Socrates says “know thyself”: I say which self?

[coberst]

Socrates says “know thyself”: I say which self?

 

I don’t know what happened to me. I was beside my self with worry.

 

My pet dog Fido uses his imagination to create image schemas to help him to comprehend and move about in his world. I use my imagination in much the same way but because my species can create abstract concepts I also use my imagination to create these abstract concepts.

 

I have the ability to use linguistic metaphors to help me comprehend my world and also my cognitive processes uses conceptual metaphors (structures from concrete experience) to construct abstract ideas while I am unconscious of this happening.

 

The concrete concepts, structured from experience, become primary metaphors that my unconscious imagination utilizes to construct image schemas for my abstract ideas.

 

SGCS (Second Generation Cognitive Science) has developed a set of theories using these metaphors, both linguistic, and conceptual to examine such abstract concepts as what is self, time, causality, etc.

 

If we examine linguistic metaphors that are common to our culture regarding “self” we can determine much information regarding what we normally think about this matter.

 

SGCS inform me that we have many different common metaphors for “self”:

 

The General Subject Self “A person is divided into a Subject and one or more Selves.” The Subject experiences consciousness only in real time. This Subject is the center of reason, will, and judgment. The Subject is thought of as the essential self that encompasses our self as a person.

 

The Physical-Object Self“Self-control and object control are inseparable experiences from early childhood…Self Control is Object Control.”I lifted my hand—I lost my voice—I couldn’t control myself—the boy picked himself up from the ground.

 

The Locational Self I was besides my self with worry.

 

The above quotes from Philosophy in the Flesh by Lakoff and Johnson

 

We are born recognizing our self as a ‘me’. The ‘me’ is an object before ‘me’ becomes ‘I’, i.e. an executive subject. Only after this happens in an infant’s life can s/he “back away” from her or him self.

 

The child discovers first that s/he is a social product. Perhaps this will show us why we are so often mere puppets jerked around by alien symbols and sounds. Perhaps this is why we are so often just blind ideologues (blindly partisan).

 

In order to separate the ego from the world it seems that the ego must have a rallying point. It must have a flag about which to rally. That flag is the “I”. The pronoun ‘I’ is the symbolic rallying point for the human’s ego; it is the precise designation of self-hood. It is concluded by those who study such matters that the ‘I’ “must take shape linguistically”. The self or ego “is largely a verbal edifice”.

 

“The “I” signals nothing less than the beginning of the birth of values into a world of powerful caprice…The personal pronoun is the rallying point for self-consciousness.” The wedding of the nervous ability to delay response, with the pronoun “I”, unleashed a new type of animal; the human species began. The ‘I’ represents the birth of values.

 

Upon the discovery of the “I” the infant human becomes a precise form, which is the focus of self-control. The creatures previous to the arrival of humans in the chain of evolution had an instinctive center within itself. When our species discovered the “I” and its associated self-control centers a dual reality occurred. “The animal not only loses its instinctive center within itself; it also becomes somewhat split against itself.”

 

Becker, the winner of the Pulitzer for “The Birth and Death of Meaning”, notes that Kant was perhaps the first to impress upon us the importance of the fact that the infant becomes conscious first of itself as a “me” and then only as “I”. This order of discover has been shown to be universal.

 

I have noticed when an infant becomes an ‘I’, when all of a sudden they behave in a self-conscious manner. Have you noticed such a change taking place in a child?

 

Quotes from The Birth and Death of Meaning—Ernest Becker

[CraigD]

Socrates says “know thyself”: I say which self?

Concerning this ancient philosophical maxim, Socrates and his many classical Greek predecessors and successors meant primarily “be introspective”, rather than “strive to understand the concept of the self”. The Socratic school – commonly figureheaded by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – was rooted in 2 key concepts related to introspection and the self:

• Awareness of ones ignorance. Quoting the wikipedia article Socrates, which is paraphrasing Plato’s Apology
  ... while so-called wise men thought themselves wise and yet were not, he
  [socrates]
  himself knew he was not wise at all which, paradoxically, made him the wiser one since he was the only person aware of his own ignorance.

  
  

• Platonic idealism, the primacy of immaterial ideas over physical objects
  

The second concept is explicitly rejected by Lakoff and Johnson in Philosophy in the Flesh, which dedicates a chapter (6) to this rejection. In comparing classical – what Lakoff and Johnson refer in PITP chapter 6 to as “a priori philosophy” and “first generation cognitive science” – to their “second generation cognitive science” (SGCS) with its central concept of embodied mind, this rejection can’t be overemphasized. According to SGCS, physical objects and processes generate ideas. According to Platonic idealism, ideas generate physical objects and processes.

We are born recognizing our self as a ‘me’. The ‘me’ is an object before ‘me’ becomes ‘I’, i.e. an executive subject. Only after this happens in an infant’s life can s/he “back away” from her or him self.

Since the widespread acceptance of Piaget's theory of cognitive development in the 1920s and 30s, there’s a near universal consensus among psychologists that humans are not born with a significant ability to think symbolically (or, in SGCS terms, metaphorically). According to SGCS or other “embodied mind” cognitive theories, self-recognition requires great symbolic reasoning ability. Thus, we are emphatically not born recognizing our self as a “me”, or as anything else.

 

I think it’s important to understand that the idea that human infants are not, according to mainstream cognitive science, sentient, while offensive and dismaying to many laypeople, is accepted science. Unlike much of cognitive science, this is not an untested or ambiguously tested theoretical preditions: human infants consistently fail clear tests of a sense of self, such as the mirror test.

I have noticed when an infant becomes an ‘I’, when all of a sudden they behave in a self-conscious manner. Have you noticed such a change taking place in a child?

Though the precise age at which a human child acquires sufficient symbolic reasoning ability to have a sense of self, and the ability to use either “me” or “I”, spans a large range for different individual children, the generally cited age range is 24 to 36 months. Children usually begin passing the mirror test at about 18 months.

 

Recognition and use in language of the different parts of speech in a given language – “me” vs. “I” – and use of the various subject-self metaphors described in PITF, appear to me to require the acquisition of considerable language and cultural skills, so much so that not all may occur even in adulthood for all individuals in all cultures.

SGCS inform me that we have many different common metaphors for “self”

 

The General Subject Self “A person is divided into a Subject and one or more Selves.” The Subject experiences consciousness only in real time. This Subject is the center of reason, will, and judgment. The Subject is thought of as the essential self that encompasses our self as a person.

 

The Physical-Object Self “Self-control and object control are inseparable experiences from early childhood…Self Control is Object Control.”I lifted my hand—I lost my voice—I couldn’t control myself—the boy picked himself up from the ground.

 

The Locational Self I was besides my self with worry.

Coberst, I believe you’re failing to describt the structure of the subject-self metaphor system described in (chapter 13 of) PITF.

 

The general subject-self metaphor “conceptualizes a person as bifurcated” as either, put in traditional language terms:

a subject (in either PITF or traditional language terms);

or an self (in traditional language terms, an object)

 

The general subject-self metaphor then has 4 “everyday” and 1 “folk theory” special case, which can be named by the experiences to which they apply:

1) manipulating objects

2) being located in space

3) social relations

4) empathizing with others

5) talking about “essences” or “the real self”.

 

As my personal work in cognitive science is focused on writing computer programs to “embody minds” as Lakoff and others describe, the detailed enumeration and organization of metaphors from PITF, and, I assume, similar works, aren’t as useful to me as old works such as Piaget’s and Minsky’s. Like much of less cross-disciplinary academic Philosophy, cross-disciplinary SGCS provides little details “what not to do” suggestions than I’d like, because it little emphasizes the underlying neurology of its many described metaphors. IMHO, until we can model cognition, including symbolic thought including self concepts, “from the bottom up”, most likely using digital computers, SGCS will remain more of a philosophical discipline than a science.

[coberst]

CraigD

 

Whoo! You apparently know more about SGCS than I. However I am confused, your heart seems to belong to first generation cognitive science. Do the cognitive models you speak of have any relationship to the ICM's SGCS speaks of?

[Rade]

Socrates says “know thyself”: I say which self?

Nice topic. I would suggest that Socrates was referring to the Existential Self, when the "me" as "object" we hold as a child, returns as "object", after the "me" (object) ---> "I" (subject) stage you discuss. This adult "self", the Existential Self, comes to each human mind at a moment in time, it is thus called the Existential Moment (EM)--usually in early teens, sometimes earlier sometimes latter. After the experience of the EM (which can be VERY intense emotionally) the "object" of the "me" returns, and the subjective I is transformed into the objective I. It is at the EM (that short moment in the time of life) that the mind comes to realize "I EXIST" :naughty: Once this is realized, once you cross the bridge, there is no return.

 

I would say Socrates asks that we form a mental grasp of and think rationally about the consequence of this single EM fact of reality, that "I myself exist as an object of reality". Once you come to know this, then you can begin to think about how you can know "the other", all that is outside the objective I. This is a topic for another thread.

[coberst]

Extended consciousness

 

Antonio Damasio is a scientist who has set out to organize a scientific study of human consciousness. Damasio utilizes a rather unique method that involves careful observation of individuals who have been deprived of some aspects of consciousness because of brain lesions caused by accidents. He studies brain dysfunction caused by such things as strokes and accidents.

 

Damasio finds that “nearly all the sites of brain damage associated with a significant disruption of core consciousness share one important trait…these structures are of old evolutionary vintage, they are present in numerous nonhuman species, and they mature early in individual human development.”

 

That is to say that his evidence indicates that core consciousness is centered about the brain’s physical areas that developed very early in the evolution of life on our planet, i.e. human core consciousness is directly evolved from early animal forms.

 

The basic facts made available for analysis give testimony to the hypothesis that consciousness is not a monolith. Most importantly there is an abrupt division between what is identified as core consciousness and extended consciousness. There are also distinguishing levels within extended consciousness it self. When core consciousness fails then extended consciousness follows.

 

Many non human creatures have emotions—“human emotions however have evolved to making connections to complex ideas, values, principles, and judgments”—thus human emotion is special—the impact of feelings on humans is the result of consciousness—a distinct difference between feeling and knowing a feeling—“neither the emotion or the feeling caused by the emotion is conscious”—these things happen in a biological state—there are three stages here; emotion, feeling, and consciousness of feeling—consciousness must be present if feelings have an influence beyond the here and the now—consciousness is tooted in the representation of the body.

 

We need not be conscious of the emotion or the inducer of the emotion—we are about as effective in stopping an emotion as in stopping a sneeze.

 

“Emotions are about the life of an organism, its body to be precise, and their role is to assist the organism in maintaining life…emotions are biologically determined processes, depending upon innately set brain devices, laid down by long evolutionary history…The devices that produce emotions…are part of a set of structures that both regulate and represent body states…All devices can be engaged automatically, without conscious deliberation…The variety of the emotional responses is responsible for profound changes in both the body landscape and the brain landscape. The collection of these changes constitutes the substrate for the neural patterns which eventually become feelings of emotion.”

 

The biological function of emotions is to produce an automatic action in certain situations and to regulate the internal processes so that the creature is able to support the action dictated by the situation. The biological purpose of emotions are clear, they are not a luxury but a necessity for survival.

 

“It is through feelings, which are inwardly directed and private, that emotions, which are outwardly directed and public, begin their impact on the mind; but the full and lasting impact of feelings requires consciousness, because only along with the advent of a sense of self do feelings become known to the individual having them.”

 

Damasio proposes “that the term feeling should be reserve for the private, mental experience of an emotion, while the term emotion should be used to designate the collection of responses, many of which are publicly observable.” This means that while we can observe our own private feelings we cannot observe these same feelings in others.

 

Core consciousness—“occurs when the brain’s representation devices generate an imaged, nonverbal account of how the organism’s own state is affected by the organism’s processing of an object, and when this process enhances the image of the causative object, thus placing it saliently in a spatial and temporal context”

 

First, there is emotion, then comes feeling, then comes core consciousness of feeling. There is no evidence that we are conscious of all our feelings, in fact evidence indicates that we are not conscious of all feelings.

 

Humans have extended consciousness, which takes core consciousness to the level of self consciousness and the awareness of mortality.

 

Extended consciousness is the consciousness we normally speak of and that is the autobiographical consciousness possessed by humans.

 

“Extended consciousness goes beyond the here and now of core consciousness. Extended consciousness places these same experiences in a broader canvas and over a longer period of time. Extended consciousness still hinges on the same core “you”. But that “you” is now connected to the lived past and anticipated future that are part of your autobiographical record…autobiographical memories are objects, and the brain treats them as such, allows each of them to relate to the organism in the manner described for core consciousness, and thus allows each of them to generate a pulse of core consciousness, a sense of self knowing.”

 

This is why we have the ability to learn and the ability to retain records of experiences. “The ability to reactivate those records in such a way that, as objects, they, too, can generate “a sense of self knowing,” and thus be known”.

 

 

Quotes from The Feeling of what Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness by Antonio Damasio

[Rade]

Most importantly there is an abrupt division between what is identified as core consciousness and extended consciousness

This sounds exactly like what happens at the Existential Moment, when the human mind comes to know that "I Exist as an Object".

 

If true, then Extended Consciousness would be easy to quantify as an event as a cause. It could be measured as a moment within the lifetime of a human, to the accuracy of ~ 1 second. Problem is, the moment it will occur cannot be predicted (nor do many teens even know it would occur to them), so they are not looking at the clock to record their individual Existential Moment event. For me, there were two such moments, not far apart in time (maybe ~ one year ?).

 

An interesting research question is raised. Do all adults recall their Existential Moment event ? Perhaps best to ask late age teens as a school project (16-19)--it will be more fresh in their memory. But, because it is not very pleasant event, I suspect that some would suppress memory of it ? Does anyone who reads this do research in this area ?

[coberst]

 

An interesting research question is raised. Do all adults recall their Existential Moment event ? Perhaps best to ask late age teens as a school project (16-19)--it will be more fresh in their memory. But, because it is not very pleasant event, I suspect that some would suppress memory of it ? Does anyone who reads this do research in this area ?

 

 

I am not conscious of every experiencing the Existential Moment that you speak of.

[Rade]

I am not conscious of every experiencing the Existential Moment that you speak of.

Hi Coberst.

 

From what I have read, the Existential Moment comes in many forms, it is often related to depression or an emotional event. But, that was not the case for me as I recall, it was related I think to thinking from very, very early age (pre-teen)--just thinking--thoughts such as why is there death--who is God (lots of bible reading)--how big is the universe, those types of things. I can visualize the Existential Moments I had (more than one) clearly, what room I was in, what chair I was sitting in, etc. (but not the date--only that it was early teens). Each event was completely out of the blue, not planned. I would say they arose from my unconscious mind.

 

Apparently, from what I have read, the Existential Moment comes with a thought of "feeling small"--that I am about as importance as a speck of dust in the big picture of the universe. This was the case for me. The feeling small thought came before the thought that "I Exist"--this I recall very well.

 

For me, looking in a mirror was involved--I mean looking into my eyes and thinking about questions--who are you ?--do you realize that you are real, that you are not a dream ?--Do you realize that you are not a nothing--OK--go live your life as if it means something, because it really does, it means something to you. Now, the thoughts at the time were not the words I use today--but the words express what I was thinking at the time.

 

This is what I call my Existential Moment.

 

Perhaps the Existential Moment can be induced if you have never had one :). A calm environment in nature, perhaps at ocean or by a stream. Take along the song White Rabbit by Jefferson Airplane :phones: (an existential song based on Alice in Wonderland), then "feed your brain" with thinking about who you are, why do you exist (no drugs required). Take along a mirror.

 

Perhaps for any of us to have the Existential Moment experience (and to tell the truth, be happy if you never have, it is not a pleasure moment) it is required that we deconstruct our self--perhaps it takes some emotional event (such as depression, or death of a friend or family member, or just thinking about how you fit into the big picture). After the deconstruction feeling however (the feeling of being small) it is critical to reconstruct the self to come to know that "I Exist", that I am important, if to no one else at least to me. Otherwise, if you only deconstruct the self, deep depression will take control. This gets to the OP question--what did Socrates mean--"know thyself". If you never get to the "know" stage about the self--perhaps life ends up being one moment of depression after another. Perhaps this is what Socrates was telling us--to me it sounds like Socrates would have had an Existential Moment. If true, then the event called Existential Moment could be both a bad event (deconstruct) and good (reconstruct). If you never reach the second stage--big problem :( Then again, such a moment may not be needed at all to reach a healthy view of the self as an adult--seems logical given that humans are genetic creatures with unique gene combination that can control behavior of the mind.

 

There are books on the subject, mostly by existentialist philosophers and educators. Rolo May, 1983, The Discovery of Being, one good source.

 

==

 

It would be nice to know if others (yes, no) have had anything similar to what I describe as an Existential Moment ? Perhaps I should start a new thread specific to the topic.

[CraigD]

Whoo! You apparently know more about SGCS than I.

I owe my acquaintance with SGCS to you and hypography, Coberst, as your posts incited me to get a copy of Philosophy in the Flesh and begin reading it fairly carefully. Thanks. :) I’m far from an authority, however, lacking the background in academic philosophy that professionals like Lakoff have.

However I am confused, your heart seems to belong to first generation cognitive science.

I can understand how the my position – that of a “Strong AI” proponent, one who believes that human-like thought can in principle be produced (in SCGS terms, embodied) – is confusing when described according to the scheme described in PITF, because of it conceptualizes the term dualism differently – mostly more broadly – than is usual in the AI discipline.

 

Both strong AI and SGCS reject the old kind of dualism (I’ll call it “paleodualism” for short) that theorizes that minds are a kind of qualitatively different, non-physical essence that inhabits the “inanimate matter” of a brain. Both consider mind to be a phenomena that arises from the microscopic, physical law-defined processes that occur in the brain.

 

SGCS, however, goes further, considering the central assumption of strong AI that mind is fundamentally a pattern that can be produced by either brains or digital computers with sufficient storage and numbers of compute cycles to be a form of dualism, in that like paleodualism, it considers mind “software” to be essentially separable from its embodying “hardware”. PITF terms this a “‘functionalist’ perspective”.¹

 

In this, I believe SGCS as described in PITF errs. Considering mind software – symbolic systems, in AI terms – separable from the hardware that “runs” it is not, I think, the same as paleodualism’s theory that patterns (what paleodualism terms “form”, “soul”, “spark of consciousness”, etc) cause mind in its hardware. It’s such a given in AI – and computer science in general – that hardware and software are critically and intimately related, that it is not often stated per se. Rather than AI’s functionalist perspective asserting, as PITF concludes it does, that what embodies mind is not important, I believe it asserts that the embodying medium of mind is important, but that very different media can in principle embody very similar minds.

 

It seems to me that SGCS can, in a sense, perpetuate paleodualism’s idea of the objective existence of the physical and the metaphysical. Paleodualism asserts that mind is metaphysical, brains physical. AI’s functionalist perspective asserts that brains are physical, minds a useful level of description of the physical processes of brains. SGCS asserts this also, but can further assert that the brains and minds are in some practical sense inseparable – that is, that it’s bad to describe minds as abstract programs independent of their embodying brains. Since, by definition, AI’s goal is to produce minds (“intelligence”, the “I” in “AI”) embodied in non-brain hardware (“artificial”, the “A” in “AI”), this puts AI and SGCS, as described in PITF, unambiguously at odds.²

 

I believe both strong AI and SGCS assert what PITF calls “The Cognitive Reality Commitment” – that an “adequate theory of concepts and reasons” involved in human thinking must be “realistic” – consistent with physical law. However, PITF includes an additional criteria: quoting, bolding mine,

The Cognitive Reality Commitment: adequate theory of concepts and reasons must provide an account of the mind that is cognitively and

neurally

realistic.

³

The kind of strong AI of which I’m a proponent does not require that an account of the mind necessarily involve a neural model (“neural” has a very specific meaning in computer science, involving state representing schemes involving networks with “firing” weights and thresholds).

 

So, finally getting to a direct response to your question, Coberst, of to which generation of cognitive science as described in PITF my heart belongs, I must answer that I don’t accept the demarcation well enough to give my heart to either. I’m certainly not a paleodualist, but I reject Lakoff and Johnson’s assertion that “computers cannot understand anything” because “meaning must be embodied”.² I believe this would cause me to be classified, according to their criteria, as having a functionalist perspective belonging to first generation cognitive science.

Do the cognitive models you speak of have any relationship to the ICM's SGCS speaks of?

I don’t recognize the acronym “ICM”. Can you expand it into words?

 

----

¹Philosophy in the Flesh, Chapter 6, p75, “this ‘functionalist’ perspective”

²ibid, Chapter 12, p261, “Searle’s Metaphorical Chinese Room Argument”

³ibid, Chapter 6, p79, “The Cognitive Reality Commitment”

[coberst]

CraigD

 

SGCS has coined a phrase called ICM (Idealized Cognitive Model); this is basically a theory about categorization utilizing prototype theory.

 

Classical categorization is a conscious rational taxonomic like scheme that has been discovered as being insufficiently encompassing for our embodied theory of cognition.

 

The following are several posts that I have made regarding this matter:

 

Is dinosaur a bird?

 

“Fossil evidence and intensive biological analyses have demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that birds are theropod dinosaurs.”—Wiki

 

When is a politician lying? Is the Pope a bachelor? It all depends upon what is is!

 

Category is the staff of knowledge. What are categories and who gives a #@*&?

 

The word “bachelor” is a noun for those individuals defined as being an unmarried adult male. Most people would not say that the Pope is a bachelor even though he is an unmarried adult male.

 

Let us examine the process that is called “framing the issue”. We see an example of this when one side calls it self ‘pro-life’ and the other side calls it self ‘pro-choice’. The pro-choice individual is framing the issue about that beautiful concept ‘freedom’. The pro-life individual is framing the issue about that beautiful concept ‘life’.

 

Framing the issue is about choosing categories based upon often ideological and self-serving purposes. However, we do also frame the issue by categorization with or without ideological or self-serving motivations. Frames are one type, among many, of cognitive models.

 

What day is this, it’s Monday, the worst day of the week! Monday can only be defined in reference to what might be called an ICM (Idealized Cognitive Model). The concept ‘week’ is an ICM. The week is a whole that has seven parts. The model of the week is idealized, meaning that the seven-day week has no concrete existence, it is an abstract idea that we humans have created. It belongs to our culture; other cultures may have all kinds of different ICM for dividing up their cycles of the sun.

 

Back to the category of “bachelor” and the question ‘is the Pope a bachelor?’ There is generally a social context when using this word. We do not consider a gay male couple to be a set of bachelors. Catholic priests are not generally considered to be bachelors. I suspect that we do not think of Tarzan as being a bachelor.

 

Bachelor is an ICM like ‘week’ and in this case it does not fit even our culture in a complete and exact manner. “An idealized cognitive model may fit one’s understanding of the world either perfectly, very well, pretty well, somewhat well, badly, or not at all. If the ICM in which bachelor is defined fits a situation perfectly and the person referred to by the term is unrequitedly an unmarried adult, then he qualifies as a member of the category bachelor.”

 

When is a politician lying?

 

The category ‘lie’ can be a very important category especially when perjury is a question; perhaps it is even more important when citizen confidence is at stake. When is a lie, a lie, and when is it something more innocuous and can we know the difference?

 

There are a number of conditions that classical categorization of ‘necessary and sufficient’ place upon a statement before we catalogue it as being a lie: falsity of belief, intended deception, and factual falsity. A good example of a lie wherein there is little or nothing in which we might quibble is ‘when I steal something and then deny doing it’.

 

Empirical research has turned up a surprising conclusion about this matter of lies and liars. Most people consider that Fred is lying when Fred says something that Fred considers to be false, regardless of its factual falsity.

 

Bachelor, bird, and lie are example of prototypes. While some cognitive models are classical; that is to say, that they share rigid boundaries and are characterized by necessary and sufficient conditions, many are not.

 

Often there are is a prototype of the category by which we judge whether something belongs to a category. In the case of the three categories mentioned we use prototypical characteristics to judge whether a man is ‘really’ a bachelor or a liar. In the case of dinosaur I suspect most of us recognize that for zoological science the dinosaur is a bird but we would ordinarily not consider that a dinosaur is much like a sparrow or robin, which for many of us is a prototypical bird.

 

This business of categorization is what President Clinton was talking about when he replied “It all depends on what is is!”

 

Quotes from A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind by Steven L. Winter professor of Law.

 

Prototype Theory

 

Various scholars have played a significant role in the evolution of the new paradigm for cognitive science, which I call ‘embodied realism’.

 

These roles, and much more, are organized to facilitate comprehension by the interested lay person in the book Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things by George Lakoff. This new paradigm is created by an operating group that I call SGCS (Second Generation Cognitive Science) to distinguish it from the first paradigm for cognitive science which is commonly known as AI (Artificial Intelligence).

 

The first crack in the classical theory of categorization was initiated by Ludwig Wittgenstein. Classically defined categories have clear cut boundaries, and these boundaries are defined by common properties. Wittgenstein noted that a category like game cannot fit such clear cut boundaries because all games do not share common properties.

 

Wittgenstein noted that games do not share common properties but do share family resemblances. Chess and poker both involve one-on-one competition, skill, and knowledge; poker and old maid are card games, etc. He further noted that in mathematics, number must be precise but different mathematicians give differing precise definitions that are dependent upon their particular goals. They can define numbers which may or may not include or exclude transfinite and complex numbers. This applies also to such things as the concept of polyhedron.

 

Philosopher J. L. Austin extended this sort of analysis when he asked “Why do we call different [kinds of] things by the same name?” The answer to this question depends upon classical categorization theory, which Austin argues to be inaccurate.

 

As example Austin uses the word “healthy”: “when I talk of a healthy body, and again of a healthy complexion, of healthy exercise: the word is not just being used equivocally…there is what we may call a primary nuclear sense of ‘healthy’

 

Austin furthermore speaks of a holistic structure, a gestalt, governing such activities as cricket. A modifier such as cricket, when speaking of a cricket bat, a cricket ball, does not pick out any common property or similarity but refers to a structured activity.

 

“Wittgenstein assumed that there is a single category named by the word game, and he proposed that that category and other categories are structured by family resemblances and good and bad examples.”

 

“Like Wittgenstein, Austin was dedicated to showing the inadequacies of traditional philosophical views of language and mind—views that are still held today.”

 

The classical theory of categories is still held today by most people. New theories in the human sciences move into main stream culture very slowly. Unlike new theories in the natural sciences there is generally “no-money-in-it” for the new theories of the human sciences assimilation into the general culture. Thus the culture lags generations behind the sophisticated technology that our society generates.

 

Psychologists, linguists, and anthropologists, i.e. those sciences at the forefront in the human sciences have discovered that categories cannot be defined by a list of features. Instead a confused Tom and Jane tend to define categories (e.g. bird) by identifying prototypical members of the category (e.g. sparrow or robin) and then comparing others to these prototypical examples. Our ordinary concepts are thus seldom uniformly or homogeneously structured.

 

Our moral concepts are also not what we ordinarily think them to be. Such concepts as person, duty, right, and law will have prototype structure also. Because the general sense regarding categories is not consistent with our “real” way of categorization we find our self constantly trying to stuff square pegs into round holes and fighting over the failure of others to comprehend our comprehension of reality.

 

Quotes from Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things by George Lakoff

[Vox]

s.

 

 

This is why we have the ability to learn and the ability to retain records of experiences. “The ability to reactivate those records in such a way that, as objects, they, too, can generate “a sense of self knowing,” and thus be known”.[/b]

 

 

Quotes from The Feeling of what Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness by Antonio Damasio

 

If we compare that to reality of "now", "I" can be deemed as an mind illusion as that self is not existing anywhere else than now as is and changing every moment to moment..so we just create sense of self in our minds which is not the real "I"..it is only memory collection of illusive former "I"´s put to the continious sequence..me is only now and it is changing to something else momemt by moment.. Therfore Ego needs to create "I" which can be preserved to the mind as constant and static "I". Illusory creation alltogether within a mind?