Thank you for your definition of to know as: "to have some data". I can work with this definition.
First we need to define what it means to have, then data.
It really could be easier if instead of creating a definition for each word one by one, you just moved on and understood a broader context first, which in turn would allow you to understand the definition implied by the author.
While you do appear to be one step closer to the intented definition, there are few critical misinterpretations;
To have in the context of this discussion means mental possession. Data from english dictionary is defined as facts about physically real entities, and facts are defined as information based on a real event or occurance.
...In post #136, I said:
"Anyway, the definition of the past [to say "past is what you know"] here is simply a reference to some "noumenaic data", which is to say, "knowing it" is not referring to knowing a correct explanation for it. What you think it is (and how do you fill the blanks), is a function of how you explain the data."
I included the word "noumenaic" there, which is Kant's concept I know, but just work with it for now.
The whole thing is simply a reference to the fact that, past can be explained in multitudes of ways (most of which no one is even aware of), and what you think the past "is", is a function of your explanation.
Still, all the possible explanations are based on some "noumenaic data". They are not based on entities and particles or even conscious perceptions fundamentally, because those all must be in themselves a result of an explanation (meaning, they can all be transformed into another equally valid version).
I did not include the word "noumenaic" in my previous post on purpose (I thought about it, opted not to); because I wanted to express the same thing with different semantics; The same meaning is embedded in exactly what I said. I didn't want to confuse you with Kant's concept you may not want to work with, as saying "having it does not mean knowing how the data is explained" implies the same idea as "noumenaic data" already.
So it is erroneous to think that with "data" I was referring to "facts about physically real entities" (not under my terminology anyway). I was just referring to the raw material that a world view is based on, whatever that material is. "Physical entities" arise as an explanation of the data.
This is a perfect segway to another complaint I have. You must have noticed that many people, when they try to explain something to another person, they often opt to explain it in many different ways, in the attempt to let the "student" find inconsistencies in their interpretation. If the student thinks he understands one version, but another version appears to conflict that understanding, he must find an understanding that yields consistent interpretation to both versions. Just look at all the different ways to explain relativity (a subject particularly vulnerable to misinterprations), to understand what I mean.
Now, when you find yourself in a situation where DD or me appear to say something that sounds obviously conflicting to another thing we have said before, the chances are, either we have made an error in our thinking and/or communication, or you have made an error in your interpretation.
I feel like you always, always opt for the former. You really should work more with the idea of trying to create consistent interpretation of something people have said. The more your personal terminology differs from the one used by the other party, the more effort this requires (which is exactly the source of the difficulty for paradigm shifts). Go back to what you think they have said, and note how many different ways those things can be understood (and let me tell you, you will find that is not trivial).
Your definition of to know helps understand this comment you made:
"What you think it is (and how do you fill the blanks), is a function of how you explain the data."
So, if we define the past as 'what you think you know", as presented by DD above, then, it is a logical conclusion of the presentation of DD that the past is <a mental possession of information relative to the actual occurance of a real event involving physically real entities as a function of how you explain the information>
Possibly, if I understand correctly what you mean. I might not, and those would not be the words I would use.
Important to note thought that, implied to defining the past as "the data your explanation is based on" (which just another way to express the same definition) is that your explanation of it always has got the potential to change, but the past itself never changes. Say you fall out of religious world view, your explanation of the past has changed. But the underlying data never changed. That unchanging component (which you cannot directly think of) is "the past".
Future on the other hand, is entirely a function of your explanation. There are no unchanging components to the future, it just is what you believe it is at any given moment. If you believe rapture will come next week, that's just a function of your explanation of reality.
Conversely, it seems obvious that the future is such a mental possession of information relative to a potential occurance of a real event involving physcially real entities>
I don't know what you mean by real, but I would warn your use of the word here is at the very least particularly dangerous. And I would just refer back to my post where I brought up the difference between Rand's and Kant's terminology, and the uselesness of Rand's terminology when talking about the problem me and DD are talking about.
As relates to knowledge as you defined above, science then can be defined as the method of thinking that yields "uncertain knowledge" about defined particles of quantum mechanics that exist as thing in themselves. Thus the presentation of DD reaches the valid conclusion that if you claim to have certain knowledge about particles that exist as thing in themselves, such knowledge was not gained via methods of science.
Also here I cannot be sure what you mean, but I would warn that using the phrase "things in themselves" to refer to exactly the opposite thing that Kant meant (who coined the phrase), is probably not a great form of communication. What he wanted to point out was precisely that the objects we define (such as QM objects) cannot be taken as things in themselves. For they had to be defined first.
The last sentence could probably be understood as is, from either paradigm; science certainly does not yield certainty in ontological knowledge about anything, as it's not supposed to. Only tautological relationships are "certain", and if your ontological beliefs are tautological to your underlying definitions, what does that yield? It yields exactly what Kant was talking about...