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What is "religion"?


alexander

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Just to make a better effort than my faded memories had afforded, I found time to look at my old copy of C & R and see the exact bit I referred to. It is entitled A presumably false yet formally highly probable non-empirical statement and is the appendix of Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge and the verbatim statement is:

 

There exists a finite sequence of Latin elegiac couplets such that, if it is pronounced in an appropriate manner at a certain time and place, this is immediately followed by the appearance of the Devil--that is to say, of a man-like creature with two small horns and a cloven hoof.

 

He describes it as being "a simple, purely existential statement which is formulated in purely empirical terms" and later in his discussion, arguing against the positivists who consider it an empirical statement, says:

 

And why, I ask, should anybody who takes it for
empirical
think it is
false
?. Empirically, it is irrefutable. No observation in the world can establish its falsity. There can be no empirical grounds for its falsity.

 

Hence: non-falsifiable statements cannot be falsified. To this I have agreed, and further agreed with Popper that it should indeed be excluded from the empirical sciences for being non-falsifiable (that he calls it metaphysical... I see as beside the point). The issue I have is not with the above, but rather:

 

You’ve now said that it is futile to devise an experiment to observe the devil statement and that it can’t be investigated. Popper’s only conjecture is that such statements cannot be falsified and are therefore (on their own) inadmissible to science. This does *not* mean that they can never be part of science, or that they can never be investigated, or never be confirmed. In 1974 he gave an example involving neutrinos—where some purely existential statement regarding the observation of neutrinos became part of science:

 

Whenever a pure existential statement, by being empirically confirmed, appears to belong to empirical science, it will in fact do so not on its own account, but
by virtue of being a consequence of a corroborated falsifiable theory
. Thus the discovery of the neutrino... not only confirmed the until-then metaphysical assertion ‘For every beta emission there is a neutrino emitted from the same nucleus’; it also provided a test of the much more significant
falsifiable
theory that such emitted neutrinos could be trapped in a certain way. [his emphasis.]

 

 

Even by Popper’s extreme criteria, the devil statement (and other such purely existential statements) can be investigated, confirmed, and become part of science. He even allows for their usefulness (as something to be investigated) when it appears in retrospect to never have been destined for confirmation:

 

Even purely existential assertions have sometimes proved suggestive and even fruitful in the history of science even if they never became part of it. Indeed, few metaphysical theories exerted a greater influence upon the development of science than the purely metaphysical one: “There exists a substance which can turn base metals into gold (that is, a philosopher’s stone)”, although it is non-falsifiable, was never verified and, and is now believed by nobody.

 

 

The link above also gives me the opportunity to quote this:

 

Popper himself, in his [1934], had already stressed the heuristic importance of ‘influential metaphysics’, and was regarded by some members of the Vienna Circle as a champion of dangerous metaphysics.

Compare this to your statement:

 

well known member of the totally anti-metaphysical Vienna Circle by the name of Popper

and again today:

 

Of course believing them is a choice but the opposite conviction can only be based on an anti-metaphysical dogma, such as that which Popper shares with the Vienna Circle.

and that is why I said you were using the term rather carelessly, although I do apologize for putting it that way. It may have been a little offputting that you inducted Boerseun and I to the circle. :)

 

In any case, Carnap, himself, gave two examples of purely existential statements which are analogous to the devil statement that he considered meaningful. The first, that there exists a color (trumpet-red) which terrifies anyone who looks at it and another along the lines of there existing a mountain on the far side of the moon [this was, of course, before the far side of the moon was imaged].[1] To say that it is pointless to investigate such things or that it is futile to try and devise an experiment observing them is not the correct deduction.

 

This goes to a greater overall problem I have with your position:

 

The scientists I talked about aren't replacing scientific method with faith, they simply see where their domain is different and they aren't talking about beliefs that will someday be replaced by scientific knowledge.

 

You posit a border of religious concepts which can and cannot someday be replaced by scientific knowledge. I think doing so is inappropriate and I’m confident you would have no way to draw that line. The example you gave previously is of a deistic god lighting the fuse of the big bang. While the concept of ‘that which initiated the big bang’ is currently not part of science, it certainly could be someday. Arbitrarily ruling out the possibility in favor of believing god did it is not indicative of good reasoning. Summarizing Kant, it amounts to using metaphysics constitutively rather than regulatively—which is where religion errs.

 

I, moreover, believe the sentiment can be dangerous. Morality is often considered part of the domain of religion. A religious person can easily fall into the trap of believing that empirical evidence cannot alter moral tenets of religion—that the two are separate arenas. This is currently killing millions of people who are proscribed the use of condoms by god’s representatives thus acquiring AIDS—many of them married and guiltless of infidelity. The church cites Humanae Vitae and the Pope says regarding contraception “What was true yesterday is true also today”. In other words, moral laws regarding sex and marriage can’t be disproved by empirical evidence because they transcend the empirical sciences (see #7 of Humanae Vitae). And, it’s true that no deductive method can disprove such a thing as ’there is a god who forbids contraception’, but this doesn’t mean the religious method of having blind faith in that god is a good idea—especially when lots of people die because of it!

 

We must expect that rational and empirical understanding will answer questions and solve problems even if those questions and problems are currently claimed by religion or are currently metaphysical.

 

To avoid confusion, my contention was that even some religious beliefs involving observable phenomena which, at face value, go against scientific "laws" are at most as falsifiable as that example so they formally don't contradict scientific knowledge.

 

In saying this (your reply to Freeztar) you were refuting the idea that all of religion is incompatible with scientific knowledge. As far as I can tell, you were refuting something that nobody claimed. And, again, unless non-falsifiability is a demarcation for religion the way falsifiability is a demarcation of science then this exercise involving the devil statement does not help us define religion.

 

Wherein I'm currently unable to shed further light on references to Carnap and that paper.

 

Chapter 8 section 2 is helpful in that regard, some of which I quoted in my last post.

 

Carnap attributed empirical character to any meaningful observational statement. What I said previously (actually, what Popper said previously) about his method admitting astrology is true. He mitigates this with the following:

 

However, even at the time of the Vienna Circle, we did not interpret the principle of verifiability in this narrow sense. We emphasized that the principle required, not the actual possibility of determination as true or false, but only the possibility in principle. By this qualification we intended to admit cases in which the determination was prevented only by technical limitations or by remoteness in space or time. We accepted, for example, a sentence about a mountain on the other side of the moon as meaningful...

 

I wish to emphasize that the proposed criterion for the significance of sentences is not meant to guarantee the fruitfulness of T. If all terms of V
T
fulfill D2 and the postulates T are in accord with the rules of formation, then these postulates are indeed regarded as significant. But this should by no means be understood as implying that T must then be a scientifically satisfactory theory. T may still contain postulates which are of very little use from a scientific point of view. But the question of scientific fruitfulness of sentences and of a theory should be clearly distinguished from the question of empirical significance. There is no sharp boundary line between fruitful and useless hypotheses or theories: this is rather a matter of degree. It seems even doubtful whether it is possible to formulate in a completely general way a definition of a quantitative degree of fruitfulness of a scientific theory.

 

 

I honestly can see both sides of the argument (falsificationism vs. verificationism). The modern scientific method, however, has clearly sided with Popper and his hypothetico-deductive method.

 

The other thing:

 

I've seen various dictionary and encyclopedic definitions of theism, deism, and pantheism &c. but I didn't find the exact same that those quotes say, which don't completely agree with each other and I really don't think it's worth arguing about

 

Yes, how unfortunate it is that words are used in ways that can mislead, just like pantheism with its antipodically opposite meanings.

 

It is inconceivable that "Einstein's pantheism" could refer to a belief in a pantheon of gods. Every online dictionary entry definines the word as some sort of equivalence between god and nature (e.g. "The belief that the universe is divine and should be revered. Pantheism identifies the universe with God but denies any personality or transcendence of such a God.") except for two; princeton and wiktionary, which give the normal definition as well as "The belief in all gods" preceded by the qualifier "rare".

 

A well-informed hypographyer may recall one of the many posts on the topic,

 

From this and other of your posts, I’m inclined to categorize you simply as a
. This view – pantheism is usually not considered a religious belief system – is one of the most common among scientists. Statements such as Einstein’s famous

 

“I believe in Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists, not in a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of human beings”

is considered by most scholars, and by me, to be an affirmation of pantheism.

 

Many people who describe themselves as atheists might, under certain circumstances, acquiesce to be termed pantheists. I fall into this group. The main reasons I prefer the label atheist to pantheist are simplicity, avoiding confusion, and, to some extent, as a courtesy to theists. Atheism simply discards the troublesome concept of God as unreal, while pantheism keeps it in a form that few if any traditional religionist would agree should bear the Name. “I don’t believe God exits” is, IMHO, a more courteous position to offer theists than “I believe in God, but not what you mean by God, because your definition is childish and wrong”. I’ve also had some experience with people confusing pantheism with “belief in a religion with a
”.

 

I consider it critical to recognize the term
, and understand that it is entirely unlike pantheism.

 

There are, in addition, a variety of encyclopedic sources available online describing pantheism in detail. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry is particularly well-informed, well-written, and comprehensive. A relevant quote will demonstrate both the use of the term "Pantheism" as I used it, and the use of the term "Theism" as I used it:

 

1. Pantheism and Theism

 

Where
pantheism
is considered as an alternative to theism it involves a denial of at least one, and usually both, central theistic claims.
Theism
is the belief in a "personal" God which in some sense is separate from (transcends) the world. Pantheists usually deny the existence of a personal God... They deny that God is "totally other" than the world or ontologically distinct from it.

 

Notice, it is not only admissible to use "theism" as a reference to a personal and monotheistic god, it is the norm. Compare, for example, my use of "non-theistic" with the article linked above:

 

Pantheism remains a much neglected topic of inquiry. Given their prevalence,
non-theistic
notions of deity have not received the kind of careful philosophical attention they deserve.

 

Spinoza’s god is clearly a counterexample to my definition, but does it falsify it? It would depend on how many people consider that kind of ‘non-theistic’ concept to be a god

The wikipedia article for theism says in the first paragraph:

 

In a more specific sense, theism refers to a particular doctrine concerning the nature of God and his relationship to the universe. Theism, in this specific sense, conceives of God as personal and active in the governance and organization of the world and the universe. The use of the word theism as indicating a particular doctrine of monotheism arose in the wake of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century to contrast with the then emerging deism which contended that God — though transcendent and supreme — did not intervene in the natural world and could be known rationally but not via revelation.

giving the following sources:

 

See, for example,The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, Second Edition; The Oxford Dictionary of World Religions, 1997, or the current Encyclopedia Britannica.

The Encyclopedia Britannica:

 

The view usually entails the idea that God is beyond human comprehension, perfect and self-sustained, but also peculiarly involved in the world and its events...

 

Theism’s view of God can be clarified by contrasting it with that of deism, of pantheism, and of mysticism. Deism closely resembles theism; but for the deist, God is not involved in the world in the same personal way...

 

Theism also sharply contrasts with pantheism, which identifies God with all that there is...

 

 

I don't mean to be patronizing or pedantic with all this linking and quoting... I'd just like to make clear amidst any implication that I'm using these terms in a confusing way that they are, in fact, common words and commonly used just as I have used them. I guess it emphasizes what a monumental task defining religion really is.

 

~modest

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... In any case, Carnap, himself, gave two examples of purely existential statements which are analogous to the devil statement that he considered meaningful. The first, that there exists a color (trumpet-red) which terrifies anyone who looks at it...

~modest

 

is that a (re)statement of the inverted spectrum then? i might not have noticed except hofstadter devotes a short chapter to it in i am a strange loop. this wiki article mentions hofstadter's view, among others. :)

Inverted spectrum - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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... In any case, Carnap, himself, gave two examples of purely existential statements which are analogous to the devil statement that he considered meaningful. The first, that there exists a color (trumpet-red) which terrifies anyone who looks at it....

 

is that a (re)statement of the inverted spectrum then?

 

Ignoring all the gory problem's of Locke's argument, I'd say the inverted spectrum is the inversion of Carnap's trumpet-red. The way Locke formulated his argument, the two people experiencing different spectra behave exactly the same. The trumpet-red statement:

there exists a color (trumpet-red) which terrifies anyone who looks at it

is meaningful because we can imagine both the idea of a red color and the experience one has to it (terror). Locke's argument of spectrum inversion would be considered by a verificationist like Carnap as not meaningful:

 

If a behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion scenario is possible, how do we know it does not actually obtain? There is a temptation to say that we do not know — moreover, that we cannot know. (For more discussion, see subsection 3.6 below.) And if we cannot verify or falsify the claim that such a scenario does not obtain, then according to the verificationist theory of meaning held by the logical positivists (Ayer 1959) the scenario is meaningless. Indeed, the logical positivists sometimes gave spectrum inversion as an example of an unverifiable claim (Schlick 1932/3, 93, quoted in Shoemaker 1982, 339; see also Ayer 1936, 173-4, and Wittgenstein 1958, §272).

 

 

So, presumably, according to a Carnapian verificationist theory of meaning, the first would be a meaningful and empirical statement while the second would not:

  • there exists a color (trumpet-red) which terrifies anyone who looks at it
  • there exists a person who sees the 'inverted spectrum' of others

It is indeed the case, in Carnap's theory of meaning, that a statement needs to be at least conceivably verified (or falsified) [edit: verifiable (or falsifiable)] to have meaning. Lock seems to have formulated the inverted spectrum in such a way that it is explicitly not verifiable.

 

~modest

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...And if we cannot verify or falsify the claim that such a scenario does not obtain, then according to the verificationist theory of meaning held by the logical positivists (Ayer 1959) the scenario is meaningless. ...

So, presumably, according to a Carnapian verificationist theory of meaning, the first would be a meaningful and empirical statement while the second would not:

  • there exists a color (trumpet-red) which terrifies anyone who looks at it
  • there exists a person who sees the 'inverted spectrum' of others

It is indeed the case, in Carnap's theory of meaning, that a statement needs to be at least conceivably verified (or falsified) to have meaning. Lock seems to have formulated the inverted spectrum in such a way that it is explicitly not verifiable.

 

~modest

 

ok. however, hofstadter does falsify the inverted spectrum*, so that condition is met and, presumably, a Carnupian verificationist would have to accord it meaning. oui/no? :hihi:

 

*I Am a Strange Loop: Chapter 23: page 333

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ok. however, hofstadter does falsify the inverted spectrum*, so that condition is met and, presumably, a Carnupian verificationist would have to accord it meaning. oui/no? :hihi:

 

*I Am a Strange Loop: Chapter 23: page 333

 

Yes, in actual practice (not Locke's idealized version) an inverted spectrum would certainly have verifiable consequences. There is, firstly, an asymmetry to human perception of the color wheel. We can distinguish more hues of some colors than others. Inverting the colors, in a strict sense, would be verifiable for that reason alone. Moreover, I personally think that the human brain is hard-wired to emote differently to different colors which is not entirely learned, but is universal to humanity. That red feels warm, or that blue-green feels cool for example.

 

A different inverted spectrum argument exists which tries to keep with Locke's meaning by presupposing that the people involved see things monochromatically or in black and white. How did Hofstadter approach the issue?

 

~modest

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Yes, in actual practice (not Locke's idealized version) an inverted spectrum would certainly have verifiable consequences. There is, firstly, an asymmetry to human perception of the color wheel. We can distinguish more hues of some colors than others. Inverting the colors, in a strict sense, would be verifiable for that reason alone. Moreover, I personally think that the human brain is hard-wired to emote differently to different colors which is not entirely learned, but is universal to humanity. That red feels warm, or that blue-green feels cool for example.

 

A different inverted spectrum argument exists which tries to keep with Locke's meaning by presupposing that the people involved see things monochromatically or in black and white. How did Hofstadter approach the issue?

 

~modest

 

i think doug would say your "different" argument is not different at all. i at least gathered that myself at any rate which is why i questioned the trumpet-red scenario. they all involve a sense, seeing color, and peoples' reactions to different aspects of the sense, or as we say, "feelings" about seeing color.

 

he does take your asymmetrical sense/sensation approach among others, although as that wiki article i linked on inverted spectrum points out, he makes the analogy with sound/hearing as he builds his argument. for example, an inverted sound spectrum is falsifiable because no one hears/"feels" high-pitch sounds as vibrations in the chest cavity of the kind that low pitch sounds physionomically produce in humans. or such a matter. :hihi:

 

i would quote some from chapter 23 of i am a strange loop, but some won't do for the argument to hang together as doug strung it and quoting all of it is a capital offense. :) anyway, i can give the title of the chapter word-for-word i guess. :applause: (forgive me doug for the necessarily clumsy attempt at emulating your formatting, but i know how much time you spent on it. :applause: )

 

Chapter 23

___________

 

Killing a Couple of Sacred Cows

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Again, we seem to be getting into an exponential growth which only draws even further astray from the topic. I think it's even less useful you should keep getting back about word meanings, where I had welcomed your clarification or recognized a meaning I had previously missed, or even where there may still be discrepancy. This isn't necessary, nor effective, toward getting over the sad woes of language usage.

 

I had attempted to very briefly tell Freeztar the essence of what I meant, regarding unfalsifiable religious beliefs, because he said he was curious and would have appreciated it in another thread, but I lack sufficient interest, so let's all the more avoid it in here. Mostly, the exponential is due to you connecting what I say with other than what I refer to, which in some cases I can understand due to complexity and subtlety but in others you should simply try not to lose track of why I said something and my specifications of what is definitely outside of my purpose (and the topic).

 

So most of your replies about Popper and Carnap fall into the above; I will strive to cofine voicing my disagreement and addressing points only to where it is most relevant to what I meant.

 

Hence: non-falsifiable statements cannot be falsified.
Now this was not what I was trying to say, neither had I made it relevant that he calls it metaphysical. So, what are we arguing about here?

 

You’ve now said that it is futile to devise an experiment to observe the devil statement and that it can’t be investigated.
Actually, I said that Popper says this and, really, it is not his conjecture and I don't see how you can view it as such. More essentially, that statement was devised especially to the purpose of being inherently non-falsifiable; I don't see how you could consider it as being only currently such. Russel's teapot is a very different example, that doesn't meet this requirement. I'm not under the impression that you fully get his point, e. g. about the neutrino.

 

So what does Popper mean when saying things like "...confirmed the until-then metaphysical assertion..."? Perhaps it has something to do with the distinction he makes in the brief chapter about Berkely that I mentioned: The distinction between laws of nature and Laws of Nature. No, I'm not joking, he does make this distinction and the former is what all of his arguments concern and is central to the meaning of "Conjectures and Refutations" whereas the latter is the metaphysics that he continuously rejects as non-existent and describes any statement about as being meaningless gibberish (both words his). Now, what do you think I meant, in relation to certain religious beliefs, by mentioning those folks' anti-metaphysical stance?

 

It may have been a little offputting that you inducted Boerseun and I to the circle.
That was a jocular interlude to what I was saying, in reference to your actual attitudes, which I sincerely hope you had enough sense not to find offensive or even off-putting. You displayed it even after that, stating your opinion about the garden's fairy which obviously has no bearing on the actual discussion, though it does seem to prevent you from being objective and sometimes even from distinguishing what I do say from things I do not. Note that your quotes by no means distance Popper from the VC so, as it even has no bearing on the point to which I've cited them, avoid remarks which only overlook the very nature of the philosophical profession. Carnap was his very best buddy, they and their wives socialized closely, they held some of their fiercest disputes while scaling difficult alpine rocks together.

 

To say that it is pointless to investigate such things or that it is futile to try and devise an experiment observing them is not the correct deduction.
Until you get the distinction, I think we are at a loss to understand each other. Are you able to propose even a gross outline of some manner by which the devil statement could be seen on the par with Fermi's neutrino conjecture?

 

You posit a border of religious concepts which can and cannot someday be replaced by scientific knowledge. I think doing so is inappropriate and I’m confident you would have no way to draw that line.
No more successfully than Carnap and Popper could agree about the demarcation between metaphysical and epistemological statements. Yet they posit there being the border, they just don't agree what it is. I doubt you and I could ever agree on this when (unlike Popper even) you consider his ad hoc designed devil statement as not being past such a border. This is equivalent to considering, like Boerseun, that concepts of god must be a subset of x. There is no rational proof of this, my point was that only a VC type stance on metaphysics justifies the subset must shrink to zero in the limit of all possible knowlege becoming known. Like it or not, we will never reach agreement, it requires a dogma.

 

While the concept of ‘that which initiated the big bang’ is currently not part of science, it certainly could be someday.
There are many disagreements about the issue of cosmogony though the present opinion AFAIK is that of it being inherently beyond the reach of observation and any manner of scientific investigation. In any case, avoid killing the messenger:
Arbitrarily ruling out the possibility in favor of believing god did it is not indicative of good reasoning.
Surely you don't accuse me of this? Whether or not you are, at the heart of our disagreement lies the distinction between one believing something and one letting it get in the way of accepting what is heavily corroborated by evidence, like Einstein saying "Der liebe Gott würfelt nicht". You should not however think that religion alone does this, look at the medieval peripatetics, they were saying ipse dixit even when contradicted by the evidence... and this despite that He HimSelf dixit that one should never hold philosophical opinion which contradicts evidence.:applause:

 

I, moreover, believe the sentiment can be dangerous. Morality is often considered part of the domain of religion. A religious person can easily fall into the trap of believing that empirical evidence cannot alter moral tenets of religion—that the two are separate arenas. This is currently killing millions of people....
I have agreed that religion can be pernicious, I even said that this is what Spinoza was aiming at in his work, which was an appeal to any intelligent and wise people that might read him. It is what Einstein says in "Raffiniert is der Herrgott, aber boshaft ist er nicht" but it is not really within the matter of compatibilty with scientific knowledge; it would be yet another sidetrack but certainly a much more trivial one. More on the thread topic would be the authoritative tradition of some churches including the Roman Catholic, look at history and understand the cause.

 

In saying this (your reply to Freeztar) you were refuting the idea that all of religion is incompatible with scientific knowledge. As far as I can tell, you were refuting something that nobody claimed.
It is rooted in the attitude of many people, and around here too; some of these even wind up being very illogical and irrational, the more they rail out about it and I really tire of it.

 

And, again, unless non-falsifiability is a demarcation for religion the way falsifiability is a demarcation of science then this exercise involving the devil statement does not help us define religion.
Again, that was not my intent in citing the example statement. Try to follow what I say and avoid needless exponential growth.

 

I honestly can see both sides of the argument (falsificationism vs. verificationism). The modern scientific method, however, has clearly sided with Popper and his hypothetico-deductive method.
Will you be surprised at me saying that this was not so strictly initiated by Popper? AFAIK Bacon was the evil spirit who hardly emphasized falsification, unlike the more or less contemporary Galileo. Of course in those days they were distant and their work was somewhat independent.

But again, don't kill the messenger.:hihi: Let's avoid red herrings.

 

It is inconceivable that "Einstein's pantheism" could refer to a belief in a pantheon of gods.
That was exactly what I said, but this was well before those two quotes of me as well as my recognition of the meaning in philosophy, so what's the point? But, further:
A well-informed hypographyer may recall one of the many posts on the topic,
Come on, Modest! I humbly genuflect at Craig's feet, despite having read those three publications by Einstein and Nadler's article. See also the first two footnotes below the webpage you had linked (of which Raner gives his own judgement) and I again implore forgiveness for living in a country where the remains of Roman pantheons are not yet so rare.:applause:

 

I don't mean to be patronizing or pedantic with all this linking and quoting... I'd just like to make clear amidst any implication that I'm using these terms in a confusing way that they are, in fact, common words and commonly used just as I have used them. I guess it emphasizes what a monumental task defining religion really is.
I would dearly hope you mean not to be patronizing, I only think it is unnecessary to insist where all is past and, most of all, try to follow my points without taking them further off the track of the thread. Yes it is difficult to comunicate and I believe the VC members who remarked on Popper's "dangerous metaphysics" weren't catching distinctions. BTW their consternation must have been because, excepting Schlick's rather silly opposition, they otherwise saw him as one of their ilk. (This, of course, is only my conjecture :))

 

Why don't we avoid such a great waste of time, banging our heads against the wall? I can't even proof-read all this so I won't pardon any stupid slips that may have escaped my notice. Why don't we try instead to avoid misunderstanding?

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I think it's even less useful you should keep getting back about word meanings, where I had welcomed your clarification or recognized a meaning I had previously missed, or even where there may still be discrepancy. This isn't necessary, nor effective, toward getting over the sad woes of language usage.

You could expect that saying “I didn't find the exact same that those quotes say” might get the response “here they are”.

 

I had attempted to very briefly tell Freeztar the essence of what I meant, regarding unfalsifiable religious beliefs, because he said he was curious and would have appreciated it in another thread

Fair point.

 

Hence: non-falsifiable statements cannot be falsified. To this I have agreed, and further agreed with Popper that it should indeed be excluded from the empirical sciences for being non-falsifiable (that he calls it metaphysical... I see as beside the point). The issue I have is not with the above, but rather:
So, what are we arguing about here?

 

The paragraph acknowledges agreement.

 

"You’ve now said that it is futile to devise an experiment to observe the devil statement and that it can’t be investigated. ~modest"

 

Actually, I said that Popper says this

You draw the conclusion yourself on both accounts:

 

I only meant that some beliefs can be compared to the devil statement. Attempting to scientifically devise an experiment to observe a miracle is futile.

"I would simply agree with Popper that “There is a ceremony whose exact performance forces the devil to appear” is inadmissible to the empirical sciences. ~modest"

 

...What I conclude is that a belief such as that can't be in conflict with the scientific method, it is simply something that can't be investigated.

More essentially, that statement was devised especially to the purpose of being inherently non-falsifiable; I don't see how you could consider it as being only currently such.

I have never, and would never say that the devil statement is only currently falsifiable. I have said, in language I think is quite clear:

 

Observational statements are conceivably observable. The thing which cannot be conceived of is an experiment which falsifies the statement. No experiment can be devised which proves this statement false: “There is a ceremony whose exact performance forces the devil to appear”, but it is conceivable to devise an experiment proving it true.

I am disagreeing with your deduction that the devil statement (or other such purely existential statements) are “simply something that can't be investigated” or that “attempting to scientifically devise an experiment to observe a miracle [the devil statement] is futile”. Both Popper and Carnap would agree that the devil statement is verifiable—that is to say, confirmable or observable—but not falsifiable.

 

Verifiable existential statements (and beliefs related to verifiable existential statements) can be investigated. It is certainly *not* futile to try and observe something that is observational and verifiable. The quotes I have of Popper talking about the philosopher’s stone and of Carnap talking about the empirical character of trumpet-red speak directly to this.

 

Russel's teapot is a very different example

I didn't give Russel's teapot as an example. Yes, the example is different. No, it isn't "very different". For the teapot example, [math]exists a exists b | P(a,B)[/math], both a and b (a location and a teapot) are individually known to exist. We don't know, however, if P(a,B) is true or false. In the devil statement we know a exits (a finite sequence of Latin elegiac couplets) but we don't know if b (a devil) exists.

 

That is a difference between the two and therefore not an example I would use.

 

The examples I gave,

 


  •  
  • There exists a substance which can turn base metals into gold (that is, a philosopher’s stone)
     
  • For every beta emission there is a neutrino emitted from the same nucleus
     

 

Are not different in this respect. Also, If you think the teapot is relevant, or you have some reason to introduce it, then it would be best to explain that when you post it.

 

I'm not under the impression that you fully get his point, e. g. about the neutrino.

Also, please stop with the ad-hominem-like "you don't get", "you're not following", commentary. If you have something useful to say about the Neutrino comment then say it. As it stands, it supports my conclusion that purely existential statements can be investigated and verified.

 

So what does Popper mean when saying things like "...confirmed the until-then metaphysical assertion..."? Perhaps it has something to do with the distinction he makes in the brief chapter about Berkely that I mentioned: The distinction between laws of nature and Laws of Nature.

This is what I was wanting to avoid in using the term metaphysical. The issue is mainly that Popper (and other falsificationists) used the words “testable” and “metaphysical” different than Carnap (and other verificationists).

 

Nor would Carnap have to consider Popper’s examples, even if testable in his own peculiar sense, metaphysical (cf. Popper 1983, pp. 213 ff.). In his famous essay on the elimination of metaphysics, Carnap distinguished between
mythological
statements which, like statements of magic, are phrased by means of empirical predicates, and
metaphysical
ones, which are not (Carnap 1932, pp. 225 ff., 1963, pp. 875, 881). Popper’s conception of metaphysics — the unfalsifiable — is thus seen to be much broader than that of the positivists, and indeed than that of traditional metaphysicians

 

 

Clearly the neutrino quote reveals that Popper considered a confirmed purely-existential statement to be part of science and hence not metaphysical only when it is the consequence of some falsifiable theory. I would mostly disagree with pure falsificationists on that point as I believe that purely existential statements can be part of science and non-metaphysical if there is a well-established and reproducible method (or ‘recipe’) for confirming the statement even if no theory explains the observation.

 

But, again, all of that is beside the point of my objection. I insist only that purely existential statements can be confirmed and therefore aren’t precluded from investigating empirically. Just because something is non-falsifiable doesn’t mean it is futile to try and seek it out empirically. For example: “there is a living microbe on mars” is like the devil statement in that it is non falsifiable / confirmable / purely existential / etc. but clearly could be investigated.

 

No, I'm not joking, he does make this distinction and the former is what all of his arguments concern and is central to the meaning of "Conjectures and Refutations" whereas the latter is the metaphysics that he continuously rejects as non-existent and describes any statement about as being meaningless gibberish (both words his).

I’m sorry, Q, you’ve got that backwards—Popper is not dismissing metaphysics as gibberish, but rather explaining that verificationist theories of meaning do that. I would give you the page numbers, but I fear nothing less than quoting it will be believed.

 

Toward the beginning of Conjectures Popper talks about his motivations in proposing a new demarcation which started as a refutation of a verificationist (no doubt of the VC) named Wittgenstein. In describing Wittgenstein’s method he uses the word gibberish (please read all of the following. It will be very informative and took some effort to type):

 

That this was not the case I learnt from Wittgenstein’s work, and from its reception; and so I published my results 13 years later in the form of a criticism of Wittgenstein’s
criterion of meaningfulness
.

 

Wittgenstein, as you all know, tried to show in the
Tractatus
(see for example his propositions 6.53; 6.54; and 5) that all so-called philosophical or metaphysical propositions were actually non-propositions or pseudo-propositions; that they were senseless or meaningless. All genuine (or meaningful) propositions were truth functions of elementary or atomic propostions which described ‘atomic facts’... All other apparent propositions will be meaningless pseudo-propositions;
in fact they will be nothing but nonsensical gibberish.

 

This idea was used by Wittgenstein for a characterization of science, as opposed to philosophy. We read (for example in 4.11, where natural science is taken to stand in opposition to philosophy): “The totality of true propositions is the total natural science (or the totality of the natural sciences).’...

 

This amounts to a crude verifiability criterion of demarcation. To make it slightly less crude, it could be amended thus: “The statements which may possibly fall within the province of science are those which may possibly be verified by observation statements; and these statements, again, coincide with the class of all genuine or meaningful statements.’ For this approach, then,
verifiability, meaningfulness, and scientific character all coincide
...

 

...I was interested only in the problem of demarcation, i.e. in finding a criterion of the scientific character of theories. It was just this interest which made me see at once that Wittgenstein’s verifiability criterion of meaning was intended to play the part of a criterion of demarcation as well; and which made me see that, as such, it was totally inadequate, even if all misgivings about the dubious concept of meaning were set aside...

 

All this I pointed out on various occasions to Wittgensteinians and members of the Vienna Circle. In 1931-21 I summarized my ideas in a largish book (read by several members of the Circle but never published; although part of it was incorporated in my Logic of Scientific Discovery); and in 1933 I published a letter...

 

...My attacks upon verification had some effect, however. They soon led to complete confusion in the camp of the verificationists philosophers of sense and nonsense. The original proposal of verifiability as the criterion of meaning was at least clear, simple, and forceful. The modifications and shifts which were now introduced were the very opposite. This, I should say, is now seen even by the participants. But since I am usually quoted as one of them I wish to repeat that although I created this confusion I never participated in it. Neither falsifiability nor testability were proposed by me as criteria of meaning; and although I may plead guilty to having introduced both terms into the discussion, it was not I who introduced them into the theory of meaning.

 

Then toward the end of refutations:

 

Here I must again stress a point which has often been misunderstood. Perhaps I can avoid these misunderstandings if I put my point now in this way. Take a square to represent the class of all statements of a language in which we intend to formulate a science; draw a broad horizontal line, dividing it into an upper and lower half; write “science” and “testable” into the upper half, and “metaphysics” and “non-testable” into the lower; then, I hope, you will realize that I do not propose to draw the line of demarcation in such a way that it coincides with the limits of language, leaving science inside, and banning metaphysics by excluding it from the class of meaningful statements. On the contrary: beginning with my first publication on the subject, I stressed the fact that it would be inadequate to draw the line of demarcation between science and metaphysics so as to exclude metaphysics as nonsensical from a meaningful language.

 

I have indicated one of the reasons for this by saying that we must not try to draw the line too sharply. This becomes clear if we remember that most of our scientific theories originate in myths. The Copernican system, for example, was inspired by a Neo-Platonic worship of the light of the Sun who had to occupy the ‘centre’ because of his nobility. This indicates how myths may develop testable components. They may, in the course of discussion, become fruitful and important for science. In my Logic of Scientific Discovery I gave several examples of myths which have become most important for science, among them atomism and the corpuscular theory of light.
It would hardly contribute to clarity if we were to say that these theories are nonsensical gibberish in one stage of their development, and then suddenly become good sense in another.

 

I, therefore, think accusing Popper of being a totally anti-metaphysical member of the Vienna Circle is not a good characterization nor would I agree with your characterization of what is “central to the meaning of Conjectures and Refutations".

 

Now, what do you think I meant, in relation to certain religious beliefs, by mentioning those folks' anti-metaphysical stance?

I understood what you meant.

 

You displayed it even after that, stating your opinion about the garden's fairy which obviously has no bearing on the actual discussion, though it does seem to prevent you from being objective and sometimes even from distinguishing what I do say from things I do not.

The garden fairy was a linguistic tool—an analogy. I’m sorry it didn’t work for you, but another member liked it well-enough to private message me asking if they could quote that section of my post elsewhere on the internet, so I’m glad I used it despite your disapproval.

 

"To say that it is pointless to investigate such things or that it is futile to try and devise an experiment observing them is not the correct deduction. ~modest"

Until you get the distinction, I think we are at a loss to understand each other. Are you able to propose even a gross outline of some manner by which the devil statement could be seen on the par with Fermi's neutrino conjecture?

 

I know of no distinction that you have made between them, and I further point out that I was not the one to introduce the existential devil statement nor to claim that belief in such a thing could not be investigated. I have, however, shown that Karl Popper considered both the devil statement and the neutrino statement to be non-falsifiable, yet verifiable, purely existential statements. I also directly showed by a quote from Popper that he believed investigating such statements could be very worthwhile even if they end up being as presumably-false as “There exists a substance which can turn base metals into gold (that is, a philosopher’s stone)”. Imagine the time it took me to find those quotes which directly support my claim in both the case that the statement turns out confirmed and the case it is not. I further found two examples from Carnap which are said to be meaningful and empirical. I took that time despite what little of it I have out of respect for you—wanting to be sure that in expressing disagreement I had a well-supported argument.

 

I find “until you get the distinction...” most unfortunate. :ohdear: If you are unable to support what you said or unable to address my refutation then don't offer up ad hominems instead. It does the discussion no good.

 

"You posit a border of religious concepts which can and cannot someday be replaced by scientific knowledge. I think doing so is inappropriate and I’m confident you would have no way to draw that line. ~modest"

 

No more successfully than Carnap and Popper could agree about the demarcation between metaphysical and epistemological statements. Yet they posit there being the border, they just don't agree what it is.

That’s a good point.

 

I doubt you and I could ever agree on this when (unlike Popper even) you consider his ad hoc designed devil statement as not being past such a border.

As I said positing such a border would be inappropriate, I’m sure you are correct that we could not agree on what the border would mark.

 

"Arbitrarily ruling out the possibility in favor of believing god did it is not indicative of good reasoning. ~modest"

Surely you don't accuse me of this?

Correct.

 

Whether or not you are, at the heart of our disagreement lies the distinction between one believing something and one letting it get in the way of accepting what is heavily corroborated by evidence, like Einstein saying "Der liebe Gott würfelt nicht". You should not however think that religion alone does this, look at the medieval peripatetics, they were saying ipse dixit even when contradicted by the evidence... and this despite that He HimSelf dixit that one should never hold philosophical opinion which contradicts evidence.:doh:

 

~Qfwfq

That is certainly true, and you give good examples, but that is not at the heart of our disagreement. I believe, and have shown why, non-falsifiable existential statements should be investigated empirically. You have stated that they should not. That is the issue of disagreement and I won't be chasing the goalpost around.

 

~modest

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I really don't want to continue a degenerating debate, I will first say that pointing out your misunderstanding is not ad hominem, neither is saying where you miss distinctions and make false attributions to me or miss my point (supposing I implied otherwise or meant another thing). Understand the difference, ad hominem is more along the lines of this especially crass example: "But your uncle is a fag gay so your opinion doesn't count!" although there can be more subtle examples too. A slightly less crass example (which I ignored along with other fallacies) is one I received privately just the other day: My judgement, of some contributions to a theoretical physics discussion being off topic, specious and fallacious, was dismissed and implicitly on grounds of my contributions here in this forum, seasoned with character allegations. Now that, yes, I do call ad hominem, not what you point to.

 

I have the right to say "I meant X not Y." and even to dissent with what you construe about things you quote and even to point out red herrings. Given the length of recent posts, I caneven make general statements saying that we shouldn't drag on like this. Where you condense my discussion of the devil statement to a pure, obvious tautology and don't see what I use it to imply, I can certainly say there's no point in what you said and, later in the post as a reply to another quote of you, I tried to shed light on that misunderstanding. Well, I didn't draw an arrow through the post, from one thing to the other, but the nexus was there.

 

I'm pleased that someone who agrees with your personal opinion about the garden's fairy liked your words so much as to ask your permission to quote it elsewhere. I hope their intent is to do so in a discussion which truly concerns each participant's belief, as a way of stating their own; this discussion isn't and I haven't been upholding my own agnostic stance, I have instead been discussing religious beliefs in general, including which ones be in contradiction of science. I did not miss nor disapprove of that analogy, I even used the same linguistic tool in making my own points; I said that your subjective opinion about it isn't an epistemological argument concerning others being self-consistent or contradictory in their opinions. Is the distinction hard to make?

 

Now there's no point disclaiming that you made points when I did not say so and I'm even aware myself of having made them. Why forbid me to compare the devil statement to the teapot one? I also see a difference between the devil's and one about a god existing, that is able and might choose to perform a miracle; OTOH your microbe on Mars example is at least as verifiable as Russel's teapot; they are both feasibly verifiable (despite the one having no plausibility) while not so even for the devil one let alone miracles. (Here begins an arrow down through the post.) One could only hit on them by pure fluke and even then each is verified only to the ocular witnesses; all others remain free to believe these preachers or to scoff at them. Note that I do not identify the devil statement with miracles. (Here begins another arrow.)

 

The neutrino OTOH is a whole different kettle of fish, the very reason for Fermi's conjecture was already excellent grounds to expect its existence and it was even in the framework of his own weak interaction theory that detection could be sought, also the distinction between that energy-momentum discrepancy and the "more direct" observations is somewhat subtle; I will not go into details of how particle detectors work.

 

I insist only that purely existential statements can be confirmed and therefore aren’t precluded from investigating empirically. Just because something is non-falsifiable doesn’t mean it is futile to try and seek it out empirically. For example: “there is a living microbe on mars” is like the devil statement in that it is non falsifiable / confirmable / purely existential / etc. but clearly could be investigated.
You don't need to insist, I did not say that any non-falsifiable statement is futile to investigate (Here begins another arrow.), it's a lot more subtle than that, as you might gather from other things I say.

 

I took that time despite what little of it I have out of respect for you—wanting to be sure that in expressing disagreement I had a well-supported argument.
I am sorry that you wasted so much time, only to bark up the wrong tree. The cat is watching the dog in dismay, not in amusement, from the tree I did run up, because I don't want to see you as an enemy such as prey sees a predator. I only see that your struggle hinders you in following me and it is due to your personal opinion about god(s) getting in your way, preventing you from objective debate about third party opinions.

 

My mention of Popper's devil statement and his antimetaphysical stance had a purpose which you do not defeat. What you quote shows how he was aware that the demarcation can't be neat; apparently Wittgenstein was caught up in the Leibniz dream. I'm not sure whether that is the only part of the book from whence I remember him using those words, but I do find it pointless to insist on trying to disprove that Popper shared an antimetaphysical stance. I had already pointed out that whether he was formally a VC member has no bearing, he definitely did not believe in religion; he considered such things at least as presumably false, but couldn't have denied the non falsifiablity of them, any more than for his own example. I also recall him elsewhere using the word myth in talking about conjectures, which he did not mean to consider as meaningless gibberish but instead as part of the scientific method.

 

From a logical standpoint, adding to a set does not exclude from it what was added to. Therefore you don't really support that Popper ruled out that something could be metaphysics period. If he did, why was he wasting so much time on the demarcation? your quotes don't prove the negation of what I said. Consequently you don't defeat that he shared the stance and hence even less my initial point. On which grounds did he describe that statement as presumably false?

 

That is certainly true, and you give good examples, but that is not at the heart of our disagreement. I believe, and have shown why, non-falsifiable existential statements should be investigated empirically. You have stated that they should not. That is the issue of disagreement and I won't be chasing the goalpost around.
I really hope your are not proposing to attempt any verification of Popper's devil statement, or even only of Russel's teapot. I more dearly hope you wouldn't suggest scientifically investigating the existence of a god that could choose to perform a miracle. I'm not so sure even Zichichi would, despite some statements for which he fell under heavy criticism. (Here begins the last arrow.)

 

(Here end the arrows from above.) So, why did I introduce the devil example? [striving to remember, after all this time] Oh, yeah! Suppose for the moment it is a religious belief. Of course, it can't be falsified and at least we agree upon that. Although verification can't be ruled out, it is clearly folly to attempt it and nobody in their right minds would. Examining the reason for this, we find that it contains some unknown quantities and details, it only posits the existence of the right ones. (N. B. this is the sense in which it is purely existential, the devil's existence is merely consequent in the hypothetical case of the statement being true. The existence in general of devil(s) isn't essential and this goes for teapots too.) Unlike Mars and the range of orbits for Russel's teapot, the devil statement gives no range of where nor when, but the unicity of when makes it clear that it could be or become too late, aside from one living long enough and travelling far enough; this defeats a "sooner or later" objection to its non-falsifiability being total. Heck, you can observe microbes and orbiting teapots without destroying them and once you got the cross marking the spot you can direct any interested parties to find the treasure. But...

 

At least the devil statement puts it as something any of us could do (in principle and if it isn't too late), it isn't a statement concerning the discretion of a god. Even the recipe of praying is no guarantee, it is God's arbitrary choice. Unless one preaches that, if you perform a ritual and guess the right numbers, 'Mbongwibkawchimh WILL make <some specific thing> happen, it isn't equivalent to the devil statement. So, neither beliefs nor the devil statement are stuff for Randi to dismiss, he only aims at paranormal powers that one purports to be voluntarily capable of. But, compared to the devil statement, even the belief that God might answer a prayer is less verifiable than the devil statement and even less belief that God could choose to make something happen. So some thing are beyond scientific investigation but others are not, even though they are worth nobody's time nor taxpayer's money. The last arrow: Zichichi became a great PR figure for research, especially of particle physics, and was very adept at campaigning for reseach funding and squeezing it out of the politicians, he was one of the originators of the CERN LHC and founder of the Gran Sasso; in the '90s he was distributing T-shirts with a 100 TeV logo. Although he participated in a lot of public science divulgation and sometimes voiced his views about religion in relation to science, he wasn't trying to convince anybody to scientifically investigate religious beliefs.

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Whoa there, fellas...

 

I've been reading both your posts for a bit now, and to say the least, they are marathonic in nature.

 

For clarity and brevity, and as an aid to understanding for other members following this thread, will it be possible for each of you to create a single post of no more than, say, a ten line paragraph to state your position? Not saying "where he's wrong is in x,y and z", but merely stating your position. Then we take it from there.

 

If not possible, don't bother.

 

But I'm thinking you're getting side-tracked by a whole bunch o'stuff, and getting away from the thread topic. And it's getting mighty hard to follow.

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But I'm thinking you're getting side-tracked by a whole bunch o'stuff, and getting away from the thread topic. And it's getting mighty hard to follow.
I quite agree, :eek2: and I've been hoping to get this storm to subside.

 

As for my last post, for anybody who would like, I can suggest starting at the second last paragraph where it says:

(Here end the arrows from above.) :)

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For clarity and brevity, and as an aid to understanding for other members following this thread, will it be possible for each of you to create a single post of no more than, say, a ten line paragraph to state your position?

 

Good idea.

 

A purely existential observational statement is of the form (or can be formulated as) "there exists A such that B". Examples given so far include:

  • There is a ceremony whose exact performance forces the devil to appear.
  • For every beta emission there is a neutrino emitted from the same nucleus
  • There exists a substance which can turn base metals into gold (that is, a philosopher’s stone).
  • There exists a color (trumpet-red) which terrifies anyone who looks at it.

Wikipedia's rather dull example:

[*]There exists a swan which is black.

Statements of this sort can be verified, but not falsified,

Purely existential statements are not falsifiable—as in Rudolf Carnap’s famous example: ‘There is a colour (‘Trumpet-red’) which incites terror in those who look at it.’ Another example is: ‘There is a ceremony whose exact performance forces the devil to appear.’ Such statements are not falsifiable. (They are, in principle, verifiable: it is logically possible to find a ceremony whose performance leads to the appearance of a human-like form with horns and hooves. And if a repetition of the ceremony fails to achieve the same result, that would be no falsification, for perhaps an unnoticed yet essential aspect of the correct ceremony was omitted.)

 

Because they can't be falsified the scientific method excludes them from the empirical sciences unless they are a confirmed prediction of a falsifiable theory. And, purely existential statements can be confirmed.

 

I assert that such statements cannot be excluded from empirical investigation. That is to say, it would make no sense to claim existential statements (such as the devil statement or the philosopher's stone statement) are somehow inherently exempt from attempted experimental observation. They are logically observationally confirmable, and even if they are destined not to be confirmed that is no reason to bar them from investigation. How, after all, do we know they are not going to be confirmed unless we've put some effort into investigating the subject?

Even purely existential assertions have sometimes proved suggestive and even fruitful in the history of science even if they never became part of it. Indeed, few metaphysical theories exerted a greater influence upon the development of science than the purely metaphysical one: “There exists a substance which can turn base metals into gold (that is, a philosopher’s stone)”, although it is non-falsifiable, was never verified and, and is now believed by nobody.

 

Popper therefore agrees with me as do the verificationists on the other end of the philosophy of science spectrum. Qfwfq has stated the opposite of the position given above which I think he will have an uphill battle to support.

 

By the bye, religious institutions would also disagree, I think, with the position given above as they have historically. I'll leave it to the reader to consider why. [omitting the quotes I guess that was about 10 sentences... :eek_big:]

 

~modest

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Qfwfq has stated the opposite of the position given above which I think he will have an uphill battle to support.
Sorry but I did not state the negation of the above position so I needn't take on such an uphill battle. I can't help the misunderstanding and I don't think it's worthwhile insisting.
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