Answering Qfwfq

Rade · October 4, 2010

AnssiH... thank you for your example about alien data patterns. Let me try to understand.

1. Some raw data information arrives from aliens to some earth sensor (some machine that senses evidence of data).

2. The raw data are revealed to be data by the sensor (that is, they have data identity), but the meaning (or not) of the raw data is completely unknown to the sensor.

3. The raw data continue to arrive over time, the set of unknown data grows, the sensor must then have a way to store the raw data whose meaning is unknown. The place of storage is assumed to be a different place than the place of sensor. That is, sense of data and storage of data are two different operations.

4. The meaning of old raw data received by the sensor is just as unknown as newly arrived data, thus raw data from the past are unknown to meaning, but known to the extent they have been revealed to be data to the sensor. Thus the past is partly unknown (as to meaning of raw data stored) and partly known (the sensor knows raw data are being received over time and it knows the data must be stored if any meaning is to be extracted from them).

5. In summary, it is only possible for the sensor to "observe" that data exist as data and to store the data for future operation (i.e., interpretation or to look for patterns).

[note: I think the above is what you mean when you say that in your (and DD) terminology it makes no sense to say you can observe what the information means]. Here I would agree completely. But, do you agree with my position that it does make sense at this point of the example to claim that some sensor can observe that data exist as data ? (this is what I have been trying to explain for two years to DD with absolutely no success).

==

6. The next step is to take the stored unknown data and to have some part of the machine, other than the sensor, search for pattern, with the goal of future prediction of pattern. Perhaps this operation is the same location as where the data are stored (I suspect it most logical to assume not the same location). You indicate it is a type of "computer program".

7. The search for pattern by the computer program is basically a search for meaning, but this search has absolutely nothing to say about the intrinsic nature of the raw data nor anything about the aliens that send it. All we know about the raw data is that they exist, for if not, then no pattern could be looked for (that is, looking for pattern is a meaningless concept within non-existence).

8. During the process of looking for patterns some sets of data may be identified, and these unique sets put aside to form a concept about the raw data, and then given a definition to allow for communication with another machine, or with another location within the machine. At this stage of the process unknown data as to meaning are transformed into data with known meaning. Now, at this stage there exists two different claims of "knowing" (1) the knowledge of the sensor that raw data exist to be sensed (2) the known meaning of the raw data after the transformation. I think these two ways of "knowing" have not been made clear so far in the presentation of DD--I hope you will agree.

9 The search for pattern in the raw data could end two ways (1) a pattern is found (2) no pattern is found. Whatever the outcome of the analysis of raw data, something of importance is learned about aliens that send raw data. Either they send data with pattern or they send data without pattern. Both results allow for future prediction of the raw data (that is, it is as important to know that data have random pattern or aggregated pattern or redundant pattern, etc.). All pattern results allow for your survival, since the only constraint on survival (in your example) is "to predict what sort of data would come next"--that is, will future data have a pattern or not, and if yes, what type of pattern.

10. It is possible that once a pattern is found, and a prediction made about the future, that new future raw data input will show the past prediction to be completely incorrect. Thus, what is "predicted" is always predicted with a certain degree of uncertainty about future raw data input.

==

Next you had this to say:

I'm sure you can also see' date=' that that same exact computer program can be used to yield meaningful predictions for any information regardless of what the "real meaning" of that information is. In building of that program, you never made any assumptions about what the information is. The way it internally categorizes and handles the information is always the same.[/quote'] Yes, I would agree there is no "real meaning" to the raw data, only "real raw data" with potential for meaning if they are intercepted by a sensor, and then connected to a computer program that searches for pattern.

I hold that this continued building of "uncertain knowledge" of past data patterns is what we call the process of Science--the accumulation of uncertain knowledge of data patterns from alien sources (sources alien to the human senses), that allow for prediction to help future survival, not only of individual humans, but the species as a whole. Now, I hope you agree with this statement, because, if so, much of our disagreement over the past two years ends.

It also seems to me, that the importance of the Fundamental Equation of DD is that it relates to "the way it (computer program) internally categories and handles the information [unknown raw data]". Without the Fundamental Equation no meaning is possible to be extracted from raw data, the Fundamental Equation "is" the computer program. Apparently DD completely disagrees with me on this issue (at least that is my understanding of what he told me)--but I do not understand why this is incorrect understanding.

I could go on, but I will stop here to see if you have any comments.

Qfwfq · October 5, 2010

Is that correct interpretation of your question?

Heck, Anssi, I mean phenomena just as Kant means it, distinct from noumena and ding an sich, just a way of making you understand that I meant nothing about ontology. Who needs wiki-schmiki?

Well even if I don't have the competence to address your argument, could you please just point it out to me because I didn't spot it after skimming through all the confusion of this thread :D (Admittedly, I have not read it very carefully)

If case 2 is your actual contention, what you would need to convince me of is that you can recover the Lorentz covariance in a manner that doesn't rely on choices that turn out to be ad hoc. My vague suspicion is that, when you introduce those matrices and their anticommutation rules, it boils down to pulling the covariant structure out of Dirac's rect... ehem, er... hat, as is often done in shorthand courses.

This was a point I made to Dick and he refuses to address it. He also missed that I said Dirac's hat, not his.

Anssi, I was trying to get a point straight with you about what I did and didn't mean about a fact being supported by observation and your judgement of this being oxymoronic; it seems you aren't keeping track at all. There's no hope.

This would be easier for me without the cheeky additions. (I'm serious, I don't know if there's some sort of point embedded in there or not)

I meant nothing cheeky toward you, actually it was a recognition of having so far been cheeky toward Claudia, but celebrities are accustomed to that. I doubt she would actually punch me on the nose, she would probably have fits of giggles at the idea of being mentioned in this raging debate in Philosophy of Science about such arcane topics that are so removed from catwalks and cashmere fashion lines.

Anssi, it is a hard (oh, so hard!) fact supported by all my observation that Claudia is already married to Matthew Vaughn and has two kids. If there is any other coherent way of interpreting all my neurosensory data so far up to now, by a different wiring of my brain, with at least that much difference, it would likely be a worldview according to which such an exquisitely enchanting woman doesn't even exist; who knows what kind of critter I would find seductive anyway... better not even try to imagine. And of course it's only phenomena, appearance according to our perception.

And triangles have three sides...

As long as Nanny has already taught Baby to count at least three, and gestures well enough to make Baby understand what she means these "sides" are. Nanny would never tell Baby that triangle is defined as a three sided polygon, defining polygon as a closed polygonal &c... Baby can just see the shape Nanny is showing, and her finger running along each of the sides, as she says those words and counts one-two-three sides. At that point Baby can likely tell a triangle apart from a square, a circle or a ball.

Or did you rather mean to ask, "is it possible that one world-view interprets some undefined information as if there's a ball there, and another world-view interprets that same information differently?" What do you think? And why?

Well, there actually is a slight chance that what you are meaning to say here is along the lines of what I was trying to make a point about...:rolleyes:

Perhaps I can address one of the old points that was exhausting my patience:

I should comment, that I don't view this issue as a question about solipsism or realism (it's not really an interesting question to me)

I really thought I had worded my point well enough to avoid this misunderstanding. I did not confuse solipsism with your points about interpretation, about what constitutes "a real object", and what's just "a useful definition" and what constitutes the "real" identity of something. Surely you can see the strong nexus though, that these and solipsism are aspects of the same thing; surely you could have gathered that if I had thought of solipsism long before anyone had taught me any related philosophical topics, I can't be having the kind of difficulty that you keep perceiving me to have? When I try to show you that I see these things and even more, you think I'm misunderstanding you. You don't seem to see further than the each single sentence I write, nor the implications of other things I say. That is what strikes me like staring at the index finger of someone that is pointing toward the stars. Is there any chance we have got past these things?

AnssiH · October 5, 2010

Okay, I feel like we are one step closer to the root of the problem!

I'll just concentrate on one issue before I say more;

Heck, Anssi, I mean phenomena just as Kant means it, distinct from noumena and ding an sich, just a way of making you understand that I meant nothing about ontology. Who needs wiki-schmiki?

Now here. Let's first figure out whether we even understand Kant the same way.

In my mind, noumena refers either to the actual ontological structure of reality, or alternatively to the actual facts of the information-to-be-explained, in a form that is free of human definitions. Thus, it is also not something that can be thought about (because thinking about something means you are doing so with some definitions)

As an interrelated concept to this, phenomena refers to how something appears to senses, i.e. it is the noumena having been interpreted according to some definitions.

To relate this to DD's terminology, the undefined information is the unthinkable noumena, and any "phenomological observation" (i.e. any perception), is a specific interpretation, done according to some specific world-view (or "explanation").

Now, given that I have the above in mind, when you say....

I think current theoretical methodology is less dependent on undefendable ontological assumptions than you put it. I've already tried to point out some semantic issues, but researchers certainly vary about these things; the crowd of them hardly cares to be bothered by considerations about Kant's ding an sich but the most theoretical stuff could hardly be called ontological assumption. It's mostly mathematical choices for phenomenological circumstances and the consequences of these choices that can be compared to data.

Concerning the Bell inequalities, I'm not 100% that you are distinguishing between saying that, according to a formalism, we "do not expect them to" hold and saying that we "expect them not to" hold. I'm not fully sure of what you mean when outlining your understanding of these things. For the weaker of these two propositions, it is sufficient not to hold the opinion of Einstein et al. (and translate it the way Bell did) so Dick's formalism certainly isn't necessary for this. The stronger proposition is consequential to applying some very basic aspects of QM formalism to certain phenomenological circumstances and I don't see how this can be said to depend on ontological assumptions

...that doesn't really make sense to me. Having a phenomological circumstance means, by definition, that it is already an interpretation of something unknown. That is why I was asking, what does it mean to observe (as oppose to interpret) something from undefined information.

Now how did you mean it?

-Anssi

AnssiH · October 5, 2010

AnssiH... thank you for your example about alien data patterns. Let me try to understand.

1. Some raw data information arrives from aliens to some earth sensor (some machine that senses evidence of data).

2. The raw data are revealed to be data by the sensor (that is, they have data identity), but the meaning (or not) of the raw data is completely unknown to the sensor.

Well I don't know what you mean by "data identity", but I suspect it is irrelevant. The point is just that there is something to be explained, and we don't know anything about its real meaning.

3. The raw data continue to arrive over time, the set of unknown data grows, the sensor must then have a way to store the raw data whose meaning is unknown. The place of storage is assumed to be a different place than the place of sensor. That is, sense of data and storage of data are two different operations.

Well how the information is stored is irrelevant, but it is of course relevant that it is stored, i.e. our current world-view is a function of all past data (it must explain all past data in order to be considered valid)

4. The meaning of old raw data received by the sensor is just as unknown as newly arrived data, thus raw data from the past are unknown to meaning, but known to the extent they have been revealed to be data to the sensor. Thus the past is partly unknown (as to meaning of raw data stored) and partly known (the sensor knows raw data are being received over time and it knows the data must be stored if any meaning is to be extracted from them).

That seems like a re-iteration of your 3rd comment.

5. In summary, it is only possible for the sensor to "observe" that data exist as data and to store the data for future operation (i.e., interpretation or to look for patterns).

[note: I think the above is what you mean when you say that in your (and DD) terminology it makes no sense to say you can observe what the information means]. Here I would agree completely.

Yes, and then you can probably also see that when Qfwfq says something like "Baby can just see the shape Nanny is showing", that is immediately off the topic of "the transformation that turns undefined information into sensible interpretation".

But, do you agree with my position that it does make sense at this point of the example to claim that some sensor can observe that data exist as data ? (this is what I have been trying to explain for two years to DD with absolutely no success).

Like I've commented before, that's just to say that we know something exists. But again, when you say "data exists as data", I have no idea why you feel the need to separately specify something like that. That just implies you can define what it means that something is "data". I.e. it means you imply intrinsic properties to the "information-to-be-explained". There are things that you can say are universal to all information that our world view is based on (such as, the amount of the information is finite), but I can't tell if that's what you are referring to when you just say "data".

So, just be careful there, and keep in mind that we can't say anything about the meaning of the information, or how it should be read (like what sorts of things are relevant in it) or anything like that. I.e. pay attention to how we are limited to try and recognize familiar patterns one way or another (familiar to other parts of the information)

6. The next step is to take the stored unknown data and to have some part of the machine, other than the sensor, search for pattern, with the goal of future prediction of pattern. Perhaps this operation is the same location as where the data are stored (I suspect it most logical to assume not the same location). You indicate it is a type of "computer program".

Those kinds of specifics of that operation are irrelevant; ultimately we are just interested of discussing about the logical consequences of us limited to draw our expectations from familiarity to some patterns in some sense.

7. The search for pattern by the computer program is basically a search for meaning, but this search has absolutely nothing to say about the intrinsic nature of the raw data nor anything about the aliens that send it. All we know about the raw data is that they exist, for if not, then no pattern could be looked for (that is, looking for pattern is a meaningless concept within non-existence).

8. During the process of looking for patterns some sets of data may be identified, and these unique sets put aside to form a concept about the raw data, and then given a definition to allow for communication with another machine, or with another location within the machine. At this stage of the process unknown data as to meaning are transformed into data with known meaning. Now, at this stage there exists two different claims of "knowing" (1) the knowledge of the sensor that raw data exist to be sensed (2) the known meaning of the raw data after the transformation. I think these two ways of "knowing" have not been made clear so far in the presentation of DD--I hope you will agree.

You have to be careful here; there are limits to my thought experiment. Those limits are exactly that it (harmfully) implies something about the "undefined data"; it implies it is measured from a sky with an antenna etc etc. Those ideas already may put some constraints onto what the meaning of the information can be. So, to pull this thought experiment to the context of DD's analysis, the actual source of the information-to-b-explained is also unknown (Not coming from the sky, not being measured by antenna) I.e, there is undefined information.

9 The search for pattern in the raw data could end two ways (1) a pattern is found (2) no pattern is found. Whatever the outcome of the analysis of raw data, something of importance is learned about aliens that send raw data. Either they send data with pattern or they send data without pattern. Both results allow for future prediction of the raw data (that is, it is as important to know that data have random pattern or aggregated pattern or redundant pattern, etc.). All pattern results allow for your survival, since the only constraint on survival (in your example) is "to predict what sort of data would come next"--that is, will future data have a pattern or not, and if yes, what type of pattern.

Actually, this comment expands into a discussion about whether it is possible to recognize SOME sorts of patterns from ANY sort of information, given large enough volume of information. It's a complicated topic, and for me, I'm currently just thinking that evidently it is possible for us to recognize patterns that follow other patterns, because we do have expectations; we have an ideas regarding what follows what, even though those ideas come in a very specific terminology of our own world-view.

That is the issue I am referring to, when I'm saying that all the expectations are ultimately tied to having recognized some recurring patterns in some sense.

10. It is possible that once a pattern is found, and a prediction made about the future, that new future raw data input will show the past prediction to be completely incorrect. Thus, what is "predicted" is always predicted with a certain degree of uncertainty about future raw data input.

Yes, and that must always be so, because our world view can never be "based on" infinite amount of information. As long as the information that has been accouned for is of finite amount, there exists uncertainty to all expectations.

Unless of course, your expectations contain undefendable assumptions of some sort. That is what newtonian world view contains; it's just an assumption that the rules that explain the past, also explain the future.

Now if you understand that bit, I think you can also trivially understand how Erasmus' argument "Newtonian physics yields absolute probabilities (1 or 0), but DD's fundamental equation does not. Newtonian physics is a self-coherent explanation in itself, thus the fundamental equation does not universally cover all self-coherent explanations", is trivially invalid.

(For instance, when he says "explanation in itself", he is not relating newtonian physics to how it aligns with some undefined data, and he is not thinking about how in that case the certainties are just assumptions. I.e. he is not working with DD's definition of "an explanation")

So what we have at this point is, there is undefined information, being transformed via unknown transformation (i.e. it is being interpreted according to some explanation), yielding a perception/interpretation that comes in some understandable terminology, i.e. in terms of some defined objects.

Next you had this to say:

Yes, I would agree there is no "real meaning" to the raw data, only "real raw data" with potential for meaning if they are intercepted by a sensor, and then connected to a computer program that searches for pattern.

I hold that this continued building of "uncertain knowledge" of past data patterns is what we call the process of Science--the accumulation of uncertain knowledge of data patterns from alien sources (sources alien to the human senses), that allow for prediction to help future survival, not only of individual humans, but the species as a whole. Now, I hope you agree with this statement, because, if so, much of our disagreement over the past two years ends.

I can't see any problems with that statement (semantical issues aside)

It also seems to me, that the importance of the Fundamental Equation of DD is that it relates to "the way it (computer program) internally categories and handles the information [unknown raw data]". Without the Fundamental Equation no meaning is possible to be extracted from raw data, the Fundamental Equation "is" the computer program. Apparently DD completely disagrees with me on this issue (at least that is my understanding of what he told me)--but I do not understand why this is incorrect understanding.

I'm not sure how you mean that, but I could say about the fundamental equation, that it is the logical tool for investigating the logical possibilities, when a world view is based on recurring patterns of some undefined information. What it uncovers in DD's deduction of modern physics is how our human definitions are related to each others in unapparent ways, and things like, why Bell inequality is violated when some recurring patterns are interpreted in such and such ways (in terms of QM). I.e. how that phenomena is in fact entirely epistemological by nature; a side product of using a specific interpretation to "explain" some recurring patterns.

Now that is a topic I tried to get across to Qfwfq for some time, but right now he is saying he doesn't really see how an analysis like that of DD's could reveal anything about that issue. To me, that sounds like he is still thinking of the Bell Inequalities in terms of his specific world view, i.e. in terms of exactly those entities, that do appear to violate Bell inequalities. In other words, he is thinking that the entities defined by QM correspond to reality some way by their supposed persistent identities, as oppose to looking at them as references to some recurring patterns (those recurring patterns being the unthinkable noumena). If my interpretation of him is correct, he is holding on to a hidden belief, is he not?

Now I must say I was pleasantly surprised by your post, I think there's a good chance you can understand something about what I am talking about in the above.

-Anssi

Qfwfq · October 6, 2010

Having a phenomological circumstance means, by definition, that it is already an interpretation of something unknown.

Is an experimental apparatus an interpretation of something unknown?

Well, of course it is but, if you survive well enough in this world, if you're not on LSD all the time and neither have hallucinations by other causes, if you find that things and events you perceive match up well enough that you can successfully avoid pains and seek comforts, you tend to believe these macroscopic objects are at least some kind of likeness to the way you perceive them. We know how many pitfalls there are to this but we are able to understand some aspects of them. At least, enough for it to make sense when you said you gotta learn how to play your new electric guitar; this obviously would make no sense at all if there wasn't something tangible about these objects and if they couldn't be described in terms of (phenomenological) properties.

Does it make sense to say that, after correctly performing a ritual called "tuning" you observe that the chords sound OK? Can this not all be described in terms of phenomena without ontological assumptions?

We can make models of how acting on the strings in certain ways causes the sensory perception that we call sound. Surely there are bad and good models. If a given model bears consequences of how certain actions on the strings ought to sound but, instead, the sound you hear is totally different, you have observed an outcome the model doesn't match up with, you could call it a fact that it's a bad model. The more you observe, the more you can hone down where the model is bad and where it is good.

Rade · October 6, 2010

Hello AnssiH. Well, your last communication was near revolution for me, in that I really do not see that we disagree on anything of significance. So, just to be safe that we are on the same wavelength, I have cut-paste your key comments in an order that makes perfect sense to me. I find that I agree with all of them, and since they are your comments, you should agree with them also :) , but I do highlight terms that I feel important for understanding. Also I include some of my comments in italics. However, perhaps you want to change some of your wording and/or discuss my comments ? :

Quotes of AnssiH:

1. Like I've commented before, that's just to say that we know something exists.

2. The point is just that there is something to be explained, and we don't know anything about its real meaning.

====

I want to highlight the great importance of your use of the word something, and the fact that the something is logically prior to the explanation of it. I agree completely that we cannot "know" anything about the real meaning of the something. Here I agree with Kant, that the something is a dialectic of the [transcendential ideal + empirical real], it is not an either or situation. In the same way ontology and epistemology are not either-or as relates to something, one cannot discuss the one of something without the other.

====

3. Our current world-view is a function of all past data (it must explain all past data in order to be considered valid)

4. It makes no sense to say you can observe what the information means.

5. Keep in mind that we can't say anything about the meaning of the information, or how it should be read.

===

Yes, we cannot say anything about the meaning of raw data information until we recognize (or not) patterns that result from the information. Of course, once patterns are identified, then we can say lots about their meaning and it is best to use reason to do so, even given the limits of pure reason as discussed by Kant, it is all we have to work with.

===

6. Ultimately we are just interested of discussing about the logical consequences of us limited to draw our expectations from familiarity to some patterns in some sense.

7. The actual source of the information-to-be-explained is also unknown (Not coming from the sky, not being measured by antenna) I.e, there is undefined information.

8. I'm currently just thinking that evidently it is possible for us to recognize patterns that follow other patterns, because we do have expectations.

9. As long as the information that has been accounted for is of finite amount, there exists uncertainty to all expectations.

===

After recognition of that fact that something exists that needs explanation, the analysis moves to understanding the role of information in the process of the explanation of the something

===

10. I can't see any problems with that statement (semantical issues aside)---continued building of "uncertain knowledge" of past data patterns is what we call the process of Science--the accumulation of uncertain knowledge of data patterns.... that allow for prediction to help future survival, not only of individual humans, but the species as a whole.

11. Our world view can never be "based on" infinite amount of information. As long as the information that has been accounted for is of finite amount, there exists uncertainty to all expectations....Unless of course, your expectations contain undefendable assumptions of some sort.

===

Here we have identical views of what is called science--the search for uncertain knowledge of past data patterns that result from something that requires explanation

===

12. So what we have at this point is, there is undefined information, being transformed via unknown transformation (i.e. it is being interpreted according to some explanation), yielding a perception/interpretation that comes in some understandable terminology, i.e. in terms of some defined objects.

13. I could say about the fundamental equation, that it is the logical tool for investigating the logical possibilities, when a world view is based on recurring patterns of some undefined information. What it uncovers in DD's deduction of modern physics is how our human definitions are related to each others in unapparent ways.

==

I see nothing with your concluding statements that I disagree with. AnssiH, you may find this hard to believe, but reaching this sort of understand of what DD (and you) have been claiming is the reason I have been so critical of posts in the last two+ years, on this forum and the Physics Forum. I just did not have a clear understanding of what definitions you were using or the logic of how DD (and you) combined to definitions. Just call me a very, very slow learner.

However, having said the above, I continue to disagree with the definition of time used by DD as an index of presents, and I think my alternative definition that it is an index of what is intermediate between presents reaches the same conclusions vis-a-vis the fundamental equation--perhaps a future topic for discussion.

AnssiH · October 10, 2010

One more step closer to the root of the problem...

I should comment that I am putting effort in trying to figure out where these communication obstacles are, because the communication of DD's analysis has apparently been so impossible. In your last post you are expressing very clearly exactly the belief that appears to be so pervasive in physics community, and what DD constantly complains about, as blocking their view towards understanding his analysis. (i.e. you are expressing exactly the idea that you carry with you while trying to interpret what DD is talking about)

Let's see if we can untangle this one.

Is an experimental apparatus an interpretation of something unknown?

Well, of course it is but, if you survive well enough in this world, if you're not on LSD all the time and neither have hallucinations by other causes, if you find that things and events you perceive match up well enough that you can successfully avoid pains and seek comforts, you tend to believe these macroscopic objects are at least some kind of likeness to the way you perceive them. We know how many pitfalls there are to this but we are able to understand some aspects of them. At least, enough for it to make sense when you said you gotta learn how to play your new electric guitar; this obviously would make no sense at all if there wasn't something tangible about these objects and if they couldn't be described in terms of (phenomenological) properties.

When you talk about the idea about your perceptions mathing "well enough" the actual reality, you must be thinking about how a person can't just interpret a wall off from his apartment, while interpreting everything else as he used to. The possibility of such a thing is not at all what is being suggested. (It would be trivially incoherent interpretation for one)

When you imply that there must be some likeness between our perception and the actual reality, you are expressing your belief to some facets of the mental model of reality, that you are using. I think this is the reaction that you make with your physicist' hat on; you are (vaguely) thinking of things we base our conscious efforts on, when building physics models.

I suppose it is not helpful that me and DD talk a lot about "man-made definitions", because that implies we are only referring to conscious efforts of defining things, or to conscious efforts of interpreting our mental perceptions. That is not the case.

We are rather talking about the forming of any sensible mental ideas/perceptions based on some UNDEFINED information. If you were to follow DD's definitions, you should realize he is explicitly talking about explanations to UNDEFINED information. Surely you understand in what sense a mental perception of something would already be "defined information"? If you can understand why naive realism is not really a serious stance to reality, you can also understand that the information entering the cortex is not those objects themselves that we interpret that information as.

So, to bring this back to physics, when people think of things in terms of "reality being like our perceptions of it", they are also limiting their thinking regarding the possibilities open to them. I.e. possibilities, if they were only concerned of their ability to predict UNDEFINED information. (When you refer to phenomological observations, you are taking mental perception as the starting point)

The key point to grasp here is that the immediate mental "perception" is already containing undefendable aspects to it, and it is by itself a result of a specific explanation to some UNDEFINED information. (All major breakthroughs of physics of course being cases of bringing down another undefendable aspect of that interpretation)

When DD is saying that he is only expressing absolutely universal constraints to all explanations, he is NOT referring to universal constraints of explanations of our mental perceptions.

I'm guessing that at this point, you might read that as "his work must then be too universal to make any useful contribution to understanding our reality". Well, you'd be wrong, because it turns out that it explains why it is possible to express your expectations of any recurring patterns, in terms of newtonian objects. That is, it explicitly proves that it is possible to mentally comprehend any UNDEFINED information in exactly those same terms with which we understand reality around us!

If you think about that possibility, you should understand why he is so adamant about not taking the common idea of reality as granted. When you do, you will always grant ontological identity to some objects you have defined yourself (unconsciously or not). That is called "hidden belief", and it limits your ideas of possibilities open to you. (Granting ontological identity to self-defined things is exactly why physicists find the violation of Bell Inequalities so eluding)

Okay, now if you can take your physicist' hat off for a moment, and think about this problem without trying to guess too far ahead. We are concerned with drawing expectations from UNDEFINED information. It should be immediately obvious to you that there is no way to just "observe" what that information means, and as long as you don't want to make any undefendable assumptions about its meaning, you are exclusively limited to drawing your expectations from the known history of that information (i.e. recognizing recurring patterns).

To align that with what I've been talking about all along, notice that any single "mental perception" of any single defined persistent thing, is essentially a reference to a huge amount of underlying UNDEFINED information. If you keep staring a rock that just stays there, you are receiving loads and loads of new information all the time, which you keep interpreting as "the 'rock' just stays there".

We can make models of how acting on the strings in certain ways causes the sensory perception that we call sound. Surely there are bad and good models. If a given model bears consequences of how certain actions on the strings ought to sound but, instead, the sound you hear is totally different, you have observed an outcome the model doesn't match up with, you could call it a fact that it's a bad model. The more you observe, the more you can hone down where the model is bad and where it is good.

That is a case of honing your existing model, i.e. keeping the terminology intact as much as possible. You should realize that it's entirely different issue from being able to interpret UNDEFINED information in multitudes of ways. No one is forcing you to interpret UNDEFINED information in terms of a 3 dimensional space, for instance. If you can prove that some entirely different way to interpret the same information exists, with exactly as good predictions, then you can also understand that it is largely an evolutionary accident that you happen to be perceiving reality the way you do; exactly the same survival rate exists for that different interpretation!

But where DD's analysis comes into play is that there are epistemological constraints that force certain features to your interpretation, and modern physics is just one way to express those features (approximately anyway). Make no mistake about it though, modern physics also does contain a lot of arbitrary definitions, in order to have the specific form that it has. Any specific terminology we are using now, will affect how things will be defined later on (i.e. an issue what Andrew Pickering calls "the sociological history of modern physics").

Now if we are more on the same page after you have read this, think about the following very carefully;

If it can be proven that our mental idea of reality, including QM, is a (predictive) interpretation of some recurring patterns, and thus all the entities that we perceive around us, appear to "exist persistently" simply because some patterns can be interpreted that way (i.e. the very idea of "persistent identity" being just a human idea, not ontologically correct), what do you suppose that implies about something like violation of Bell Inequalities?

-Anssi

AnssiH · October 10, 2010

Hello AnssiH. Well, your last communication was near revolution for me, in that I really do not see that we disagree on anything of significance.

Don't worry, I'm sure it's just a temporary misunderstanding... "with best wishes from the pessimistic finn"

Well okay, on a more serious note;

Quotes of AnssiH:

1. Like I've commented before, that's just to say that we know something exists.
2. The point is just that there is something to be explained, and we don't know anything about its real meaning.

====
I want to highlight the great importance of your use of the word something, and the fact that the something is logically prior to the explanation of it. I agree completely that we cannot "know" anything about the real meaning of the something. Here I agree with Kant, that the something is a dialectic of the [transcendential ideal + empirical real], it is not an either or situation. In the same way ontology and epistemology are not either-or as relates to something, one cannot discuss the one of something without the other.

Now, I can't be at all sure how you mean that, but it tastes like a more traditional discussion about epistemology and ontology. Which revolves more around specific ideas for ontological reality, and their epistemological consequences (or vice versa). And it typically ends up to the logical conclusion that ontological reality cannot be known. (i.e. there is no way to rule out all-but-one possibility, because anything can be described in multitide of ways if you really want to)

Since you picked up that DD's analysis is about being able to interpret some undefined information in a meaningful way (and that multiple valid interpretations always exist), think about how he is purposely avoiding any moves that would require a specific kind of information-to-be-explained. That is important because if he was making an assumption about the structure of the information-to-be-explained, he would be essentially limiting his logical possibilites with some belief.

You can probably appreciate the fact that when you make a single guess about the actual meaning of the information-to-be-explained, you are essentially just moving towards a specific ontology, without being able to defend your move. Essentially, you are just choosing a specific terminology, out of many possibilities.

That is exactly how traditional physics works, and there the idea is often, that if the guess produces correct predictions, that serves as its ontological defense. There are physicists who understand (to some extent) that more properly, they are just limiting their terminology with those guesses. But forgetting this just makes it much harder to go back in your path of guesses, and see all the different possibilities that were open to you before you made certain choices in your terminology. DD is explicitly steering clear from that pitfall.

====
3. Our current world-view is a function of all past data (it must explain all past data in order to be considered valid)
4. It makes no sense to say you can observe what the information means.
5. Keep in mind that we can't say anything about the meaning of the information, or how it should be read.

===
Yes, we cannot say anything about the meaning of raw data information until we recognize (or not) patterns that result from the information. Of course, once patterns are identified, then we can say lots about their meaning and it is best to use reason to do so, even given the limits of pure reason as discussed by Kant, it is all we have to work with.

Recognizing what sorts of patterns follow what sorts of patterns gives us means to make predictions about the information, and it also makes it possible to express those patterns in terms of some defined entities. When I say that we interpret the information, that is the same as inferring "a meaning" of the information. I'm not saying "the meaning", because being able to meaningfully interpret the information does not entail that you have it figured out "as the universe meant it to be figured out". You are only performing one possible interpretation. I.e, it does not entail that the entities that you mentally comprehend, are ontological entities by themselves.

Just as an interesting example, DD's analysis explicitly proves that any undefined information can be interpreted in terms of newtonian entities in any number of dimensions you want to. That is not to say that whatever information you interpret as a "tennis ball" in the 3-dimensional form, would correspond to a single entity in a 4-dimensional form. It is to say that it is possible to draw valid predictions via interpretation where the recurring patterns correspond to defined entities that operate on 4 spatial axes.

If you think about this from the perspective of "explaining undefined information", it should not be much of a stretch to believe such a possibility (and if you took the time to understand DD's proof, you would understand exactly why and how that works).

But if you think about this from the perspective of our common 3-dimensional world view, it is quite impossible to mentally comprehend such translation (between 3D and 4D interpretation of the same situation). The impossibility of intuitively comprehending this is what works as the blockage for many people. They just concentrate onto the "bold claims", trying to understand them in terms of their own definitions, as oppose to concentrating onto the actual proof of those claims... And sure enough, the kicking and screaming is immense!

(Just in the previous post I am trying to make Qfwfq recognize his beliefs of how reality is "like" how he perceives it)

===
6. Ultimately we are just interested of discussing about the logical consequences of us limited to draw our expectations from familiarity to some patterns in some sense.
7. The actual source of the information-to-be-explained is also unknown (Not coming from the sky, not being measured by antenna) I.e, there is undefined information.
8. I'm currently just thinking that evidently it is possible for us to recognize patterns that follow other patterns, because we do have expectations.
9. As long as the information that has been accounted for is of finite amount, there exists uncertainty to all expectations.

===
After recognition of that fact that something exists that needs explanation, the analysis moves to understanding the role of information in the process of the explanation of the something

It's more accurate to say; the analysis moves to understanding the role of universal aspects of explanations of undefined information. I.e. things common to all valid explanations.

Anything that is not common to all valid explanations, would imply an assumption about the meaning of the information. (i.e. ruling out possibly valid interpretations without analysis)

===
12. So what we have at this point is, there is undefined information, being transformed via unknown transformation (i.e. it is being interpreted according to some explanation), yielding a perception/interpretation that comes in some understandable terminology, i.e. in terms of some defined objects.
13. I could say about the fundamental equation, that it is the logical tool for investigating the logical possibilities, when a world view is based on recurring patterns of some undefined information. What it uncovers in DD's deduction of modern physics is how our human definitions are related to each others in unapparent ways.

==
I see nothing with your concluding statements that I disagree with. AnssiH, you may find this hard to believe, but reaching this sort of understand of what DD (and you) have been claiming is the reason I have been so critical of posts in the last two+ years, on this forum and the Physics Forum. I just did not have a clear understanding of what definitions you were using or the logic of how DD (and you) combined to definitions. Just call me a very, very slow learner.

Well right now, I'm thinking a lot about what would be a good way to communicate this analysis, without making implications that make people think about all the wrong things. It is very hard, because it concerns topics that people generally just have very naive stances on. For many people, a superficial interpretation of DD's analysis just looks like he is referring to things that "obviously" cannot be known, and thus they think his deduction of modern physics is just an immaterial re-arrangement of its definitions, and such a thing can always be done. Of course it is entirely immaterial, but there's something quite valuable to be learned there.

However, having said the above, I continue to disagree with the definition of time used by DD as an index of presents, and I think my alternative definition that it is an index of what is intermediate between presents reaches the same conclusions vis-a-vis the fundamental equation--perhaps a future topic for discussion.

I don't know what you mean by your definition of time, but DD's definition is simply meant to be an entirely general way to keep track of the order of the accumulation of the information (without it, that order could not be expressed, i.e. the consequences of it having an accumulation order could not be taken into account).

I.e, making the definition that he makes (just an index for the storage of the information) does not exclude any possibilites about specific world-views defining time however they wish, be it relativistic or newtonian or anything else at all. All of those can be (and will be, incl. general relativity) still expressed in terms of his notation.

You should understand that his definition is carefully defined to be a generally useful reference index, applicaple to any information. As such, of course it is referring to information itself, not somehow to "between" information; the meaning of "between" information has not even been defined in his notation, so...

Effectively, you are referring to something quite different when you say "time", than what it is in terms of DD's analysis.

ps, in the other thread you were wondering how come this is not in a science journal by now. Well, isn't it sort of funny, that the kicking and screaming against special relativity was also quite immense, until Minkowski put it down into terminology that can be more easily intuitively understood, i.e. 4-dimensional relativistic space time... It just seems people can't accept things in too abstract form. Too bad; there is no ontological form to DD's analysis...

Also, his analysis is not about Pioneer anomaly. That's just one interesting detail of it, that his derivation appears to deviate from GR little bit, and there exist observations that would be expected via similar correction to GR. That of course also means, that it's possible to just come up with a new rule or a new entity to patch up modern physics, anything that would correspond exactly to that deviation... ...and sure enough, they already did.

-Anssi

Qfwfq · October 11, 2010

Anssi, let's get it straight. You keep repeating the same things, thinking I have yet to understand them. The more I show that I do understand them and I'm even able to manipulate them, the more you confuse this for my misunderstnding of them. That's what I call staring at the index finger. Can we get over this hurdle? How could I be able to manipulate ideas if I were unable to understand them?

When you talk about the idea about your perceptions mathing "well enough" the actual reality, you must be thinking about how a person can't just interpret a wall off from his apartment, while interpreting everything else as he used to. The possibility of such a thing is not at all what is being suggested. (It would be trivially incoherent interpretation for one)

Sure! The person would be constantly at the risk of banging into the wall, and therefore wouldn't be a successful survival machine. So:

(When you refer to phenomological observations, you are taking mental perception as the starting point)

I am referring to exactly the above matter of coherence, survival mahines, a worldview being valid. If I sadly state that Claudia Schiffer is already married and apparently even had her third child this year, I'm saying the exact same thing as the wall in the above person's appartment.

...it explains why it is possible to express your expectations of any recurring patterns, in terms of newtonian objects. That is, it explicitly proves that it is possible to mentally comprehend any UNDEFINED information in exactly those same terms with which we understand reality around us!

To put it bluntly, I think this is possible without his equation and I don't think his equation is useful for this purpose.

What I don't get with certainty is which things he claims follow as consequence and which things follow from choices he knowingly makes to the purpose of applying his presentation to something specific. I have no intention of wading through his ramblings, I tried to query you and you only say "that comes further down the road" as if I hadn't seen the whole road and there seems to be no hope.

(Granting ontological identity to self-defined things is exactly why physicists find the violation of Bell Inequalities so eluding)

It isn't so simple.

Okay, now if you can take your physicist' hat off for a moment,

and put on an information theorist hat. Suppose you recieve a file from an unknown sender and there is no extension nor other indication of what format it is in. You try opening it Word and it says invalid format, try with Excel and it also gives an error, Corel and Autocad, and many others. You might suppose it was a totally randomly generated sequence of bytes, which are just combinations of eight bits with 255 combinations each. Just before you delete it as rubbish, your geek friend stops you and tries various decompression algorithms first. One of these works and you again try different formats. Acrobat successfully opens it as a .pdf doc and whatìs more, the text content is perfectly grammatical Finnish and its semantics even makes sense. In fact it is a tutorial on how to play the electric guitar, you try following it and find it is a great help in improving your proficiency with the instrument; you no longer have to use headphones to avoid folks complaining, you can now hold a concert in your neighborhood and people like it.

At this point, how seriously would you take the idea that the unknown sender had really sent some engineering project in the format of some unheard of SCADA application that you hadn't tried opening it with, but the byte sequence just happened to be translatable in a manner that made a totally different sense and turned out having great survival value? You never know...

No one is forcing you to interpret UNDEFINED information in terms of a 3 dimensional space, for instance.

That's why I said who knows what kind of critter I would find seductive according to an alternative interpretation, if there is a valid one (that isn't just simply a different choice of gauge or other arbitrarities already apparent in modern physics).

If you can prove that some entirely different way to interpret the same information exists, with exactly as good predictions, then you can also understand that it is largely an evolutionary accident that you happen to be perceiving reality the way you do; exactly the same survival rate exists for that different interpretation!

Call it an evolutionary accident! :rolleyes:

Make no mistake about it though, modern physics also does contain a lot of arbitrary definitions, in order to have the specific form that it has. Any specific terminology we are using now, will affect how things will be defined later on (i.e. an issue what Andrew Pickering calls "the sociological history of modern physics").

Back before I left off replying to you in the other thread, I had a look at the sample of Pickering's book. As far as I could tell, it is interesting I I thing I would pretty much agree if I read the whole thing. I found much more objection to your quotes from John Gribbin's Schrödinger's Kittens, arguing as if no physicist were aware of the model vs. fact issue. As for Bruno Augenstein and the idea of using the work of Banach and Tarski as an alternative to QCD, he would have to show us a model that is at least as good and he would have to replace the whole of quantum field theory as far as I can see. His geometric consideration just plain isn't enough.

If it can be proven that our mental idea of reality, including QM, is a (predictive) interpretation of some recurring patterns, and thus all the entities that we perceive around us, appear to "exist persistently" simply because some patterns can be interpreted that way (i.e. the very idea of "persistent identity" being just a human idea, not ontologically correct), what do you suppose that implies about something like violation of Bell Inequalities?

Complicated territory so I won't address it today, since I've only got this morning anyway. Edited October 11, 2010 by Qfwfq
dumb blunders

AnssiH · October 11, 2010

Anssi, let's get it straight. You keep repeating the same things, thinking I have yet to understand them. The more I show that I do understand them and I'm even able to manipulate them, the more you confuse this for my misunderstnding of them. That's what I call staring at the index finger. Can we get over this hurdle? How could I be able to manipulate ideas if I were unable to understand them?

If you understand what I'm saying, why do you keep bringing up those examples involving different interpretation about Claudie Schiffer's life?

To put it bluntly, I think this is possible without his equation and I don't think his equation is useful for this purpose.

Are you aware of another analysis that proves the same thing in simpler manner?

And perhaps you can clarify, what is it exactly that you disagree with about his analysis at this point?

What I don't get with certainty is which things he claims follow as consequence and which things follow from choices he knowingly makes to the purpose of applying his presentation to something specific. I have no intention of wading through his ramblings, I tried to query you and you only say "that comes further down the road" as if I hadn't seen the whole road and there seems to be no hope.

Well I understand you don't want to walk through the analysis properly but perhaps you shouldn't criticize it on superficial understanding then either. I mean, my reaction to replying to you is simply an attempt to clarify what DD is actually talking about, if I see very crude misrepresentations and misinterpretations of what he's trying to say. I can't actually replace the algebra with english words.

(Granting ontological identity to self-defined things is exactly why physicists find the violation of Bell Inequalities so eluding)
It isn't so simple.

Obviously that sentence was not meant to replace the entire analysis... :I I.e. I don't expect anyone to actually find the proof of the matter from that sentence.

and put on an information theorist hat. Suppose you recieve a file from an unknown sender and there is no extension nor other indication of what format it is in. You try opening it Word and it says invalid format, try with Excel and it also gives an error, Corel and Autocad, and many others. You might suppose it was a totally randomly generated sequence of bytes, which are just combinations of eight bits with 255 combinations each. Just before you delete it as rubbish, your geek friend stops you and tries various decompression algorithms first. One of these works and you again try different formats. Acrobat successfully opens it as a .pdf doc and whatìs more, the text content is perfectly grammatical Finnish and its semantics even makes sense. In fact it is a tutorial on how to play the electric guitar, you try following it and find it is a great help in improving your proficiency with the instrument; you no longer have to use headphones to avoid folks complaining, you can now hold a concert in your neighborhood and people like it.

Do you understand that you are just saying that "guessing" is the best way to interpret information? Also, you are implying there is a one true way to interpret undefined information, or more likely, you are not even thinking of undefined information.

Once again I can only try and drag this back to the topic; drawing valid predictions from undefined information. That means, you don't even know it is "bits". If you setup your thoughts as "it's a file", you are limiting your possibilities (i.e. you are setting down some characteristics of the information, when it was supposed to be UNDEFINED)

And before you just say "yes I understand stop looking at my finger", please also explain, if you really understand this, then why did you give an off-topic example?

Back before I left off replying to you in the other thread, I had a look at the sample of Pickering's book. As far as I could tell, it is interesting I I thing I would pretty much agree if I read the whole thing. I found much more objection to your quotes from John Gribbin's Schrödinger's Kittens, arguing as if no physicist were aware of the model vs. fact issue. As for Bruno Augenstein and the idea of using the work of Banach and Tarski as an alternative to QCD, he would have to show us a model that is at least as good and he would have to replace the whole of quantum field theory as far as I can see. His geometric consideration just plain isn't enough.

He was not proposing an alternative to QCD, but it is interesting you saw it that way. What he was talking about was something quite analogous to DD's work, but in a very limited sense. I.e. that there exists evidence of something that is seen as an (odd) feature of the structure of reality, being simply a feature of the associated human definitions.

Complicated territory so I won't address it today, since I've only got this morning anyway.

Yup, no hurry.

-Anssi

Qfwfq · October 12, 2010

If you understand what I'm saying, why do you keep bringing up those examples involving different interpretation about Claudie Schiffer's life?

Goodness Anssi, that isn't what I did. I was talking about different interpretations of my own sensory data and whether they can be valid. It really seems you just don't get my point altogether.

Are you aware of another analysis that proves the same thing in simpler manner?

And perhaps you can clarify, what is it exactly that you disagree with about his analysis at this point?

I have lost any hope of discussing this with you and Dick.

Well I understand you don't want to walk through the analysis properly but perhaps you shouldn't criticize it on superficial understanding then either. I mean, my reaction to replying to you is simply an attempt to clarify what DD is actually talking about, if I see very crude misrepresentations and misinterpretations of what he's trying to say. I can't actually replace the algebra with english words.

This is not a correct description of my criticism and I was not expecting you to replace the algebra with English words. I was only hoping we could sort it out in terms of what follows from what (according to you and Dick) and, if necessary, further details where I see fit. No hope.

I don't expect anyone to actually find the proof of the matter from that sentence.

I wasn't talking about finding a proof from that sentence, I simply don't think your perspective is complete.

Do you understand that you are just saying that "guessing" is the best way to interpret information?

You could put it in these terms if you like but this isn't the point. I was talking about interpretations being valid.

Also, you are implying there is a one true way to interpret undefined information, or more likely, you are not even thinking of undefined information.

This is not a correct description of my point.

I posed a socratic question there. Did you reflect upon it at all?

That means, you don't even know it is "bits". If you setup your thoughts as "it's a file", you are limiting your possibilities

Exactly like Dick. You both make analogies with familiar things when it suits you but, if others do likewise, they are missing the entire meaning of the presentation. Apart from analogy, information theory is exactly what you and Dick are attempting to treat. A file is just a finite length data stream; bits are just the smallest possible single element of information.

(i.e. you are setting down some characteristics of the information, when it was supposed to be UNDEFINED)

I talked about an unknown sender and an unknown format. It just turned out to have great survival value when interpreted in a specific way. Yes, I'm supposing my worldview to be valid everytime I believe I can "know" what you think by reading "posts" on this "screen" and that vice versa you should be able to get what I'm trying to say. :doh: How overly optimistic of me, just look at how hopeless it all is, I'm making the undefendable assumptions that:

This PC is what it looks and feels like to me.
The network works the way it is described in the manuals, with all the gateways and stuff.
The hosting server and the proxy work as described.
All these things correctly implement the protocols, form HTTP downward, and sort out the character encoding (and then render the HTML).
Last but not least, all those cables are able to transmit those sequences of pulses (reliant on the fundamental laws of physics) and the redundancy algorithms are succsessfully restoring the plentiful errors from degraded signals.

Quite a leap of faith eh? And yet, I'm so gullible as to keep believing it all, despite how hopeless it is to get my points across to you or Dick! :doh:

He was not proposing an alternative to QCD, but it is interesting you saw it that way. What he was talking about was something quite analogous to DD's work, but in a very limited sense. I.e. that there exists evidence of something that is seen as an (odd) feature of the structure of reality, being simply a feature of the associated human definitions.

Who do you mean by "he"? Pickering, Gribbin or Augenstein? The text you quoted mentions all three but it seems you did not sort it out; this makes discussion no use at all.

AnssiH · October 12, 2010

I talked about an unknown sender and an unknown format.

I know you did, and I said it's off-topic.

Look, me and DD are talking about consequences of drawing your predictions exclusively from some sorts of recurring patterns of some information, without actually knowing the meaning of that information. I.e. exactly what you are forced to do, when you are not making any undefendable assumptions about the meaning of some undefined information. Pretty simple, right?

But you come back with an argument that basically says "yeah but a .PDF file is best read with an Acrobat Reader, even when you don't know it's a .PDF". Yeah, but rather off topic isn't it? If that's your finger, what are you pointing at, because I don't get it.

And yes we (especially me) make examples with undefendable concepts, but like I just warned Rade, there's a limit to my thought experiment; the data being "alien data" was an attempt to push the thinking towards how we are forced to look at familiarity of patterns, and how the ability to predict the information does not entail knowing its correct interpretation. Well, in case of Rade, the thought experiment seemed to work in that it explained to him what the topic is about, so it's all good I think.

You remember, before that thought experiment, Rade was equating a knowledge of what a triangle means, with predicting the future. That's just an example of the kinds of semantical problems that goes on with these discussions, and for anyone who actually knows what this topic is about, it's incredibly trivially invalid objection. The same goes to the fact that Word documents open with Word.

A file is just a finite length data stream; bits are just the smallest possible single element of information.

It's the smallest element of a specific (human defined) way of representing information. It is not the smallest element of undefined information; you don't know what sorts of features of undefined information would correspond to "a single element" of any sort, until you have defined it. Like I said, you are implying constraints that you shouldn't with your examples. Aligning your thoughts to a problem of "interpreting files", does not make you think of issues that exist with the problem of "interpreting undefined information".

Back before I left off replying to you in the other thread, I had a look at the sample of Pickering's book. As far as I could tell, it is interesting I I thing I would pretty much agree if I read the whole thing. I found much more objection to your quotes from John Gribbin's Schrödinger's Kittens, arguing as if no physicist were aware of the model vs. fact issue. As for Bruno Augenstein and the idea of using the work of Banach and Tarski as an alternative to QCD, he would have to show us a model that is at least as good and he would have to replace the whole of quantum field theory as far as I can see. His geometric consideration just plain isn't enough.
He was not proposing an alternative to QCD, but it is interesting you saw it that way.
Who do you mean by "he"? Pickering, Gribbin or Augenstein? The text you quoted mentions all three but it seems you did not sort it out; this makes discussion no use at all.

Bolded part is what I was referring to. It looks like you are referring to Bruno Augenstein and his paper, of course I realize it can be read differently. But more to the point, what difference does it make; none of the mentioned ones is proposing Augenstein's paper as an alternative to QCD... :huh: It certainly is hard to discuss if you are putting your attention to irrelevant side issues like "who is Anssi referring to?".

-Anssi

Rade · October 12, 2010

Hi AnissH. Maybe hard to believe, but I am over a major roadblock in how I am thinking about what DD is claiming. I am trying to take the approach of Descartes, remove everything except only that which is needed from my mind. I now focus all my attention to the "undefined information", "perception", and the "patterns" produced by the undefined information via perception. I find I cannot remove these three concepts from my mind if my goal is to understand DD approach, nor can I put into words what I need to understand in more simple form (of course, this is why DD uses mathematics--correct ?).

So, let us take as a given that undefined information exists as something (we know nothing about details how), that it can be perceived (we know knowing about details how), and that patterns can be looked for (we know nothing about details how).

I have a question. Do you agree (using DD approach) that to say you can produce a prediction from the undefined information via perception that the undefined information MUST be somehow constrained, in an undefined manner ? If not, I would need you to explain, because I cannot see how it would be possible to predict any pattern from undefined information via perception if this were not true.

Qfwfq · October 13, 2010

This debate is not proceeding in a reasonable fashion, we are going in circles and I have lost interest.

Yeah, sure, I'm off topic am I? :rolleyes:

But you come back with an argument that basically says "yeah but a .PDF file is best read with an Acrobat Reader, even when you don't know it's a .PDF". Yeah, but rather off topic isn't it? If that's your finger, what are you pointing at, because I don't get it.

You are proving inable to relate my points to what you and Dick talk about. The words you place in double quotes here are simply not what my point was. I had forgotten to say that I had mentioned the idea of the file being random generated too, whereas I had not so far touched on the (more complicated) matters of cryptography.

If you say you don't get it, kindly reflect upon the socratic question I had posed. Meantime:

It's the smallest element of a specific (human defined) way of representing information. It is not the smallest element of undefined information; you don't know what sorts of features of undefined information would correspond to "a single element" of any sort, until you have defined it.

Human defined? Anssi this is totally irrelevant. It doesn't matter who defined the way of representing it and how, anything that you could possibly call information can be represented as a bit sequence and there is no conceivable smaller amount of information than a pair of possible values. It doesn't matter whether you call one value red and the other blue, or one fish and the other fowl; if there are less than two possible values it can't be called information.

On this principle, it is widespread practice to treat information theory in terms of bit sequences for certain fundamental kinds of analysis, such as information entropy, data compression, transinformation, degree of randomness, security of encryption and so on. It is recognized that analysis in terms of bit sequence has a universal character. Ask a cryptanalysit. Their job consists of two opposite things: either trying to make sense of someone else's messages, or making their own party's messages as safe as possible against any adversary.

How does this relate to the socratic question I posed? How does it relate to interpreting information without knowing how it is defined, if it is at all defined? :scratchchin: :sherlock:

Back before I left off replying to you in the other thread, I had a look at the sample of Pickering's book. As far as I could tell, it is interesting I I thing I would pretty much agree if I read the whole thing. I found much more objection to your quotes from John Gribbin's Schrödinger's Kittens, arguing as if no physicist were aware of the model vs. fact issue. As for Bruno Augenstein and the idea of using the work of Banach and Tarski as an alternative to QCD, he would have to show us a model that is at least as good and he would have to replace the whole of quantum field theory as far as I can see. His geometric consideration just plain isn't enough.
He was not proposing an alternative to QCD, but it is interesting you saw it that way.
Who do you mean by "he"? Pickering, Gribbin or Augenstein? The text you quoted mentions all three but it seems you did not sort it out; this makes discussion no use at all.

Bolded part is what I was referring to. It looks like you are referring to Bruno Augenstein and his paper, of course I realize it can be read differently. But more to the point, what difference does it make; none of the mentioned ones is proposing Augenstein's paper as an alternative to QCD...

If you don't agree with the wording of "alternative to QCD" then call it a tomato or whatever, but anyway here is the bit of your quote that I was referring to:

...In the paper published in Speculations in Science and Technology, Augenstein shows that the rules governing the behaviour of these mathematical sets and sub-sets are formally exactly the same as the rules which describe the behaviour of quarks and gluons in the standard model of particle physics, quantum chromodynamics... ...the magical way in which a proton entering a metal target can produce a swarm of new copies of protons emerging from that target, each identical to the original proton, is precisely described by the Banach-Tarski process of cutting spheres into pieces and reassembling them to make pairs of spheres.

wherein I bolded quantum chromodynamics which is what QCD stands for and the other bit that you can call what you like: tomato, alternative or equivalent model... Whatever wording you choose, I simply said that it is pointless and I doubt that John Gribbin's "Schrödinger's Kittens" gives an accurate and fair interpretation of Pickering's book (which instead appears to be a more reasonable account of how ideas were forged during the past century).

It certainly is hard to discuss if you are putting your attention to irrelevant side issues like "who is Anssi referring to?".

So, it seems I am not allowed to address your points and make a good faith effort to avoid confusion to this purpose. This is further to you deciding what is off topic.

Now try to avoid wasting too much of my time, I would prefer to address the actual relevant points if you could follow me and be cooperative.

AnssiH · October 13, 2010

Hi AnissH. Maybe hard to believe, but I am over a major roadblock in how I am thinking about what DD is claiming.

Great, and yeah, it's actually a reasonably simple matter, it just seems to be difficult to communicate, without causing people to look at this from all the wrong angles.

I am trying to take the approach of Descartes, remove everything except only that which is needed from my mind.

Also keep in mind that, what is needed to examine DD's analysis, is different from what is needed to produce a specific world view.

The former entails coming up with properties that must be true for any valid world view (in terms of his universal notation), and the latter entails the existence of some arbitrary choices in your definitions, which govern what other choices are valid within the same world view.

About Descartes, a related quote would be;

...as soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want. … For the supposition which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty.

There are many ways to read that, and the way I read it is he is pointing out that doubt can and should exist as to whether we are perceiving things correctly. To confuse matters, what does it mean "to perceive correctly" varies a lot from person to person. What I'm referring to with "correctedness" is, whether our idea of what objects contain identity to themselves (i.e. what object actually "moves" from one place to another), is correct to reality, or merely a valid way to predict things. That is, whether everything we consciously "perceive" is a matter of interpreting some information in a particular terminology.

Qfwfq has made a lot of comments about "phenomenological observations", which is a tell-tale sign of a somewhat pervasive stance in physics. Essentially the stance is, that the challenge to explain reality is a matter of gathering our perceptions, and trying to come up with an explanation TO our perceptions.

I think, a lot of people equate that stance with "reality informs us of its real structure in our perceptions somehow; if it didn't, we could not use our perceptions as a basis for our world view at all, and thus it would not be possible to generate a useful world view at all."

Essentially, they are convinced that we must use our perceptions as the starting point when building a valid world view, one way or another.

Now consider DD's analysis, which serves as a proof that the very definitions that are our immediate (newtonian) perception, are actually inherent to a specific mechanism, which is capable of (approximately) predicting ANY recurring patterns. If that proof is valid, it means our immediate perceptions are just one valid solution to modeling reality, out of very many.

That puts all the doubt to the correctedness of perceptions; it means that to use those "phenomenological observations" as a starting point for building a valid world view, is to start from an already chosen path, instead of starting from the beginning.

But, instead of taking our perceptions as the starting point, if you take them just as one (approximate) solution to the problem of "generating valid world view", you can also analyze valid possibilities that are not obvious from our perceptions. Just like QM and relativity were not obvious.

And when you do start from the scratch, lo and behold, QM and relativity still falls out, if you just make few universally valid definitions (i.e. constrain your definitions by other definitions, and examine what falls out when you keep things self-coherent).

Notice how Qfwfq keeps saying that physicists are not making ontological assumptions, but "instead" they use phenomenological observations. Which is to say, they are using a pre-existing solution as a starting point.

Just as a side comment, because the belief "our perceptions must serve as a starting point" is so firm, I think a lot of people find it "intuitively obvious" that if our perceptions are not taken into account, a valid world-view cannot be formed either. Without ever examining the proof. They are equating this to an idea of having a person in a dark closed room, and expecting him to come up with understanding of how reality works; essentially, they are equating our "conscious prediction ability" with "knowing something about the structure of reality", as oppose to "being able to mentally categorize predictably recurring patterns in a simple terminology of some defined objects".

I think you can find the above quite meaningful, if you have indeed managed to start looking at this from the correct perspective. I think you will start seeing how easily people steer off-topic when they try to come up with objections, maybe you can help with the attempts to explain.

Well, onto your question;

I now focus all my attention to the "undefined information", "perception", and the "patterns" produced by the undefined information via perception. I find I cannot remove these three concepts from my mind if my goal is to understand DD approach, nor can I put into words what I need to understand in more simple form (of course, this is why DD uses mathematics--correct ?).

So, let us take as a given that undefined information exists as something (we know nothing about details how), that it can be perceived (we know knowing about details how), and that patterns can be looked for (we know nothing about details how).

...i.e. we don't know what the transformation is between "purely undefined form" and "the form that is our mental perception"...

I have a question. Do you agree (using DD approach) that to say you can produce a prediction from the undefined information via perception that the undefined information MUST be somehow constrained, in an undefined manner ? If not, I would need you to explain, because I cannot see how it would be possible to predict any pattern from undefined information via perception if this were not true.

In order to actually have a specific prediction, you need to have a valid specific world view (explanation) to the undefined information. The prediction must come in some terminology after all. So yes, the undefined information must be "constrained" in a sense that some "ad hoc" definitions must be made. (Of course, since before you can even have a perception, some definitions must exist)

Of course, DD's analysis is not set to produce specific predictions, and what's important about the particular ad hoc definitions he has chosen (in the derivation of modern physics) is that they are always definitions that are valid for any sort of information (they must be valid, because they ultimately attach themselves to the recurring patterns - whatever recurring patterns there are in any given data)

And finally, he is using mathematics simply as a tool of logic. If you can express something in mathematics, then you can examine all sorts of unobvious embedded truths to that something, via algebra and other well known mathematical operations. Just like all theoretical physicists do. Consider it as an exact scientific investigation to epistemological philosophies, if you will.

-Anssi

AnssiH · October 13, 2010

It doesn't matter who defined the way of representing it and how, anything that you could possibly call information can be represented as a bit sequence and there is no conceivable smaller amount of information than a pair of possible values. It doesn't matter whether you call one value red and the other blue, or one fish and the other fowl; if there are less than two possible values it can't be called information.

Alright, I'll give you the benefit of the doubt that there is a point coming, and it's somehow related to DD's analysis. Tell me.

If you don't agree with the wording of "alternative to QCD"

No that's not it actually.

...In the paper published in Speculations in Science and Technology, Augenstein shows that the rules governing the behaviour of these mathematical sets and sub-sets are formally exactly the same as the rules which describe the behaviour of quarks and gluons in the standard model of particle physics, quantum chromodynamics... ...the magical way in which a proton entering a metal target can produce a swarm of new copies of protons emerging from that target, each identical to the original proton, is precisely described by the Banach-Tarski process of cutting spheres into pieces and reassembling them to make pairs of spheres.

wherein I bolded quantum chromodynamics which is what QCD stands for and the other bit that you can call what you like: tomato, alternative or equivalent model... Whatever wording you choose, I simply said that it is pointless and I doubt that John Gribbin's "Schrödinger's Kittens" gives an accurate and fair interpretation of Pickering's book (which instead appears to be a more reasonable account of how ideas were forged during the past century).

I know what QCD stands for, but I repeat, they are not proposing an alternative model to QCD (or anything else). Instead, they are making an argument, that there is evidence, that the validity of the definition of "quarks" was inevitable from the surrounding definitions already (much like how special relativity is embedded to Maxwell's equations), and that the proof of that is essentially in the work of Banach and Tarski.

Like I said "What he was talking about was something quite analogous to DD's work, but in a very limited sense. I.e. that there exists evidence of something that is seen as an (odd) feature of the structure of reality, being simply a feature of the associated human definitions."

So, it seems I am not allowed to address your points and make a good faith effort to avoid confusion to this purpose. This is further to you deciding what is off topic.

What should be on-topic is what exactly is meant by "undefined information" in terms of DD's analysis, and whether he is making any undefendable assumptions about the structure of that information in his analysis, in order to get to the expression of modern physics.

I.e. when I'm saying you are off-topic, I am referring to you starting to talk about circumstances that are true for some specifically defined form of information, but not universally true prior to definitions.

-Anssi

Qfwfq · October 13, 2010

There are many ways to read that, and the way I read it is he is pointing out that doubt can and should exist as to whether we are perceiving things correctly. To confuse matters, what does it mean "to perceive correctly" varies a lot from person to person. What I'm referring to with "correctedness" is, whether our idea of what objects contain identity to themselves (i.e. what object actually "moves" from one place to another), is correct to reality, or merely a valid way to predict things. That is, whether everything we consciously "perceive" is a matter of interpreting some information in a particular terminology.

You should however be wary of the assumption that how you interpret it is the way Descartes meant it. Not that it matters all that much, except that you are revealing the link I had pointed out between solipsism and your discussions.

Qfwfq has made a lot of comments about "phenomenological observations", which is a tell-tale sign of a somewhat pervasive stance in physics. Essentially the stance is, that the challenge to explain reality is a matter of gathering our perceptions, and trying to come up with an explanation TO our perceptions.

You should avoid giving your own interpretation to what I say.

Notice how Qfwfq keeps saying that physicists are not making ontological assumptions, but "instead" they use phenomenological observations. Which is to say, they are using a pre-existing solution as a starting point.

No: which is to say they work out which models are valid, in the same sense that you and Dick talk about.

Alright, I'll give you the benefit of the doubt that there is a point coming, and it's somehow related to DD's analysis. Tell me.

No use, if we can't communicate effectively. Sorry.

Instead, they are making an argument, that there is evidence, that the validity of the definition of "quarks" was inevitable from the surrounding definitions already (much like how special relativity is embedded to Maxwell's equations), and that the proof of that is essentially in the work of Banach and Tarski.

I see no grounds for this and there's no point dicussing it if we can't talk about QCD, you would raise the usual objection to that of course. :doh:

What should be on-topic is what exactly is meant by "undefined information" in terms of DD's analysis, and whether he is making any undefendable assumptions about the structure of that information in his analysis, in order to get to the expression of modern physics.

It is impossible to discuss this without incurring into the usual objections. :doh:

I.e. when I'm saying you are off-topic, I am referring to you starting to talk about circumstances that are true for some specifically defined form of information, but not universally true prior to definitions.

OK then, you and Dick are the only Authority to decide when this is legitimate...:rolleyes:

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