The Santiago Theory of Cognition
Posted 15 August 2007 - 03:20 PM
Posted 19 August 2007 - 06:31 PM
However their theory may have relevance to expanding "free will" or "selfhood" to the other life processes they propose fall under the umbrella of "cognition". If "selfhood" is a product a system of components that are regulated by each other, or have a higher amount of interconnectivity than a perceived "external" world (that is, selfhood allows the description of a "self" and an "other" on the basis of the "self" system more "closely-knit" than that system plus other components), then perhaps selfhood can be expanded to other such "cognitive" systems; to use the example I could find on the web, the immune system. On the other hand, self-recognition and the perception of free-will may require specific computational modules (as suggested by the loss of such perception in people with particular types of brain injury/disorder) that only brains possess.
Posted 23 August 2007 - 05:46 PM
Posted 24 August 2007 - 04:16 AM
I'm not sure about your use of the word "materialistic" The latter part of this seems to give a few clues. (not allowed to link yet so GOOGLE Maturana Reality)
From a "nested systems" point of view (Von Foerster), the individual can "make choices" from its own observational level, but from the point of a second order observer such behaviour is deemed "contingent". I understand this as saying from the the "higher level" we are like bloodcells subservient to the determinism of "bodily maintenance".
Maturana follows Bateson's view that "self awareness" is a by-product of "language use" and language is about "co-ordination of action". Since language is a social phenomenon, it seems to me that "self" is a social entity involved in coordination "dialogue" (including self with self), and that the "second order observer" is one who sees the "body" to whom individuals are subservient as a "social entity". This is not a materialist view which would construct "self" from the bottom up.