Expanded Science

[Qfwfq]

I had already said I did a lousy job of that post, especially regretting that sentence. I said it should have been more like his intent wasn't of applying the demarcation criterion to each statement, certainly not independently to a statement and its negation, and the same quotes imply him also being aware that this wouldn't make sense. Trouble is he can be very confusing in his way of expounding his ideas.

[modest]

I don't disagree. I think we are of accord.

 

I will explain my thinking one thing that I think deserves an answer which I overlooked:

 

Your point about biology, explaining that the offspring of two black swans will be born black, is just begging the question; if they exist, then it follows that they exist.

 

I don't believe so. There are observations which are purely existential and not the result of any falsifiable theory. These things could be said to exist simply because they are observed. EVP's for example, could be said to exist (and are said to exist by many people).

 

But, this would not, according to Popper (and I would agree) make EVP's scientific. The statement "EVPs exists such that they are the result of paranormal communication" is non-falsifiable and no falsifiable theory can explain or predict them. Even if every person on earth observed them every day they would not be scientific until some theory or law explained them to some degree.

 

Thus, saying:

 

an isolated existential statement is never falsifiable; but if taken in context with other statements, an existential statement may in some cases add to the empirical content of the whole context: It may enrich the theory to which it belongs, and may add to its degree of falsifiability or testability. In this case, the theoretical system including the existential statement in question is to be described as scientific rather than metaphysical.

 

is not the same as saying 'if the existential thing exists, then it exists'. It may well exist, but not be explainable by any falsifiable theory, and thus not part of science.

 

~modest

[Vox]

So what do you do the things which are exluded from your definitions/requirements/lists..these are then agreed in "scientific democratic" way not to be existing? And when "we" as humans agree so these are then deemed not to exist otherwise there will be a punishment somekind?

 

I use my own sentence here "if only that what we know as humans currently would exist, cosmos and humans in it would not exist"

 

If we agree something within us as "science" or "truth" it do not mean that it is so in cosmos..

 

Cosmos or nature do not need "our scientific communitys" approval(s) to exist..

[Qfwfq]

We seem to be going in circles without getting each other's point.

 

That quote of Popper confirms that he wasn't so folly as to apply his criterion to single statements. It wasn't him that I accused of begging the question, it was your point about the swans because it had come across as being meant as a reason by which naturalists in Europe could have expected there to be naturally occurring swans of other colours too, not yet seen. Sorry for the misunderstanding, I'm aware of it from what you are defending because it isn't what I had criticized.

 

It may well exist, but not be explainable by any falsifiable theory, and thus not part of science.

I don't agree with "thus not part of science" and neither do I find it to be an interpretation of what Popper says.

 

According to that wiki, EVP does exist and is perfectly explainable, the doubtful claim is that it has a paranormal cause and an actual meaning. There's nothing unscientific about interference to audio signals and it can just happen to more or less resemble spoken words enough for some people to insist that it's a message from the defunct.

[jedaisoul]

So what do you do the things which are exluded from your definitions/requirements/lists..these are then agreed in "scientific democratic" way not to be existing?

It's not a matter of whether things exist or not, it's whether statements are classed as scientific theories or not. There are plenty of things that do not fall into the category of "scientific theory". For example, whether there is a frog in a specific box is an existential fact. Hence the statement "this box contains a frog" is a statement of existential fact. It may be true, but is not a scientific theory, as defined by Popper, as it relates to a specific box, not boxes in general.

 

Compare the statements:

a) This swan is white.

:hihi: All swans are white.

 

The first statement relates to a specific swan which is either white or not, or may not even be a swan! It is not a scientific theory.

 

The second relates to all swans, thus is a theory that has predictive powers about swans in general. I.e. It predicts that any swan you may observe will be white. Now, in fact this is untrue, because, in Australia, thee are black swans. But despite being untrue it IS a scientific theory, as it had the capacity to be proven false. Hence it is not a scientific fact, as it HAS been proven to be false.

[Vox]

Sorry to being provocative and off topic but does it change the fact that frog either is in the box or is not..so reality is what it is reagardless what we can prove of it being ? So are "therories of everything" or lesser theories important to life or cosmos? It is for human mind, but that is more or less it.."just my 10c off topic" ;-)

 

Sarcastic way : I would invent "theory of everything" ..and then I would need to go to pee...what would be changed?

[modest]

Cosmos or nature do not need "our scientific communitys" approval(s) to exist..

 

There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our science.... they just aren't scientific.

 

~modest

[Vox]

There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our science.... they just aren't scientific.

 

~modest

 

Why is that?

 

Is some crucial component of human cabability/skill left aside/not recognised within scientific work?

[modest]

Why is that?

 

Is some crucial component of human cabability/skill left aside/not recognised within scientific work?

 

Science is our quest to understand / explain the natural world. If ever there comes a day that all of the natural world is understood and explained then everything that exists will be part of science.

 

This is not the case. Not today.

 

~modest

[Vox]

Science is our quest to understand / explain the natural world. If ever there comes a day that all of the natural world is understood and explained then everything that exists will be part of science.

 

This is not the case. Not today.

 

~modest

 

Would religions also then be part of the science?

[Rade]

...Hence the statement "this box contains a frog" is a statement of existential fact. It may be true, but is not a scientific theory, as defined by Popper, as it relates to a specific box, not boxes in general...

I have a comment. I'm not sure Popper put much importance on specific vs general statements as a criterion for a scientific statement.

 

So, suppose this specific statement:

 

1. This nucleon has a positive charge.

 

It is a scientific statement because it is capable of observation and/or experiment such that it may not be a true statement. That is, any specific nucleon, "this nucleon", can be either a proton with (+) charge, or a neutron (o) with no charge.

 

This example differs fundamentally from another specific statement:

 

2. This box contains a frog.

 

Next, suppose two boxes, one with a lid (i.e., a black box), one without.

 

There are many examples of "black box" science that attempt to determine the dynamics of a system as a whole where the internal parts are unknown. Thus consider two statements:

 

3. This box with a lid contains a frog

4. This box without a lid contains a frog

 

Although #3 is a specific statement it also is a scientific statement, whereas, one could argue that #4 is not, that it is a statement of a fact. There are observations and/or experiments one could make on a box with a lid to falsify the claim that a frog is present. Best way, take off the lid.

[modest]

Would religions also then be part of the science?

 

If it is a part of a corroborated falsifiable theory.

 

I have a comment. I'm not sure Popper put much importance on specific vs general statements as a criterion for a scientific statement.

 

Not as a criterion for a scientific statement—as a criterion for a natural law or theory.

 

I would suggest, anyone who has not, to read section 5 - 18 of Popper's first major publication,

 

The Logic of Scientific Discovery - Google Books

 

~modest

[jedaisoul]

Not as a criterion for a scientific statement—as a criterion for a natural law or theory.

I agree, and to me that agrees with what I said:

 

Hence the statement "this box contains a frog" is a statement of existential fact. It may be true, but is not a scientific theory, as defined by Popper...

I even emphasised the word "theory" in the original. But perhaps I had not made the distinction clear enough, so thanks.

[Qfwfq]

I have a comment. I'm not sure Popper put much importance on specific vs general statements as a criterion for a scientific statement.

He definitely did, if you read his work you couldn't deny it. He is in fact rather extreme in making this distinction and placing importance on the one kind of statement and this is the crux of his demarcaion criterion of falsifiability. It's his attempt to get around the old problem of induction.

 

What is traditionally called a scientific "law" is a statement with an erga omnes type of meaning, in analogy to the usual meaning of the word law in society. "All swans are white." is of this type; it is violated by a swan being of another colour, so it is logically equivalant to the negation of an "exists" type of statement.

 

What his argument (outlined early in s. 6 of L. Sc. D. in criticizing the positivist school) boils down to actually has a tacit circularity: <tacit assumption>since a theory must be a law and</tacit assumption> since induction is not a logically conclusive argument, a theory can't be ultimately verifiable so therefore in order to be testable it must be falsifiable (==> therefore it must be a law). That's why he did not admit things such as "The moon is made of green cheese." as candidate theories of empirical science, even though the Apollo missions were able to refute this one and in principle might have verified it.

[modest]

He definitely did, if you read his work you couldn't deny it. He is in fact rather extreme in making this distinction and placing importance on the one kind of statement and this is the crux of his demarcaion criterion of falsifiability. It's his attempt to get around the old problem of induction.

 

What is traditionally called a scientific "law" is a statement with an erga omnes type of meaning, in analogy to the usual meaning of the word law in society. "All swans are white." is of this type; it is violated by a swan being of another colour, so it is logically equivalant to the negation of an "exists" type of statement.

 

What his argument (outlined early in s. 6 of L. Sc. D. in criticizing the positivist school) boils down to actually has a tacit circularity: <tacit assumption>since a theory must be a law and</tacit assumption> since induction is not a logically conclusive argument, a theory can't be ultimately verifiable so therefore in order to be testable it must be falsifiable (==> therefore it must be a law).

 

Well said :)

 

That's why he did not admit things such as "The moon is made of green cheese." as candidate theories of empirical science, even though the Apollo missions were able to refute this one and in principle might have verified it.

 

I agree. It might be worth noting, "the moon is made of green cheese" would be an admissible prediction of a theory. I'm not sure what that theory would look like, but presumably there could be one. In that case, the Apollo missions could have falsified any theory making that prediction.

 

Likewise, an admissible theory could be that giant impacts between mars-sized bodies creates a large iron-deficient moon and an iron-rich planet that have very similar surface compositions (in particular: isotopic compositions). The statement "the moon is made of the same material as the earth" would be a prediction of that falsifiable theory and it would be corroborated by the Apollo missions.

 

I think it is important to stress that Popper wasn't striking existential statements from science altogether. Predictions of theories are supposed to be existential, so they very much have their place.

 

~modest

[Qfwfq]

It might be worth noting, "the moon is made of green cheese" would be an admissible prediction of a theory. I'm not sure what that theory would look like, but presumably there could be one.

Indeed, neither am I sure what such a theory would look like, at all. Yet it makes sense to empirically check the statement, as it stands, by itself. Not being of the "every moon" type makes it verifiable as well as falsifiable. It isn't what we call a "law of nature" so it doesn't come into that argument, it is verifiable despite the problem of induction. Not being purely existential it is falsifiable too. It doesn't need to be a prediction of a theory, in order to be a candidate scientific fact.

 

But of course he certainly wasn't focussing on this, his concern with the problem of induction and his arguments with Carnap caused him to place all the emphasis on falsification, all too much even, building a mountain out of a molehill and resulting in many urban legends. This, I believe, is the source of the type of confusion we've seen in this thread.

 

I think it is important to stress that Popper wasn't striking existential statements from science altogether.

Absolutely. The important thing is to remind folks that induction isn't logically conclusive and therefore doesn't suffice to rule out exceptions.

 

Predictions of theories are supposed to be existential, so they very much have their place.

I wouldn't quite say they "are supposed to be" existential, but they certainly may be. Indeed if they were all only purely existential, they wouldn't be a means of falsifying the theory but only of hoping to verify.

 

Certainly, wherever there are propositions of the "natural law" type, no matter how many confirming cases have been seen, it remains important to seek out any predictions that would be bound to fail if it weren't true for quite every case. This isn't necessarily possible for every natural law, so in practice many of them simply get confirmed until exceptions crop up.

[modest]

Indeed, neither am I sure what such a theory would look like, at all. Yet it makes sense to empirically check the statement, as it stands, by itself.

 

Good idea.

 

Not being of the "every moon" type makes it verifiable as well as falsifiable. It isn't what we call a "law of nature" so it doesn't come into that argument, it is verifiable despite the problem of induction. Not being purely existential it is falsifiable too.

 

That's an excellent point. It is the purely or strictly existential statements which are both non-falsifiable and verifiable. I have the relevant section here to quote...

 

The distinction between universal and singular statements is closely connected with that between universal and individual concepts or names.

 

It is usual to elucidate this distinction with the help of examples of the following kind: ‘dictator’, ‘planet’, ‘H

₂

O’ are universal concepts or universal names. ‘Napoleon’, ‘the earth’, ‘the Atlantic’ are singular or individual concepts or names... Every application of science is based upon an inference from scientific hypotheses (which are universal) to singular cases...

 

TLoSD §3.14

 

Strict or pure statements, whether universal or existential, are not limited as to space and time. They do not refer to an individual, restricted, spatio-temporal region. This is the reason why strictly existential statements are not falsifiable. We cannot search the whole world in order to establish that something does not exist, has never exited, and will never exist. It is for precisely the same reason that strictly universal statements are not verifiable.

TLoSD §3.15

 

It doesn't need to be a prediction of a theory, in order to be a candidate scientific fact.

 

That is where I get fuzzy. Surely a singular existential statement like "earth exists under our feet" is fact. The question in my mind is if such a statement should be part of science because it is 1) falsifiable and 2) confirmed. The relevant section I'm reading is this:

 

We have thus two different kinds of statement, both of which are necessary ingredients of a complete causal explanation. They are (1) universal statements, i.e. hypotheses of the character of natural laws, and (2) singular statements, which apply to the specific event in question and which I shall call ‘initial conditions’. It is from universal statements in conjunction with initial conditions that we deduce the singular statement, ‘This thread will break’. We call this statement a specific or singular prediction.

 

§3.12

 

Clearly singular statements can be part of science. A statement like "this thread will break" or "the moon is made of cheese" is falsifiable. We agree that they are not intended to be candidate laws or theories. Beyond that—calling them "scientific fact"—I'm just not sure.

 

Some people would look at a video of Big Foot and say that "Big Foot exists" is verified. I don't think that necessarily makes is part of science. If I were personally making a criteria I would say that the statement needs to be reproducible. There needs to be a well-defined procedure for verifying the statement (à la science is reproducible). But, I'm not sure of Popper's writings on that specific point.

 

But of course he certainly wasn't focussing on this, his concern with the problem of induction and his arguments with Carnap caused him to place all the emphasis on falsification, all too much even, building a mountain out of a molehill and resulting in many urban legends. This, I believe, is the source of the type of confusion we've seen in this thread.

 

I don't think you're wrong. I might lay a little more of the blame in making the mountain out of a molehill on those who have interpreted and supported Popper. Popper himself said,

 

In the text of this chapter i have drawn attention to the criterion of progress and of rationality based on the comparison of degrees of testability or degrees of empirical content or explanatory power of theories. I did so because these degrees have been little discussed so far.

 

I always thought that the comparison of these degrees leads to a criterion which is more important and more realistic than the simpler criterion of falsifiability which I proposed at the same time, and which has been widely discussed. But this simpler criterion is also needed...

 

--Appendix A C&R p.2002

 

Falsifiability is surely an important part of his system, but I agree with you that it is a much over-emphasized part.

 

Absolutely. The important thing is to remind folks that induction isn't logically conclusive and therefore doesn't suffice to rule out exceptions.

 

:) Yes. We are very much on the same page.

 

~modest