaction of the theoretical physics community to the ace model was generally not benign. Getting the CERN report published in the form that I wanted was so difficult that I finally gave up trying. When the physics department of a leading university was considering an appointment for me, their senior theorist, one of the most respected spokesmen of all theoretical physics, blocked the appointment at a faculty meeting by passionately arguing that the ace model was the work of a charlatan" (NOTE: Such comment just goes to show that physicists often do have little bit too much blind faith into the ontological correctness of their own definitions

 

...the quark theory only began to be taken more seriously when experiments involving collisions between particles (electrons being bounced off protons, and protons being bounced off one another) began to show up structure inside the proton. But this isnot quite so simple as it seems at first sight, because protons are intrinsically more complex creatures than electrons... ...Experiments to probe the structure of the proton depended on having a good theory of the electron - QED itself. It was only because theorists were confident that they understood electrons, and that electrons really could be treated as point-like objects, that they could interpret the way electrons "scattered" off protons to reveal the structure of the protons themselves... ...[in the scattering experiments] the "answers" nature gave to the questions posed by the experimenters still depended on their choice of which experiment to carry out, and what to measure...

 

...it took years for the standard model to become established, but once the physicists had been set thinking along these lines there was an air of inevitability about the whole process. With two great analogies to draw on - the nuclear model of the atom, and the QED theory of light - the quark model of protons and neutrons and the QCD theory of the strong interaction became irresistible...

 

He is referring to sociological aspects that control the choices made about what definitions become commonly used in physics, and how those definitions further control how "more fundamental" aspects are observed/understood, and what will be defined in the next step.

 

Was the path to the standard model of particle physics inevitable? Is this the real (and only) truth about the way the world works? None of the theories which led up to the standard model was ever perfect, and particle physicists continually had to choose which theories to give up andabandon, and which ones to develop to try to make a better fit with experiment. The theories that they chose to develop also influenced the choices of which experiments to carry out, and this interacting chain of decisions led to the new physics. The new physics was a product of the culture in which it was created...

 

...They [physicists] imagine that if we ever make contact with a scientific civilization from another planet, then we will find that the alien civilization shares our views about the nature of atoms, the existence of protons and neutrons, and the way the electromagnetic force works. Indeed, more than one science-fiction story has suggested that science IS the (literally) universal language, and that the way to set up communication with an alien civilization will be by describing, for example, the chemical properties of the elements, or the nature of quarks, to establish a common ground. If the aliens turn out to have completely different ideas about what atoms are, or to have no concept of atoms at all, that would make such attempts at finding common ground doomed from the start... ...if world views really are cultural products, as Pickering and Kuhn argue, then it should be no surprise that there are different interpretations of quantum reality.

 

The point of that all is that the ideas we use to understand reality, can't really be expected to be ontologically correct at all. You have yourself commented few times that you consider some aspects of modern physics to be "merely models", which implies you think some other aspects are reality itself. Where do you draw that line, and how do you know?

 

They go on to talk about the use of mathematics as a description of nature, and there are few things worth considering there;

 

...I received a communication from Bruno Augenstein, a researcher with RAND, in Santa Monica, California... ...what Augenstein had to tell me... ...helped to convince me that Pickering was right about the way science works... ...literally every version of mathematical concepts has a physical model somewhere... ...as Pickering has suggested, physicists are capable of producing understandable versions of reality given ANY self-consistent raw material... (NOTE: By raw material he is NOT referring to what DD refers to as UNDEFINED information

 

...[Augenstein] had already found that a rather obscure branch of mathematics concerning a subject known as the Banach-Tarski theorems provides another example where work in pure mathematics can be seen as having anticipated a realization subsequently found in physics. In this case, that realization is the original quark theory of Gell-Mann and Zweig... ...The essential feature is that the work of Banach and Tarski (published in 1924) deals with the way objects can be decomposed into constituent parts and reassembled to make something different... ...a solid sphere with unit radius can be cut into five pieces in such a way that two of the pieces can be reassembled into one solid sphere with unit radius, while the other three pieces are reassembled into a second solid sphere with unit radius. These are the minimum numbers of pieces required to do the trick, but it can be repeated indefinitely... ...In the paper published in Speculations in Science and Technology, Augenstein shows that the rules governing the behaviour of these mathematical sets and sub-sets are formally exactly the same as the rules which describe the behaviour of quarks and gluons in the standard model of particle physics, quantum chromodynamics... ...the magical way in which a proton entering a metal target can produce a swarm of new copies of protons emerging from that target, each identical to the original proton, is precisely described by the Banach-Tarski process of cutting spheres into pieces and reassembling them to make pairs of spheres.

 

Now the interesting bit about this is that the idea, about what we are actually observing in those experiments, is very much a product of sociological choices made in the history of particle physics. This same mathematical relationship could manifest itself in some wildly different manner in a different world view.

 

How a similar problem extends itself to all "observations" is that any given observation is already a case of undefined data having been defined in some manner, i.e. any observation already contains "arbitrary choices" in that we don't know if our perception is the only valid way to categorize reality; thus we can't take it as a literal form of reality!

 

What DD is doing is he is not making any assumptions about how reality has been categorized, but in order to get to something like Schrödinger's equation, he deliberately make the exact "arbitrary choises" that are needed to arrive at that expression form. The point is, that he never makes any assumptions about what the information itself is, when judging the validity of his choices. The "tautologous connection" between Schrödinger and his fundamental equation then means that all the definitions associated with Schrödinger, i.e. all that it implies about the structure of reality, have been sociological choises regarding how reality was to be interpreted. (i.e. the same definitions with the same relationships can always be found, given any sort of UNDEFINED information-to-be-explained, because the definitions are exclusively anchored to mathematical probabilities of whatever recurring patterns can be recognized)

 

Likewise, how this illuminates something about the violation of Bell Inequalities is that the choices that led to such defined entities that act that way, were arbitrary choises (in that other choices would have led us to comprehend the same underlying relationships in wildly different manner).

 

The mathematical relationships related to those definitions, are valid purely on epistemological grounds, so whatever ontological implications people pull from those definitions (including the nature of space and time), are not grounded to any knowledge about reality.

 

Whoever thinks that the violation of Bell Inequalities is mysterious, is thinking about ontological implications that are simply not defendable via the validity of quantum mechanics (and never will be).

 

-Anssi

[Doctordick]

Qfwfq, you make it quite clear that you have utterly no idea of what I am presenting. Your comment,

 

If you can show me that Dick's presentation in some manner makes it easier to sort this puzzle out, I'll be all ears as long as I find arguments satisfactory.

shows that you apparently think I am presenting something having to do with “sorting this puzzle out”. I have no interest whatsoever in solving the problem of explaining anything. That is simply not the subject of my presentation. The subject is, what constraints follow purely from “the definition of an explanation” and nothing else? It seems that the existence of that question is totally over your head.

 

As I have said many times, I discovered my equation back in the late sixties and realized it was indeed a valid constraint applicable to any and all explanations of anything. At that time I thought it to be a totally worthless relationship (which is exactly what you are feeling right now). Some twenty years later, I deduced that much of modern physics can be seen as nothing more than an expression of that very relationship.

 

There are two quite different issues here. First, is my equation a valid representation of the constraints which follow purely from the definition of an explanation and nothing else or is it not? And, second, is much of modern physics actually nothing more than an expression of that specific relationship? You are apparently grossly confusing the two issues.

 

The validity of my equation follows from three steps. One, a mathematical notation which can represent all conceivable circumstances and all conceivable outcomes (that would be found in the thread, “Laying out the representation to be solved”). Two, symmetry considerations applied to that representation (that would be this thread, “Conservation Of Inherent Ignorance”). And, three, a mechanism for expressing all possible rules (a thread I have not yet posted, I am waiting for a little evidence of some comprehension of OP's one and two).

 

Either you have the mental capacity to comprehend these issues or you don't. At the moment you haven't made it clear to me that you possess that capacity. Baring a rational response to this post, I have no intention of wasting my time with your silly machinations any further.

 

Have fun -- Dick

[modest]

As I have said many times, I discovered my equation back in the late sixties and realized it was indeed a valid constraint applicable to any and all explanations of anything.

 

A counterexample is sufficient to disprove your claim.

 

http://scienceforums.com/topic/19512-%e2%80%9cwhy%e2%80%9d-relativistic-mechanics/page__view__findpost__p__274847

 

Either you have the mental capacity to comprehend these issues or you don't. At the moment you haven't made it clear to me that you possess that capacity.

 

A while ago I read something you wrote, "1987... I thought I would look around and see if there might be an rational educated person out there capable of carrying on an intelligent conversation with me. To date the answer seems to be in the negative". It seemed strange that there have been no intelligent people in all your internet interactions, and some of the people on this forum whom you've characterized as mentally deficient I would consider extremely intelligent.

 

I think what is happening is that when you say "you're not mentally capable of following my analysis" what you mean is "you're not agreeing with me". That is to say, you equate understanding with agreement—believing that anyone who understands your presentation will agree with it.

 

As you've put it,

 

If they understood the presentation given, "A Universal Analytical Model of Explanation Itself", then they would "know" that the answer to any question which could be asked can be expressed as a mathematical function I call Psi. Furthermore, they would "know" that Psi would have to obey the equation given in that paper.

 

In other words, anyone understanding your presentation will know it is correct. Therefore, anyone questioning that presentation just isn't getting it. That may be why you continually characterize forum members as somehow mentally deficient. It's probably that they aren't agreeing with your analysis.

 

~modest

[Rade]

Hello AnssiH...in reading over this thread, I see a few comments you made, and here are some thoughts I have about them:

 

I would like to comment, that DD is not set to prove how any specific mechanism would categorize the recurring features of some data in useful ways. It's just to prove that there exists, somewhere in the possibility space (of logical mechanism), some procedures that yield meaningful expectations for some information, by categorizing its recurring aspects according to some immaterial definitions

With this statement you answer a previous question you had concerning how you can come to know that anything real exists as an object. See how you conclude that the approach of DD will prove that something "exists" as "procedure", and that it exists in some abstract "possibility space", with a space being a place. So, all we need to do is think about what type of primary substance as "object" could include the possibility of "procedure" to be contained within, in such a way that it could interact with some "information" found outside, and logically we conclude that it must be within the mind.

 

This world view is of critical philosophic importance, because it means that the presentation holds as true that there "exists" some faculty of the mind that can be applied to this "possibility space", that is, there exists within the mind an object that contains the possibility space. There are few philosophies that take the position that within the mind there can be faculties that exist as possibility space, DD appears to be one of them, and I agree completely with this view.

 

Let me take this one step forward. If we agree that within mind at least one faculty as object must exist (i.e., the mind faculty with possibility space internal dealing with explanation procedure), then it is a logical step to conclude that this form of existent can interact with other similar forms of existent external to it--other minds. But, given that what is external to the faculty as input is |undefined information (data)|, all that can be said about the external, no matter what its source, is that while it must be in some whatever form as repetitive patterns of energy open to explanation, it is impossible to attach to it any specific existence as a specific real object.

 

...when you say "physicists are looking at what is observable"' date=' I don't understand what that is, because I don't understand how to observe without comprehending it via some definition[/quote']Yes, because it is impossible for consciousness to understand it. Logically, the |undefined information| MUST yield repetitive patterns of energy, otherwise explanation itself would be a moot point. When a physicist says they observe repetitive patterns of energy as a wavefunction or state-vector, they are not saying they understand "how" the wavefunction collapses after observation, they are saying the wave function does so collaspe, and this change in the evolution of the wave function, as a disruption of the repetitive pattern, is "what they observe".

 

And since I don't know what information there was and how it was transformed to be mentally comprehensible' date=' I also don't know what any given observation "really is".[/quote']You do not have to know anything at all specific about the |undefined information|to know that any "given observation" of it must logically be some undefined interruption of the "pattern" of the repetitive pattern of data input that you wish to explain. This is what the physicist means when they say they "collaspe the wavefunction" of the unitary evolution. It would be an incorrect assumption of the DD presentation to assume you "know" whether or not the state-vector reduction (the collaspe) is a "real" action of the physical world, for this would imply that you hold as true the presumption that the state-vector does describe an actual quantum physical reality. It may, it may not, and whatever the answer, it has nothing to do with the presentation of Doctordick. Quantum experiments may indicate that reality is not local, but this does not mean they conclude that reality does not exist, nor does it mean that that quantum reality is influenced by, the human mind. The human can only make a choice "how to measure" and "what to measure", a choice of what instruments to use to measure. Thus, every time you observe or measure, what any "given observation" "really is" is a confirmation of the abstract nature of the dialectic {reality + knowledge}.

[modest]

Give me an example of an explanation which lacks causality and makes good predictions. Can you not comprehend that such a thing would be an oxymoron. It is the explanations which require causality not the things being explained.

 

To assume that causality must explain data is to assume that data must be explained by causality. There is no distinction.

 

Of course, an explanation which lacks causality cannot make predictions any more than a bird which lacks the ability to fly can take flight. But, this doesn’t imply that explanations must make predictions about the future any more than saying “birds which lack the ability to fly cannot take flight” implies that birds must fly—that would be affirming the consequent—bad logic.

 

Explanations explain data. In doing so they may invoke causality or they may not. Euclidean geometry explains circles and triangles without x,y.z,tau space and without causality. The Peano axioms explain arithmetic without cause and effect. Examples abound. Symmetry, causality, x,y,z,tau space and other such assumptions are most certainly not meaningful constraints on the concept of an explanation, and by assuming that they are, you are making assumptions about the nature of the data being explained.

 

~modest

[Rade]

View PostDoctordick' date=' on 02 September 2010 - 08:47 AM, said:

Give me an example of an explanation which lacks causality and makes good predictions. Can you not comprehend that such a thing would be an oxymoron. It is the explanations which require causality not the things being explained.[/quote']Well, no, the law of causality does not permit you to mentally explain your thing, before you have a thing to explain. The law of identity does not permit you to say you can have a thing and at the same time explain it, first must be a thing caused then comes the action (the explanation). The logic rule is that all actions (such as explanation as procedure) are "caused" by entities, but this does not mean entities have no causes.

 

Here is an example of an explanation that lacks causality and makes good predictions. It is known that two types of decay occur when the ratio of neutrons to protons in an isotope is too small (1) positron decay and (2) electron capture. Both are well explained as processes where P -> N (plus details) and make good predictions. It is known that if the energy difference between the two decays is < 1.002 MeV only positron emission is possible, if greater, both decay possible, but the explanation lacks causality, why this number and not < 0.500 MeV, the cause is unknown. All that can be said is, shut up an calculate and use < 1.002 in your explanations, what causes it to be this number is unknown.

[Qfwfq]

Rade I have doubts about your example and the statement that there's no cause of the restriction. Are you sure the correct figure isn't rather 1.022 MeV and coudn't it be due to the formal relation between electron coming in and positron going out?

 

You two make me feel compelled to fish up the same quote and address it:

Give me an example of an explanation which lacks causality and makes good predictions. Can you not comprehend that such a thing would be an oxymoron. It is the explanations which require causality not the things being explained.

I would put the third sentence differently: an explanation assumes causality in the things being explained. Oddly enough, this makes it like the "reason why" notion of explanation that I had conceded to let go of, in the face of your very own definition. I think that what Modest says means he wouldn't use the word explanation if it isn't based on some assumption of causality, i. e. if it is only an algorithm that assigns a probability to each outcome.

 

I noticed that, just before the above quote, you had said:

Either show me where I presumed there was causality or order in the data being explained or show me an error in my deductions!

It isn't you that presumes it, it is an explanation (that requires it, as you said in the other bit). More precisely i would say it assumes the first thing (causality) and, the more it is restrictive (regarding whether it is valid) the more it requires some form of order, or repeating patterns that Anssi keeps repeating about, or in other words constitutes a low entropy format.