Scientific Objectivity

[Doctordick]

Well, it's been a while since I posted here. A month ago or so, I picked up a translation of some of Kant's work (his 1887 edition of his "Critique of Pure Reason; translated by F. Max Muller). Of course, being ignorant of philosophy (it isn't a subject pushed at graduate physics students; at least not when I was a student) I needed to read some of this stuff. I was surprised by the similarity between Kant's complaints and my reactions to the posts on these forums. As I read the contributions to this forum, I find things to be much the same as seen by Kant over two hundred years ago. I appears that there has there been no progress in the field of philosophy since his time. If I can quote Muller's translation, the following is a specific comment by Kant:

Metaphysic, a completely isolated and speculative science of reason, which declines all teaching of experience, and rests on concepts only (not on their application to intuition, as mathematics), in which reason therefore is meant to be her own pupil, has hitherto not been so fortunate as to enter on the secure path of a science, although it is older than all other sciences, and would remain, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism. In metaphysic, reason, even if it tries only to understand a priori (as it pretends to do) those laws which are confirmed by the common experience, is constantly brought to a standstill, and we are obliged again and again to retrace our steps, because they do not lead us where we want to go; while as to unanimity among those who are engaged in the same work, there is so little of it in metaphysic, that it has rather become an arena, specially destined, it would seem, for those who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no combatant has, as yet, succeeded in gaining an inch of ground that he could call permanently his own. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the method of metaphysic has hitherto consisted in groping only, and, what is the worst, in groping among mere concepts.

 

Immanuel Kant,1787

More to the point is another of his comments:

It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure.

This is exactly my complaint on the common approach to the issue of foundations of modern science. It is as true today as it apparently was two hundred years ago.

 

In reading that document, it seemed to me quite clear that Kant was trying to develop a reasonable rational mechanism to turn metaphysics into an exact science. From an “exact” analysis of current philosophic thought, I would judge that the final consequence of his effort was abject failure; however, I do not find his goal to be at all ridiculous. I think he just made some very poor assumptions.

 

The most serious error in his approach was that he missed the very essence of the problem. He begins by setting up two categories of knowledge; a-priori, (which he terms "intuitive")being achieved without experience of any kind, and a-posteriori (which he terms “empirical”), arising from analysis of one’s experiences. His first major mistake is to attribute a-priori knowledge to “intuition”. By making that identification, he clearly makes the assumption that intuition is not based on experience, a rather extreme assumption. I strongly suspect that he made that error because he needed a source for that a-priori knowledge and “intuition” was the only thing he could come up with.

 

Kant himself essentially points out the impossibility of a-priori knowledge in his section, “The General Problem of Pure Reason”.

Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question, How are synthetical judgments a-priori possible?

In the same section, he credits David Hume with the closest approach to the problem. At the same time, Kant complains about the fact that David Hume held that a-priori knowledge was entirely impossible. It is quite evident that Kant held this to be an obviously illogical statement:

If he [Hume] had grasped our problem in all its universality, he would never have thought of an assertion which destroys all pure philosophy, because he would have perceived that, according to his argument, no pure mathematical science was possible either, on account of its certainly containing synthetical propositions a-priori; and from such an assertion his good sense would probably have saved him.

It seems to me that Kant shows a major deficit in his comprehension of mathematics. Mathematics is little more than a very carefully examined synthetical construct. It seems quite clear to me that any decent mathematician would accept any abstract structure shown to be totally internally self consistent to be a “mathematical” structure (in most cases, he would immediately reduce that abstract structure to something which has already been examined as mathematics is a very broad subject). The ontology of mathematics is as intuitively (i.e.,from experience) generated as is any other field. What makes it “pure” is the fact that it is without contradiction (at least as best as the mathematicians can manage to achieve). In no way can the existence of mathematics (and its presumed “purity” of essence) be held as evidence of the existence of a-priori knowledge.

 

I don’t know Hume’s position, but, if he did hold that a-priori knowledge was impossible, I would certainly agree with him and not Kant. It seems to me that all knowledge must be based upon past experience in some way and whether that experience be personal experience of an individual or the experience provided to the entity via evolution is of no real consequence, it can still be credited to experience.

 

However, there is certainly a very great difference between deduced conclusions and inductive conclusions. Philosophers make much of the fact that those deduced conclusions are based upon a-priori inductive foundations. But that fact does not diminish the significance of analytic truths (truths which are dependent only upon definition itself). It seems to me that the common philosophic separation of this issue is fairly clearly expressed through the division between ontology and epistemology, ontology commonly refers to the collection of things concepts or ideas held to be the foundation of a field (in philosophy that would be the fundamental question of what exists).

 

I tried, in the first thread I started on this forum (posted almost two years ago) to clarify my idea of how the issue of deductive and inductive reasoning should be separated. It seems that I exceeded the attention span of most all of you. The essence of that post can be summarized in four sentences.

The power of intuition is that it can bring together vast amounts of information and discover apparent connections utterly inconceivable on a conscious level. The weakness of intuition lies with the same fact; the vastness of the information handled guarantees that no finite effort exists which can assure the validity of its conclusions (logically every intuitive conclusion must be taken with a grain of salt). The power of rational thought is that it can examine the relations used to reach its conclusion and assure the validity of those conclusions. The weakness of rational thought is that only extremely small volumes of information can be handled: i.e., don't expect it to solve all your problems.

 

It should be clear to all of you that, if a valid ontology exists, what this ontology consists of is certainly beyond our knowing a-priori; it has to be learned subject. Prior to being learned or understood the correct ontology is no more than a collection of undefined “things”: concepts, objects, ideas…., whatever! The central issue everyone seems to miss is the very fact that this “ontology” being referred to has to be regarded as a collection of undefined things.

 

That is, the definitions people put up for ontological elements are divined from arguments based on those ontological elements. These definitions are developed from functioning explanations as those explanations are refined. What needs to be understood here is that the definitions of those ontological elements can not be a-priori information: they themselves must be explained.

The problem most everyone seems to have with the issue of ontology is that they cannot comprehend not knowing what they have to work with and thus fail at the very first step. The issue being that the moment you put meaning to any ontological element, you are already outside the field of ontology and are, in fact, creating an epistemological argument: i.e., attaching meaning to an ontological element requires understanding the explanation of a definition and that is the essence of epistemology.

The very essence of metaphysics is understanding what can be said about ontology without defining any specific ontology. That is, in fact, the very essence of my paper on explanation.

 

If anyone here can come up with a concept more basic than “an explanation” I would be quite interested in their arguments. I was very tempted to say “their explanation” but that sort of presumes they are wrong (think about that for a moment). Baring the existence of a more basic concept, it follows, as the night the day, that the absolute first effort of any objective scientific analysis of metaphysics must begin by examining exactly what it is that should be used to qualify something as “an explanation”. An effort apparently attempted by no one other than myself. As you all l know very well, my opinions on that issue are expressed in the document “A Universal Analytical Model of Explanation Itself”.

 

So long as you refuse to come to grips with that central problem, you will all be doomed to “exercise [yourselves] in mock fights”.

 

So, is anyone here interested in a scientific approach to ontology? Or is this forum merely a preferred arena of mock logic? What I would like to do is discuss metaphysics from the perspective of an exact science.

 

Have fun -- Dick

[Rade]

Hello,

 

I would like to start with these comments you make about a priori knowledge.

 

First you state this:

 

...Kant complains about the fact that David Hume held that a-priori knowledge was entirely impossible. It is quite evident that Kant held this to be an obviously illogical statement...

 

Then this:

 

...I don’t know Hume’s position, but, if he did hold that a-priori knowledge was impossible, I would certainly agree with him and not Kant...

 

So clearly you (eg, Doctordick) hold a priori knowledge impossible.

 

But, then you submit a manuscript link with this as the logical starting point of an argument:

 

...Everything presented [in the manuscript] will be presented as an absolute truth in the sense of the philosophic concept of an analytical truth. as per Immanuel Kant: "Analytic truth is a priori, necessarily true, independent of reality...

 

So, how about we start here, how it is exactly that you hold a priori knowledge impossible then take time and effort to write a manuscript based on a false premise ?

[Doctordick]

Hi Rade, I don't usually answer your posts because you seem be a lot more interested in setting up "mock fights" then you are in understanding what I say; however, in this particular case, I will take the trouble to specifically answer your profound query.

 

First your difficulty resides in the vagueness of common English. It is interesting that you removed a big percentage of my statements in a clearly motivated attempt to remove them from context. I hope that most readers are sharp enough to see around such blatant misrepresentations.

...Kant complains about the fact that David Hume held that a-priori knowledge was entirely impossible. It is quite evident that Kant held this to be an obviously illogical statement...

This arises directly from his division of knowledge into two categories, "a-priori, (which he terms "intuitive")being achieved without experience of any kind" and "a-posteriori (which he terms “empirical”), arising from analysis of one’s experiences".

..I don’t know Hume’s position, but, if he did hold that a-priori knowledge was impossible, I would certainly agree with him and not Kant...

I am disagreeing with Kant's presumption that "knowledge" can be achieved without experience of any kind.

...Everything presented [in the manuscript] will be presented as an absolute truth in the sense of the philosophic concept of an analytical truth. as per Immanuel Kant: "Analytic truth is a priori, necessarily true, independent of reality...

This particular use of the term "a priori" need not require "knowledge achieved without experience of any kind" (in fact the use here has no connection with "knowledge" at all); it is, instead, a statement of the consequences of acceptance truth by definition. If one accepts a specific definition as a statement of what is meant by a term, then, in further arguments, the fact that the term refers to that statement is an analytical truth and as such, that particular fact has utterly nothing to do with reality. Just because Kant was easily confused does not mean that everything he said was invalid.

So, how about we start here, how it is exactly that you hold a priori knowledge impossible then take time and effort to write a manuscript based on a false premise ?

I seriously wonder if you could detect a false premise if one was right in front of you.

 

Have fun -- Dick

[Rade]

First post deleted.

So where in front of us do we find the false premise of this class of argument ?:

 

Originally Posted by Doctordick:

...Everything presented [in the manuscript] will be presented as an absolute truth in the sense of the philosophic concept of an analytical truth. as per Immanuel Kant: "Analytic truth is a priori, necessarily true, independent of reality...

 

The false premise is put in bold and red, eg.; that what must be necessarily and analytically true must be a priori and independent of reality and thus cannot be factual. Kants theory of a so-called analytic-synthetic dichotomy is rooted in two types of errors, one epistemological (eg, concepts have meaning apart from their units), the second metaphysical (there is dichotomy between necessary and contingent facts). Any argument (such as that here by DoctorDick) presented as an absolute truth in the sense of Kants false analytic-synthetic dichotomy is based on a false premise and thus, like all such arguments, it is factually incorrect.

[Tormod]

I would agree with Kant that metaphysics lead to mock fights. If we take the (rather big) leap and assume science is akin to metaphysics, then mock fights appear when people think they have the *truth*, and fail to see that all they have is *interpretation of data*. Biased interpretation as such, even.

 

I agree with Hume in that I favor empirical analysis as the only way to work with the scientific method. Since modern science is based upon the scientific method, there can be no such thing as "objectivity", but there can be levels of bias that are acceptable.

[Doctordick]

I would agree with Kant that metaphysics lead to mock fights. If we take the (rather big) leap and assume science is akin to metaphysics, then mock fights appear when people think they have the *truth*, and fail to see that all they have is *interpretation of data*. Biased interpretation as such, even.

It appears to me that "taking the leap" you propose amounts to burying the difference between "hard" and "soft" science. Historically, there is certainly enough difference to lend meaning to the differentiation and predictive success seems related to the very issue being swept under the rug here.

 

I was trained as a physicist and, by the time I received my Ph.D. I was pretty disappointed with physics because they had no interest in examining their ontological assumptions. Of course, I didn't know that was my problem at the time because I hadn't any experience with philosophical issues; all I knew was that their conclusions were based on very mushy foundations. I ended up looking at things which were of no interest to the physics community at all. Over the years, I discovered a rather humorous fact: physicists I approached said I was doing philosophy (which was outside their interest), philosophers told me I was doing mathematics (which was outside their interest) and mathematicians said I was doing physics (which was outside their interest). So certainly whatever I was doing was clearly outside everyone's interest.

I agree with Hume in that I favor empirical analysis as the only way to work with the scientific method. Since modern science is based upon the scientific method, there can be no such thing as "objectivity", but there can be levels of bias that are acceptable.

Ok, I can go along with that. The question then becomes, do you find the bias I put forth acceptable?

 

It seems to me that that the philosophic academy (if such a thing exists) has made it quite clear that their definitions do not lead to solid foundations of any kind. In my opinion, that is a direct consequence of the inadequacy of their definitions. My bias is then, if you want to follow my thoughts, you need to use my definitions; not argue about them not being your definitions.

 

As I have said many times in the past, if our purpose is to "understand", the first concept we must have in our mind is "an explanation". Without a concept of "an explanation", how can we possibly understand anything? My definition of "an explanation" is quite simple: I define "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. Can you work with that definition? I am neither defining "given known information" nor "expectations"; those are issues to be established by the ontology we are trying to understand.

 

I am only trying to establish a starting point for rational analysis. I am looking forward to your response -- Dick

[Qfwfq]

There are certainly semantic issues to watch out for, as is typical especially when reading a text written in past centuries as well as in another language.

 

His first major mistake is to attribute a-priori knowledge to “intuition”. By making that identification, he clearly makes the assumption that intuition is not based on experience, a rather extreme assumption. I strongly suspect that he made that error because he needed a source for that a-priori knowledge and “intuition” was the only thing he could come up with.

When I read that stuff, I gradually ;) came to the conclusion that he uses 'intuition' to indicate what is immediately manifest by our direct senses, and distinguishes this from 'experience'.

 

Further, I would bring your attention to the word synthetical and the counterpart analytic, in Kant's critique.

 

Kant himself essentially points out the impossibility of a-priori knowledge in his section, “The General Problem of Pure Reason”.

 

Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question, How are synthetical judgments a-priori possible?

 

In the same section, he credits David Hume with the closest approach to the problem. At the same time, Kant complains about the fact that David Hume held that a-priori knowledge was entirely impossible. It is quite evident that Kant held this to be an obviously illogical statement:

I remember well that he showed how a-priori knowledge could only be analytic and couldn't be synthetic. Actually, once his use of terms is clear, it is perhaps tautological.

 

I think that whether Kant or Hume is right depends a lot on carefully defining the terms.

 

"A sphere is round."

 

Is that intuitive? Is it a-priori? Is it analytic? :doh:

[Tormod]

It appears to me that "taking the leap" you propose amounts to burying the difference between "hard" and "soft" science.

 

I don't know about that. I merely pointed out that IMHO there is bias in every field of science, regardless of how hard it is.

 

Ok, I can go along with that. The question then becomes, do you find the bias I put forth acceptable?

 

I don't think it matters much what I think about your bias. Since this is a philosophic discussion there will be all kinds and all levels of bias, and I'd need to know a lot more about you before I can even begin to understand it.

 

That's the main difference between natural sciences and philosophy: In natural sciences the foundations used can be empirical but the experimentation must be (ie the scientific method must be followed). The bias here is usually either hidden but somehow implied (paid research, for example) or it is very complex (many researchers who have different personal biases).

 

In philosophy there is no absolute requirement that the scientific method be followed as long as logical fallacies are ruled out by the writer. Thus bias tends to be directly related to the particular researcher and as such more difficult to evaluate.

 

I am not saying one is better than the other. It is just different. Richard Feynman was one of those philosopher scientists (who did very "hard" science) who despised philosophy... I think he meant it in jest.

 

My definition of "an explanation" is quite simple: I define "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. Can you work with that definition?

 

I read this as the definition of research. An explanation is simply an assumption about something. It may or may not be correct.

[TheFaithfulStone]

I think Kant meant that analytical truth was truth by definition, not be experience - as Q says - a hair tautological.

 

For example, you do not need to experience A & C together to know that if A=B and B=C then C=A. The particular equation is always true, regardless of what A&C actually ARE, so in a sense it's true that it's "independent of reality."

 

"A sphere is round" by definition, so that's not much help, but if you take that as a definition, you can prove without experience that a circle is a two-dimensional version of a sphere. If you were to take something that seems a little less obvious - such as "A igglyaboo (and only an iglyaboo) is perfectly farkle, and 3 dimensional" and you know that "A Tagliablue is also perfectly farkle, and 2 dimensional" you can know that a igglyaboo could project a Tagliablue, without ever having actually done the test to see if it's true.

 

TFS

[okay, so ignore for a minute that cylinders and cones could also project circles - the point is that if something is farkle in two dimensions it has at least one farkle dimension in 3D - and you can know that without having any idea what it means to be farkle.]

[Doctordick]

I don't know about that. I merely pointed out that IMHO there is bias in every field of science, regardless of how hard it is.

My question was inserted in response to your comment, "Since modern science is based upon the scientific method, there can be no such thing as "objectivity", but there can be levels of bias that are acceptable". As I stated, I would like to discuss the subject of ontology and the only opening constraint I place on the discussion is,

I define "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. Can you work with that definition?

that is, I am asking you if you find that opening constraint on the discussion too biased to be acceptable?

I read this as the definition of research. An explanation is simply an assumption about something. It may or may not be correct.

Well, I guess that's your prerogative but, to me, it seems far too biased outside the normal meaning of the term to be a useful definition and I have utterly no comprehension as to why you would want to work with such a definition. If one goes to use "research is a method of obtaining expectations from given known information" one immediately runs into difficulties. "Research" is a title commonly attached to the act of accumulating information and, if one is working only with known information, it is pretty clear that no research is required. The definition appears to be openly self contradictory or we are outside the common meaning of "research".

 

Then you assert that "An explanation is simply an assumption about something"? I am afraid I find that definition quite lacking in detail. Suppose I assume A is equal to B. How is that an explanation and exactly what is being explained? I think my definition is much more in line with common usage. Give me something which the world would accept as an explanation which does not begin with the assumption of some facts (known information) or leads to no expectations whatsoever. Or, as an alternative, point out a proceedure (a procedure which cannot be seen as "an explanation") which starts with some facts and, based on those facts, yields expectations of some sort. Every "explanation" of anything which I have ever heard seems to include those two aspects.

 

Personally, I don't care much for "mock fights" so I have no desire to fight over such issues. If you think my position is so biased as to be unacceptable; I can accept that.

I think that whether Kant or Hume is right depends a lot on carefully defining the terms.

 

"A sphere is round."

 

Is that intuitive? Is it a-priori? Is it analytic? :evil:

Well, as I said, I was trained in physics, not philosophy so my interpretation could certainly be wrong. Also, as I have said before, most languages are very complex constructs subject to easy misinterpretation, that's why I like to keep things simple (the phrase, "A sphere is round", can be interpreted many ways). In this particular case (regarding explanations), I am interested in "truth by definition" as a communication convenience, not as an axiomatic statement. I am sorry if that was not what is commonly meant by the term "analytic truth". If we agree as to what is going to be meant by the term "an explanation" then the possibility of communication exists; if we disagree, there is simply nothing for us to talk about.

[okay, so ignore for a minute that cylinders and cones could also project circles - the point is that if something is farkle in two dimensions it has at least one farkle dimension in 3D - and you can know that without having any idea what it means to be farkle.]

Sounds scientifically objective to me! But I'm easy. :D

 

Again, I am only trying to establish a starting point for rational analysis of ontology and am looking forward to a response on that issue -- Dick

[JRC]

Quo Vadimus?

 

Zero Ontology?

 

This is my first post on this forum. So a big halo to all.

 

For what its worth, I would like to put my own two cents in to 'one aspect' of this discussion. For the moment I exclude one of my own interest,- Zero Ontology, by way of merely joining in.

 

Can we not say that such ideas have no more meaning than the idea that the summation of all substantial reality, is either unintelligible or "Can not be Known", to one's self?

 

Similarly, we may also argue that the question ' Priori Knowledge', is as equally unintelligible in terms of the limitations placed upon our cognitive processes, and on what I consider "The limit of Conceptualized Reality"

 

Conceptualized Reality, in this sense, refers to the idea that all human Perceptions, Thoughts, and Concepts, are merely the product of a three dimensional pardiagram, that "may not be known", out side of a three dimensional frame of references.

 

When we ask such questions as the limitation to Priori vs Scientific Method, are we not merely attempting, 'in both instances', to "know our self's" within the bounds of our own limited three dimensional experiences?

 

Such questions, 'for most' seem to cause our logical processes to some how stall.

 

I refer to this as the duality of mind, and describe it as the limitations to a three dimensional conceptualization of the human experience.

 

Just though I would share my thinking on this, by way of introduction to the forum.

 

John.

[WuffenCuckoo]

Benjamin Franklin wrote:

 

The most exquisite folly is made of wisdom spun too fine.

[HydrogenBond]

If you look at Einstein's theories of relativity, this did not stem from any direct empirical experience. It is outside the normal range of human experinece. It was based on a priori or intuitive understanding that started within Einstein. His inner reality led to a major advancement in thinking bring us closer to reality.

 

This is not metaphysical at all. It is simply a function of right versus left hemisphere thinking. The left hemipshere is more analytical and therefore constrainted to logic and empiricm, i.e., cause and affect. The right hemisphere is spatial or 3-D and organizes data with an extra dimension. It is more like cause, affect and what could be. The problem with 3-D thought is that it is hard to translate, usually creating subjectivity in place of the third dimension of what might be.

 

To put things in perspective, 1-D thinking is pure memory, that does not require logical understanding. Most people can do that. If we bump thinking up to 2-D or logic, i.e., cause and affect, this is much harder to do in comparison. Bumping thinking up to 3-D puts logic in the same boat as logic puts 1-D memorizing A logical person trying to think in 3-D typically lead to the third dimension appearing as subjectivity and is therefore assumed to useless to science. In reality, 3-D is a very fast language not easily translated with logic alone. It usally appears as a fast forward blurr that can be only felt/perceieved with intuition. Einstein was able to translate at least an aspect of his fast 3-D memory when he developed relativity.

 

If you look at nature, for example an eco-system, it is integrated in 3-D. One can break it down the eco-system into logical relationships. But often things are left out since logic and/or empiricism is not enough to account for everything. The use of statistics/chaos is an attempt to add another dimension to 2-D to explain things that occur naturally in 3-D. That extra dimension allows what can be without fully translating.

 

The goal should not be taboo, with respect to 3-D thought. An effort should be made to advance thought to 3-D. I suppose this goal is analogous to when people just memoried stuff without thinking and logical people came along at the beginning of the Age of Enlightment showing rational relationships in reality. This new wave thinking was considered taboo and needed to be avoided, less people expand their minds with logic and become more than linear.